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Abstract 
 
This doctoral thesis aims to trace the impacts of campaigns carried out by coalitions of 
social movement organisations in the transnational arena of the EU.  In order to accomplish 
this task, an original approach to process tracing is adopted using methods used in social 
movement studies.  The internal aspects of campaigns are investigated using a dynamic, 
cross-time and multi-level, frame analysis, while the contexts of the campaigns are 
analysed through political and discursive opportunity approaches adapted to the 
peculiarities of the EU arena.  Four case studies, including two campaigns concerned with 
environmental / public health policy (GMOs and coexistence, and the REACH legislation) 
and two concerned with broadly defined social policy (the mid-term review of the Lisbon 
agenda and the Services directive), make up the empirical part of the study.   
 
Drawing on documentary evidence as well as semi-structured interviews with staff 
members from the core SMOs involved in each campaign at the Brussels level, the 
processes leading to access, agenda, or policy outcomes (or indeed non-outcomes) are 
traced using the analytical methods mentioned above.  These processes provide the basis 
for preliminary conclusions on the nature of campaigning in the EU.  Elite allies are found 
to be important in securing desired outcomes in campaigns, as are solid, previously agreed 
shared frames between coalition organisations.  The cases also show that the EU is not an 
arena where conventional tactics (i.e. lobbying) are always enough – indeed the ability to 
campaign effectively at multiple levels using appropriate tactics is identified as a major 
factor in campaigns that saw positive outcomes.  This finding challenges the idea that the 
EU arena is unsuitable to protest actions (e.g. Marks and McAdam 1996).  Finally, the 
study uncovers the beginnings of a divide between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ campaigns in 
the EU.  Stemming from the finding that national contexts still provided the opportunities 
or threats that appeared most important in campaign outcomes, the cases showed that 
where campaigns were more ‘political’ - in that they were more ideologically charged - 
groups were more likely to be able to mobilise grassroots members and secure their desired 
outcomes.  In more ‘technical’ cases, where the European Commission played a greater 
role, mobilisation efforts were subdued as groups sunk their resources in long cycles of 
consultation and knowledge production geared to the needs of the Commission.  
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Foreword 
 
This project began with the broad idea of studying social movements in the transnational 
arena of the European Union.  Social movements were important in the development of 
European nation states.  Charles Tilly has shown how these groups gradually came to direct 
their claims to national governments as modern nation states emerged (e.g. Tilly 1975, 
1984; Tarrow 1996:48-49; Marks and McAdam 1996: 98).  This shift was critical in 
legitimising these governments' decisions, linking the emergence of the national social 
movement in western Europe to the advent of electoral democracy.  If social movements 
were important to the nation state, it would logically follow that they would also be so to 
the European Union.  In other words, the EU, like other intergovernmental organisations, 
has altered the landscape of opportunities available to social movements (Passy 1999:149, 
Smith 1999:177, Lahusen 1999:190).  Yet the more closely I looked at campaigns at the 
European Union level the less they resembled social movements as defined in the 
literature.1  The groups that campaign at the European level (EU) seem too organised, and 
their coalitions too short-term and instrumental to be termed social movements (for a 
similar assessment on EU coalitions see Warleigh 2000).  Nevertheless, there were some 
similarities with social movements – the threat of protest and the involvement of networks 
of citizens to say the least.  If these were not social movements as understood in their 
incarnation within national boundaries, these were at least cousins of those movements.  
Indeed, if changes in the power structure provided the impetus for the emergence of 
movements as they are now understood from earlier, parochial forms, then a similar 
situation could reasonably be expected to accompany the transfer of power to the EU 
(Tarrow 1995, Marks and McAdam 1999, Imig and Tarrow 2001, Bandy and Smith 2005).  
As they changed to better challenge new structures within the nation state, so they will 
adapt to the peculiarities of the European arena.  There is evidence of a change in 
associational life to fit this theory.  In particular, after the extension of the EU’s 
competences that came with the Single European Act in 1986, the number of European 
public interest groups greatly increased (Mazey and Richardson 1993, Lahusen 2004).   
 
The focus of the project was thus narrowed down to looking at how social movements had 
metamorphosised in order to deal with the unique arena of the EU.  The reasons for this 
                                                 
1 See section 1.1 for a definition of the social movement.  
 2
choice are twofold.  The first and original reason for my interest in social movements and 
the EU was the simple fact that “Few social movement theorists do research that looks 
inside of international institutions to understand how social movements work there and 
what kinds of impact they have had” (Sikkink 2005:152).  Those few studies approaching 
social movements in their European level guise have tended to use the tools and theories 
developed specifically for their study at the national level (see, for example, the chapters by 
Imig and Tarrow in Imig and Tarrow 2001).  At the same time, studies dealing with interest 
representation in the EU see social movements organisations merely as another category of 
lobby group (see, for example, Greenwood 2003).  These studies all tend to conclude that 
social movement activity at the EU level is weak, either because they are so outnumbered 
by interest groups representing industry and other interests, or because they have not yet 
managed to achieve truly transnational protests.2  Such conclusions are a result, I believe, 
of assuming that movements should act mainly via protest actions at the transnational level, 
even if this is not the case anymore even at the national level, and despite the many 
problems surrounding transnational protest in terms of practical, psychological, and 
political barriers, and the fact that few transnational protests actually take place (Bédoyan, 
Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004).  It would seem to make more sense to assume that since 
the member states of the EU are (arguably the most) important actors in that system, the 
‘domesticated’ protests that tackle EU issues from the national level may also be 
considered just as relevant as more strictly defined transnational protests.  In other words, 
these assessments may not be wrong in their conclusions, but to arrive at such a judgement 
on the state of movement activity at the EU level a different approach may be needed.  The 
EU is still, today, made up of nation states that call the shots on most of the Union’s 
business.  In this sense, actions by social movements at the national or local level can 
indeed be ‘European’ whilst still interacting with the work carried out at the supranational 
institutions by Brussels-based groups.  The latter must, however, play by the rules of the 
different institutional, political, and social contexts found in this space.  The study thus 
attempts to fill a gap by paying attention to the ways in which EU social movement 
campaigns ‘join up’ these different levels, mirroring the structure of the Union itself. 
 
On a more normative level, social movements in the EU are also interesting because of the 
historical role movements fulfilled in the development of the nation state – a role which 
                                                 
2 For a summary of the work uncovering the lack of ‘truly’ transnational protest, see Bédoyan, Van Aelst and 
Walgrave (2004:39-41). 
 3
could be reprised to contribute to the EU’s legitimacy problems.  This is certainly a 
possibility according to the EU institutions themselves, as exemplified in the European 
Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance.  Drafted in the wake of the Irish rejection 
of the Treaty of Nice, this document admits a widespread distrust in institutions and 
politics, the over-complexity of the EU system and its remoteness from many citizens, 
along with the fact that perceptions of the EU as run by technocrats does not help in matters 
of trust, especially in the light of then very recent public health scares (BSE and foot and 
mouth disease).  These various weaknesses in the visibility and legitimacy of the EU have 
been described extensively by political scientists, and are often placed under the label of 
the ‘democratic deficit’.3  This is a wide-ranging and often very contentious debate, and to 
do it justice here is near impossible.  For the purposes of this study, it is simply interesting 
to note that the White Paper on Governance (Commission, 2001) sees the increased 
inclusion and structured consultation of civil society4 as key in improving weaknesses in 
EU legitimacy in the eyes of citizens5, as do more recent offerings (Commission 2005b, 
2006).  Consultation is hoped to have the dual effect of increasing participation while 
simultaneously strengthening channels for the dissemination of information about the EU, 
thereby contributing to the solution of the problem of opacity and bringing the EU ‘closer’ 
to its citizens.6   
 
                                                 
3  Of course, many analysts disagree about this ‘democratic deficit’, arguing that in comparison to other 
national institutions, the European institutions are actually highly democratic.  The existence or otherwise of 
problems in democratic accountability in the EU are not fully discussed here, as the important point for the 
subject at hand is the fact that the European institutions themselves have recognised such a debate, and see 
civil society, including social movements, as important in resolving this situation.  Whether the problem 
actually exists or not becomes irrelevant since many people perceive it to exist. 
4  Civil society is understood by the Commission “to refer to a range of organisations which include: the 
labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and employers federations – the “social partners”); organisations 
representing social and economic players, which are not social partners in the strict sense of the term (for 
instance, consumer organisations); NGOs (non-governmental organisations), which bring people together in a 
common cause, such as environmental organisations, human rights organisations, charitable organisations, 
educational and training organisations, etc.; CBOs (community-based organisations), i.e. organisations set up 
within society at grassroots level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth organisations, family 
associations and all organisations through which citizens participate in local and municipal life; and religious 
communities.” (Commission 2002: 6).  As will be demonstrated at a later point in this paper, this definition 
fits with my definition of a European Social Movement Organisation where the various civil society groups 
are joined in a network of common cause. 
5 In addition to and in conjunction with other measures such as more dialogue with regional and local 
authorities, the increased availability of on-line information, a platform for the direct participation of citizens 
on the europa site and many others. 
6 The White Paper did not escape criticism – see in particular papers from the symposium ‘Mountain or 
Molehill?  A critical appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance’ available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010601.html. 
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The aim of this study is not, however, to evaluate the role of social movements in resolving 
the EU’s democratic deficit, but rather to look at how the groups connected to movements 
operate in the EU arena and what factors are present when they achieve some outcome.7  In 
other words, I am interested in whether the actions taken by these groups have any effects.  
In order to investigate this theme of the effects of EU level campaigns I use tools provided 
by social movements studies adjusted to fit the EU arena, in an attempt to fill the gap in 
research in this area mentioned above.  Although there are, of course, many different 
theoretical approaches to the study of social movements, more recent works recognise that 
these are in fact complementary, and that the present task for movement scholars is to 
integrate the different strands into a unitary approach (McAdam et al 2001).  This thesis 
provides one such attempt at this by incorporating different theoretical approaches into a 
single framework used to examine the process of social movement campaigns at the 
European level.  Following from the definition of social movements now commonly 
accepted in the literature, these include collective identity and political process approaches.   
 
                                                 
7 It is not only social movement and interest representation scholars who conclude that there exists some 
impact from European level activism.  Following Marks’ multi-level governance approach, for example, 
Fairbrass and Jordan conclude that some political outcomes are partly due to activism (2001:501).  The multi-
level governance approach also deems that states are not entirely in control of the integration process, leaving 
spaces for civil society. 
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1.  What’s in a name?  Social movements in the EU arena 
 
This introductory chapter will present and discuss theoretical approaches to the study of 
social movements, with a particular emphasis on how they may or may not be suited to 
transnational arenas.  Below, I begin with a discussion of the concepts used in the study of 
social movements, pinning down the label of ‘transnational social movement organisation’ 
as the most suited to the phenomenon under examination here.  The remainder of the 
chapter is then dedicated to the critical discussion of the theoretical approach, divided into 
sections concerning collective identities, political and finally discursive opportunities. 
 
Different authors have emphasised different aspects of social movements in their work.   
Taking account of all of these, della Porta and Diani have formed a synthetic definition of a 
social movement (della Porta and Diani 1999:14-16) comprising of four different aspects. 
1) Social movements are made up of informal interaction networks; 2) they are based on 
shared beliefs, or imply the existence of a collective identity; 3) they focus on conflicts; 
and 4) engage in protest (in its various forms).  These four defining aspects of social 
movements are linked together in a mutually reinforcing manner.  Thus, networks permit 
both mobilisation and the building of collective identities: collective identities allow 
collective action through solidarity between members; protest and conflict allow networks 
to be widened and consolidated, and identities to be strengthened, and so forth.  When 
looking at the European Union arena, however, some more work on conceptualisation is 
necessary to specify the components of movements that interact across borders.  Concepts 
developed to study transnational social movements may therefore prove fruitful.   
  
Tarrow (2001), for example, makes a clear conceptual cut between the often confused 
terms of social movement, international non-governmental organisation (INGO), and the 
transnational social movement.  The latter is quite simply a social movement with bases 
outside its target state or society.  Transnational social movements are defined as “socially 
mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious 
interaction with power holders in a least one state other than their own, or against an 
international institution, or a multinational economic actor” (Tarrow 2001:11).  INGOs are 
engaged in routine transactions rather than contentious interaction, and their main purpose 
is seen in terms of service provision.  This definition betrays Tarrow’s position as one of 
the leading exponents of the political process approach, since his definition strongly 
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emphasises ‘contentious interaction’ without including any descriptions of organisation or 
identity links.  Another concept linked to the transnational social movement is Keck and 
Sikkink’s (1998) transnational advocacy or activist network.  These authors theorise in 
greater detail the organisational networks employed at the transnational level.  Whilst 
national level social movements are more likely to be based on interpersonal contacts at the 
individual level,8 transnational networks are based on contacts made at the organisational 
level.  They are ‘networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of 
principled ideas or values in motivating their formation’, that serve to build new links and 
channels between various groups and the international system, for the exchange of 
knowledge, services, funds and the like.  They aim to change the shape of debate, to bring 
new issues and ways of approaching those issues into the public sphere, and to maximise 
their influence over their targets.  They may include entire social movements, NGOs, or 
even governments.  This concept does not challenge the definition of a social movement 
given above, it merely locates movement within a broader perspective.  Movements are 
seen as forming only one possible node of the network, rather than as constituting the 
network itself.9   
 
This concept brings organisation and identity to the fore, since another important function 
of the transnational advocacy network is its role as a channel for the diffusion of common 
frames of understanding.  This can be understood as essential in the business of persuading 
other parties (especially important political actors) of the relevance and importance of the 
advocates’ point of view (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 6).  As transnational advocacy networks 
function centrally around the exchange of information between groups, the common 
understandings of problems that emerge from such exchanges are the main form of 
‘currency’ employed in their dealings with those in power.  The networks thus rely on 
“leverage politics” (ibid: 202) more than protest.  They engage the media, attempt to create 
dramatic framings of situations, and exploit the adherence of prestigious partners in order 
to enhance their credibility in the quest to effect change.  These networks are then a long 
way from the understanding of the ‘traditional’ social movement with its marches and 
meetings.  Indeed, social movement theorists have criticised Keck and Sikkink’s concept 
for lacking an explanation of the relationship between the network and international 
                                                 
8  A view strongly held by the theorists of the ‘New social movement’ school.  See, for example, Melucci 
(1989). 
9 Linking this concept more specifically to the EU arena, Klotz (2002) likens the transnational advocacy 
network to an epistemic community transferred to the social sphere.   
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organisations, a link whose explanation is essential in explaining the existence of social 
movements (Tarrow 2001).  However, the concept of the network is indispensable for 
understanding the organisation of transnational level movements.  
However, since the unit of analysis dealt with in this study is the campaign rather than the 
movement itself (see below), it is necessary to pay more attention to the concepts used to 
look at the constituent parts of social movements.  McCarthy and Zald’s concept of the 
social movement organisation (SMO) (McCarthy and Zald 1977) combines the direct 
participation of constituents in actions with an organisational orientation to making claims 
on authorities.  Smith (1997) moves the concept to the transnational level by describing 
transnational social movement organisations (TSMOs) as a subset of SMOs operating in 
more than two States whose “transnational structures [...] provide them with the resources 
essential for addressing interdependent global problems and allow them greater access to 
intergovernmental institutions” (ibid 1997:42).  TSMOs have developed around new 
international arenas requiring new skills of movement activists, and TSMOs can help them 
to become familiar with these arenas, facilitate the division of labour between different 
organisations and eventually become focal points for movements.  From this central point 
they may not only disseminate information downwards, but also aggregate opinions to feed 
upwards.  However, authors have claimed that TSMOs are likely to become co-opted, 
adapting to the rules of the game as imposed by the international organisation in order to 
receive funding (della Porta and Kriesi 1999, 19).  Thus, the conflictual and protest 
components of the social movement may be theoretically lost.   
However, Smith et al (1997) ‘bring protest back in’ to the concept of the TSMO by 
specifying that because these organisations work with groups at multiple levels, each of 
these individual groups will function in separate (although interlinked) political opportunity 
structures.  Following from this, TSMOs will see a division of labour with national level 
groups, as well as an equivalent variation in tactics at various levels according to what is 
deemed appropriate within each political opportunity structure.  This idea seems perfectly 
suited to the movements working in the EU, whose structure as a group of nation states that 
have instituted some supranational institutions has also seen supranational branches of 
social movement organisations spring up in its vicinity.  This ‘division of labour’ thus leads 
to the adoption of varying tactics depending on the target of the organisation.  International 
institutions are seen to foster tactics of a more ‘institutional’ nature, such as lobbying and 
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monitoring activities, whereas the national level entails more direct tactics like protest and 
petitions – a function of the increased normalisation of such action in these political 
opportunity spheres.    
This idea of the importance of solidarity created through common understandings, or 
frames, in social movements held together through networks at the transnational level is 
also taken up in the concept of the TSMO (Smith et al 1997).  As the concept is rooted in a 
theoretical approach which considers that the “impact of social movements on the political 
process is conditioned by their mobilizing structures; by the political opportunities inherent 
in national, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental contexts, and by strategies to 
mobilize resources to act” (Smith et al 1997:60), the authors conclude that achieving 
structures capable of arriving at common frames with wide cultural resonance is essential 
for these often resource-poor groups, for whom solidarity is a primary asset in allowing 
engagement with international governmental organisations.  The TSMO is just such a 
structure, a vehicle for the dissemination of values, frames, tactics, and practices (ibid: 72), 
as has been empirically proved in further work on the particular subject of collective 
identity in TSMOs by Smith (2002) 10.   
This concept thus contributes much in terms of organisational factors and their functions to 
the literature on TSMs.  The idea of the TSMO fills out Tarrow’s definition of the TSM in 
terms of their target with some organisational assumptions, namely the form of a network 
stemming from a centre situated close to the target international organisation which gathers 
the expertise necessary for engaging with that particular institution, and serving as a centre 
point through which framing and dialogue may take place between the various components 
of the movement in order to (hopefully) achieve some degree of solidarity.  Accordingly, it 
is this concept that best fits the majority of the groups involved in each of the campaigns 
presented here – groups that are organised and given to engaging for the most part in non-
contentious forms of campaigning, but who are also closely linked to national and local 
level counterparts and a common history of more contentious approaches.  This concept is 
also useful in that it takes the study a step away from ideas more strictly connected to social 
movements as understood in their form at the national level.  As already mentioned, and as 
becomes clear in the case studies, the coalitions of what we may term ‘European Union 
                                                 
10  Smith’s method for measuring the density of transnational networks will be seen in more detail in section 
4.2.1. 
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social movement organisations’ (EUSMOs) are different from the more strictly defined  
national social movements, as indeed all transnational movement coalitions are.  
This concept is also chosen because of its fit with the theoretical approaches adopted, and 
because it is an established concept that can be adapted to the level of analysis tackled in 
this study, thus avoiding the creation of new but unhelpful concepts that cannot ‘travel’ 
(della Porta 2002:294).  Flowing from the aim to approach these groups with tools provided 
from social movement studies with the idea that such approaches may bring to light new 
evidence on how they work in the EU arena, I draw on two schools of social movement 
research in outlining the approach to measuring EUSMOs’ effects: collective identity and 
political process approaches – from which also flows the idea of discursive opportunities.  
The remainder of this chapter will, preceded by a typology of the effects the study seeks to 
uncover, outline these theories and how they will be applied more practically to the case 
studies, always bearing in mind recent calls for social movement research to focus on 
dynamic processes (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).  Chapter two will present the 
analytical model describing the approach to tracing the processes leading to campaign 
outcomes, and briefly present the cases, why they were selected, and the sources employed 
for their study.   
1.1 EUSMO effects – a typology 
 
Studies that systematically measure the effects of campaigns on institutions identify 
numerous problems that to be overcome, and are relatively scarce.  Nevertheless, work 
dealing instead with issues of movement ‘success’ are more numerous than many think 
(Giugni 1998).  One of the first, and arguably the most thorough, studies of movement 
success was Gamson’s ‘The Strategy of Social Protest’.  Although highly debated, and 
often criticised,11 this work remains the starting point for the majority of later work on the 
various effects of social movements on the societies in which they are embedded.  Gamson 
splits the types of effects that movements may have into two broad categories: ‘new 
advantages’ (the achievement of specific aims) and ‘acceptance’ (where an actor is 
recognised to be representative of a specific group’s claims) (Gamson 1990).  Whilst this 
dichotomy indeed provided fruitful and useful results, many scholars later criticised its 
simplicity, and added or changed categories of consequences.   
                                                 
11 For a resume of these debates see Giugni 1998, the original articles are re-printed in the 1990 edition of 
Gamson’s ‘Strategy of Social Protest’. 
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The first problem with Gamson’s dichotomy is of course that it tends to equate movement 
consequences with the term ‘success’ and thus only positive consequences.  Although the 
term success may be more appropriate when measuring the achievement of clearly stated 
movement goals, it automatically excludes all of those consequences that were unintended 
by movement actors.  This preoccupation with intended movement effects has indeed been 
noted in the field as a whole (Giugni 1998, Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999), and as a 
result many important outcomes may remain undetected.  Amenta and Young (1999) also 
argue that the category of ‘new advantages’ is too restrictive on the basis of the observation 
that movements in general tend to receive concessions, but not the full satisfaction of their 
demands.  They also highlight the fact that the consequences of movement actions may also 
be very negative, as in the case of violent repression.  They therefore suggest a broadening 
of the category to encompass all collective goods (defined as goods from which it is 
difficult to exclude group members) – whether explicitly aimed for or not.  In addition to 
this, the category of new advantages, or success, also carries the problem of subjectivity.  
That is, since social movements must be considered as loosely connected networks, rather 
than well-established organisations or single units of analysis (Melucci 1996), it is often 
impossible for the researcher, or for that matter movement leaders, to define success in any 
way that is shared by all members.  Although goals may be definable in the sense of 
publicly stated movement goals, these still present the problems of restriction to intended 
consequences as outlined above.  Gamson’s category of ‘acceptance’ has also been 
criticised by, amongst others, Amenta and Young (1998), as acceptance in itself does not 
imply any concrete consequence of the movement on wider society. 
 
Various new typologies of movement consequences have since been developed.  
Schumaker (1975) provides one useful fivefold typology, classified according to the points 
in policy making process in which a movement may have an effect.  These categories are: 
access (the improved ability or position of a movement to communicate with those in 
power, corresponding to Gamson’s ‘acceptance’); agenda (a movement has been able to 
spark a debate on a previously ignored subject); policy (changes in policy concurrent with a 
movement’s goals), output (the effective implementation of legislation relating to a 
movement’s goals), and finally impact (the actual consequences of a policy change – e.g. 
where an agency is established, does the latter have any real power?).  Some of these 
consequences may entail one another – for example a policy change may also imply 
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recognition and thus access responsiveness.  Other typologies on similar bases distinguish 
between consequences according to broader levels.  For example, Meyer (1998) examines 
movement effects on three different ‘planes’: policy, culture (these are wider, agenda 
changes, effects that stretch into potential future policy changes such as the general 
acceptance of the importance of protecting the environment), and participants.12   
 
Other typologies make dichotomies according to the paths movement effects have 
followed, thus concentrating on resolving the issue of the exclusion of unintended 
consequences.  Giugni, McAdam and Tilly (1999), in the introduction to their collection of 
essays on the subject, provide one such typology.  This is divided according to direct links 
between movement claims and effects, combined paths between movements claims and the 
effects of outside events and actions, direct consequences concerning movement claims but 
stemming from outside events and actions, and finally any combination of the above 
causing outcomes unintended by any of the parties.  In particular, this typology highlights 
the importance of taking the likelihood of complex paths into account when investigating 
issues of movement consequences.  More specifically, it demonstrates the importance 
(widely observed in the literature, for example Giugni 1998, Meyer 1999, Kriesi and 
Wisler 1999) of context in determining the paths of movement consequences.  Or, in the 
language of this piece of research, political opportunities, structures, and discursive 
opportunities.  These may be described as the filter between a movement’s claims and 
eventual outcomes (Kriesi and Wisler 1998), a filter which may let claims through more or 
less easily.  This idea will be explored further when the model for analysing the effects of 
EUSMO campaigns is elaborated. 
 
Having outlined some typologies that have been used to describe the kinds of effects that 
social movements may have, we come once again to the problem of adapting such schemes 
to the context of the EU.  In terms of the decision between a typology concentrating on the 
complexity of the paths, sources, and combinations of movement effects and one 
concentrating on the area where an effect is seen, the latter of these two is, at least in the 
case of the EU, the clearer.  Whilst taking the complexity of paths into account is extremely 
important, in theory any path may lead to any kind of outcome, and thus typologies which 
                                                 
12 These may be described in a similar manner to McAdam’s concept of ‘biographical impact’, including 
effects such as the participation of a person in one action will increase the likelihood that they participate in 
another. 
 12
inform the researcher of the path taken but nothing of the actual nature of the effect miss an 
equally important aspect of the equation.   
 
Therefore, the approach to the consequences of EUSMOs in the European Union adopted 
here will be based on Schumaker’s typology, which distinguishes between access, agenda, 
policy, output, and impact responsiveness.  Such a scheme captures all of the types of 
different effects described in the literature on the subject, from the more obvious effects 
regarding specific policies, to previous effects that may have been exerted in agenda-
setting, to follow-up effects regarding implementation, and broader effects concerning 
issues of access to relevant powerful actors.  However, describing effects in terms of 
‘responsiveness’ does carry the problem of implying the positive outcomes of movement 
actions.  Disregarding negative effects by judging a movement as not having achieved any 
‘responsiveness’ risks losing valuable descriptive information as to why a movement did 
not achieve this.  A label inclusive of negative outcomes will overcome this problem.  
Therefore the more generic label of ‘outcome’ will be used, and non-outcomes investigated 
just as thoroughly as outcomes in the analyses.   
 
Not all of Schumaker’s categories are useful for this study however.  As this work is 
mainly concerned with the EU, an organisation that relies mostly on national structures for 
enforcing rules and policies when adopted, the thorough and complete assessment of  
output and impact outcomes lie outside the scope of research.  Intended EUSMO goals, as 
well as unintended outcomes, will most likely be more concerned with access, agenda and 
policy outcomes.  The analysis of movement consequences will thus concentrate on these 
three types of outcomes, and will based on an approach that draws on theories of collective 
identity and political and discursive opportunities, which, as I shall show in the next 
sections, are the most important factors to be considered when thinking about EUSMO 
campaign outcomes. 
 
1.2  Tolerant collective identities and building shared frames 
 
Collective identities in social movements have long been considered necessary to collective 
action – without the commitment entailed by a sense of common identity and beliefs, 
movements would be unable to mobilise members to act, and thus be unable to cause any 
effects.  The following brief literature review of the concept in relation to social 
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movements is by no means exhaustive, but aims to investigate what kind of collective 
identity may be present and necessary to allow common actions among EUSMOs.  
Beginning with concepts developed for the older, national-based movements, this 
investigation will conclude with an overview of concepts of tolerant collective identities 
developed in studies of transnational movements, and of the ideas connected with frames 
and framing processes, understood as the building blocks of such identities.   
 
The study of the role of collective identity in relation to social movements has a long 
history.  Broadly speaking, approaches to the subject may be split into three schools: social 
psychological, constructionist (mostly in Europe), and rational (mostly in North America).  
However, more recent versions tend to see these schools overlapping and drawing upon 
one another, as will be seen below.  Early social psychological perspectives that sought to 
explain not only social movements but all types of collective behaviour saw collective 
action as a pathological, irrational reaction akin to panic (Le Bon summarised in Oberschall 
1993: 4-6), or as the alienated individual’s search for some sense of belonging (Hoffer 
1951 in Gamson 1992).  Later contributions from the Chicago school of collective 
behaviour saw this as a source of new ideas, a ‘seedbed of new institutions’ (Gusfield 
1994).  Neither of these approaches theorises the deliberate or conscious building of a 
collective identity however – obviously important when looking at networks of groups 
spread out over a continent.  More recent work based on identity theory do account for this 
possibility.  For example, Stryker (2000 - but starting from 1980) has adopted a version of 
identity theory in order to account for and explain variations in levels of participation in 
and commitment to movements, and also provides a useful contribution in terms of 
stressing the complexity and multiplicity of identities.  Traditional identity theory or social 
identity theory based on the work of Tajfel (see Stryker 2000; Gusfield 1994) rests on a 
symbolic interactionist frame.  Interactions between people in various situations allow them 
to develop shared meanings and definitions of situations, as well as self-conceptions.  In 
turn, interactions are shaped by self-conceptions and definitions of situations.   
 
Stryker then develops his theory to account for current understandings of society as 
complex yet likely to reproduce structures.  These structures are recognised as providing 
opportunities and constraints on action therefore making some choices more probable than 
others in various situations.  Structural symbolic interactionism then sees social behaviour 
as role-related choices, affected by identity salience, which is in turn affected by 
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commitment - which specifies society.  In this approach, people are seen to hold multiple, 
ranked identities.  With relation to social movements, this theory accounts for competing 
identity claims (rooted in social groups) on movement members from, for example, family 
or work.  When competing identities overlap, that is include similar interests, more 
commitment to the movement is likely.  The repetition of identity choices also increases 
identity salience - so that once a movement member has participated in one action they are 
more likely to participate in another13.  Identity is thus a condition for engagement in a 
movement. 
 
The constructionist school consists of those scholars who see collective identity as the goal 
of a social movement.  This view stems from the study of ‘new social movements’, such as 
the women’s, gay rights and civil liberties movements, seen as removed from the ‘old’ 
movements’ attachment to ideology and rooted instead in the quest for the definition and 
acceptance of specific identities.  Perhaps the most prolific and detailed of the new social 
movement theorists was Alberto Melucci.  According to Melucci neither structural nor 
rational models of collective identity are adequate, as collective identity is not found at the 
macro or micro levels, but at the intermediate or meso level where “individuals recognise 
that they share certain orientations in common and on that basis decide to act together” 
(Melucci 1989, 30).  Another of Melucci’s main criticisms of other approaches, important 
in understanding the reasoning behind his extensive work on the concept of collective 
identity, is that these tend to consider the movement as a unit of analysis, as an entity to be 
discovered.  For Melucci the essence of the problem of social movements is not what they 
do so much as how they come to be: how they are constructed.  Collective identity is the 
process that shows how this actor is built.  Therefore collective identity14 is a process of 
constructing social movements or some kind of action system.  It is built through 
definitions of the group and the group’s location: its sense, means, and relationships to the 
environment: “collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by 
several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as 
well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place.” 
                                                 
13 The perceived success or failure of the action participated in is not, however, mentioned as an element in 
the subsequent identity salience ranking of the movement’s collective identity.  This point indeed highlights 
the fact that identity theory intends to explain all facets of identity rather than that specific to social 
movements and collective action. 
14 Comprising solidarity defined by Melucci (1996) as referring not only to the recognition and identification 
of a group, but also to identify with that group.  This entails recognising those outside the group, thus closing 
the system, or making it self-reflexive.  
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(Melucci 1989:34).  The concept is both self-reflexive and aware of environmental 
constraints, and changes along with developing situations.   
 
The rational approach to collective identity is in many ways a reaction to the early view of 
collective action as irrational.  Writers of the resource mobilisation school thus sought to 
bring rationality back to the business of explaining social movements, basing their research 
on approaches concentrating on the mobilisation of resources, political opportunities, issue 
framing processes and organisational forms.  However, these were made at the expense of 
any consideration of the importance of shared ideas and beliefs, of collective identity, in 
mobilisation processes (Gamson 1992).  Collective identity was often swept under the 
carpet through the assumption that those who joined a movement would automatically 
share understandings and identities through the mere act of adherence (Oberschall 
1993:13).  Since further research showed that this was not always the case, with levels of 
commitment varying among movement adherents, collective identities were slowly brought 
back, first as another necessary movement resource, and then more specifically via the 
literature on framing, which may be understood as the mechanism of collective identity 
building.  The practical approaches of the resource mobilisation school thus provided 
another method for studying collective identity. 
 
The idea of ‘framing’, as originally theorised by Snow and Benford (see Hunt, Benford and 
Snow 1994) is specifically connected to collective identities in the assertion that identity 
constructions are inherent in all framing activities.  Frames attach characteristics and 
definitions to people and issues in space and time - they attribute blame, outline alternative 
paths and means of achieving goals.  They perform the role of interpreting the significance 
of a person, event or symbol - each frame is an attempt to align individual and collective 
identities, thus highlighting the role of social movements as constant builders and 
interpreters of situations rather than as carriers of fixed identities (Snow 2004).  The 
attributes assigned by frames correspond to three frames of identity: protagonist identities 
derived from attributes assigned to movement members and leaders; antagonist identities 
derived from attributes assigned to movement opponents; and audience identities related to 
uncommitted or neutral observers of the movement (in so doing they also define the 
relevance of each to the situation).  Identity assignations coming from outside the group 
feed back into the framing process in various ways depending on how they are treated by 
the movement - with acceptance, as reinforcements, denial or admittance.  Therefore 
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framing and identity building processes are inextricably linked.  In fact based on this image 
of collective identity the definition of a frame can equally be read as one of identity, “an 
interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively 
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions 
within one’s present or past environments” (Snow and Benford 1992:137 cited in Hunt, 
Benford and Snow 1994:190).   
 
Last but not least, we must of course consider how these approaches to collective identity 
have been dealt with in relation to transnational movements.  Here, theorists have stressed 
the point that the views of collective movement identities as described in much of the 
nationally based literature are too all-consuming and exclusive.  At the transnational level 
identities that are more connected to individuals and more tolerant of differences and 
multiple organisational alliances are important.  Only such tolerant, or ‘multi-layered’ 
(Hunt and Benford 2004) identities will allow many organisations to come together in one 
transnational movement.  In forging new, loose identities based on individual or 
organisational contributions and collectively constructed meanings, transnational 
‘movements of movements’ may be bound together (della Porta 2003b).  Thus, Rucht 
(1999:207) has asserted that “Transnational movements hardly exhibit a distinct collective 
identity as opposed to national movements.  It is best to conceptualize different layers of 
identities which are not mutually exclusive.  Thus a single group can be at the same time 
part of a local, national and international movement.”.  In campaigns in particular such 
identities need not resemble strong and coherent structures: “Concrete common campaigns 
are … built upon a minimal common denominator” (Tarrow and della Porta 2005:240). 
 
This description of collective identity complements the ideas explored above.  A less rigid 
understanding of a collective identity built through the construction of shared meanings and 
goals between various organizations is therefore the one employed in this study.  This view 
allows for many different identities, built from information and negotiations with many 
different sources and constantly revised as new information arrives, to be held at once.  As 
seen in the description of Stryker’s work, such a view does not render an explanation of the 
presence and creation of structures impossible.  Yet neither does it subscribe to the 
structuralist approach, where structure is seen to dictate interpretations – this is likely true 
to some extent, but cannot be considered a useful view when the object of investigation is 
so clearly ‘unstructured’, and even their target (the European Union) can be described as a 
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particularly young and evolving structure.  In accordance with the view of collective 
identity ascribed to here, the constructionist view of meaning as produced in dialogue, as 
between rather than within people, will be given precedence over the De Saussurian 
structuralist view of meaning as located in the differences between words embedded in a 
structure, and therefore arbitrary (Mohr 1998: 351). 
 
That said, it should be stressed once more that it is not collective identity in the sense in 
which it is understood for national level movements that is of interest for this study, but the 
presence of shared meanings and goals which allow different EUSMOs to work with one 
another (Balme and Chabanet 2002:85-6) – and therefore to potentially cause some effects.  
While these obviously have a lot to do with collective identity, I will refer to the search for 
evidence of shared problem definitions and aims in order to distance the study from those 
approaches, in line with the fact that the objects of analysis (campaigns carried out by 
coalitions of EUSMOs) is not a social movement of the classical definition.  In order to 
operationalise this concept, I draw on the literature on framing, described above as the 
‘mechanism’ of identity building – as have other scholars of transnational campaigns in a 
perspective of tolerant identities (Keck and Sikkink 1998).   
 
In order to further clarify this position that common frames or, put otherwise, shared 
problem definitions, can be understood as indicators for the presence of some level of 
tolerant collective identity, it is useful to refer to the different logics of collective action 
described by Diani (2005:51).  Diani refers to three such logics – social movement 
dynamics, coalitional dynamics, and organisational dynamics.  Where groups are not 
involved in dense collaborations they are involved in “organizational processes… 
Collaborations with other groups will be relatively rare and, most importantly, scattered 
across a broad range of different organizations.  There will be no … strong feelings of 
collective identity” (ibid:51).  Coalitional processes refer to situations where dense 
collaborative exchanges addressing specific issues take place, and, finally, social 
movement processes are observed where “groups identify each other as part of a broader 
collective actor, whose goals and existence cannot be constrained within the boundaries of 
any specific protest event or campaign.” (ibid:51).  Taking these terms of reference, I 
believe that the coalitions seen in the case studies here fall somewhere between what Diani 
terms coalitional processes and social movement processes.  While social movement ties 
may indeed be present between some groups involved in a particular campaign, they may 
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not apply to all coalition members.  However, the ties that are shown to spring up between 
the campaigning groups examined in the case studies here do show that the groups are 
capable of a “sustained series of collective actions”, something impossible in coalitional 
process according to Diani (ibid:51).  While Diani seeks out identity bonds between actors 
in terms of groups’ previous participation in the same public events and the sharing of core 
activists (through network analysis), the alternative employed here is to seek for common 
framing strategies between coalition groups, where shared frames are understood as 
indicative of the basic level of tolerant collective identity necessary for those groups to 
campaign and work together.  Therefore, I equate the presence of shared problem 
definitions contained in common frames as an indicator for the presence of an ‘in-between’ 
level of collective identity that allows these campaign coalitions to carry out a joint 
campaign together on a specific issue. 
 
Not only is this approach useful in that it provides the researcher with measurable units – 
frames – which may be singled out and tracked through the words and actions of different 
groups at different points in time, it is also underpinned by the constructionist view of 
identity.  Other methods used for exploring similar issues, for example surveys, “…assume 
the task is to array relevant publics on a pro-con dimension” (Gamson and Modigliani 
1989:36).  This entails the assumption that the meaning of the problem in question is 
shared by the ‘relevant publics’, who may then declare themselves either for or against it.  
As many have since argued, presenting a problem in such a fixed manner obliges people to 
answer questions they may never have considered, and as such creates rather than reflects 
opinion.  A constructionist model, on the other hand, results in a methodical choice that 
“begins by calling this assumption into question and examining it.” (ibid: 36)   
 
Constructionism is the explicit foundation of framing processes.  Since social movements 
are not, as mentioned above, the carriers of fixed identities (Snow 2004), framing processes 
or the work undertaken to forge collective definitions is questioned from the outset by 
social movement scholars.  “The framing perspective is rooted in the symbolic 
interactionist [re. Stryker 2000] and constructionist principle that meanings do not 
automatically or naturally attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences we 
encounter, but often arise, instead, through interactively based interpretive processes”. 
(Snow 2004: 384)  Frame analyses should thus pay attention to processes of social 
construction (Oliver and Johnston 2000), which are conflictual and dynamic (Steinberg 
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1998).   
 
Frame analysis is rooted in the method of content analysis.  Content analysis began as a 
quantitative method, in its simplest form as counting words.  As scholars realised that 
meaning was more likely to be devolved from at least sentences rather than single words, 
the method graduated to a more qualitative output using grammars or syntax as the 
analytical unit.  The latter were then usually coded to obtain standardised information, and 
convert the words to numbers (Franzosi 2004).  Other versions that have grown from this 
more general category include thematic analysis, story grammars or semantics, and of 
course frame analysis, which has been described as focusing on the broad images conjured 
up in a text (Franzosi 2004).  However, the concept of the frame was originally developed 
by Erving Goffman.  Goffman began from the unit of an interpersonal ‘encounter’ bringing 
different tasks and issues into focus via the frame activated on that occasion – “We must 
start with the idea, that a particular definition is in charge of a situation” (Gamson 
1985:616).  The concept found its way into social movement studies with Snow and 
Benford, who sought to correct the aforementioned lapse in attention to issues of identity 
and ideas in social movement studies. 
 
A brief review of the use of frames in studies on social movements is also instructive for 
developing a method of frame analysis for European level campaigns.  Following the 
introduction of the frame to social movement research, scholars were divided into those 
who examined frames in a fixed perspective and those who examined them in a dynamic 
perspective.  Although the literature invariably describes frames as the outcome of dynamic 
and ongoing framing processes and therefore as fleeting and emergent, much literature 
fixes the frame of a social movement and then proceeds to analyse it.  This has been 
attributed to theories concentrating on the organisational elements of social movements, 
strategic content thus taking analytical first place over interactive negotiation (Oliver and 
Johnston 2000: 42).  Accusations of concept-stretching may also be applied to some uses of 
the frame concept in the literature, where the latter is raised wherever an idea comes into 
play but without properly specifying the processes that led to this (ibid: 42).  Therefore, the 
first lesson to be learned when dealing with frames, framing processes, and frame analysis, 
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then, is that care must be taken to distinguish process and product.15  Although selecting 
some ‘snap shot’ of a frame during its continual negotiation is necessary for analytical 
purposes, several images are necessary to track the development of frames.  It is these 
processes that give the frame its meaning in the first place, if we follow the idea of 
meaning being created in interaction.  Frames are problem solving schemata stored in 
memory for making sense of presenting situations.  Frame analysis then, is about working 
out how information is processed in order to arrive at an interpretation (Johnston 1995). 
 
This information that passes between movements and their various audiences (for example 
counter movements, institutions, the public, individual members) during framing processes 
can be broken down into three categories.  These are 1) diagnostic – information 
identifying a problem; 2) prognostic – information on how this problem should best be 
solved;16 and 3) motivational – encouraging action to draw attention to and thus contribute 
to solving this problem.  According to Benford and Snow, “Collective action frames are 
constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some 
problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions 
regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge 
others to act in concert to affect change.” (2000:615).   
 
Benford and Snow are also explicit about the many different techniques that social 
movements may employ in framing (as summarised in Benford and Snow 2000).   
“[F]rames are developed, generated, and elaborated on not only via attending to the three 
core framing tasks discussed above, but also by way of three sets of overlapping processes 
that can be conceptualized as discursive, strategic, and contested” (ibid: 623).  Discursive 
processes are described as utterances, that is speech acts and written communications.  In 
framing processes, such utterances contribute by articulation – “the connection and 
alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and 
compelling fashion” (ibid: 623), and amplification – stressing the importance of certain 
issues, events, or beliefs in order to make them more salient. Logically, a coherent 
                                                 
15 For comments on this problem with particular regard to the differences between framing and ideology, see 
Oliver and Johnston (2000). 
16 Although it should be noted that some scholars have found that this framing action is less important for 
social movements, as their role is often not so much to propose solutions as to point out problems (Gerhards 
and Rucht 2002:582; della Porta et al: 2006).  This, as will be seen later, may not be so much the case for 
EUSMs as these are hypothesised according to the sketched political opportunity structure of the EU to be 
moulded as information and thus solution suppliers in this sphere. 
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argument will produce a frame that is more acceptable and therefore more likely to be acted 
upon (Gerhards and Rucht 1992).  Strategic processes are therefore aimed at building 
frames to achieve a specific purpose.  Here the authors identify four tactics, frame 
alignment or bridging17, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation.   
 
Frame bridging is of particular importance to the analyses to be carried out in this study, as 
it is well suited to the problem of frame analysis and shared problem definitions in 
transnational settings (see for example Ruzza 2004).  Recalling the understanding of 
identity within transnational movements as multiple and tolerant, as constructed in 
interaction, the concept of frame bridging is useful for describing how different identities 
may hang together around a frame that may be interpreted in different ways by different 
groups.  Benford and Snow (2000) believe that frame bridging is indeed the most used 
strategic framing action employed by movements.  The authors define the action as 
follows: “frame bridging refers to the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (ibid: 624).  Since 
the EUSMO campaigns to be studied involve different groups, the building of such 
‘bridges’ should allow for shared problem definitions.18   
 
One further concept that is useful when studying shared frames in transnational movements 
in particular is the concept of diffusion.  While frame bridging deals with the fusion of two 
or more frames, diffusion looks at how a frame travels among different groups or the same 
groups at different levels.  Indeed, diffusion is most often used  with reference to frames 
moving across national borders.  On this subject, Snow and Benford (1999) are again at the 
forefront of the field.  They have detailed how frames elaborated at the national level can 
be transferred over national boundaries by drawing on the concept of diffusion – meaning 
the “flow of social practices among actors within some larger system” (Strang and Meyer 
1993 cited in Soule 2004).  Frame diffusion, which may occur both actively through the 
deliberate efforts of movement actors, or more passively through external channels such as 
the media, who may diffuse movement frames of their own accord (della Porta and Kriesi 
1999), takes place when a frame (the ‘innovation’ in the language of diffusion) is useful to 
                                                 
17 The two words are used interchangeably, both indicate the same process. 
18 In some cases such frames have become so widely ascribed to as to be taken on by movement opponents.  
Ruzza (2004) details the example of the very extensive frame of ‘sustainable development’ and its eventual 
absorption by the industries it first targeted.  By invoking the EU-friendly term of ‘development’ – since the 
EU’s roots are in economic alliance – the movement succeeded in bridging their frame of environmental 
protection with that of economic progress.   
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both parties involved (‘transmitter’ and ‘adopter’ respectively), when both share some 
basic cultural or structural characteristics, and when they are linked together either directly 
through relational contacts or indirectly through, for example, the mass media (Snow and 
Benford 1999, 24).  There are two main models for diffusion: the hierarchical model and 
the proximal model, within which diffusion may take place either through direct or indirect 
links (Soule 2004).  In the former, diffusion takes a trickle-down form, with a leading 
individual or organisation diffusing frames downwards to lower organisations or actors.  In 
the latter, organisations or individuals “mimic others who are spatially or culturally 
relevant to them” (Soule 2004:295).     
 
Concerning the conscious and deliberate use of diffusion, Snow and Benford (1999) see the 
important factor in the process not in this mechanical act of diffusion but in the 
manipulation and interpretation of a frame in order to fit it to a new societal context.  They 
develop a typology of diffusion in order to specify this point.  Reciprocation occurs where 
both the transmitter and the adopter actively take an interest in the process.  Where only the 
adopter takes an active interest, adaptation takes place, whilst accommodation describes the 
opposite situation.  Finally, ‘contagion’ describes diffusion between two passive actors, 
although there is little empirical evidence of such processes.19  In the framework introduced 
here, reciprocation would then be so close to the concept of frame bridging as to be one and 
the same.  In that case, the group targeted by frame diffusion becomes active in the 
reinterpretation and thus the re-elaboration of the frame – part of the ongoing framing 
process.  In the analyses carried out here, passive instances of a frame being transferred 
from one group to another will be referred to as diffusion, and more dialogic accounts as 
bridging.  
 
There are three main aims that must therefore be borne in mind when investigating 
campaign frames: 1) to discover if a campaign has adopted or developed a strong frame or 
group of frames throughout its duration; 2) whether there has been dialogue with the 
national and / or local level, enabling a multi-level campaign and; 3) if framing work has 
taken place (i.e. evidence of dialogue and meaning creation between groups, through 
bridging or diffusion).  The hypothesis behind these aims is that a campaign fulfilling these 
                                                 
19 A similar idea on the transfer of ideas among social movements has been elaborated by Tarrow and 
McAdam (2005).  Although they speak of ‘scale shift’ and ‘brokerage’, the essential ideas for the purposes of 
this study are the same (McAdam et al 2008:322). 
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requirements will be more likely to see the outcomes aimed for, as together they indicate 
the construction of shared meanings between separate groups.20  Framing work in particular 
may be theorised as the closest to providing some evidence of the creation of meaning 
through dialogue, and therefore some basic level of collective identity that will allow for 
greater mobilisation (following the definition of a social movement at the national level).  
The relative importance of these three factors will also be discussed in the concluding 
chapter. 
 
1.3  The importance of contexts: the political process approach 
 
Another tried and tested approach to the study of social movements and, of course, their 
consequences, is political process.  If we think of collective identity as an important factor 
in influencing movement effects in terms of the internal processes of social movements, 
then political process is important to effects in that it denotes the factors external to the 
movement that may either hinder or aid its actions and eventual outcomes.  The following 
will provide a brief review of the approach, alongside useful delimitations of its scope that 
will be employed in this study, and finally describe a political opportunity structure of the 
EU detailing the fixed factors that may help or hinder EUSMO campaigns’ trajectories and 
therefore their consequences.   
 
The political process, or political opportunity, approach aims to explain social movements’ 
actions as rational courses followed in the light of perceived options, possibilities, and 
barriers present in political contexts.  In this sense, the approach can be tied to the ‘rational’ 
or ‘resource mobilisation’ school of social movement scholarship (Kitschelt 1986:59).  The 
approach is useful for this study for reasons that have become clear in the introductory 
sections of this chapter – the uniqueness of the EU as an arena for social movements, and 
their need to adapt to it.  To put it plain and simply, the context in which a campaign takes 
place will effect its outcome.  The political process approach leads the researcher to explain 
social movement actions in the light of the contexts in which they are embedded – social 
movements are influenced by events in their surroundings.  Not only does the approach 
enable the interpretation of various actions, it also forces the scholar to note in detail and 
                                                 
20 This hypothesis recalls Haas’ work on epistemic communities, where “only organizations that share similar 
views on the origins of the conflict, common ideological frameworks and common goals can have a 
significant impact on the elaboration of international norms” (Passy 1999:162). 
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pay attention to other actors and circumstances outside the actions forming the central 
focus of study.  In this way outcomes are seen in a complex universe, and the construction 
of overly simplistic causal chains is averted.  In view of this, I explore the trajectory of the 
political process approach below with an eye to its application to my own study.   
 
The seed of the approach was sown by Lipsky (1970 cited in McAdam 1996:23), who 
called for the taking into account of institutional particularities when explaining collective 
action, as previous work had mostly concentrated on explanations based on characteristics 
internal to movements.  This challenge was first taken up by Eisinger (1973 cited in 
McAdam 1996:23) whose study of the variations in behaviour during riots in different 
American states represents the first practical enunciation of the approach.  Following this, 
the political process approach to the study of social movements developed apace, with the 
approach being expanded and refined by authors such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and 
Doug McAdam.  These studies tended to focus on what may be termed dynamic political 
opportunities, such as shifts within ruling elites, wars, or electoral instability, to explain 
sudden rushes of collective action (see Tarrow 1994).  McAdam saw as relevant to this 
particular brand of political opportunities “any event or broad social process that serves to 
undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is 
structured” (McAdam 1982 cited in della Porta and Diani 1999: 207).  Other studies 
concentrated on more stable and fixed political opportunities, or political opportunity 
structures.  The most thorough example of this is Kitschelt’s (1986) comparative study of 
mobilisations concerning nuclear power in four countries.  For him, relatively unchanging 
factors such as the number of parties competing in the electoral system, the effectiveness of 
the state in implementing policy, the degree of the separation of powers in a system, and 
historical precedence explain social movements’ actions as these facts act “as ‘filters’ 
between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to 
change the social environment” (Kitschelt 1986:59). 
 
However, the relevance of other factors in explaining the actions of social movements led 
some authors to include a host of other kinds of opportunities in the approach, resulting in 
the criticism that the approach was becoming a catch-all approach - too wide, with too 
many variables and too little consensus on its actual meaning or on what it could explain 
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(for example McAdam 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999; Koopmans 1999). 21  The 
criticisms are well summed up by the following accusation formulated by Gamson and 
Meyer (1996): “The concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of 
becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement 
environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, 
and policy shifts…Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all” (cited 
in McAdam 1996: 24).  Reacting to these criticisms, Koopmans (1999) has clarified and 
separated the different concepts of the political process approach: 
 
Opportunities are “options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them 
that depend on factors outside the mobilizing group.” (ibid: 97)    
 
Political Opportunities are options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to 
them that depend on political actors and institutions outside the mobilising group. 
(Following Koopmans 1999: 97-98)   
 
And finally, a Political Opportunity Structure is a constellation of opportunities “that 
cannot be influenced – at least not in the foreseeable future – by collective action.” 
 
The variables employed in studies using the political opportunity approach thus concern 
political constraints, possibilities and threats (in that they depend on political actors and 
institutions), but the latter do not add up to opportunities in and of themselves.  
Opportunities exist only insofar as they are perceived and acted upon by social movement 
actors (Tarrow 1994).  An unexploited opportunity will not help a campaign, and a threat 
reacted to imaginatively may be overcome, and even, as the cases presented here will show, 
be transformed into an opportunity.  This answers the criticism that the approach leaves the 
link between political opportunities and movement actions unspecified (Kriesi et al 1995; 
Koopmans 1999).  When classifying opportunities, I follow the definition applied above by 
Koopmans (1999:97-98) between dynamic and static political opportunities.  A political 
opportunity structure refers to relatively fixed or structural opportunities, or in other words 
                                                 
21 The theory has also been criticised in that it assumes political opportunities to be paramount in explaining 
various actions of social movements, and thus implicitly assumes social movements’ inherently political 
nature.  This leads theorists of this school to concentrate only on political social movements.  Although true 
to some extent, some applications of the theory to New Social Movements, such as the European 
environmental movement, have been fruitful and robust (Koopmans 1999).   
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to political institutions (Kriesi 2004), while dynamic opportunities are the results of 
unstable characteristics of those institutions – actions by individuals, elections and the like.  
Other authors studying impact in transnational campaigns have also used similar 
approaches, distinguishing between opportunities related to structural features, and those 
more related to the process of policymaking (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Hellferich and Kolb 
2001:145).  The dual result of these clarifications is to place the approach in a bounded 
space and to admit the relevance of other factors.  When using these terms, which have 
often been used in an interchangeable manner, and to describe different things, it must be 
remembered that “Opportunity is not always political opportunity, and political opportunity 
is not always structural (…) Structural opportunities, moreover, do not have to be political 
in origin.” (ibid: 101).22   
 
Once again it must be said that the political process approach was developed with the 
national level in mind.  Some discussion of the approach’s relevance outside of the national 
arena is then necessary.  That the international arena more generally requires a reworking 
of the approach has been posited (Lahusen 1999:202), and respecifications in order to study 
movements and the EU have been underlined by several authors, for example in the volume 
edited by della Porta and Kriesi (1999).  However, the variation most suited to this research 
is the variable political opportunity approach, which has been recommended (in essence) 
by authors both from outside the discipline of social movement studies (Peterson 1997; 
Marks and McAdam 1996; Bieler 2005) and from within the discipline (della Porta et al 
1999, della Porta and Caiani 2007).  Della Porta et al (1999) take globalisation as their 
starting point, understanding the latter as relevant to the study of TSMs in its incarnation 
within three types of transnational interactions: transnational interactions between 
movements; transgovernmental interactions; and cross-level interactions between 
movements and governments.23  Globalisation for social movements is then seen as the 
diffusion of various resources between movements tied together informally in networks, 
with proof of this being found in the increasing similarity of, for instance, repertoires of 
contention across national borders (ibid: 8-9).  Interactions should be analysed through the 
lens of their surrounding political opportunity structures, both in the international and the 
appropriate national arenas.  The latter’s continued importance despite processes of 
globalisation and the creation of veritable supranational spheres of action such as the EU is 
                                                 
22  Hence the addition of discursive opportunities, which will be detailed below.   
23  This typology is developed in more detail in the specific European context in della Porta (2003a). 
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underlined, since national actors are still the major players in world politics.  TSMs thus 
juggle their perceptions of multiple opportunity structures, which are themselves in 
dialogue with one another.  Several of the contributors to the volume by della Porta et al 
(1999) use this theoretical framework to approach the study of social movements in the EU, 
and a similar approach is also called for by Sikkink (2005).  For example, Imig and Tarrow 
(ibid) find that the relatively low level of protest at the actual European level can be 
explained by the various barriers posed by the EU, as well as groups’ more extensive 
knowledge and feeling for the national opportunity structures.  Protest at the national level 
thus indirectly targets the European via national governments.   
 
This ‘variable opportunity structure’ approach is thus particularly suited to the study of 
European level campaigns, as it accounts not only for interaction between actors on 
multiple levels, but also for the interactions between opportunity structures on multiple 
levels, as well as admitting the continued importance, but not the exclusivity, of national 
governments on the international stage in line with the EU’s multi-level organisational 
form.24  Interactions between different opportunities and threats are particularly relevant 
when examining effects: in a complex arena like the EU opportunities and threats take on 
different levels of importance, and may cancel one another out in some cases.  As Marks 
and McAdam observe:  
 
“Whereas the classic nation-state tended to define the ‘structure of political opportunities’ 
for all challenging groups, the emergence of a multi-level polity means that movements are 
increasingly likely to confront highly idiosyncratic opportunity structures defined by that 
unique combination of governmental bodies (at all levels) which share decision-making 
authority over the issues of interest to the movement.” (Marks and McAdam 1996: 119) 
 
In the EU then, they conclude, social movements must adapt to the new political 
opportunity structures that this arena constitutes (ibid).  Following the model of variable 
opportunity structures, this will likely lead to the relegation of some parts of their repertoire 
of contention to the national or local level (i.e. protest), and the adoption or more extensive 
use of others more suited to the European opportunity structure (i.e. lobbying), as the EU 
can be said to provide more opportunities for the latter, whilst presenting barriers to the 
                                                 
24 A similar approach has recently been applied by Lahusen (2004:57): “particularly in the case of the EU, we 
cannot speak of a uniform and formalised assimilation but of an undeclared and elastic accommodation”. 
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former (della Porta and Kriesi 1999).  This claim can be tested through the case studies that 
will be presented here, and will be further discussed in the conclusions in chapter seven. 
 
One task that none of the studies that use political process approaches to examine social 
movements in the EU carry out is a systematic evaluation of the variables that may 
fruitfully be employed for determining political opportunities in that arena.  Because the 
approach was developed for national spheres, this is an important exercise for adapting the 
approach to the EU level.  To facilitate this, the following table synthesises the variables 
that have been used by the major political process authors according to the broad 
dichotomy of ‘dynamic’ and ‘fixed’ opportunities.  Following McAdam (1996), each of 
these two broad categories can then be further divided, so that variables concerning 
‘dynamic’ political opportunities may be grouped under the headings of : “the stability or 
instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity” and “the 
presence or absence of elite allies” (McAdam 1996: 27), whilst variables concerning 
‘fixed’ opportunities may be grouped under the headings of:  “the relative openness or 
closure of the institutionalised political system” (i.e. its receptiveness or otherwise to 
claims-making by social movements) and “The state’s capacity and propensity for 
repression” (McAdam 1996: 27). 
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Table 1 - Synthesis of elements relevant in determining political opportunities 
 
Fixed – political opportunity structure 
 
Dynamic political opportunities 
Openness / 
Closure 
Prevailing Culture (In)stability of 
elites 
Elite allies / 
‘enemies’ 
No. of parties Government: 
unitary or coalition 
Intra-elite conflict Position held by 
ally 
Effectiveness in 
implementation 
Extent of 
polarisation of 
opposition 
Electoral instability Ability of ally to 
fulfil promises 
Rules on dialogue 
with 3rd parties 
Attitude to 
opposition opinions: 
exclusive or 
integrative 
Proximity of 
elections 
Hostile elites 
Professionalism and 
resources of 
administration 
Style of police 
protesting 
Contingent events: 
war, coup d’etat, 
natural disaster (…)
Presence of counter 
movements 
Centralisation    
Separation of 
powers 
   
Institutionalisation 
of direct democracy 
   
Sources: Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1994, 1996; della Porta and Diani 1999) 
 
Beginning with those variables that determine the degree of openness or closure of a state, 
the first is the number of parties, groups or factions vying for power in the system.  The 
institutional domain of relevance here is the European Parliament (EP), which is directly 
elected by the citizens of each member state of the EU according to varying national 
systems.  European political parties do exist, and members of the EP sit in session 
according to their European party affiliation rather than by nationality.  However, European 
parties are still broad coalitions of national parties rather than fully fledged political parties 
with individual membership bases (Nugent 2006:261), and European elections attract ever 
lower voter turnouts (Balme and Chabanet 2008, Nugent 2006:258).  Campaigns’ focuses 
tend towards national issues, and many voters and parties alike consider them merely an 
opportunity for a mid-term endorsement or rejection of the government.  Quite apart from 
this, the EP is not a parliament in the sense of those of the member states of the EU.  Since 
the EU has no ‘government’ in the sense of the nation-state, this is not drawn from the 
ranks of the European Parliament, and sovereignty is not invested in it.  Thus, it does not 
constitute a familiar focal point for the expression of citizens’ concerns, as reflected in the 
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non-European nature of European elections, often regarded as ‘second order’ national 
elections (Nugent 2006: 260).  This would seem to rule out the importance of the number 
of European political parties. 
 
On the other hand, the European Parliament actually wields more power in terms of 
amending legislation than many national parliaments.  Especially since the introduction of 
the co-decision procedure, under which the European Parliament is co-legislator along with 
the Council of Ministers, the EP’s power to amend is considerable, making it an 
increasingly popular target for interest groups (Greenwood 2003).  When it comes to voting 
legislative amendments in full plenary session however, no one European party currently 
holds the majority necessary to pass an amendment.25  The number of parties is important 
then in terms of the constraints this places on the number of groups which must be 
convinced of the worthiness of a group’s claims in order to gain a result.  This, however, 
falls into the ‘dynamic’ category of political opportunities since voting coalitions in the EP 
vary not only according to policy area, but sometimes split along national fault-lines, and 
habitually shift from amendment (or paragraph of amendment!) to amendment.  This 
variable is therefore retained as a dynamic political opportunity. 
 
Next is the variable ‘effectiveness in implementation’.  Here, the lack of relevance for the 
EU is clear-cut.  The EU relies on national governments and bureaucracies to implement 
legislation in the member states.  This is most definitely not the case for the next element 
on the list however: rules on dialogue with third parties.  For the sake of avoiding 
repetition, I will also include the next element – professionalism of the administration – in 
the following discussion, as the reasons for the importance of these two elements in an EU 
political opportunity structure are mutually reinforcing.  The Commission is certainly 
professional in the sense that its staff members are highly trained and competent 
bureaucrats,26 but the institution lacks other resources.  Both as a result of the small size of 
its staff in comparison with the size of its tasks, and as a result of the often highly technical 
nature of the legislation it drafts, the Commission is reliant on information from outside 
sources.  For these reasons the Commission consults widely and extensively with many 
                                                 
25 This was also the case prior to the 2004 elections. 
26 At least within the various directorates general – the Commission having been described as notorious for 
the low levels of policy coordination between these (Greenwood 2003). 
 31
different interest groups, national civil services and experts.  The more ‘informal’ 
consultations27 carried out with interest groups are subject to specific rules28.       
 
The general principles of these rules (which take the form of a non-binding code of 
conduct) are defined by the European Commission as openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence (see Commission 2002).  These principles 
should be adhered to by the Commission, other EU institutions and, crucially, those that 
groups that the EU institutions consult when drafting legislation.  Steps taken to achieve 
these principles included the setting up of an internet database of civil society groups,29 
CONNECS,30 and the setting out of minimum standards to be followed in consultations.  
These minimum standards mostly apply to the Commission itself, who must (for example) 
make sure that its communications on consultations are clear and precise, circulated a 
reasonable amount of time before the deadline for contributions, ensure a wide and 
balanced consultation of interested parties, and provide feedback on contributions.  
However, apart from the fact that these minimum requirements are not (according to many 
interviewees) always respected, the information requirements of the rules, along with the 
type of information (highly detailed and technical) often required by the Commission form 
a constraint to the participation of less organised or institutionalised EUSMOs,31 leading to 
the perception that organised business interests often hold sway in the EU.  
 
Other EU institutions are also open to the representations of various interested groups.  The 
EP especially, as a result of its increased legislative power, has seen an increase in lobbying 
in recent years, leading to calls for rules on the lobbying of members.  As the only directly 
                                                 
27 The Commission defines ‘consultation’ as follows: “those processes through which the Commission wishes 
to trigger input from outside interested parties for the shaping of policy prior to a decision by the 
Commission” (2002: 15-16).   
28 These rules form one part of the Commission’s effort to secure increased legitimacy through transparency.  
On this subject as concerns dialogue with interested parties, see Commission 2001, where dialogue with ‘civil 
society’ is also explicitly recognised as an alternative path to active participation in the EU by its citizens.  
The rules themselves are detailed in Commission 2002. 
29 “Civil society includes the following: trade unions and employers’ organisations (“social partners”); non-
governmental organisations; professional associations; charities; grass-roots organisations; organisations that 
involve citizens in local and municipal life with a particular contribution from churches and religious 
communities” (Commission 2001: 14). 
30 This database no longer exists.  As as result of the Communication on the follow up to the Green Paper 
'European Transparency Initiative' (COM (2007)127), the Commission launched a voluntary register for 
interest representatives in Spring 2008, which may be found at 
http://webgate.ec.europe.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do?locale=en.  Nevertheless, registering here entails 
adhering to the principles of “openness, transparency, honesty and integrity”.  
31  Although the rules also mention that the participation of unorganised interests should also be encouraged 
(Commission 2002). 
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representative institution of EU citizens, the EP is the natural ally for many ‘public interest 
groups’, including social movement organisations (Greenwood 2003).  The Council of 
Ministers also engages in dialogue with third parties, although to a much lesser degree 
(Greenwood 2003).  The elements concerning dialogue with third parties and the 
professionalism of the administration may thus be deemed relevant in building the EU’s 
political opportunity structure.  This is explicit in the Commission’s own view on 
consultation procedure: “It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving 
the Union’s objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback, criticism and 
protest” (Commission 2001: 15). 
 
The next pair of elements, which may also be discussed fruitfully in function of one 
another, are centralisation and the separation of powers.  These are included because of 
their importance in terms of the number of access points they open to campaigning groups.  
Regarding centralisation, the EU is a decentralised system – the implementation of 
European policies is entrusted to member states.  In decision-making processes, the roles of 
the different institutions exist in a delicate balance which differs according to the subject 
matter in hand.  The prolonged and inconclusive debates between proponents of the 
intergovernmental and supranational explanations of the EU highlight the fact that in the 
day to day reality of the EU no one institution, actor, or logic holds sway.  Perhaps the only 
consensual description of the EU is that it is a multi-level system.  Decentralisation is also 
enshrined in the Treaties in the form of the subsidiarity principle.  Thus, the EU as a 
decentralised system provides plenty of access points for EUSMOs to present their cases.  
The EU institutions may also be described as well separated.  The Commission, EP, and 
Council of Ministers may work together in a delicate balancing act, but each institution has 
a well-defined and separate role and culture – as demonstrated in frequent disputes over the 
detail and persuasion of legislation.  The separation of the EU’s institutions thus combines 
with its decentralised (or, perhaps more accurately, dispersed) system of decision-making 
to provide effectively different and multiple points of access for social movements32.  The 
final variable in this group, from the work of Kriesi et al (1995), is the institutionalisation 
of direct democracy.  This is not relevant for the task at hand, as although the EU is often 
the subject of referenda, it cannot call its own.   
 
                                                 
32 For a useful figure depicting the multitude of European level points of access, see the figure in Greenwood 
2003: 31. 
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Which takes us to the next grouping of elements in the table.  These concern prevailing 
culture in a system, which may be best indicated by the composition of government 
(unitary or coalition), the extent of the polarisation of the opposition, exclusive or 
integrative attitudes to opposition opinions, and styles of protest policing33.  The latter can 
immediately be ruled out, as the EU is not a state and has no police force.  Of the remaining 
three, two turn out to be useful if slightly adapted, as all three are couched in very national 
terms. 
 
Concerning the composition of government as unitary or coalition, this variable cannot be 
transferred to the EU level without alteration, as the system has no government as such.  
However, the term coalition is useful for describing the prevailing culture of consensus in 
the EU.  Thus, if we ask if the EU institutions involved in legislative work are made up of 
coalitions, we can explain the constant effort for consensus demanded by the task of 
creating legislation that may be effectively implemented and meaningful in 27 different 
countries.  Commissioners, for example, are nominated from all the member states, and are 
obliged to form multinational cabinets.  When working as a college, they can certainly be 
described as a coalition, as despite giving up any national preferences, the interests of their 
particular DG pit them against one another (Peterson 1997).  The Council of Ministers too 
is necessarily a coalition, as ministers of different ideological persuasion find themselves 
obliged to work together in order to achieve progress, and the Council as a general rule 
seeks consensus even where a qualified majority will suffice.  The EP too can be described 
as a coalition, despite the presence of a leading party.  As mentioned earlier, the European 
parties are themselves broad coalitions of national parties.  In addition to this, when it 
comes to the crunch in legislative votes, even the largest group must form coalitions in 
order to achieve the necessary absolute majority.  
 
Very much linked to this is the element of the extent of polarisation of opposition.  Since 
the EU is by definition a coalition, as mentioned above, no ‘opposition’ in the sense meant 
by the original authors of this element exists.  The more general element of the extent of 
                                                 
33 Other views on the prevailing culture of a system are more connected with “the political-cultural or 
symbolic opportunities” (Kriesi 2004:72, see also Tarrow 1994).  Variables here would concern the cultural 
resonance of certain symbols given discourses of national identity, citizenship and the like.  However, since 
the main focus in this section is the political opportunity structure of the EU which - as numerous authors 
have pointed out – has no ‘culture’ of its own (there being no one single European demos) this view is left 
aside as  property of the national political opportunity structures.  It may also be argued that under the 
distinctions made here, such opportunities are not strictly ‘political’.  
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polarisation of opinions was considered for inclusion in the model as a dynamic 
opportunity, following the reasoning that polarised opinions may block legislation, and 
thwart efforts for consensus.  However, in the actual analyses it became clear that the 
variable of hostile elites already covered these points.  This variable was therefore 
discarded.  The very final element for consideration is attitudes to opposition opinions.  An 
‘opposition’ as understood in national politics does not exist in the EU.  Yet the inclusive 
nature of the EU as seen in the overall culture of consensus is important.  This element may 
be useful if adapted to read attitude to differing opinions – which is definitely inclusive in 
the terms of Kriesi et al (1995).  Within the Council of Ministers, consensus is sought in 
order to achieve progress, as detailed above.  In the EP, coalition, if not overall consensus 
is sought – yet attitudes to differing opinions tend to remain respectful as coalitions shift so 
quickly, and very often today’s enemy must be tomorrow’s ally.  The Commission’s 
attitude to differing opinions is most important in terms of its consulting procedures when 
drafting legislation for the purpose of political opportunity structures for social movements.  
Its inclusive attitude is in fact a duty:  "the Commission should [...] consult widely before 
proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents".  
(Protocol (N° 7) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 
annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty cited in Commission 2002: 4).  These attitudes may spell 
important opportunities for EUSMOs.   
 
The elements that are relevant in building the EU’s political opportunity structure, along 
with the EU’s ‘score’ on each of these - that is its political opportunity structure, are 
summarised in the following table.34   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Obviously, this structure will only apply where the European Union as a supranational body has the 
competence to act, rather than the clearly intergovernmental areas contained within the Union’s structure. 
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Table 2- Political Opportunity Structure of the EU  
 
Overall then, the EU institutions represent an accessible arena, which is tolerant of the 
opinions of other groups.  Such an assessment does however require some qualification – 
how should we theorise each of these variables in terms of whether they denote 
opportunities or threats for EUSMOs?  Some degree of access may be relatively easy to 
achieve, but at what price does this access become effective?  In fact, the various criteria 
that must be fulfilled by those wishing to exploit these qualities of the EU’s political 
opportunity structure also represent a variety of constraints.  Firstly, although the 
Commission is often described as an institution very open and in fact actively seeking 
consultation with third groups (Balme and Chabanet 2002:24), the rules governing informal 
consultation by the Commission35 with third parties oblige groups to acquire a certain 
organisational form and culture, as is clearly demonstrated in the criteria allowing 
registration in the CONNECS database, which run as follows: 
 
“In order to be eligible, an organisation must be a non-profit representative body organised 
at European level, i.e. with members in two or more European Union or Candidate 
                                                 
35 Although the Commission makes clear in the White Paper on Governance (Commission 2001) that the 
‘principles of good governance’ should also be applied by other EU institutions both in general and in 
consultations with outside groups.  
 
 
 
Characteristics of EU 
 
 
Rules on dialogue 
with 3rd parties 
 
Where institutionalised formal and binding, extensive non-
binding rules for non-institutionalised dialogue.  Inclusive for 
organised interests when addressing their ‘natural’ partners. 
 
Professionalism and 
resources of the 
administration. 
 
Commission lacking in resources – reliant for information on 
national civil services and third parties. 
 
Degree of 
centralisation 
 
Multi-level system with decision-making shared between 
institutions at the EU and national levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Elements 
determining 
Openness / 
Closure 
 
Extent of separation 
of powers  
 
Separate roles, although much mutual dependency in many 
legislative matters.  Judiciary highly independent of all other 
institutions. 
 
Institutions unitary 
or coalition 
 
Coalition in all institutions. 
 
 
Elements 
determining 
prevailing 
culture  
 
Attitudes to differing 
opinions 
 
Highly inclusive. 
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countries; be active and have expertise in one or more of the policy areas of the 
Commission, have some degree of formal or institutional existence; and be prepared to 
provide any reasonable information about itself required by the Commission, either for 
insertion in the database or in support of its request for inclusion”  (Commission 2002)36  
 
Since the Commission is often the logical primary target for many campaigns (Greenwood 
2003:33) as an institution involved in all stages of policy making (Balme and Chabanet 
2002:53), these requirements can be seen as a constraint on the organisational form of 
EUSMOs (della Porta and Caiani 2007:8).  However, avoiding the Commission as a 
campaign target makes little sense.  Although many other access points exist, the 
Commission is logically the primary target of campaigns as the initiator of legislation 
(Greenwood 2003:33).  This is not only because ‘the devil is in the detail’, but also because 
of the simple statistical fact that in general a large share of the text of draft legislation 
remains intact at adoption.  The Commission also represents a major source of funding for 
EUSMOs.  Obtaining funding from the Commission also imposes constraints in terms of 
“Europeanness”, transparency, and formal organisation, not to mention the fact that 
funding is provided for carrying out projects for the Commission,37 meaning that EUSMOs 
may be obliged to carry out work tailored to meeting the institution’s need for information 
(see below) instead of the work they would choose to carry out – a circumstance which 
may distance them from grassroots membership (see Guiraudon 2001:171).38     
 
Where an EUSMO has complied to these requirements, however, what rewards may be 
expected?  Michalowitz (2002), in her study of the pluralist and corporatist qualities of 
interest representation in the EU, has found that the Commission displays both, but at 
different stages of their consultation procedures.  In a first, more pluralist step, a wide 
variety of parties is consulted for their opinions on a particular legislative initiative.  In a 
second step however, where the drafting of the legislation proper is undertaken, 
consultation is cut down to privileged partners who have secured seats in the Commission’s 
                                                 
36 As noted previously, this database no longer exists.  Its closure came after the end of all the campaigns 
included in case studies here however, and its rules therefore applied to these.  In any case, it may be argued 
that these rules continue to be relevant for groups today, since they may have already made difficult to 
reverse changes in their organisational cultures in order to fulfil them and become partners for dialogue with 
the Commission. 
37  Budget lines for funding civil society groups have been ruled to be illegal by the ECJ (Cullen 2005). 
38 Interestingly, a fairly similar description of the opportunities presented by the United Nations to social 
movements is provided by Passy (1999), suggesting that international governmental organisations may have 
some similarities in how they deal with their information needs in particular. 
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labyrinthine network of expert, technical and other committees.  When it comes to ensuring 
a say, this is where an EUSMO must secure a place.  Yet such places are secured exactly 
by the ability to produce fresh information on demand (Balme and Chabanet 2002:54)39 – 
very difficult considering the relative lack of resources of most EUSMOs as compared to 
industry groups.  Whilst the latter may often rely on substantial resources in terms of 
membership fees, industry-funded research and expertise, EUSMOs often rely, as already 
mentioned, on short-term Commission project funding, and thus a small amount of paid 
staff or the occasional voluntary services of their member organisations.  Once the proposal 
is drafted, opportunities for consultation were found to be very much closed.    
 
In addition to all this, the Commission represents further constraints as a result of its highly 
fragmented nature, where the cultures and interests of each separate DG may often be 
played off against one another in internal power struggles.  Following Ruzza’s (2004) idea 
of the ‘institutional activist’, I therefore include the caveat of the ‘natural partner’ as a 
condition for more fruitful dialogue with the Commission.  In many DGs, Ruzza asserts,  
staff tend to share a certain ideology, or at least a sense of the importance of their particular 
policy area.  This was previously the case in DG Environment, where many of the original 
staff members came from the Nordic countries where environmental policies were already 
considered as a priority – thus supplying a ready-made expert group, but one with a fairly 
homogeneous conception of the environmental problem.  This means that some 
institutional actors are ‘naturally’ sympathetic to the ideas of a specific movement, 
although they may not be directly connected to the latter.  This can be theorised as a 
helping hand for a campaign, or, vice versa, a hindrance when not dealing with the natural 
partner DG.  It should be noted, however, that those DGs that are more friendly to 
movements are not usually those that pack the punches within the Commission.  As Bieler 
puts it, “The DG for Competition and the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs are more 
decisive within the EU.  Together with the DG Internal Market and DG Trade they are the 
hard core of the Commission” (2005:469).  The more general theoretical point from these 
considerations is that it is crucial that we do not consider the Commission as a unified, 
single institution, but as yet another group of smaller organisations jostling for power and 
influence amongst themselves.   
                                                 
39  Michalowitz (2002) in fact cites a case study of BEUC (Bureau Europeen des Union des Consommateurs – 
the European consumer groups’ union), who affirm that they strategically release information to the 
Commission over time in order to be able to provide fresh information as required to remain a player in the 
consultation process. 
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However, it may be argued that other institutions do not represent so many constraints.  
Significant opportunities to amend are to be had via the European Parliament under the co-
decision procedure, and with the exception of the European Court of Justice, which 
obviously requires the construction of formal legal cases, the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers provide not only institutional channels of access but also invite more 
unconventional forms of action.  Summits of European ministers are often targets for mass 
protests.  The European Parliament, although not a magnet for protest on the scale of the 
Council of Ministers or the European Council (Lahusen 2004), certainly attracts more 
unconventional actions such as letter writing and e-mail actions, as well as lobbying.  Yet 
the fact remains that in running an effective campaign all opportunities must be exploited, 
and all methods and points of access exhausted (e.g. Hellferich and Kolb 2001).  And 
inclusion of a group’s position from the first legislative step can be the surest route to 
inclusion in final legislation.   
 
Thus concerning the first two boxes in the previous summary table, we can say that the EU 
imposes formal organisation, or institutionalisation40, at the European level, and certain 
modes of information production on EUSMOs that wish to become trusted and regularly 
consulted partners of the Commission.  While this may be considered an opportunity for  
more formally organised and resource-rich groups, it may be considered a disadvantage to 
more traditional, nationally-based EUSMOs and their networks.  Therefore both 
opportunities and threats may be theorised.  Those groups that do not institutionalise and 
become partners of the Commission face disadvantages in that they will find it harder to 
bring their message to the EU institutions at an early stage41.  However, they will conserve 
opportunities in that they are more likely to be able to maintain close contact with grass 
roots members, who may see institutionalised groups as having ‘sold out’ to the EU 
system.  This brings a certain ‘moral’ authority to the organisation, and may hold more 
sway over processes in the Parliament and Council, both of whom are ultimately subject to 
re-election and thus more likely to be concerned about public opinion (Burstein 1999).  The 
mirror-image of these opportunities and disadvantages are repeated for those groups that do 
                                                 
40 “Civil society must itself follow the principles of good governance, which include accountability and 
openness. The Commission intends to establish, before the end of this year, a comprehensive on-line database 
with details of civil society organisations active at European level, which should act as a catalyst to improve 
their internal organisation.” (Commission of the European Communities 2001:15, emphasis added.) 
41 Although, as mentioned above, the presence of institutional activists may be a powerful opportunity that 
may cancel out these threats.  See Ruzza (2004) 
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institutionalise at the European level.  Of course, this does certainly not rule out the 
possibility of an alliance within a campaign network of each kind of group.  Such an 
alliance would theoretically allow for the most effective mounting of a campaign – 
although the ‘sell out’ threat still exists for ‘grass-roots’ groups entering into these 
agreements.   
 
The assessment of the EU as highly decentralised, with a fairly clear cut separation of 
powers, brings the other institutions into the explanation of European political 
opportunities.  While different cultures may be said to reign in each of the institutions in a 
general sense, it must be remembered that within each institution different powers are still 
at play.  In the European Parliament, the different committees may be thought of in a 
similar way as the different DGs in the Commission – different cultures and interests apply 
in each one.42  The European Parliament also illustrates the expertise constraints implied by 
coalition institutions: traditional differences along ideological lines also need to be borne in 
mind when carrying out actions in this institution.  The affiliations of the rapporteur (and 
shadow rapporteurs), the committees, the presidency, and the parliament as a whole must 
be considered at different stages of a legislative proposal’s journey through the 
institution.43  The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, is formed along sectoral lines 
according to the subject in hand, and requires a drastically different strategy again.  Since 
lobbying opportunities at this stage are all but closed to EUSMOs because the Council 
must work to strict national mandates (Michalowitz 2002), it make sense to theorise that 
groups must anticipate this stage and work to get their message across at the national levels 
where negotiation mandates are elaborated.  The same logic applies to the European 
Council.44 
 
The upshot of all of this in terms of political opportunities is that multiple access points, as 
well as complex legislative procedures and the relatively distinct separation of powers 
(Balme and Chabanet 2002:44), place a heavy burden of knowledge and expertise on 
EUSMOs.  Although the existence of multiple access points is certainly an advantage to 
                                                 
42 This may be said to depend greatly on the committee chair’s personal style.  For example, whilst a 
committee with relatively little legislative power due to its competence’s position in the pillar structure, such 
as the Culture and Education Committee, longer and more normative contributions may be the norm.  In 
committees with a heavy legislative workload, such as the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
Committee, the pressure to ‘get through work’ will be higher, and stricter Chairs more likely. 
43 Especially where the co-decision procedure applies. 
44 Although both Councils are also, as mentioned earlier, more obvious targets for European level protest. 
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EUSMOs, the ability to exploit all of these is tempered by this requirement for knowledge 
and expertise on the system.  They must be able to judge the appropriate tone and aim of 
each action that forms their European level campaign, as well as be able to anticipate the 
entire European level process with enough time to launch national level campaigns in order 
to influence Council.  Therefore, EUSMOs need staff with detailed knowledge of the 
institutions, their composition, and the legislative processes of the EU in order to mount 
effective campaigns at the European level.  At the same time, they need to have good links 
with their national members or affiliates in order to mount campaigns to affect negotiating 
mandates in the Council.  Once again, we find a relationship similar to that imposed by the 
constraints of becoming a consultation partner with the Commission.  That is, expert 
members of staff at the European level are likely to find it difficult to keep up close 
contacts with national counterparts, or vice versa.  Yet these contacts are needed to exploit 
all access points in the legislative process.  Once again, it can be said that  those groups 
able to draw on significant knowledge of the EU whilst simultaneously ensure close links 
between European and national levels will mount more effective campaigns. 
 
The final boxes of the table presented above, coalition in all institutions and inclusive 
attitudes to the opinions of others, require little further comment.  The story here in terms 
of opportunities and threats for the campaigns and the groups that carry them out is already 
fairly well covered by above discussions.  Coalitions in each of the institutions require 
EUSMOs to have knowledge and skills in tailoring their actions to bolster the appropriate 
coalitions at relevant points.  The inclusive attitudes of the Parliament (described as 
anxious to prove its credentials as the interlocutor of citizens by Balme and Chabanet 
2002:81) and the Commission in particular to third party opinions obviously provides 
opportunities for campaigning groups in terms of having their message heard, although 
dynamic opportunities and threats will condition how far these positions will actually be 
considered when making decisions.    
 
Dynamic political opportunities are specific to each campaign.  However, some of the 
variables used for outlining these more dynamic opportunities have already been presented 
above, and some variables classed as fixed at the national level were added to the dynamic 
side in the case of the EU.  Below those variables used for determining dynamic political 
opportunities at the EU level are presented.    
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Table 3 – variables for determining dynamic political opportunities at the EU level 
 
Dynamic political opportunities 
 
(In)stability of elites Elite allies / ‘enemies’ 
Intra-elite conflict Position held by ally 
Electoral instability (= no. of parties 
needed in voting coalition – variable 
from subject to subject) 
Ability of ally to fulfil promises 
Proximity of elections Hostile elites 
Contingent events Presence of counter movements 
Extent of polarisation of opinions  
 
Following McAdam’s synthesis (1996)45 as presented earlier, dynamic political 
opportunities may be defined by following variables that effect “the stability or instability 
of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity” and those that effect 
“the presence or absence of elite allies” (ibid 1996:27).  Using the sources of data described 
earlier, the dynamic political opportunities for each case may be detailed using the above 
variables as a guide.  However, some very brief comments about what sorts of situations 
the variables may point to may be made. 
 
Intra-elite conflict refers to conflicts or differing opinions not only within European 
institutions (between DGs of the Commission or Parliament committees), but between the 
different European institutions and the member states.  Electoral instability and the 
proximity of elections are related to the political make-up of both the European Parliament 
and the Commission.  Elections at the European level are especially important for 
EUSMOs in terms of the opportunities and threats they may bring about as a result of the  
changing composition of the EP and also as a result of changes in the Commission.  Where 
                                                 
45 This synthesis is particularly applicable here, as it explicit goal is to root out those elements introduced to 
the theory that do not concern political opportunity in its strict sense.  McAdam understands this in a similar 
manner to Koopmans, whose clarifications are employed in this study.  For example, McAdam (1996) 
excludes “Brockett’s inclusion of “temporal location in the cycle of protest”” as he fail[s] to see what makes 
this a form of political opportunity, as opposed to a more general temporal facilitator of (or constraint on) 
movement activity” (McAdam 1996: 28 – emphasis in the original). 
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a Commission changes, this may signal a change in the overall perception of the 
Commission’s position on the campaign subject.  The variable ‘contingent events’ refers to 
a whole host of circumstances that, occurring during a campaign, may have significant 
repercussions on its outcomes.  As will be seen in the case studies, these events may 
eventually be reclassified in less vague terms, and indeed the recasting of this category for 
future studies is discussed in the conclusions.  During the earliest stages of the research 
however, leaving this category as wide open as possible was necessary as the nature of the 
different contingent events could not be predicted, and a narrower definition entailed the 
risk of missing important elements.  In the second column of the table, positions held by 
allies needs little further comment – are allies to be found in positions of power, such as 
within the institutions?  This would mean a significant opportunity, as mentioned earlier in 
discussing Ruzza’s (2004) emphasis on the importance of institutional allies.  Similarly, the 
size of the opportunity will be dictated by the ability of the ally to fulfil promises.  Hostile 
elites refers to European actors that are firmly set against the positions of the EUSMOs 
involved in the campaign.  Finally, the presence of counter movements presents a challenge 
to the clarity of the message of the EUSM, as the opposing frames will clash in the arena of 
the campaign.  Counter movements may then pose threats to the campaign, but also 
opportunities to rally activists, refute arguments and so on (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).  
These variables provide a guide to be applied to each of the case studies, and therefore will 
be explained in more detail in the following chapters.   
 
1.4 Discursive Opportunities 
 
One final theoretical approach must be discussed before the cases and their analysis with a 
view to tracing outcomes remains unexplored.  In a sense, the discursive opportunity 
approach draws together the two theories already discussed in order to pay attention to the 
discourses and frames that also provide an important context to the campaigns, and by that 
token to their effects. 
 
The idea of discursive opportunities, as devised by Koopmans and Statham (1999) can be 
discussed in terms of both the literature on framing, and that on political process.  Thus far, 
framing processes have been described as processes internal to coalitions of EUSMOs or 
movements.  Yet contestation in framing processes comes not only from within 
movements, but also from without.  Counter movements, the media, institutions, political 
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parties, governments and the like may also be engaged in the competition of constructing 
the most salient frame.  This is where discursive opportunities come into play: since 
framing is an ongoing process that must react to outside factors if it is to retain any 
meaning beyond the groups directly involved in the processes, frames must interpret new 
information, and be sure to respond to other, competing, frames in order to ensure their 
frame’s superiority when actors consider the issue in hand.  In the framing literature, this 
idea corresponds to ‘resonance’ - frames which resonate with the context in which they are 
embedded will be more believable, and probably appeal to a wider number of people.46  In 
this study similar ideas are considered under the heading of discursive opportunities for the 
simple reason that the analysis of these ‘external’ frames is seen in terms of the 
opportunities and threats posed to a campaign.  The opportunities label is thus more 
appropriate.  The choice is also linked to the analytical model developed for tracing 
campaign outcomes that will be described below.  Because the model makes an analytical 
distinction between processes internal and external to the campaigning groups, it makes 
more sense to define discursive opportunities as external.   
 
This choice may seem incongruous since such pains have been taken to limit the political 
opportunity approach precisely to political opportunities.  Yet specifying that political 
opportunities are different to discursive ones merely implies that care is taken in classifying 
the different factors that contribute to campaign outcomes.  The argument underpinning 
Koopmans and Statham’s idea of a discursive opportunity approach is their assessment that 
the political opportunity approach leaves no room for discourse,47 which is seen as the 
major explanation for differing outcomes amongst movements in the same field.  While I 
believe that a consideration of both of these types of opportunities and constraints48, 
alongside a consideration of identity factors, will yield the most complete explanation of 
variations in campaign outcomes in the European Union, it is certainly relevant, especially 
                                                 
46 See, for  example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989). Here the authors describe two different frames that had 
developed around the issue of nuclear power – one emphasising its dangers no matter the aim of its use, the 
other making a distinction between nuclear power for energy production and nuclear power used for 
constructing weapons.  When accidents at electricity-producing nuclear plants happened at both Three-Mile 
Island and  Chernobyl, the latter frame began to lose its resonance with the public as it clearly did not allow 
the interpretation of this information as effectively as the former frame, which highlighted the dangers of 
nuclear power.  As it lost its resonance, it thus lost its salience, and thus contributed to the anti-nuclear 
movement’s growth in importance.   
47 Where the political opportunity approach is properly specified according to Koopmans’ own work of 
course.  See section 1.3. 
48 Recalling that ‘political opportunities’ actually refers not only to potential advantages but also 
disadvantages presented by the political sphere. 
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in light of the framing approach used here, to make such a link.  If discourse, as an identity-
building tool employed by social movements via framing processes, is important for 
movements, and if their discourses are constantly challenged and forced to respond to 
events taking place in the wider social and cultural context (Benford and Snow 2000), then 
it makes sense to consider these discursive opportunities as important in determining the 
fate of movement campaigns.  As Koopmans and Statham describe the idea, discursive 
opportunity structures “may be seen as determining which ideas are considered “sensible”, 
which constructions of reality are seen as “realistic”, and which claims are held as 
“legitimate” within a certain polity at a specific time” (1999: 228) – in this sense, they are 
evidently important for EUSMO campaigns and their eventual outcomes.   
 
In addition, this approach has the merit of covering the areas that the two approaches 
already introduced leave out.  As Koopmans and Statham (1999) point out, not only do 
political opportunity approaches often have trouble explaining different outcomes in 
similar circumstances (a problem tackled by adopting a variable political opportunity 
approach here), but, as logically follows, framing approaches have difficulty in explaining 
the differential success of similar frames in different circumstances.  Thus, as many of the 
most influential scholars in the area have called for, a fusion of the two theories – which 
are by no means contradictory but indeed highly complementary – is necessary for a 
complete approach to the subject.   
 
Unlike the political process approach, it is more difficult to neatly divide discursive 
opportunities into their more fixed and more dynamic types.  Because discursive 
opportunities may come from such a wide variety of sources (whereas the sources of 
political opportunities are well defined) it is counter-productive to limit their description 
with too many categories.  Where deemed relevant, dynamic discursive opportunities will 
be described separately for each case.  That said, some variables for describing discursive 
opportunities in the EU in general and the campaign areas in particular can be listed.  
Reactions to these by the movement may then be explored.  There are two main elements 
that apply to all four of the case studies.  The first of these may be broadly labelled as 
perceptions of legitimacy.49  As the drafter of legislation and an unelected body, and as a 
                                                 
49 Although the division of the discursive category legitimacy and those concerning the prevailing culture of 
the EU as placed within the political opportunity structure is quite arbitrary – all of these categories are 
somehow concerned with frames as will be seen below.  However, while legitimacy can be said to be a 
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result of the controversies of the democratic deficit, legitimacy can be said to be especially 
sought by the Commission (but also by the EU institutions in general) by engaging in 
dialogue on policies with as wide as possible a sector of civil society or ‘stakeholders’ 
(Balme and Chabanet 2002:54).  Opportunities connected to the perception50 of legitimacy 
are for good reason discarded in national accounts, where the struggles that endowed the 
state with perceived legitimacy to act in various areas on behalf of the population as a 
whole were concluded long ago (although often re-opened precisely with the advent of 
ventures such as the EU).  All the governments of the member states of the EU are more or 
less accepted by their populations as the legitimate centres for defining rules and 
regulations concerning various areas of private and public life.   
 
But this is far from the case for the EU, which is not as yet widely accepted as a legitimate 
(whether democratic or not) authority.  This is especially relevant for EUSMOs, because 
although the European Union is not a nation state in any traditional sense, and has been 
best described by Jacques Delors as an ‘unidentified political object’, it cannot be denied 
that the legislation it passes has effects on the everyday lives of European citizens, and 
indeed on the lives of many citizens of nations outside the EU.  Essentially, for the 
purposes of building a picture of the discursive opportunity structure, this perception of a 
democratic deficit, or a lack of legitimacy, is shared within the EU institutions, and 
especially the Commission – the first port of call for many EUSMOs as the body 
responsible for drafting policy.  Even where individuals in the Commission do not share 
this view, the practical outcome is the same: to write legislative proposals likely to pass 
through the other institutions, the Commission must attempt to satisfy (or at least not 
utterly disappoint) as many interested parties as possible.  Although the perception may not 
be shared in reference to their own institutions by the European Parliament and the Council 
of Ministers, the problem for the EU as a whole is certainly recognised.  For example, the 
European Parliament cannot, according to Wessels’ simple yet powerful argument of the 
‘number problem’, take responsibility for representing every European citizen.  The 
citizens represented by each MEP are simply too many (Wessels 2004).  The European 
Parliament, as seen in the section on political opportunities, is to some extent considered 
                                                                                                                                                    
discourse, the prevailing culture elements may be said to be directly derived from institutional characteristics, 
hence the choice of division. 
50 The debates over whether or not the democratic deficit actually exists or not, and if it does how and 
whether it should be solved are largely irrelevant at this stage in the research.  What is important here is that 
the democratic deficit is perceived and discussed in the institutions of the EU.  The role that EUSMOs may be 
able to play in this respect should be discussed in the conclusions rather than here. 
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the natural ally of EUSMOs.  While MEPs Conceive of their duty as that of representing 
the citizens of the EU, EUSMOs that can claim to represent some of these citizens may find 
a ready ear in the European Parliament. 
 
The perceived democratic deficit thus translates into an opportunity for EUSMOs since, as 
Mény puts it “As long as the legitimacy deficit concerns public action alone, the situation is 
not serious. (…) By contrast, the position becomes more problematic when the legitimacy 
deficit relates to the institutions or political elites.” (2003: 252)  Thus, the institutions must 
react to this distrust amongst citizens or risk the eventual rejection of the rules they impose.  
Much of the institutional discourse on the subject of legitimacy has been connected with 
that on governance (understood as the formulation and application of policies via a wide 
range of actors not all considered to form part of the traditional set of government actors) 
via the various (and very widely defined) institutions of civil society.  The basic idea of 
opportunity here is that those groups that demonstrate some form of moral authority in that 
they represent a section of public opinion (as most social movement organisations may: see 
Boli 1999) will be in a good position to exploit the institutions’ weakness (especially the 
Commission as an unelected body) in terms of a lack of legitimacy.  In demonstrating that 
decisions have been taken in line with - or at least with an awareness of - the preferences of 
the public, the EU institutions may claim more (input) legitimacy – an option attractive to 
them.  Ruzza succinctly sums up the opportunity for EUSMOs presented by this situation. 
 
“The concept of civil society, in particular, strikes many observers as warranting special 
interest as a construct that constitutes a third level of political action located between 
decreasing political interest, knowledge and commitment at the level of individuals, on the 
one hand, and the functions of the state, which are shrinking or at least being substantially 
redefined in economic terms, on the other” (Ruzza 2004:9) . 
 
Another source of discursive opportunities or threats (depending on the subject area) for 
campaigns in the EU arena may be hypothesised as flowing from ideology, or the 
ideological import of different subject areas.  As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
certain subjects at the EU level are easier to split into series of small, technical questions, to 
some extent stamping out the broader questions surrounding the subject, whilst others are 
harder to break down into uncontroversial issues.  This is very much related to ideology – 
some issues do not fit into traditional right-left ideological continuums (such as 
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environmental issues), while others do.  Following on from the previous descriptions of the 
EU institutions as working mostly on the basis of consensus, it may be hypothesised that 
non-ideological issues may have an advantage over ideological ones in that they may find a 
ready ear amongst actors of all political colours.51  Social and employment issues, 
traditionally the stamping ground of the left-wing, carry connotations that mean that non-
left wing actors may be automatically hostile to the sorts of arguments advanced by 
interested EUSMOs in the area.  The upshot of this may be that to some extent, the nature 
of the policy area structures the debate around the issue, and the form of the campaign. 52  
 
The second broad variable used in defining the discursive opportunity structure of the EU 
concerns issue salience, and more particularly the effects that past or contemporary events 
may have on this.  One study providing concrete proof of how past or contemporary events 
in this sense is that on the diffusion or contagion of protest events among different EU 
member states by Reising (1999).  In this research, the author points out that as individual 
citizens adapt to the transfer of power to the new locus of the EU, they will not only focus 
more of their protest activities on the latter, they will also begin to form cross-national and 
transnational networks, as they did when power shifted from local to national levels 
previously (ibid:320).  It is then hypothesised, following the reasoning of both the 
collective action and political process traditions, that “the increasing interdependence of 
state actors on a global or transnational level to be mirrored by increasing interdependence 
of transnational protests” (ibid:322).  This is then tested via the counting of European 
protest events that took place in the neighbouring countries of France, Belgium and the 
Federal Republic of Germany between 1980 and 1995.  The analysis of the data 
demonstrate that recent protest events in one of these countries, as well as other events 
focusing on European Union issues, have a (varying) positive effect on the occurrence of 
protest (ibid:333-7).  In another, more recent, example of how protest events may affect 
issue salience, Uba and Uggla (2008) find preliminary evidence linking the occurrence of 
europrotests with fluctuations in levels of public support for the EU and the process of 
European integration.   
                                                 
51 As may be guessed, this opportunity straddles the political/discursive dichotomy, underlining that this is, at 
the end of the day, a theoretical construct that is not so clear cut in the real world.  The connotations of the 
opportunities related to ideology may however be seen as slightly more connected to discourses than 
structural political opportunities. 
52 I am indebted to Prof. Sidney Tarrow for picking up on what was originally a simple comment about 
ideology and suggesting that its consequences may well be far wider than first appeared to me. 
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As these studies show, recent or parallel events can have effects on other campaigns.  It 
may be that they also have other effects apart from simply making these more likely – 
successful tactics or discourses may for example be replicated, or previous mistakes 
avoided.  Although separated for analytical clarity, the relationships between political and 
discursive opportunities may thus be very close – for example, Smith notes that shifting 
political alignments following the end of the cold war allowed the salience of 
environmental issues to develop as security concerns receded (Smith 1999:181).  Various 
events may amplify a campaign’s relevance for the public, organisation members, and 
campaign targets by underlining their importance.  Some such events may be described for 
each of the policy areas under study here.   
 
For the environmental / public health cases, several recent health scares have contributed to 
pushing the issue of public health high on the agenda in the EU.  The first, and possibly 
most important, of these was the BSE (‘mad cow’) crisis.  The disease began in the UK, 
which then led to an EU ban on the export of British beef.  However, the late detection of 
the disease meant that many other European Union countries, although at relatively low 
levels, were affected by the disease.  The continuing uncertainties of how BSE is connected 
to its counterpart disease in humans, Creutzfeld Jakobs Disease (CJD), exacerbated by the 
disease’s characteristics (it can take many years to manifest itself)53, in addition to the high 
level of media coverage of the affair, meant that public health became an extremely salient 
issue on the European agenda.  Coming hard on the heels of the BSE crisis, and again in 
the UK, the first European outbreak of foot and mouth disease for 50 years contributed to 
keeping public health and food safety highly salient issues in the EU.  Both BSE and foot 
and mouth sparked new EU directives.  Even more recently the issues surrounding the 
likely spread of the Avian Influenza virus to humans has again placed public health, and 
the perceived unprepared state of science for such an epidemic, high on the agenda.  Other 
scholars have also noted the importance of these previous health scares on consumer 
confidence in new technologies and the like (including GMOs) (Imig and Tarrow 2001:29, 
Kettnaker 2001:208, Skogstad 2003:329, Juska and Edwards 2005:202, Hansen  2005).  
 
                                                 
53 This uncertainty is also reflected in the fact that those who lived or travelled for a long period of time in the 
UK in the years before the disease was finally uncovered are not allowed to donate blood in other EU 
member states. 
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For the social cases, recent examples of rather controversial European legislation in this 
field may also have affected the overall salience of social issues.  Three prominent 
examples spring to mind.  The first two, the Working Time Directive and the Temporary 
agency workers Directive, remain unadopted at the time of writing (March 2008).  The 
first, an amendment to a longstanding Directive, saw a Commission draft proposal 
extensively amended by the European Parliament in order to end the opt-out clauses 
allowing some member states to continue without any cap on maximum working times – 
clashes between Parliament and Council (and the UK in particular) remain unresolved.  
The second, on temporary agency workers, is a similar story of a number of member states 
blocking attempts to adopt legislation, with numerous presidency attempts at breaking the 
deadlock having proved unsuccessful.  Finally, legislation attempting to liberalise port 
services saw widespread and even violent protests organised by the European Transport 
Federation in 2006.  These protests saw around 6000 striking dock workers smash windows 
at the European Parliament, with simultaneous actions taking place in Rotterdam, Antwerp, 
Marseilles, Le Havre and Thessaloniki.       
 
The remaining variables that may be useful in specifying discursive opportunities are 
related to the two separate policy areas covered by the cases.  They are included, along 
with the two variables already introduced, in the following table.  
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Table 4: Variables for specifying discursive opportunities 
 
I shall begin by outlining some possible discursive opportunities for the two environmental  
public health campaigns.  The first of these is related to the relatively recent change in the 
public perception of scientists, and more specifically the way the risks associated with 
various products are perceived.  Generally speaking, since the 1970s, it may be said that 
“scientific progress and technological innovation are no longer unambiguously equated 
with social progress” (Hansen 2005: 9).  The actual truth of such a statement is, in this 
thesis, somewhat irrelevant for reasons similar to those put forward concerning the 
Perceptions of legitimacy 
(all cases) 
 
Discourse on the ‘democratic deficit’ (shared by many in EU 
institutions, academics, public). 
Ideology (all cases) Non-ideological issues may have wider audiences. 
 
Issue salience 
(all cases) 
 
 
 
Past (or contemporary) events heightening the salience of campaign in 
hand. 
 
 
Scientists no longer perceived as able to identify all risks, and therefore 
caution is needed to avoid these unknown risks. 
 Public health / environment 
 
Recent development of the precautionary principle. 
 
 
Social Dialogue – EU sees need for negotiation between employers and 
workers on legislation and other issues affecting employment. 
 
 
After 2000 (Lisbon Agenda agreed) loss of power for left-wing 
governments in many member states, resulting in the weakening of 
social discourses. 
 
Social 
 
Growth of the movement for globalisation from below / global justice 
movement (European Social Forum; Attac..) as a new force behind 
social discourses. 
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discourse on the ‘democratic deficit’ above.  The important point, for discursive 
opportunities, is not the truth of such a statement but the extent to which it is discussed and 
considered seriously by different actors.  In the case of declining trust in a generic class of 
‘scientists’, public concerns and low levels of acceptance of innovations such as genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), cloning, and other reproductive technology indicate this 
change. 
 
Following this line of thinking, the issue of risk, and the public’s declining acceptance of 
risk assessments belonging exclusively to the domain of science contributes to a concrete 
discursive opportunity for the two environmental / public health cases.  The social and 
environmental risks posed by innovations like those mentioned previously are seen as 
unpredictable, as previous experiences have shown science incapable of uncovering all of 
the possible outcomes of innovations.  Some examples here may be Thalidomide, a drug 
administered to many before being found to cause serious deformities in children; the 
poisonous effects of the industrial fertilizer DDT; and more recently the terrible 
consequences of some animal feeds in the BSE, or ‘mad cow’ controversy.  A discursive 
opportunity for campaigns on public health issues may spring from exploiting this 
uncertainty. The EU’s reliance on experts and scientific committees when making 
decisions in the area of public health is a potential discursive point of attack. 
 
The next potential source of discursive opportunities is the general policy guideline 
developed by the EU as a result of the ‘unknown risks’ discourse: the ‘precautionary 
principle’.  A first communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle was 
published in 2000 (Commission 2000) after a Council request that it apply the principle 
more generally.  This request was itself presumably a reaction to some of the health scares 
mentioned above.  The only mention in the EC Treaty of the precautionary principle is 
under the environment title, and it is specifically stated that it should be generally applied 
in all matters concerning environmental protection, human, animal or plant health.  It 
should be followed where there is not enough scientific evidence to complete proper risk 
assessments – in such cases policies and other instruments should follow the most cautious 
path in terms of protecting public health until new and complete evidence is available.  
Thus, this general principle can be said to represent an important discursive opportunity for 
EUSMOs, who may bring it up, along with complementary comments on the lack of 
scientific evidence in any particular case, as a more concrete basis for their demands for 
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caution.  Since no scientific assessment can easily be shown to take into account all 
evidence and all possible future risks, the principle should be easy to invoke.  In addition, 
because the principle is not entirely clear its application may be proposed to cover an 
extensive range of possible policy options – even a complete ban on a product or 
technology perceived to be too risky.   
 
Turning now to the variables connected to the two social policy campaigns.  The first of 
these is the social dialogue.  This is specifically related to the European Trade Union 
Congress (ETUC) and its members, and their official role in legislation regarding social 
and employment issues.  Along with the European employers’ association (UNICE) the 
ETUC takes part in this dialogue, whose joint texts (where these have been reached) take 
the place of Commission proposals for relevant legislation.  The social partners also have a 
role as privileged interlocutors on a host of other non-legislative issues in this area.  This 
gives an obvious discursive opportunity to the ETUC, and the Trade Unions it represents 
that stands quite apart from the political opportunity the position also affords.  Politically 
speaking, they have access to high-level players in the EU that others do not.  Yet access 
alone would be relatively insignificant without the discursive opportunity attached to the 
perception that their opinions have the right to be taken into account by these actors as a 
result of their legislative role.  The second variable concerns the more general political 
climate in the EU since 2000, when the Lisbon Agenda was decided.  Since then, many 
left-wing governments in the member states have lost power, with a corresponding shift in 
overall policy directions towards more right-wing agendas of economic growth and the free 
market.  This has been seen as a significant discursive threat for social discourses of the 
welfare state, social rights, globalisation with a human face and the like, which do not have 
any economic benefits in an immediate sense, but also a spur to mobilise, as the ‘neo-
liberal’ turn of the EU has been cited as a major condition behind the Euro marches (on 
unemployment and other issues) (della Porta and Caiani 2007:10).  The final circumstance 
relevant to discursive opportunities around employment and social issues at the level of the 
EU is the (relatively) recent rise of the global justice movement, or the movement for a 
globalisation for below.  The emergence of many new movement organisations and protest 
events based on opposition to neo-liberal globalisation may be seen not only as providing 
political opportunities for new alliances and campaigns for EUSMOs active on such issues, 
but also as providing a new source of social and rights discourses that could counteract the 
threats mentioned above.  While EUSMOs often state that they have problems making 
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issues attractive to the mass media, this movement has attracted a great deal of media 
coverage (albeit often unfavourable) in recent years.   
 
In this I hope to have developed a more or less coherent model for approaching social 
movement campaign outcomes that is in line with recent calls for the integration of 
political process and identity approaches.  Drawn together into a single analytical 
framework that will be presented in the next chapter, the approaches outlined here will 
assist me in uncovering and describing the causal chains between EUSMO actions and their 
(eventual) consequences by paying proper attention not only to the latter (through frame 
analysis and attention to tactics) but also to external contexts and actors (through the 
political and discursive opportunity approaches).  Although the analytical distinctions 
between politics and discourse, strategy and identity are arbitrary, they may be brought 
back together in the thick descriptions of the cases.  Their separation is however necessary 
for drawing out the tangled paths from movement action to outcome.  The following 
chapter will first discuss the data collection and methods employed in the case studies 
before presenting the integrated analytical model. 
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2. Untangling paths of influence: data and methods 
 
This second, briefer chapter will critically discuss the choices of data sources and methods 
used in the study.  Beginning with a discussion of the case study itself, the chapter will also 
discuss data sources and their triangulation, the methods developed for examining shared 
frames and political and discursive opportunities, and, finally, will present the integrated 
analytical model used to untangle the paths of influence between the various actors in each 
of the cases. 
 
2.1  Cases and campaigns 
 
The basis of the research that will be presented in the following chapters is the case study, 
which, following Snow and Trom (2002), should comprise of the description of “sets of 
interrelated activities and routines engaged in by one or more networks of actors within a 
social context that is bounded in time and space” (Snow and Anderson 1991 cited in Snow 
and Trom 2002:149).  In addition to thick narrative descriptions on how the story of each 
case unfolded, with a focus on actors, events, and targets, the methods that will be 
described below will contribute to fulfilling this aim by ensuring that proper attention is 
paid to the relations between the central actors as well as to the contexts in which they 
work.  The triangulation of methods focusing on political and discursive opportunities and 
shared frames also necessitates the use of qualitative methods of data collection, as will be 
described below.   
 
The decision to conduct the research based on a small number of relatively in-depth case 
studies was very much a consequence of the theoretical considerations that have already 
been presented.  And, indeed, comparative approaches require strong theorisation (della 
Porta 2002:293)  Because the ultimate aim of the study is to show the processes that lead 
EUSMOs to effect different kinds of outcomes at the EU level, a design allowing the close 
inspection of those processes (what della Porta (2002:292) describes as a Weberian 
comparative approach) is necessary.  Outcomes cannot easily be assigned as effects of one 
single action or another, as will be seen in the following discussion of process tracing.  A 
larger N study would have given the apparent advantage of allowing broader conclusions to 
be drawn, but at the price of foregoing any in-depth understanding of the processes linking 
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actions and outcomes.  While smaller-N studies inevitable suffer the defect of conclusions 
that cannot be generalised to any great extent (della Porta 2002:297), the decision to limit 
the study to four cases studies is a reasonable one in an area where no great amount of 
literature yet exists.  A more wide-ranging study looking at higher numbers of cases would 
be appropriate in the future in order to test the suggestions of this study, but in the absence 
of an exploratory study such as this one, where the possible mechanisms connecting 
EUSMO actions and those of other actors are explored, a large-N study would miss a great 
deal.  The present study aims to provide at least indications of the kinds of variables that 
would need to be considered in a large-N study, which would in any case require more 
resources in order to be carried out properly.  A paired comparison lies somehow halfway 
between the single case study and the large N study in that it still extends, if only a little, 
the generalisability of conclusions, and allows me to test some of the statements on EU 
movements that have already been made by other scholars (della Porta 2002:297).  In 
addition, the fact that the work presented here also makes a contribution in terms of 
empirical knowledge, in that it focuses on cases that have not, for the most part, been the 
subject of research before, also marks a point in favour of a more in-depth exploration.   
 
The unit of analysis that will provide the basic focus of each of the case studies is the social 
movement campaign.  This choice was made for several reasons, both theoretical and 
empirical, and I believe that this unit of analysis not only matches the actual phenomena 
under study well, but also facilitates the investigation of the research questions.  Della 
Porta and Rucht (2002) assert that in social movement studies in a general sense, analyses 
either approach entire movements as coherent entities – generally problematic since 
movements have been shown to be ephemeral and constantly shifting phenomena (Tarrow 
1994) and problematic for this project in particular because movements as they are 
understood in the traditional sense do not neatly transfer to the European level - or focus on 
case studies that are difficult to place in the context of any wider trend.  In addition, Tarrow 
and della Porta (2005:240) have asserted that “the modal unit of transnational contention is 
not the bureaucratic movement organization, but the loosely linked movement campaigns, 
social fora, or other types of weakly structured networks” (emphasis in original).  A focus 
on campaigns, defined as “a thematically, socially, and temporally interconnected series of 
interactions that, from the viewpoint of the carriers of the campaign, are geared to a 
specific goal” (ibid:3, emphasis in the original) lies between these approaches, paying 
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attention to both context and the shifting nature of movements over time.  
 
In more mundane and practical terms, the campaign is chosen as the unit of analysis for 
reasons of clarity.  Since the goal of the research is to identify whether European level 
groups have any effects on the EU in terms of changes in policy or legislation, the 
European agenda, or access to actors (as described in section 1.2), a focus on single 
campaigns makes the task of untangling the actions and effects of different actors more 
manageable.  Identifying the effects of a social movement, drawn out over time and with 
shifting goals, is an especially tricky matter, and therefore a fairly rigorous limitation of the 
types of effects to be investigated is useful.  The goal here is to look at precise effects on 
policies and access rather than the wider-ranging effects that larger movements may have 
over longer lengths of time (for example the movement for a globalisation from below).  
Bearing this in mind, campaigns with clearly stated goals are a more suitable unit of 
analysis, as will be further discussed below.54  In terms of the theoretical approaches to the 
research, specific campaigns also allow a more in-depth examination.  If a campaign 
consists of a network of EUSMOs engaged in a certain activity at certain levels for a 
relatively short period of time, then analysing campaigns should provide some insights into 
the internal cohesion and organisation of campaign coalitions.  Limiting the focus to 
campaigns also allows for a deeper analysis of internal characteristics, since the moment is 
short enough to allow detailed delving, whilst avoiding too brief an image.  Eventually, 
then, the information generated from these case studies could conceivably be tied in to the 
history of a wider movement.55   
 
2.2 Data and sources 
 
The first step in gathering data for the analysis of the campaigns is naturally to identify the 
groups involved in each of these.  The identification of those groups or organisations starts 
                                                 
54 A point also made by della Porta and Rucht (2002) 
55 For an enumeration of the advantages of comparative campaign analysis, see della Porta and Rucht 
(2002:1-9).  Campaigns have concrete aims, mobilise a limited set of actors and opponents around a specific 
target, and are temporally bounded (ibid 2002:3); focusing on campaigns allows the researcher to avoid 
privileging one particular actor or activity, although we are limited to a smaller unit that will not necessarily 
reflect the movement as a whole (ibid 2002:3); by comparing campaigns, cross-movement patterns that may 
otherwise remain hidden can be uncovered, and a systematic investigation of spatial dimensions (ibid 2002:5) 
showing interaction between all kinds of groups, in “pragmatic, although short-term alliances on concrete 
aims (ibid  2002:6, emphasis in original).  Finally, studying campaigns “offers better chances to assess 
impacts” (ibid 2002:9). 
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at the European level, since this is the main site of interest for this study.  Preliminary 
research on the more prominent groups in each of the subject areas active at the European 
level revealed that campaign information, such as press releases, calls for action, reports 
and the like were usually gathered in thematic pages, with logos and links to other 
organisations involved in the campaign and their resources.  It therefore seemed most 
practical to identify the ‘hard core’ of groups involved at the EU level through a 
‘snowballing’ technique, borrowed from the most preliminary stages of network analysis 
(see below for further discussion).  Once the group or groups involved in a campaign have 
been identified,56 (the ‘central node’ to employ the language of network analysis), the 
whole network of organisations involved  can then be traced by seeking out the contacts of 
the central organisation, and then theirs, and so forth until no further contacts are 
mentioned.  Obviously, such a technique requires the setting of specific boundaries, or risks 
becoming never-ending.  Therefore, contacts will be understood as relevant only when the 
relevant EUSMO campaign under study is actively participated in by the organisation, 
thereby filtering out more passive organisations that merely advertise links or banners.  
This technique builds a preliminary picture of the EUSMOs involved in the campaign, as 
well as ideas of the links between them and the role of each organisation, information then 
corroborated or otherwise in interviews with representatives of the organisations (see 
below).   
 
The subsequent selection of national groups involved in the campaigns is a little more 
complicated.  Although those national groups involved will be members of the European 
level groups leading the campaign at the transnational level, active participation was found 
to vary a great deal from country to country as well as from organisation to organisation.  
For example, in the coexistence case, the national Greenpeace group in Greece was 
extremely active, while in the UK the Friends of the Earth took the lead.  A sample of the 
organisations most active in only a few countries was therefore decided as the most 
workable solution (see also the discussion of problems with surveys in 2.3), also because 
interview evidence showed that a few key countries in each case aided the campaigns – that 
is where national involvement was achieved to any degree (the REACH case, for example, 
                                                 
56 These organisations are also located by internet research.  When a controversial issue is noted at the EU-
level, this is generally because one or more EUSMOs have begun to make public statements about it.  
Whether or not the organisations identified at first are really the ‘central nodes’ of the campaign coalition is 
irrelevant, since the subsequent snowballing ensures that all organisations involved are identified.  Further 
research reveals just how far each organisation is active. 
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saw little national involvement).  Therefore interviews as well as clues provided by 
publicly available documents from the European groups were used to identify these key 
organisations in the member states. 
 
Once the organisations had been identified, the first batch of documentary data sources 
could be collected.  This consisted of all the relevant documentation provided by the 
organisations on the subject of the campaign, and included mainly web pages, press 
releases, policy positions, investigative reports, conference reports, and information for 
activists such as newsletters, instructions for protests, model e-mails and letters etc.  These 
were supplemented by the relevant official documents – i.e. legislative proposals and 
communications, European Parliament reports and legislative summaries taken from 
legislative oeil (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/), Council common positions, as well 
as press releases and occasionally the texts of speeches.  Other documentary sources were 
policy files available from www.euractiv.com, which provide useful summaries of policies 
and the positions of principal actors, and occasionally newspaper articles, from the 
European Voice in particular.  Wherever quoted these sources are included in the 
bibliography, and the locations of all the documents used in the frame analyses (see below) 
are included in a separate annex.   
 
The second main source of data is from semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
each of the European level organisations involved in the campaigns.  (For a discussion of 
interview techniques, see section 2.4 below).  A total of twenty four interviews were 
carried out with, wherever possible, the member of staff responsible for following the 
campaign in question, although in some of the smaller organisations interviewees also 
followed several other issues.  Efforts were made to organise interviews with 
representatives of all the organisations identified as involved in each of the campaigns, yet 
this was not always possible.  Because the groups are often extremely small in their 
European guise, running offices with only a few staff members in Brussels who are 
responsible for following all the business of the Union, some organisations did not have the 
time to grant an interview, directing me to their websites for information.  In the Bolkestein 
case a different problem was met with, namely that nearly all the members of the ETUC 
have their own offices in Brussels.  In this case, selections of organisations were made 
based on their levels of activity on the issue, and with an effort to contact social NGOs as 
well as trade union organisations.  Amongst the trade union groups, the services 
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confederations were, understandably, the most active in this campaign.  There are four 
European service confederations at the EU level: the European Transport Workers 
Federation (ETF), the European Trade Union Committee for Education (ETUCE), the 
European Regional Organisation of Union Network International (UNI-Europa), and the 
European Public Services Union (EPSU).  Of these, only the latter two organisations were 
interviewed, as attempts to arrange similar interviews with the remaining two were 
unsuccessful.  Nevertheless, the two interviews carried out concern the broadest of the four 
confederations, representing workers from several sectors, and appear (based on internet 
research) to have been more active in the campaign as a result of this.   
 
Despite these slight gaps in the interviews, overall the source provides a wealth of 
information on the choices of the campaigning groups that cannot be gleaned from public 
sources, such as the reasons organisations took certain choices or actions, the mechanics of 
how they work with other groups and how they take joint decisions, as well as 
representatives’ real feelings about outcomes (even where optimism may be upheld 
publicly, privately groups may feel more disappointed about campaign outcomes).  By 
triangulating data sources and including documentary as well as interview evidence, the 
danger of too one-sided a story is also avoided, and various facts as well as the consistency 
of stories (an often pointed-out risk of interview data) can be checked.  Cross-checking is 
also facilitated by drawing not only on documents produced by the organisations involved 
in each campaign, but also on official documentation and analyses provided by third 
parties.  The main sources of evidence do however remain the campaigning groups, which 
entails the risk of exaggerating the role of their actions in eventual outcomes.  Yet because 
the focus of the study is exactly these groups’ actions, this bias in data sources is to some 
extent necessary.  Exaggeration is avoided by using, as already mentioned, other 
documentary sources as well as via the political process approach, which obliges me to pay 
proper attention to other actors and events affecting the course of the campaigns and their 
outcomes. 
 
With the ‘mechanics’ of data sources covered, the remainder of this short chapter will 
discuss and detail the methods used in the analyses of the case studies.    
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2.3 Measuring shared frames 
 
Measuring indications of collective identity is an extremely difficult endeavour, not least 
because there is no easy way of pinning down exactly what proves that a collective identity 
is present.  In the theoretical discussions presented earlier in the previous chapter, I fixed 
on the concept of the frame as indicating shared ideas and problem definitions between 
different groups, which would allow them to work alongside one another and therefore 
have effects on the EU, as an alternative to seeking out ‘collective identity’ in a stronger 
sense, since this is contested even as a possibility in transnational movements (Rucht 
1999).  These frames build “sustained connections among activists in different regions, 
they structure the repeated opportunities for transnational cooperation and exchange that 
are essential to building trust and promoting commitment to group identities” (Smith 2002: 
507-508).  Frames are thus essential for, and good indicators of, collective identity, and are 
spread through the mechanism of diffusion (Snow and Benford 1999).   
 
In order to trace the diffusion of frames, several methods are possible.  For example, the 
organisations involved in a web of diffusion could be identified through some preliminary 
form of network analysis.  Indeed, qualitative versions of network analysis have been 
recommended for studies concerned with investigating networks in relation to more 
‘meaningful’ issues such as collective identity (Diani 2002).  The technique has also been 
connected with the theory of diffusion, since “Direct channels of diffusion are akin to 
cohesion models used by network analysts which hold that ideas diffuse most rapidly when 
individuals are in direct and frequent contact” (Soule 2004:295).  However, network 
analysis is an extremely time-consuming and involved method, and would leave little room 
for the investigation of shared frames that is the real aim here.  Accordingly, some very 
preliminary techniques of this method are drawn on to identify the organisations relevant to 
each case, and nothing more (i.e. the snowballing technique described earlier).     
 
Once the authors of frames (that is the organisations involved in each campaign) have been 
identified, several solutions for examining the frames they create are possible.  Perhaps the 
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most direct and thorough way of determining how and if frames are diffused among 
organisations is the use of qualitative surveys which may gather information on both the 
strength and content of frames (Smith 2002).  These surveys include questions that may be 
answered according to qualitative scales, or indeed freely by the respondent, providing the 
researcher with rich data on framing processes as well as the frames themselves.  Direct 
interviews would of course be even more preferable, but including national level 
organisations as well as European level organisations would be too much for one researcher 
to carry out.  Such a survey, with questionnaires designed to query aspects of collective 
identity, common understandings and solidarity (see Smith 2002), as well as the frequency, 
quality and direction of contacts and the exchange of resources between different 
organisations was attempted for the co-existence case – the first undertaken for this study.  
The usual recommended steps were taken in order to reduce the chances of a low response 
rate (a cover letter promising results, possibility to respond electronically, reminder letters, 
following  Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992).   
 
However, this more direct attempt at analysing the extent of shared frames between 
organisations involved in a campaign met with the common problem of response rates too 
low to base any analyses on.  In addition, the wording of some of the questions, which 
necessarily included their own framings, were criticised by some respondents.57  At the 
national level especially European technical terms for some problems were simply not 
recognised, although equivalent words were used.  Since the suitability of the method for 
analysing frames produced at multiple levels was paramount, it was decided to develop a 
technique for analysing the frames that organisations used in their publicly available 
documents – such as press releases, conference reports, or position papers.  Where surveys 
may impose some personal view of shared frames, documents would tell the truth of the 
frames as they were developed.  While such an analysis also has its drawbacks – most 
prominently as a result of the necessity of sampling, of ensuring a dynamic analysis and 
such like – it does at least ensure that a more detailed picture of shared frames is built, by 
avoiding the imposition of boundaries and language. 
 
The method of frame analysis developed for this thesis draws on many different studies, 
                                                 
57 Some respondents in the national groups active around the issues of the coexistence case do not accept the 
cultivation of GMOs in any form, and therefore reject outright the idea of rules for coexistence of normal and 
GM crops.  These groups were more active in promoting regional or local bans. 
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and in particular della Porta et al (2006), that have employed similar tools in an attempt to 
elaborate a method that overcomes the main pitfalls normally associated with the approach 
whilst remaining well-suited to this particular subject. It should be noted however that the 
frame analyses carried out will be used to corroborate (and if necessary to correct) the more 
qualitative thick descriptions of the case studies.  
 
The first question to be answered is what exactly is to be analysed?  Documentary sources 
for the campaigns studied are plentiful (at least for the European-level groups) – too 
plentiful for one person to analyse meaningfully or within the timeframe of this project.  In 
addition there are many downsides to undertaking analyses of a large amount of documents 
where the information sought in these is more of a qualitative nature (Gerhards and Rucht 
2000:573).  Although the roots of frame analysis are, as mentioned earlier, in content 
analysis which started as basic word counting, searching for meaning in syntax is of a far 
more qualitative nature, and correspondingly more open to argument.  Sampling is thus a 
good solution to both the problem of reducing a labour intensive job, and to that of 
debatable interpretations since focusing on a small sample of documents means that these 
may be more easily and speedily consulted by the reader who wishes to check the 
researcher’s analysis (Johnston 1995, 2002; Gamson and Modigliani 1985; Gerhards and 
Rucht 1992).  Reproducing the documents analysed is also the best available response to 
the criticism that all discourse analysis is inevitably reification since the researcher brings 
her own expectations and knowledge to the analysis (Steinberg 1998).   
 
The documents sampled are publicly available texts published by the groups active in the 
campaigns at both the European and national levels, as described in the previous section.58   
Since the interest here is not only in shared frames but how these frames came to be shared, 
that is in framing processes, it is also clear that documents written at different points in the 
campaign must be analysed in order to trace frame development.  Within each campaign, 
critical events that required a movement response can be identified.  These form the basis 
for the periodisation of each campaign, and documents are chosen to reflect the intensity of 
the campaign within each of these periods, including reactions to the critical event marking 
the beginning of each.  This continuous analysis of documents throughout the campaign 
                                                 
58 These documents were found while identifying the network of EUSMOs involved in the campaign via the 
snowballing technique mentioned above, which involves examining all the documents available from the 
internet that are apparently pertinent to a campaign.  This wider reading allows informed choices to be made 
on which documents to analyse.)   
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addresses the common criticism by many academics that although framing is described as 
an ongoing process, analyses tend to ‘freeze’ a frame and take it as fixed in describing it 
(Oliver and Johnston 2000).  By taking ‘snapshots’ of frames at different points, the 
analysis should avoid such a static representation of the campaign, focusing instead on 
framing processes (following the advice of Johnston 2002).  In addition, this technique is 
well-suited to the multi-level nature of the campaigns – it’s dynamic analyses can include 
‘snapshots’ from different levels simultaneously as well as over time. 
 
The analysis thus follows framing processes both throughout the campaign – from event to 
event – and at different levels – from transnational to national.59  The comparison of 
frames, classified according to whether they are diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational in 
order to provide more information for discussion, provides evidence of where frames 
change or incorporate new arguments over time.  Backed up with interview evidence, 
which shows where groups contacted others, for example with the hope of their joining the 
campaign, this will provide proof of ‘bridging’, ‘diffusion’ etc., and draw a detailed picture 
of how shared problem definitions develop (or not) during the campaign.  The ‘frames’ 
found in each document analysed are recorded in a grid, including the position of each 
frame within the document (title or paragraph number) and the total amount of mentions 
across all documents analysed.  In fact, what these grids record is what Johnston (2002:64-
5) would describe as the components of frames.  By taking each component of the wider 
argument contained in each of the documents, the analysis takes account of how the 
hierarchy of the frame components shifts across each campaign (ibid 2002:64-5).  The 
grids show in a simple graphic how far different frames are shared, and which frames are 
closely connected.  Another advantage here, pointed out by Johnston (2002:87) is that 
“systematic methods of presentation… increases confidence in interpretations, and makes 
comparisons easier”.  These grids, compiled for each period of each campaign for the 
European and national levels, are included in Appendix I.  The documents they analyse are 
listed in Appendix II.  Where necessary, any problems with the selection of these 
documents is discussed further in the relevant section of each chapter. 
 
2.4  Varying political and discursive opportunities 
                                                 
59 Unfortunately the research outlining the networks in each campaign stops at national contact points, since 
to follow through to the local groups simply makes too much work for one project.  Ideally, the study could 
be followed up by a more thorough investigation of all the groups involved and their communications. 
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The comments on methods for identifying and analysing opportunities and threats further 
below in this section apply to both political and discursive opportunities, and so in order to 
avoid repetition the two are merged in this discussion.  First, however, the task of 
identifying and analysing the political opportunities and threats present in each campaign, 
as well as the responses to these, raises its own particular methodological question.  This  
touches on the theme of case selection, a theme that will be further discussed in relation to 
other criteria at the end of this chapter.  Some discussion is nevertheless warranted here as 
a result of the methodological implications for analysing political opportunities.   
 
As the main aim of the research is to examine the outcomes (if any) of campaigns by 
EUSMOs at the European level, the political opportunity structure in which they act must 
be held constant as far as possible in order to facilitate the tracing of causal paths towards 
outcomes (see section 2.5).  In addition, holding contexts constant contributes to making 
the cases more comparable.  The overall political opportunity structure in which the 
campaigns take place is of course the European Union as a whole.  However, the suitability 
of a variable political opportunity approach was also posited in the theoretical discussions 
presented earlier on.  In order to ensure that the national and local political opportunity 
structures that also bear consequences for the campaigns do not vary too widely, and 
therefore ensuring the method’s suitability for studying multi-level phenomena, the cases 
will concern campaigns focusing on subject areas where: 1) the EU has a  clear policy 
competence, meaning that the supranational institutions have power.  Comparing a 
campaign on, say, environmental policy with a campaign on immigration would not 
produce comparable results as the EU’s supranational institutions hold no jurisdiction over 
matters of immigration, whilst they do for environmental matters.  2) the areas of 
competence must be comparable.  Comparing different subject areas where one is more 
recently acquired and thus less developed in terms of procedures, actors etc. would also 
produce ‘unfair’ results.  This applies equally to the development of EUSMOs at the 
European level.  Areas where groups are considered policy partners and routinely consulted 
cannot be compared to areas where no such relationships exist.  This means that the study 
may be accused of another bias – that of tending to include only the most institutionalised 
or mainstream organisations to the detriment of newer and more radical groups.  This I 
acknowledge, but defend by stating that this is simply a characteristic of groups active at 
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the EU level on policy issues – acceptance of the EU in general and a willingness to work 
within its sphere is a pre-condition for participating in these campaigns.  At the national 
level, more radical groups may well be included in the cases – for example, many of the 
national Greenpeace groups involved in the coexistence campaign may be described in 
such terms.  The Bolkestein case also includes radical groups such as ATTAC at the 
national levels, and indeed some transnational involvement was seen through branches of 
the European Social Forum and in the Stop Bolkestein initiative.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that the more institutionalised ETUC, a strong player in this campaign, took steps 
to distance themselves from these organisations.  In this sense, the Bolkestein case can be 
seen as the exception that proves the rule on this issue of in-built bias in the study.  
However, because this bias towards the study of institutionalised groups is the result of the 
characteristics of the field itself, and cannot for this reason be overcome, it is ultimately 
defendable.   
 
The method that will be used to identify and analyse the political and discursive 
opportunities present in each of the case studies is a simple one.  In a first step information 
is gathered from the documents already mentioned above, as well as from other available 
sources, such as scholarly research focusing on similar or the same issues, documents from 
groups working against the campaigning EUSMOs, and news articles.60  The information 
from these sources is then combined with interview data.  Of the three classical types of 
interview (structured, semi-structured, and nondirective), the semi-structured is most suited 
to the purposes of the interviews to be carried out in the framework of this research.  Semi-
structured interviews allow boundaries to be set by concentrating on a particular area of 
interest, but also leave ample space for probing subjects as they arise.  In addition, the 
semi-structured interview has been particularly recommended for investigating political 
(and discursive) opportunities, as they minimise the “voice of the researcher” on the 
subject, and bring to the fore the aspect of human agency crucial to the exploitation of 
political opportunities (Blee and Taylor 2002). 
 
Linked to this last point, interviews should reduce interviewer bias as well as encourage 
full and descriptive answers by beginning with wide, open-ended questions that may then 
be refined as appropriate through probing questions at later points (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
                                                 
60 In particular, the European Voice weekly newspaper and the wesite euractiv.com provide good coverage of 
EU issues. 
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Nachmias 1992; Blee and Taylor 2002), with more specific or routine questions asked at 
the end of the interview.  This technique also allows the interviewee to contribute to the 
dialogic process between the empirical case and the theoretical framework,61 which may be 
adjusted and redesigned according to information from the ground provided in broad, open-
ended questions that may be answered in an unconstrained manner.  Thus, using interviews 
to probe the themes of political and discursive opportunities in the EU allows me to build a 
more complete and accurate picture of each case, as they provide information on those 
variables missed in the literature-based sketch.   
 
Interviews were carried out with as many as possible of the core European level groups in 
each campaign, as discussed earlier.  It may well be asked why interviews were not carried 
out with institutional actors, as well as counter-campaigning groups, or with groups at the 
national level.  While the reasons for omitting the latter from interviews were purely 
logistical, and would certainly be an important part of any future study, the focus on 
EUSMOs is justified by the political process approach itself.  As already mentioned briefly 
in the relevant theoretical discussions, an integral part of the role of political (and 
discursive) opportunities in social movement campaigns is their perception (Tarrow 1994).  
While the description of political and discursive opportunities can be derived from relevant 
documentary sources, information on how opportunities and threats are perceived, on 
which are seen as most important and which as relatively innocuous, on which threats or 
opportunities were most reacted to and contributed the most to shaping each campaign, can 
best be gathered from one-to-one interviews with representatives of the campaigning 
groups.  The interviews that were carried out for each of the case studies included here are 
listed in Appendix III.   
 
All of the interviews carried out, each of which lasted around one hour, were transcribed 
and subsequently coded.  The development of codes was not difficult, as the variables 
described earlier as guides for classifying political and discursive opportunities provided a 
ready made code list tailored to the purpose.  The interviews were then coded using the 
WinMax 98 programme.  Categories on shared frames and campaign outcomes were also 
                                                 
61 Such a dialogic process between evidence and theory is underlined as important by several influential 
authors on qualitative methods, for example Ragin (cited in Snow and Trom 2002), and in relation to the 
study of social movements by Snow and Trom (2002) and Blee and Taylor (2002).   The latter underline the 
importance of beginning with interviews that are broad and relatively un-structured followed by a process of 
revising and refining the theoretical approaches on the basis of these results.   
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included in this coding in order to provide more data on the variables described in the 
previous chapter.  The coded sections for each variable were then easily accessible and 
rearranged by code and / or group, facilitating the analyses of political and discursive 
opportunities that are found in the case studies.  As with the method used for analysing 
frames, this simple and very much open method for examining political and discursive 
opportunities leaves the data relatively untouched, rendering it only more easily retrievable 
according to the variable under examination.   
 
2.5  Campaign consequences:  a  method for process tracing 
 
The next challenge is how exactly we may discover the tangled paths leading to these 
outcomes.  In order to do this, information on internal movement processes (frames) and 
external contexts (political and discursive opportunities) is necessary.  The following 
discusses how the information from these analyses is used to facilitate process tracing with 
a view to assigning causal links between campaigns and their outcomes. 
 
Undertaking the task of identifying the links between a campaign and its possible outcomes 
entails the unravelling of highly complex paths of influence, and many ‘over-simplistic’ 
studies on the subject are criticised for under-estimating the complexity of these links 
(Cress and Snow 2000).  Not only must the messages of movements be identified through 
their various actions, documents and other campaigning techniques, but these must then be 
traced in their travels through the ‘filter’ of political opportunity structures, political and 
discursive opportunities.  Many authors have underlined the importance of this ‘filter’, 
pointing out that a movement, or indeed any kind of interest group, may have some effect 
only when circumstances allow.  As was described in the theoretical approaches to this 
study, the circumstances most important for EUSMOs in the European Union are political 
and discursive.  Discussing the problems in disentangling the lengthy causal threads 
between action and outcome in such situations, Giugni (1999) summarises five cross-
checking techniques for establishing tighter links between the two.  These are as follows:  
1) Collecting data not only on the movement in question and outcomes but also on all other 
actors involved (rulers, parties, interest groups, media, counter movements etc.), and then 
control for their effects, 2) Take context into account, 3) Comparative research design, 4) 
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Dynamic analysis of causal links,62 5) Examine situations with no outcomes in order to 
check for the presence / absence of hypothesised contributions to consequences.   
 
Equivalent considerations are built into the research design here.  Points 1 and 2 are 
included in the analytical model that will be used as an aid for unravelling the chains 
linking EUSMO actions and their possible consequences.  Thus, the model builds in those 
controls concerning the collection of material on other actors, as well as the proper 
consideration of relevant contexts via the determination of political and discursive 
opportunities and structures.  Point 3, which recommends a comparative research design, is 
obviously covered as the research consists of comparative case studies.  The comparison of 
cases allows the identification of similar paths, and thereby more robust pronunciations 
concerning the effects of certain actions (Kriesi and Wisler 1999).  The fourth point has, as 
already demonstrated, been included in the general approach taken to the subject of 
movement outcomes here.  Finally, Giugni’s fifth point – that of investigating cases with 
‘no’ outcomes - is also heeded, since two of the cases did not see their stated goals 
achieved.  In addition, by periodising the campaigns (as will be discussed below), the ‘N’ 
of the study is increased, providing other examples of cases with no outcomes.   
 
The following model, adapted from Schumaker (1975) will be used to guide the analysis of 
causal paths leading to campaign outcomes.63  The model includes all of those approaches 
discussed so far as important in identifying outcomes, integrating them into a method for 
process tracing.  Outcomes are the dependent variables, the results of the values for the 
independent variables of shared frames, and the intervening (‘filter’) variables of the 
various political and discursive opportunities of each campaign, at both European and other 
territorial levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Tilly develops this idea in his conclusion to Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999.  Paths should be traced from 
outcome to movement, vice versa and from middle outwards both ‘before’ and ‘after’ research has been 
carried out to control for hypothesised paths of causal chains. 
63 Following Amenta and Caren’s (2004:469) review of the literature dealing with movements’ effects on 
states, this model includes those variables found to be relevant (in various combinations) in these studies. 
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Figure 1: an analytical model for tracing campaign outcomes 
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movement impacts.  Based on studies of the outcomes of the ecology, antinuclear, and 
peace movements in the United States between 1977 and 1995, Giugni (2007) concludes 
that movements are extremely unlikely to cause any outcomes on the basis of their actions 
alone – their actions always weave in with external opportunities or threats where an 
outcome is recorded.  Similarly, he also discounts the two-step model of movement 
outcomes, which characterise movements as mere aggregators of interests subsequently left 
in the hands of institutions which act upon them accordingly.  Instead, all of these factors 
must be considered together as simultaneously occurring phenomena, as is the case in the 
model presented here (ibid 2007).   
 
Looking at the model more systematically, the first box concerns information on those 
aspects that may be described as more or less under the EUSMOs’ control – i.e. the ‘extent 
of shared frames’, denoting the results of the frame analysis.  Of course, in the real world 
the relationships between social contexts, political opportunities, internal movement 
choices and consequences are inextricably linked in what Amenta and Caren (2004:462) 
call a ‘recursive process’, that is in a circular relationship where choices affect 
consequences and vice versa.  However, the extent of shared frames within a movement is 
in the final analysis the result of choices taken by the movement alone, even if they are 
likely to have been taken strategically in light of the conditions in which it exists.  For 
theoretical simplification therefore this somewhat arbitrary distinction is made.  In the 
second box we find the fixed and dynamic political and discursive opportunities of the EU, 
which vary for each campaign.  The shading of this box indicates the effect of all these 
external conditions as a filter, more or less conducive to letting EUSMO ideas – expressed 
in frames and via different actions (tactics) – pass through unscathed.  Within this filter, we 
can imagine that ideas may be mutated, entangled, more or less altered, acquired or rejected 
by other organisations, they may also enter into competition with the claims of other groups 
and so forth.  The challenge of the analysis therefore lies within this filter, in untangling 
context from original idea in an effort to trace paths of influence.  On the far side of this 
‘filter’ consisting of various societal contexts, emerge the movement outcomes.  The 
information here will be provided by the assessment of varying political and discursive 
opportunities.   
 
How exactly will all this information be used to determine the causes and outcomes of the 
campaigns?  With such a small number of cases, there are two real possibilities, either a 
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more formal method, or the more qualitative approach of process tracing plumbed for here.  
Concerning more formal methods, one possibility is qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA), a small-N analytical tool.  QCA is based on Boolean algebra, and can be used to 
test variables in order to determine which of these, and in which combinations, are 
necessary (the variable must be present), or sufficient (the variable alone suffices) for an 
outcome.  This tool may be appropriate since complex causal paths to movement outcomes 
have been shown to be the rule (see for example Cress and Snow 2000, Giugni et al 1999), 
and “[F]or causal claims that are interactive or combinational… interactive specifications 
or like means should be employed.  Such interactions can readily be modelled by way of 
QCA, a technique that often can be employed in the absence of large numbers of cases.” 
(Amenta and Young 1999:38) 
One particular problem with the classical QCA method stems precisely from the fact that 
campaign outcomes have complex causes.  Cress and Snow (2000) discuss this problem 
with relation to QCA under the label of ‘significant impact’.  Their analysis of the 
outcomes of mobilisations by homeless organisations was hampered by the fact that 
because traditional QCA uses ‘0’ (absent) and ‘1’ (present) codes, the extent of an 
outcome’s actual impact, or importance, is not captured in the results.  This problem is 
overcome in a more recent version of QCA, which uses ‘fuzzy-sets’ to provide more fine-
grained scores.  Each variable is allocated a score between 0 and 1, according to a scale 
designed with that specific variable in mind.  In addition, each score between and including 
0 and 1 must be assigned a linguistic tag that describes its real meaning.  The laborious 
process of coding ensures a continued dialogue between analysis and case study, making 
for an accessible and considered analysis.   
Another more recent modification to the method (see Schneider and Wagemann 2006) also 
addresses the similar issue of the need for the differential treatment of ‘remote’ and 
‘proximate’ conditions (based on Kitschelt 1999).  In the ‘fuzzy-set/QCA two-step 
approach’ (ibid 2006), remote conditions, which would equate to the structural context 
variables in this study (both discursive and political), are analysed in a first step to 
determine within which overall conditions the outcome is likely or unlikely.  In a second 
step, the effects of the proximate variables, here those concerned with the more dynamic 
political and discursive opportunities, as well as those connected to internal movement 
dynamics, are tested for their effects within these background conditions, since their effects 
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may be different in each.  This method thus matches well with the political opportunity 
approach as understood in this project, as it also makes a clear distinction between what I 
have called static and dynamic variables.  It also matches well with what political 
opportunity theorists have always found: that one tactic may be advantageous in one 
context, but disadvantageous in another. 
Although this method may be tempting, the option of process tracing fits better with the 
aims of the study in hand.  QCA’s acknowledgement of the problem of limited diversity 
(since this is a problem also seen in statistical and other methods, including process tracing) 
makes a less formal method a more sensitive choice in a study with so few cases, and 
which aspires to pay such close attention to these.  Various measures have been proposed 
to alleviate the problems of limited diversity in QCA: the computer programme may 
simulate the most parsimonious solution, assigning outcomes to the entire constellation of 
possible case outcomes; or indeed all possible cases may be assigned a negative outcome; 
or the researcher may make decisions on outcomes based on theoretical assumptions (see 
Wagemann 2007:399-400).  More sophistated solutions, such as that of Schneider and 
Wagemann (2006) described above, may also be applied to alleviate the problems of 
limited diversity.   Using this more formal method of analysis thus rather defeats the object 
of the study as a more exploratory look at how complex patterns of causes contribute to 
campaign outcomes in the EU – already an under-theorised area as seen in the above 
discussions with their adaptations to the transnational level.  Therefore, a more intuitive 
method for untangling the causal paths of the case studies is employed – one that can 
certainly employ the useful terms of ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’, and uses the same kinds 
of logic as QCA, but relies on even more detailed, careful, theory-based narratives. 
 
Process tracing is one such methodological approach, and one peculiarly suited to the aims 
of this study.  Process tracing may be described as “a procedure for identifying steps in a 
causal process leading to the outcome of a given dependent variable of a particular case in 
a particular historical context” (George and Bennett 2005:176), that is, rather than simply 
narrating the accumulation of events, the researcher must ensure that narratives are guided 
and geared towards eeking out processes and causal chains and mechanisms in their case 
studies.  Since the main research question of this thesis is to do with attributing causes to 
outcomes in EUSMOs’ campaigns, process tracing is therefore well-suited to this aim.  Of 
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course, the actual method used must be adapted to the study in hand, and this is the 
essential aim of the analytical model already presented above.   
 
Process tracing also strengthens the overall design of the study as based on case studies, 
since another of its benefits is to alleviate some of the problems connected with attempts to 
recreate the conditions of controlled comparisons in the tradition of Mill.  Since the real 
world only very rarely provides us with an array of cases similar in every respect but one, 
process tracng can help overcome associated problems because it is so sensitive to detail, 
and allows the researcher to inspect all possible causal paths leading to a certain outcome, 
and then to inspect each with a view to (ideally) discarding all but one of these (ibid:214).  
The particular variant of this method that I employ is what George and Bennett term 
analytical explanation, which is “… couched in explicit theoretical forms” and focuses 
deliberately on what are considered to be the most important elements for explaining the 
outcomes of the cases – i.e. shared frames and political and discursive opportunities.  In the 
final, comparative stage of the study included in the concluding chapter, the results of the 
process tracing carried out for each of the cases are also valuable, since they may also 
contribute to middle-range theory development in that the different conditions or contexts 
of events leading to certain outcomes may begin to be generalised in what the authors call 
“contingent generalizations” (ibid:215), although these would of course require further 
investigation in order to receive proper confirmation.  Process tracing does of course have 
its limits – the researcher must be careful to investigate all the possible paths that may lead 
to an outcome and consider each carefully before accepting or discarding its validity.  Most 
importantly, process tracing can only form any kind of basis for causal inference where the 
information and path traced between a cause and an outcome is uninterrupted (ibid:217).  
In this study I believe that information and the paths posited in each of the cases are 
complete, and in each of them many different possible paths are discussed in the relevant 
sections of each study.  My belief is that the case studies that will be presented in the 
following four chapters are not pure narrative exercises – the above model and the 
theoretical approaches it encompasses lead to accounts that are focused, structured and 
geared towards the explanation of causal paths via process tracing.   
More recent work by McAdam et al (2008) takes the process tracing method a step further 
into the terrain of identifying not only causal paths but also mechanisms, a virtue also 
highlighted by George and Bennett (2005:127).  As McAdam et al put it: “…all episodes of 
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politics result from mechanisms: delimited changes that alter relations among specified 
sets of elements in identical of closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (2008:308 
– emphasis in the original).  By identifying the mechanisms at work in causal chains, the 
authors posit that the researcher not only shows a causal chain linking two events, but also 
the sort of event that produces this link.  The authors then continue to provide concrete 
examples of research that has achieved this aim, including work that directly measures 
mechanisms through “systematic events data” (ibid:310).  Indeed, the relevant example 
focuses on the mechanism of scale shift – a phenomenon that also comes to light in the 
present study in the coexistence case (see section 3.6).  The case studies presented here thus 
take account of these most recent calls to extend the method of process tracing by 
providing general classifications for the phenomena that link actions and outcomes – 
although these are not explicitly labelled as mechanisms.  These are presented in the final 
chapter drawing conclusions from the comparisons between the different case studies 
included in this study. 
 
Similar arguments for narratives bound by theoretical models are advanced in Bates et al’s 
(1998) work on ‘analytical narratives’, where these “Trace behaviour of particular actors, 
clarify sequences, describe structures, and explore patterns of interaction” (ibid: 10).  By 
paying careful attention to theoretically guided narratives, and to the model outlined earlier, 
the different paths towards case outcomes can be described and evaluated for their relative 
importance on the basis of the different analyses.  Although a less formal method, process 
tracing is much more in tune with the expectation that campaign outcomes will be the result 
of complex paths.  Even were a formal method like QCA to be used, in-depth knowledge of 
the cases would still be behind the results generated.  For such a small-scale comparative 
study it therefore makes more sense to rely directly on in-depth narratives and reasoned 
arguments for the assertions made about the outcomes of each campaign. 
 
2.6  Case selection 
 
Finally, now that methods, data collection and theoretical approaches alike have been 
described and defended, I shall introduce the cases selected for study in this thesis.  Some 
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of the factors relevant for case selection have already been described at opportune 
moments, and will merely be referred to briefly here for the sake of avoiding repetition.   
The starting point for selecting each case is simple: because the interest is in EUSMOs – 
that is organisations that may be described as having their roots in social movements at the 
national level that have subsequently transferred some of their activities to the European 
level – I began by seeking out controversial (in that they have sparked high levels of 
attention from interest groups) issues in the EU through monitoring the websites of 
prominent EUSMOs, news reports on European issues, and from personal knowledge.64  
Several potential issues were identified: the transport of live animals; gender 
mainstreaming; genetically modified organisms; the Convention on the Future of Europe 
(charged with drafting the Constitutional Treaty); chemicals legislation; the Lisbon agenda; 
and the Directive on Services in the Internal Market were the most prominent of these.  The 
start and end points of each of the campaigns are, as far as possible, dictated by the 
campaigning groups and the EU institutions themselves, with end points taken as the point 
at which a campaign can be said to have achieved or failed to achieve its stated goal.65   
The chosen campaigns took place at similar points in time (between 2003 and 2006), and 
are also comparable in the sense that they display ‘concrete’ aims, with the goal of making 
the tracing of paths to outcomes a little less complicated.  Two different policy areas were 
then fixed on in order to guarantee variation in the EUSMO coalitions studied.  These are 
environment and public health policies, and ‘social’ concerns in the broad sense often 
employed when approaching these issues at the EU level (Daly 2006:463) – that is 
encompassing internal market policies that affect EU citizens’ as workers and consumers in 
particular.  These two areas of policy competence are comparable – although 
environmental policies are a more recently acquired EU competence, with the first five-
year action plan proposed in 1972, an impressive amount of legislation has been built up in 
the area (Balme and Chabanet 2008:172).  In addition, policies with more obviously direct 
effects in the broad area of social policy can also be said to be more recent, since the 
earliest efforts of the EU in this area (following the Second World War) were necessarily 
limited to purely economic areas (Balme and Chabanet 2008:235).  It could be argued that 
better matched policy areas could have been chosen – for example internal market policy 
                                                 
64 As a researcher for a Member of the European Parliament before attending the European University 
Institute. 
65 Of course the groups involved in these campaigns differ on when exactly interest in the issue, and therefore 
the campaign, started.  For this reason I include the EU institutions when deciding start dates – these are 
usually based on reactions to particular moves by EU institutions.   
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and the common agricultural policy.  However, I believe that concentrating on 
environmental and social policy brings the important advantage of variation in the kinds of 
EUSMOs involved – while service providers and trade unions of long history and standing 
in the member states are prominent in the social policy areas, groups belonging to the New 
Social Movements are active around environmental policies.  This variation means that any 
overall conclusions of the study can more convincingly be defended as potentially 
applicable to all EUSMOs rather than those in any one particular category.  
In a second step, the organisations identified as active in each campaign were examined.  In 
order to ensure that EUSMOs were involved in the campaigns, at least some of the 
organisations involved needed to be connected to national movements, that is they needed 
to be connected to organisations credibly able to threaten forms of protest (see below).  
Other criteria were to be considered before selecting the final cases however.  In order to 
guarantee variation on the dependent variable, the original idea was to select two cases 
where campaigns achieved their stated goals, and two campaigns where they did not.  In 
addition, the four campaigns would concern two subject areas fulfilling the criteria outlined 
in the section on political opportunity (i.e. with similar levels of competence for the EU).  
In the event, the selection of cases was not as straightforward as this.  The first subject area, 
one ripe for campaigns at the EU level since much legislation is produced, is environmental 
/ public health.  While investigating the possibility of studying the co-existence issue, the 
campaigns on REACH (chemicals legislation) and the Directive on Services in the Internal 
Market (Bolkestein) began to unfold.  Both of these were being hailed as heralding 
unprecedented levels of mobilization at the European level, of both business and EUSMOs.  
The opportunity of studying these issues was therefore too tempting to pass up merely 
because the outcomes were not yet known.  Both cases were of particular interest in 
different ways: Bolkestein because of the levels of transnational protest, appearing as a 
deviant case considering the assertions against the practicability of European level 
mobilisation (Marks and McAdam 1999); and REACH because of the broad and very tight-
knit coalition that appeared to have been formed among the campaigning EUSMOs.   
This choice then entailed taking up the coexistence case (despite this issue also being 
unresolved at the time), and the Lisbon campaign.  Taking these in the order they are 
presented in the following chapters, ‘Coexistence’ (chapter 2) is a specific issue within the 
controversial issue of GMOs, concerning rules for growing GM and ordinary crops 
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alongside each other.  REACH (chapter 3) is the acronym for Registration, Evaluation and 
Assessment of Chemicals, a legislative proposal under the co-decision procedure.  The 
Lisbon Strategy (chapter 4) was a short, sharp campaign by social NGOs and Trade Unions 
against the suggestion that the Lisbon Strategy should be narrowed down to only its 
economic growth pillar, discarding (for a while) the pillars concerning social protection and 
cohesion, and sustainable development.  Finally, the proposed Directive on Services in the 
Internal Market (chapter 5) has seen sustained levels of protest on the part of social NGOs 
and Trade Unions.  Each of these cases involves groups clearly tied to social movement 
actors at the national level – the environment / public health cases both heavily involve 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, while the social cases both involve the ETUC, tied to 
national trade unions and their long histories of contentious politics.  
As the cases were resolved, it became clear that the research would after all include two 
cases that achieved their stated goals and two that did not.  Unfortunately, these correspond 
with the policy areas, with both environmental campaigns failing to achieve their stated 
goals and both social campaigns securing theirs – ideally each policy area should have 
included a ‘successful’ and an ‘unsuccessful’ campaign.  A variety of other criteria also 
contributed to choosing the cases to accompany the REACH and Bolkestein cases 
however.66  Firstly, because both were cases concerning the passage of legislation, 
coexistence and Lisbon were chosen to provide a contrast to these, as these campaigns 
focused on calls for legislation and broad policy directions respectively.  Second, the 
coexistence and Lisbon cases also provide variety in terms of their main targets, the 
Commission and the European Council, whilst the legislative cases shift their focus along 
with legislative procedures.  This variety among the  cases, it was reasoned, would place in 
relief the different kinds of actions used when targeting specific actors.  Third, while the 
co-existence campaign provides an example of a moment in a much larger scale campaign 
on the broader issue of GMOs, and indeed the longest campaign of the study, the Lisbon 
campaign provides an example of a much shorter campaign, with correspondingly quicker 
methods of mobilisation.  The two cases thus add interesting contrasts to the legislative 
cases.  Finally, the Lisbon case’s outcome is very closely linked to Bolkestein, providing an 
example of how contemporary campaigns can contribute to one another’s outcomes.    
                                                 
66 Another advantage of comparing social and environmental cases is the juxtaposition of older and newer 
conflict areas, with social issues traditionally followed by organised labour, and environmental issues more 
by newer organisations (della Porta and Rucht 2002:2), with their correspondingly more or less rooted 
methods of contestation (Balme and Chabanet 2002:25). 
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Within each of these cases, different periods can be identified according to reactions to 
actions by EU institutions, as was mentioned in the discussion of the method for frame 
analysis.  Splitting the campaigns according to these critical junctures has the advantage of 
increasing the N of the research, and therefore increasing not only the eventual 
generalisability of the conclusions, but also the number of cases of outcomes and non-
outcomes (which may be seen not only at the end of campaigns, but also during as in the 
case of access and agenda outcomes).  Periodisation also contributes to facilitating process 
tracing between actors and outcomes, as changes in overall situations regarding framing 
and political and discursive opportunities can be tracked from campaign phase to campaign 
phase, with the aid of synthetic tables. 
The following four chapters will present these case studies using the theoretical approaches 
and methods described in this chapter.  These four chapters all follow a common structure: 
beginning with a short introduction and overview, a thick description of how the case 
unfolded is presented, with particular care to note the different actions and events of the 
campaigns as well as the role played by national and / or local groups.  Following this, 
analytical sections tackle the questions of shared frames, first between the EUSMOs active 
in the campaign, and second between these EUSMOs and active national groups.  Political 
opportunities, both fixed and dynamic, are then described, and finally the discursive 
opportunities are tackled.  A separate section on campaign outcomes draws all the evidence 
together to make the processes leading to any campaign outcomes, as well as non-
outcomes, explicit, followed by a brief concluding section.   A final concluding chapter will 
compare and contrast the cases with one another in order to draw some tentative 
conclusions about how and when campaign outcomes come about, as well as discuss some 
broader ideas raised by the cases. 
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3.  Back to their roots: bottom-up approaches to coexistence and GM crops 
 
“I think it's very important to work at the national level - in Brussels what you can 
do at best on issues like GMOs is damage control basically.  You know, trying to prevent 
really really bad decisions being taken by scandalising them.” (interview 1) 
Coming, as they did, in the shadow of the long and hard fought campaign against GMOs in 
Europe that culminated in strict European legislation on labelling and other issues, 
discussions about GM crops and ‘coexistence’ or contamination are not especially well 
known.  In a nutshell, the discussion surrounds the issues of 1) how to diminish the 
possibilities for contamination and, 2) how to establish liability if contamination occurs.  In 
early 2003, reacting to a Commission communication declaring that member states should 
deal with the issue on their own, a coalition of three environmental groups – the European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB), Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) - began 
to call for EU legislation.  Although the campaign got off to a slow start, it eventually took 
off alongside an initiative led by two regional governments, Upper Austria and Tuscany, to 
form a network of ‘GM-free’ regions.  The environmental groups set up their own network 
of GM-free areas through the GM-free Europe website, adding this demand for legal GM-
free zones to that for European legislation, and began to campaign with the regions through 
an alliance with the Assembly of European Regions (AER), with events arranged from the 
local level up to the European with large conferences discussing all aspects of GMOs.   
The coexistence campaign, better known in its ‘GM-free Europe’ guise, is at a certain point 
a textbook example of European level campaigning according to the hypotheses outlined in 
chapter one.  Although it started slowly, the campaign begun by the environmental 
EUSMOs quickly adapted to the discursive opportunities provided by the parallel initiative 
of the regional governments, bridging their demand for European legislation with the 
regional government’s call to allow local bans in the GM-free Europe campaign.  The latter 
also recalled language used in existing national and local campaigns, showing the groups’ 
ability to carry out a multi-level campaign reflecting the structure of the EU itself, and 
therefore exploiting one important structural political opportunity.  More dynamic 
opportunities were also grasped in launching a barrage of actions aimed at the apparently 
more sympathetic Barroso Commission from 2004, and the campaign as a whole can be 
said to emulate the tactics of previous mobilisations across Europe on GMOs, thereby 
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exploiting the discursive opportunities provided by previous campaigns for the salience of 
current ones.  Yet despite securing access outcomes early on in the campaign, no policy 
outcomes were seen, meaning that the coexistence campaign appears to overturn the 
hypotheses outlined in chapter one.  A dynamic political threat in the form of a negative 
ruling against the EU and its previous moratorium on GMOs from the World Trade 
Organisation (a ‘contingent event’) is shown to have overturned any enthusiasm the 
Barroso Commission may have had for the idea of European legislation or allowing GM-
free zones.  The coexistence case thus provides strong evidence for the overall conclusion 
drawn about the importance of contingent events for securing outcomes in EU level 
campaigns, precisely because the WTO ruling was found to unhinge the campaign despite 
its strong performance in almost all other aspects.   
The main concerns of EUSMOs, that is the prevention of the contamination of normal 
crops, and especially of seeds, along with the connected issue of liability, are approached 
by different Commission departments - coexistence and liability are dealt with by DG 
Agriculture, while seed purity falls into the remit of DG public health and consumer affairs.  
This practical reason lies behind the choice to limit the case study to the coexistence issue 
(although the discourse on seeds is of course relevant at points).67  Nevertheless, the 
campaign on coexistence is one part of an ongoing, multi-issue campaign that remains 
relevant to its analysis.  For the purposes of clarity this case study takes a Commission 
Communication on coexistence as its starting point, and the negative WTO ruling against 
the EU of May 2006 as its end point – although effectively the draft ruling of February 
really spells the end of this phase of the campaign.  This cut-off point may seem  arbitrary, 
but I will argue that the Commission’s sudden change of stance from an apparent opening 
on the issue to an abrupt ruling out of European legislation only weeks after news of this 
ruling spelled the effective end of this particular strand of the anti-GMO movement.   
The campaign on coexistence (although it is not so well defined and unitary as other cases 
included in this study) may be split into three more or less distinct phases according to 
institutional reactions as described in chapter two.  At the beginning of the campaign, an 
environmental coalition that had been active on the labelling and traceability legislation 
demanded (alongside the European Parliament) European level legislation on coexistence.  
                                                 
67 The debate around the issue of seeds is (on a practical level) different to that on the wider debate about 
coexistence in general.  The former concerns the adventitious presence of GM material in seeds, and at what 
level (suggestions ranging from a minimum of 0.1% to a maximum of 0.9%) labelling requirements should be 
triggered.   
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This was the more latent phase of the campaign, during which groups worked to prepared 
the more radical ‘GM-free Europe’ approach.  The beginning of the second phase of the 
campaign was marked by a Commission Recommendation ruling out the possibility of EU 
legislation, and its rejection of the Upper Austrian law banning the cultivation of GM 
crops.  This was chosen as a timely moment to launch the ‘GM-free’ campaign.  Two 
separate clusters of groups are involved in similar actions here.  On the one hand regional 
governments, led by Upper Austria and Tuscany, formed the Network of European GM 
Free Regions.  On the other, environmental groups launched a website to link local groups’ 
campaigns to ban GMOs.  The similarities between the previous national and local 
campaigns targeting supermarkets, which led to governments being forced to introduce the 
moratorium, are clear here.  Once again the idea seems to be to present the Commission 
with a fait accompli whereby the vast majority of localities in the EU refuse to  
countenance GM crops, thus forcing them to act.  In a final stage of the campaign, again 
marked by a (more positive) Commission communication, the environmental groups work 
to integrate the different strands of the campaign by launching actions with the Assembly 
of European Regions, who in turn represent the majority of the regional governments 
involved in the network.  In the following section the story of the campaign in terms of the 
EUSMOs’ actions is laid out in detail.  The campaign will then be analysed with a view to 
explaining its outcomes. 
 
3.1 A tale of two campaigns 
 
The coexistence campaign is best understood as one moment within the wider, ongoing 
movement in the EU against GMOs.  Some background on this wider movement and on 
European legislation on the subject is useful for the reader to place the campaign in its 
correct context.  The first European directive on experimental releases of GMOs was 
passed in 1990, and as the market grew steadily during the first half of the 1990s, 
legislation on labelling (the ‘novel food’ directive) was instigated.  However, institutional 
wrangling over these rules lasted until 1998, with limited results.  A first wave of protest 
against GMOs had begun in 1995, lasting until early 1996 against the background of the 
EU’s hesitation, as well as the increased salience of food safety issues in the wake of the 
BSE crisis.  A second wave rose in 1998 with the progression of legislation on labelling 
(Kettnaker 2001).  Protest and lobbying actions took place all over Europe, which led  
many supermarket chains to ban the sale of GMOs in their stores, and many European 
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governments were obliged to change their positions on the issue (Kettnaker 2001, on the 
UK see Imig and Tarrow 2001, Lezaun 2004).  In June 1999, the EU imposed a de facto 
moratorium on the import and sale of all GM products until proper legislation was in place, 
leading Margot Wallström (the then environment Commissioner) to “declare NGOs 
victorious” (Imig and Tarrow 2001).68   
As legislation on the traceability and labelling of GM foods wound its way through the 
various institutions under the co-decision procedure (with its final adoption in July 2003 
spelling the effective end of the moratorium), other issues connected to the GMO field – 
including coexistence – began to move into the spotlight.  If the moratorium was to end 
with the adoption of the legislation, then other issues, such as coexistence, seed purity and 
consequences for organic farming, needed to be settled.  It was against this background that 
the Commission published its first communication on coexistence, recommending that 
individual member states develop their own rules and regulations according to existing 
regimes.    
 
Generally speaking, the environmental EUSMOs (FoEE, Greenpeace, and the EEB) were 
the most prominent actors in this first stage of the campaign.  Because the GMO issue has 
so many facets, and because they had worked together on previous campaigns, the groups 
already had a fairly formal division of labour, with Greenpeace taking the lead on the seed 
purity issue, and FoEE concentrating on coexistence (interviews 1 and 2).69  It is thus FoEE 
that provide the impetus behind the bolder actions of the campaign.  The campaign got off 
to a slow start, however.  The environmental groups responded to the Commission’s 
communication70 on coexistence with a simple press release, as did the Greens/EFA group 
                                                 
68 The moratorium effectively began in Spring 1998 when five member states - Denmark, France, Greece, 
Italy, and Luxembourg - announced that they would ban GMOs until the EU introduced effective legislation 
concerning traceability and labelling. 
69 Apart from being allies through work on previous campaigns, these groups also form part of the ‘Green 
10’, a network of Brussels environmental groups.  The groups work individually, but “coordinate joint 
responses and reccommendations to EU decision-makers on issues of interest to all NGOs” 
(http://www.foeeurope.org/links/green10.htm, accessed 4/2/08). 
70 The communication states that no form of agriculture should be excluded within the European Union, and 
that therefore rules for their coexistence are necessary.  However, since the environmental and public health 
concerns are dealt with in the draft labelling and traceability legislation, the Commission consider the issue to 
be purely economic.  Rules concerning coexistence, since measures must be tailored to particular regional 
qualities and situations, as well as to specific crops, would best be dealt with at the member state level.  
Liability, too, since already covered by national laws, must be dealt with through appropriate changes to these 
according to the subsidiarity principle.  In general, those who do not wish to see the introduction of GM crops 
should bear the responsibility for implementing protective measures.  The communication also mentions the 
possibility of GM-free zones for particular crops, but excludes the possibility of any national or community 
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in the European Parliament (although they maintain a strict independence from one 
another, the Greens/EFA groups and environmental groups exchange press releases and 
information according to interview 3).  While Greenpeace and FoEE had also expressed 
their views through other vehicles, such as position papers, internal newsletters, their 
websites and the like, the EEB was a more silent campaign partner.  The drive behind the 
EEB’s role in the campaign lay chiefly in the commitment of its Italian Vice-President 
from Legambiente, an Italian environmental organisation.     
 
One small protest at the European level did take place during this phase, although, tellingly, 
it did not have much effect.  The Commission had announced a round table discussion for 
‘all stakeholders’ on coexistence for 24 April 2003, before the drafting of more binding 
recommendations.  A letter, as well as a press release informing of the letter, was written 
by the environmental groups along with two others lamenting the fact that they had not 
been invited to the discussion, and that the majority of those that had were from the 
biotechnology industry.  The other two groups included in this action were the International 
Federation of Organic Farmers (IFOAM), and the Coordination Paysanne Européenne 
(CPE), a result of working together on previous campaigns on GMOs.  On the day of the 
event FoEE, accompanied by one of their national groups71, the CPE, and one of their 
‘GMO inflatables’ (an enormous ear of corn), staged a small demonstration outside the 
building in which the discussions were being held.  A follow-up letter released by the same 
groups also protested the unbalanced nature of the Commission’s discussion.   
 
At the end of the first period of the campaign, a more proactive action was organised in the 
form of a conference on coexistence held at the European Parliament and organised by 
FoEE, EuroCoop, and the Heinrich Boll Foundation (HBF), with the Greens/EFA group, 
and more particularly the MEP Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf as parliamentary 
sponsors.72  Graefe zu Baringdorf then went on to present an own-initiative report on 
                                                                                                                                                    
level regulation for these, since economic interests alone cannot justify “imposing such strong limitations on 
fundamental liberties” (Commission 2003).   
 
71 The nationality is not specified, but the obvious assumption would be the Belgian group. 
72 In order to organise an event within the European Parliament a member must ‘sponsor’ the event, 
organising entry to the building and a room etc.  Events cannot be held without such sponsorship as this goes 
against the Questors rules.  The inclusion of the Heinrich Boll Foundation as an organiser is presumably a 
result of a previous partnership – FoEE’s monthly GMO publication the ‘Biotech Mailout’ is written in 
cooperation with the Foundation.  As for EuroCoop, the wish to broaden the coalition as far as possible is 
made clear by all interviewees, but unfortunately exactly how the contact was made is unclear, as the staff at 
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coexistence closely reflecting the participants’ views, which was subsequently adopted as 
the Parliament’s official position.  The event was described as a ‘counter-summit’ to the 
Commission’s discussion, and as a chance to give a voice to those who were overlooked at 
that forum.  The conference thus included speakers from the scientific community, MEPs 
from the Greens/EFA and Socialist groups in the European Parliament, representatives of 
the environmental groups, consumer’s groups, trade unions, the Commission, and the 
Belgian government – as well as the conference organisers.   
 
The second, much longer, period of the campaign, begins with the publication of the 
Commission Recommendations on coexistence of 23 July 2003, which officially ruled out 
the option of European level legislation.  Apart from the usual press release from the core 
trio of environmental groups that accompanied the publication of the Recommendations, 
the campaign can now be said to move into a much more varied, public and proactive 
phase.73  Such actions, however, required planning, and following their condemnatory press 
release on the Recommendations, the environmental coalition became rather quiet.  During 
this latent period stretching from July 2003 to April 2004, the environmental groups turned 
their attentions to developing the tactics already being pursued by various like-minded 
groups at the national or local level in the Union by building the GM-free Europe website 
(interview 2).  The site’s aim was to facilitate information-sharing and was built by Friends 
of the Earth Europe.  Seeing that a growing number of national and local groups were 
beginning, or in many cases had won  campaigns demanding that local governments ban 
the cultivation of GMOs on their  territory, the group decided to set up a website providing 
information, advice on campaign and legal tactics and the like for such groups.74  The 
national level now became the principal battleground of the campaign, with high profile 
successes such as that secured by Greenpeace Greece, who managed to secure bans to such 
a wide extent that the entire territory of the country is, at the time of writing,75 ‘GM-free’.  
                                                                                                                                                    
EuroCoop had changed by the time an interview was carried out with the organisation.  The personal contacts 
between the previous member of staff and the environmental groups was made clear however (interview 6). 
73 That said it should be noted that meetings with the Commission continued to be sought throughout the 
campaign.  These meetings, often taking place with the participation of many of the different groups working 
together on the campaign (more on this below), are mentioned by all of the activists interviewed, with the 
exception of the Greens/EFA for the reasons outlined above.  Although I have no specific timetable of such 
meetings, the impression conveyed is that they are sought at regular intervals by the movement, not only in 
the hope of convincing the Commission to take on their views, but principally as a way of staying informed 
as to the institution’s intentions and preferences during quieter periods in terms of official communications 
and the like (‘corridor information’, as interview 7 dubs it).   
74 Although such blanket bans were theoretically illegal, as bans could only apply to specific GMOs. 
75 February 2006. 
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The creation of the website was thus a crucial point in the campaign, marking not only the 
increased involvement of the national and local levels but also the first step towards 
integrating the environmental groups’ campaign with the regional governments’ campaign.  
The regional governments that had already declared bans on GM cultivation, mainly 
because quality local products were under threat,76 had also decided to bring their concerns 
to the Commission.  In the first stage of the campaign (13 March 2003), the regional 
government of Upper Austria had notified the Commission of their draft law banning the 
cultivation of GM crops.  On 2 September 2003, the Commission rejected this law as 
contrary to the rules of the internal market.  Upper Austria immediately appealed to the 
European Court of Justice against the Commission’s decision, but in the meantime another, 
joint approach was decided when the Brussels representation of the region was approached 
by the Tuscan representation.  The Tuscany regional office suggested forming a Network 
of European Regions (the Network) in order to launch a more political campaign.  The two 
offices then approached other regions with similar bans or intentions to ban, avoiding, at 
this early stage, regions in their own countries, since both were known to be firmly anti-
GM.  They were anxious to prove that worries about GMOs were widespread throughout 
Europe, and not just in their countries.  The network was officially launched with a 
declaration in November 2003.  Thinking of the efforts of the environmental groups with 
their GM-free Europe website, it is hard to believe that no deliberate parallels were 
planned.  From this point onwards the Network widened, and either held or participated in 
various events on a more-or-less bi-monthly basis, with the aim of ensuring that 
coexistence remained on the agenda (interview 5).  At the same time, Upper Austria 
continued its legal challenge against the Commission. 
 
The two different attempts at coordinating the GM-free approach, on the one hand by the 
regional authorities, and on the other hand by environmental groups, are certainly 
complementary.  Towards the end of 2004, however, the hunch that FoEE are actively 
seeking parallels between their own approach and that of the Network seem to be 
confirmed by their launching a joint campaign with the AER.  The AER were drawn to the 
coexistence issue by the activities of their member regions who were also members of the 
                                                 
76 The two regions heading up the Network, Upper Austria and Tuscany, are both producers of specialised 
goods – organic, and products with various European quality labels (controlled origin etc.) – that would lose 
their value in the scenario of GM contamination.  Organic labelling was still only allowed with 0% GM 
content at this point, the reader will remember. 
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Network, and thus sought a campaign partner with more expertise on the subject.  The 
campaign guide on how to become a GM-free region published by FoEE made them an 
ideal candidate (interview 7).  This, in turn, provided the FoEE with the opportunity to 
forge a real link to the Network.  This new addition to the campaign bridges the two 
separate approaches to coexistence, and signals another victory for the bottom-up tactic of 
(illegal) cultivation bans as opposed to calls for European legislation (although the two are 
compatible, as will be seen in the section on frames).   The main tactic of this period is thus 
to build up steam behind the GMO-free zone strategy, with the main driving force coming 
from FoEE, who attempted to link their efforts with those of the Network wherever 
possible.  For example, the Network were invited by FoEE and the AER to present their 
initiative at their campaign launch press conference at the European Parliament in 
September 2004, and later, in February 2005, FoEE also began a petition explicitly 
designed for signature by local politicians.  This last tactic also contributed to reinforcing 
the link between the local and national groups, asked to circulate the petition for signature, 
and the European level in the shape of the Commission, to whom the petition was then 
forwarded. 
 
The third period of the campaign is marked once more by a Commission communication 
(22 March 2005), this time by the Barroso Commission, in which the campaign received 
recognition.77  Shortly after this, the Agriculture Commissioner (Fischer-Boel) met with the 
Network at the offices of the Tuscany region in Brussels.  It is interesting to note the 
parallels that may be drawn here between the coexistence campaign and  previous phases 
of the anti-GM movement that led to the moratorium.  The EU had already been forced to 
act because of the situation created in the member states.  In the coexistence case, the sheer 
number of GM-free bans forced the Commission, at this point in the campaign, to at least 
acknowledge a growing problem where previously the issue had been considered closed.  
This move by the new Commission recognising the campaign and entering into dialogue 
                                                 
77 “A number of regions and local communities are taking steps to implement highly restrictive national or 
regional measures, aiming at limiting (as much as possible) or preventing cultivation of GMOs.  The 
Commission continues to receive an important amount of correspondence from regions and municipalities 
declaring themselves “GMO-free”.  A network of “GMO-free” regions has been set up under an initiative 
from Upper Austria and Tuscany and now comprises twenty regions throughout Europe, notably in Spain, 
France, Germany, Greece and UK.  This network is gaining popularity and an increasing number of 
members.” (Commission 2005, emphasis in original.) 
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with the regions thus signalled an opening up at the European level that seemed to bode 
well. 
 
In terms of the tactics employed by the environmental groups, now campaigning alongside 
the AER, this phase saw the continuance of the actions begun previously (the GMO-free 
Europe site, and thus the local connection, and condemning press releases continued), as 
well as new methods.  One such innovation came in the form of a legal opinion (procured 
by a coalition of British groups) used by the environmental groups along with EuroCoop to 
declare that the Recommendations on coexistence were incompatible with existing EU 
legislation.  Continuing with the legal theme, Upper Austria also persisted in their legal 
challenges during this final phase of the campaign:  when the Court of First Instance 
rejected Upper Austria’s appeal against the Commission’s rejection of their regional law on 
5 October 2005, they reacted by introducing a new law, based on a different Treaty article, 
the very next day.   
 
More public actions at the European level also returned to the fore at this stage of the 
campaign.  FoEE and the AER organised another conference at the European Parliament, 
physically bringing together the actors from the environmental groups and the regional 
governments for the first time. At this point then the organisations from each strand were 
working together, with the Network explicitly supporting and providing speakers for the 
conference (the leading regions’ names and logos appear on the invitation), which took 
place on 17 May 2005.  It is interesting to note that the regions were very careful to 
underline that such a coalition would only last so long as all partners were willing and 
shared a goal at that particular time – in other words, it was key that coalitions remained 
flexible (interviews 5 and 6).  This is probably a result of the fact that the groups in this 
coalition would most likely disagree over the actual content (or indeed the use in the first 
place) of coexistence legislation.  Another interesting feature of this conference is the fact 
that it is sponsored by a member from the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), 
Polish MEP Janusz Wojciechowski. The first conference at the European Parliament was 
supported by very different actors – a green research foundation, EuroCoop, and the 
Greens/EFA.  This choice was made in order to underline the non-ideological nature of the 
issues in hand (interviews 2 and 8).  
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A second feature in terms of strategy that becomes more visible in this period, although 
starting in the second, is the location of events.  More and more conferences gathering EU-
level actors alongside regional and national ones now began to take place outside Brussels 
in various locations throughout the EU, reflecting the more bottom-up approach of the GM-
free zone strategy, which included efforts to broaden the network.  For example, the AER 
joined forces with the Foundation for Future Farming (FfFF) and the European NGO 
Network on Genetic Engineering (GENET) to organise an annual Conference of European 
GM-free Regions, the first of which was held in January 2005 in Berlin, that is just after 
their campaign launch with FoEE.  Another example is the Consumers International 
conference of September 2005 held in Bologna.  These conferences gathered speakers on 
all aspects of genetic engineering, but are also cited as places where all the different groups 
concerned may gather in one place and meet national and local actors (interview 1).  A 
second annual conference of European GM-free Regions was held in January 2006, again 
in Berlin.   
 
The Network, in the meantime, again met with agriculture Commission officials in 
September 2005 after their first meeting with Commissioner Fischer-Boel, apparently 
confirming the impression of a Commission more open to persuasion on the coexistence 
issue.  The institution had also promised to report on national coexistence measures and 
comment on the issue of European rules at that time.  However, in early February 2006 
rumours began to circulate that a WTO ruling on a trade dispute between the EU and other 
members of the organisation over the previous moratorium would find in favour of the 
complainants (the United States, Canada, and Argentina).  FoEE and the other 
environmental EUSMOs immediately reacted to these rumours by attacking the WTO and 
its secrecy, and by highlighting the European consumer’s right to refuse GMOs.  The 
Commission’s report on national measures of 9 March 2006 found that European 
legislation on coexistence “does not appear justified at this time”, promising a progress 
report only in 2008 – FoEE answered this news with the slogan ‘contaminate then 
legislate’.78  At the same time, the Commission had launched a new round of consultation 
on the subject, mainly through the vehicle of a conference to be held on the subject in 
                                                 
78 Press release accompanying report: ‘Commission reports on national measures to ensure coexistence of 
genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming’.  IP/06/293.  Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/coexistence/index_en.htm, accessed 4/2/08. 
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Vienna from 4-6 April.79  Several of the campaigning groups were involved in this 
conference, attending or, in the case of FoEE and the Tuscan region, speaking.  A march 
‘for a GMO-free Europe’ was also organised for 5 April with the involvement of both 
European level and Austrian groups (including, amongst others, ATTAC, regional 
organisations, and farmers’ organisations).  In addition, a global day of opposition to 
GMOs was held soon after the conference on 8 April 2006.  None of these mobilisations 
served to change the Commission’s mind either on European legislation or the right to local 
bans (although European law is clearly against regions here), despite signs of disagreement 
through the contradictory speeches made by the Agriculture Commissioner Mariann 
Fischer-Boel and the Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas at the Vienna conference.   
 
On 10 May the WTO confirmed the original rumours with a ruling against the EU (final 
reports were circulated in September 2006).  Since then, the campaign has wound down 
somewhat – although the annual conferences continue, the GMO-free Europe website 
ceased its news feed in September 2006.  At the time of writing the Commission has yet to 
publish its latest report on coexistence, and European legislation appears unlikely. 
 
3.1.1 Joined-up campaigning: the role of national groups 
 
The coexistence campaign saw much higher levels of involvement from local and national 
groups than the other cases presented in this study.  Indeed, it is the only case where 
European level groups took their central campaigning ideas from the national and local 
level rather than the other way around – the essential work of the GM-free Europe action 
was to join up the different local and national campaigns taking place throughout the 
member states.    Activities involving these groups have thus already been outlined in the 
narrative of the campaign.  In this section, then, I shall focus on how the main European 
groups of the campaign involve national and local members in their decisions on a more 
general basis.80   
 
One of the most prominent examples of national and local groups involved in the campaign 
is that of the groups that were eventually pulled together at the European level through the 
                                                 
79 It is likely this conference had something to do with the fact that Austria, as we already know a country 
highly engaged in the GMO debate, held the rotating presidency of the Union at the time. 
80 Less involved groups, such as the farmers’ groups and EuroCoop, are not considered because of the 
marginal roles they played in the campaign. 
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GM-Free Europe campaign website set up by FoEE.  Many of these groups had, as 
mentioned above, been involved in campaigns to secure cultivation bans at the local and 
regional levels across Europe, sometimes for many years prior to the actions that began at 
the EU level in 2003 (the French example is mentioned in interview 1).  FoEE’s work in 
pulling together these previously separate national and local campaigns thus drew on a pre-
existing body of collective action rather than created a new transnational effort.  The 
regions, of course, also provide an example of direct local-level involvement at the 
European level, and constitute a category apart in the sense that they are representations 
with a strict mandate to stick to local government views and positions: they are embassies 
for their regions at the European Union.  It is fairly safe then to conclude that they are 
branches of their regional governments.  The network as a whole is “a very informal 
network (…) It's just only to get an informal personal contact with other regions” 
(interview 5).  Meetings between the like-minded regions sometimes produce documents, 
to which all agree.  The AER, which provides a crucial ‘bridge’ between the regional 
network and the environmental coalition, decided to launch its joint campaign with FoEE 
following a discussion at one of its conferences – and therefore with the backing of its 
member regions, some of whom belong to the Network (interview 7).  Again, this 
organisation is strictly representative in that it employs only administrative staff with all 
decisions being taken directly by members grouped into committees at the organisation’s 
base in Strasbourg.  The AER, like the regions making up the Network, can be described as 
completely dependent on its members.    
 
FoEE describes itself as the European branch of Friends of the Earth International – a 
global organisation.  However, the organisation takes every opportunity to state that rather 
than being a single group, it unites a “grassroots network” of national and local groups who 
are independent in their choices of campaigns to launch or follow.  However, based on 
interviews it could also be said that to some extent FoEE takes on the role of representing 
all of the European national and local groups of Friends of the Earth.  Meetings with 
national groups, at which strategies for the European office are decided, take place twice a 
year.  Ideas and input for these may come from either the European staff or from the 
various national groups (interview 2).  A prominent example of this in the current case is 
the GMO-free Europe campaign, where European staff picked up on national and local 
campaigns of a similar nature (not only by Friends of the Earth groups, but also by others) 
and then created a website to share information, tactics and such like between them.  
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Information sharing is a crucial part of the European office’s work.  They aim to share 
expertise and information with other national and local groups, as well as between national 
and local groups through initiatives like the GMO-free Europe site.   
 
The Greenpeace European Unit, like the Greenpeace organisation as a whole, is a much 
more hierarchical organisation that must follow the strategies outlined by its directors.81  
This can sometimes hinder coalition work with other groups – where others may take fast 
decisions, Greenpeace must check these with superiors first (interview 4).  This 
organisation’s roots lie in ‘creative confrontation’, where a few people participating in  
spectacular actions are considered to be more effective in creating space for discussion by 
attracting media attention than grassroots actions and involvement.  The organisation for all 
groups is the same – to follow Greenpeace International which leads all campaigns.  
However, some coordination role is played by the Greenpeace European Unit, although 
perhaps not to the extent that is seen in FoEE.  In this campaign national Greenpeace 
groups are involved in the GM-free Europe initiative, most notably in Greece but also in 
Luxemburg.  These national Greenpeace groups are listed as the primary national contacts 
on the GMO-free Europe site.   
 
Finally, the European Environmental Bureau is an organisation subscribed to by more 
‘conservative’ (in both senses of the word – i.e. more institutionalised or conventional 
groups originally dedicated exclusively to the conversation of endangered species or 
habitats) organisations from different countries.  Whereas both Greenpeace and Friends of 
the Earth are themselves global organisations, the EEB is strictly European and represents 
national organisations.  The structure of this body is more formal, with working groups 
made up of national members used for both disseminating and gathering information from 
national groups, as well as for deciding positions and strategies, a board, and an annual 
general meeting where the membership of these are elected, work programmes and budgets 
decided and the like.  Campaigns are usually coordinated by a member of the EEB’s own 
staff in Brussels, although sometimes this role is filled by one particular member with 
expertise.  This is the case in the coexistence campaign, which was run by the 
representative of Legambiente, the Italian member organisation, who would draft the 
                                                 
81 For a succinct summary of Greenpeace International’s organisational structure see Lahusen 1999:192-3.  
Of particular interest for this study is Lahusen’s mention of the split between the organisation’s ‘wet suits’, 
who engage in spectacular protest events, and its ‘dry suits’, who carry out lobbying work behind the scenes 
(also mentioned by Schaefer Caniglia (2001)).   
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positions to be discussed and adopted by the working group.  The EEB is first and foremost 
a lobbying organisation, and therefore its presence in the coexistence campaign is more or 
less restricted to ‘behind the scenes’ actions such as meetings with the Commission, and 
press releases.  National members are also largely absent from the GM-free movement, as 
are more conservationist organisations in general.82 
 
To sum up this brief narrative of a long and complicated campaign, there are several points 
to highlight.  First, like the REACH case that will be presented in the following chapter, we 
see environmental groups make a special effort to build broad coalitions in this campaign – 
even if these are, in the case of the regions, highly flexible coalitions of convenience.  
Second, the national and local levels become very important for the main tactic of the 
campaign, that is the formation of a network of local areas that have banned GM crops, 
which leads to a change in the central campaign demand.  This could be described as a 
result of the fact that, as in the social cases, the supranational European institutions are not 
particularly friendly towards the campaigning groups’ ideas for the majority of the time, or, 
in the case of the European Parliament, are not well-placed to help (similarly to the Lisbon 
campaign).  Yet the parallels that can be made between this tactic and those of previous 
GMO campaigns are also striking.  The gathering of information in order to publicise 
national and local ‘GM-free zone’ tactics, and the work to bridge the environmental 
groups’ work with that of the Network’s recall the processes of ‘scale shift’ described by 
McAdam and Tarrow (2005).  Scale shift is defined as “a change in the number and level 
of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wider range of 
actors and bridging their claims and identities” (ibid:125).  In the GM-free Europe 
initiative, EUSMOs brokered links between previously unconnected national and local 
campaigns throughout the EU.  This they achieved through what McAdam and Tarrow 
term ‘relational diffusion’ – that is through “the transfer of information along established 
lines of interaction” found between the EUSMOs and their national members (ibid:127).  A 
similar process also provides a good description of FoEE’s work to link the regional and 
EUSMO campaigns through their work with the AER.  By securing this scale shift, the 
EUSMOs achieved a truly transnational campaign.   
 
                                                 
82 For brief overviews of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the European Environmental Bureau, see van 
der Heijden 2002:193-4. 
 94
Finally, it is important to note the presence of an important contingent event in the shape of 
the WTO ruling at the end of the campaign (which may also be characterised as a threat 
from a hostile transnational elite, as will be discussed in section 3.3).  These points will be 
more fully explored in the following sections, where the campaign is analysed with a view 
to tracing the paths between the actions described above and the outcomes. 
 
3.2  Bridging frames in the coexistence campaign 
 
In this section I shall look at how frames developed throughout the campaign.  As 
described in the theoretical sections of the first chapters, I shall judge the presence of 
collective identity amongst the groups active around the campaign by examining their 
arguments, or frames, as presented in publicly available documents.  Frames amongst the 
EUSMOs will be examined first, followed by a comparison with the frames from a sample 
of national level groups involved in the campaign.  First, however, a note on the documents 
analysed here.  For the European level, the documents analysed reflect both the passage of 
time in each phase of the campaign, as well as the constellation of actors involved.  For the 
national level, the documents analysed are from groups that are amongst the most involved 
in the campaign, as garnered from researching the case more generally and confirmed by 
interview data.  However, national level documents were, in the event, more difficult to 
come by than imagined.  Quantity was no problem, rather the documents available provide 
much information, but little argumentation – perhaps a result of the widespread suspicion 
of GMOs that reigns throughout Europe.  As a result, the document sample for the national 
level, while still including those groups most active in the campaign, is a little scattered in 
that documents across time from the same groups were not always available.  I have 
nevertheless included documents produced by such groups, since I believe that their 
argumentation can only serve to enrich the final analysis drawn from the exercise. 
 
3.2.1  Frames among the European level groups 
 
In the first phase of the campaign relatively few documents were produced by the 
EUSMOs.  This was still a fairly latent stage of the campaign, where the groups were 
working behind the scenes on the GM-free Europe approach.  Nevertheless, the analysis 
compares the environmental EUSMOs’ joint press release with an article from FoEE’s 
internal newsletter in order to assess the degree to which frames were shared between the 
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three core environmental EUSMOs at this early stage.  The analysis, summarised in the 
frame grid found in Annex I, showed that frames were shared to a great degree albeit with 
slight variations in emphasis.  Both the four most prominent frames of each document 
analysed and indeed those used less frequently closely match one another.  The most 
important shared frame is ‘condemn Commission communication’, a diagnostic frame.  
Following this frame in importance is the central demand (prognostic frame) of the 
campaign at this stage, that for European legislation on coexistence.  The next frame raised, 
which may be seen as both prognostic and diagnostic, is the ‘polluter pays’ principle, 
classified as equivalent to calls for the liability in cases of contamination to lie with GM 
growers, since this is consistent with the former.  Finally, among the most frequent frames 
of this phase, is the stress on widespread contamination risks.   
 
There are, however, differences in emphasis between the two documents analysed here, as 
was mentioned above.  More emphasis is placed on elements strictly related to the 
Commission and the EU in the joint press release, as may be expected in a document 
expressly framed as a response to the communication.  Nevertheless, of the frames that are 
not shared, neither contradict the overall argument expressed in the common frames.  In 
short, there exists a very high level of congruence in the arguments advanced by the core 
groups involved in the campaign during this period, as would be expected from the groups’ 
history of joint campaigning on GMOs and indeed on other subjects.   
 
In the longer second period of the campaign, the number of groups involved in the 
campaign increases, putting the strength of shared frames to the test.  To recap briefly, 
there are effectively two strands of actors involved in the campaign at this stage – the 
regions and the environmental groups (and their allies).  Later in this phase the FoEE try to 
bridge these two efforts by launching the GM-free Europe website and another campaign 
with the AER.  Interestingly and fittingly for the results of the analysis of the second phase 
(where the environmental groups steadily pick up on this frame), this last was advertised as 
a campaign not only on coexistence, but also for the protection of ‘quality food products’, 
explicitly recalling a line of argument often raised by the regions.   
 
The most striking change in the frames during the second phase of the campaign is the near 
disappearance of the demand for European legislation.  In fact, the most frequent frames 
are now those concerning the creation of GM-free zones.  It is interesting to enter into a 
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little more detail on this point, since tracing the demand through this period and amongst 
different groups reveals stories of framing work.  At the beginning of the period the frame 
is entirely absent in the press release from the three core environmental groups.  The 
Network, however, do pick up the EU legislation demand frame, although always 
conditioning it with a mention of the subsidiarity principle.83  While the environmental 
groups pick up on the bottom up approach, the regions take up the frame on EU legislation.  
Moving on to the press release marking the beginning of the FoEE’s joint campaign with 
the AER, the EU legislation demand is resurrected in the first paragraph and linked with 
the GM-free zones frame, the beginning of a bridged frame also repeated later in the same 
document.  Finally, the petition from the GM-free Europe website again includes the new 
completely bridged frame of EU legislation including the right to GM-free zones.  The path 
of this frame’s development suggest some framing work taking place between the 
environmental and regional groups, more specifically through negotiations by the FoEE 
and the AER.84  If we also consider the ‘quality food’ frame mentioned earlier, more 
evidence is gathered for this reading.  While this frame does not appear at all in the first 
press release by the environmental groups, it appears in both of the documents authored 
jointly by the FoEE and the AER. 
 
As for the other frames seen in this phase, the principle diagnostic frames (contamination 
risks and polluter pays) from the first period remain high on the agenda and are still shared.  
The contamination risks frame remains strongest in the document authored by the three 
core environmental groups, but is also prominent in the documents by the Network and the 
FoEE and AER, and is also mentioned in the GMO-free Europe petition to the 
Commission.  It is not present in the conference conclusions (authors AER, Genet and 
FoEE), but other frames consistent with this more general claim are used, such as threats to 
biodiversity and seed purity.  Nevertheless, both of these diagnostic frames become less 
prominent as the period moves on – the polluter pays frame remaining until the end of 2004 
and then tailing off, as frames concerning regional and more purely environmental issues 
start to come to the fore.  These changes also reflect the changes in tactics in this phase, 
and by the fact that the frames are so closely connected with the call for European level 
                                                 
83 i.e. European legislation should follow the subsidiarity principle, which dictates that decisions be made at 
the lowest possible level.  Since coexistence rules affect local agriculture, local authorities should have the 
right to decide. 
84 The regional representations interviewed, Upper Austria and Tuscany, were careful to point out that any 
work they did with environmental groups was temporary, lasting only so long as a shared goal.  It is unlikely 
they were in direct negotiations. 
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legislation.  To sum up the situation concerning at the end of the second period, there is 
good evidence of framing work, or more precisely the bridging of the two main groups’ 
central frames.  Although the overall convergence of frames is less striking than in the first 
period of the campaign, the evidence of bridging may be considered an indicator of identity 
building, whereas the evidence from the first phase points more to existing shared 
understandings (similar to those seen in the REACH campaign in jointly authored 
documents).  A similar story can be seen with other frames, with overall patterns 
converging during this phase (the decline of the contamination and polluter pays frames, 
the adoption of the quality food frame). 
 
The third period of the campaign includes a more diverse set of actors, which is in turn 
reflected in the document sample.  With the inclusion of new actors in the campaign, or, 
better, with the campaign being picked up by new actors, the frames that were previously 
common begin to change.  In this period, only two frames are shared across three of the 
four documents analysed, and both refer to GM-free zones.  Interestingly, the call to allow 
for regional bans is slightly less frequent than an entirely new frame here: ‘GM-free 
movement widespread and widely supported’.  This would appear to reflect a continued 
movement of frames up from the national and local level – especially since this is a 
motivational frame, more the preserve of national groups – an impression confirmed by 
paying close attention to the later documents.  The call for European legislation almost 
completely disappears, mentioned in only one document towards the beginning of the 
phase.  This change in the central frames indicates a more general trend - not even these 
frames are shared to the extent that the principal frames were previously, and the structures 
of the argumentation in the various documents are very different.  The best way of 
illustrating this diversity is by briefly describing the  documents analysed.   
 
The press release by the three environmental groups, the IFOAM and EuroCoop stresses 
the widespread nature of the GM-free movement, but also carries through more of the 
frames that dominated in previous phases, namely the claim for EU coexistence legislation 
including the right to local bans, and the contamination risks argument.    Its strongest 
frame, however, remains ‘condemn Commission recommendation’ – a frame that has 
entirely disappeared from the other documents examined.  The conference ‘statement of 
support’ by the AER and the FoEE, meanwhile, comprises of a list of reasons for which 
they believe EU legislation should be drafted and GM-free zones allowed (separate but 
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linked frames rather than the bridged frame).  Frames that were more prominent in the 
previous period in documents involving regional actors are also seen here, with emphases 
placed on regional rights, quality food products, and the polluter pays principle.   
 
In the third document, produced by a conference in Bologna organised by Consumers 
International, the frames move more decidedly away from this rather EU-oriented 
direction.  Here the emphasis is placed less on ‘political’ frames than on arguments strictly 
concerning GMOs: contamination risks, scientific evidence of GM contamination, and the 
rejection of the very concept of coexistence as impossible.  Here then we find a very 
definite move away from the EU-level and towards a more grassroots level encompassing a 
generalised opposition to GMOs.  The frames are inclusive, and although the frame of 
allow GM-free zones is present, this is preceded by the rejection of safe coexistence.  
Indeed, moving to the fourth document analysed, frames here continue to echo this 
approach.  The stress is on the frame ‘GM-free movement widespread and supported’, 
closely followed by the demand to allow GM-free zones.  Yet again these are backed up 
with more radical arguments compared to the more economics and rights oriented 
arguments found in the first two documents.  Scientific evidence of contamination and the 
rejection frame appear again, along with ‘threat to biodiversity’ and ‘end of organic food 
and farming if current approach taken’. 
 
This brief description of the diverse range of frames found in this final period of the 
campaign suggest differences in argumentation and even in fundamental understandings of 
the problems.  It seems to be the case that the campaign lost a more unified message in 
widening its appeal and becoming to some extent fused with wider and more general 
campaigns against GMOs.  Although the majority of the frames used do not contradict the 
basic demand of the campaign, by now the demand to allow GM-free zones in the 
framework of European legislation, the rejection of the very concept of coexistence among 
some groups seriously compromises that demand.  In terms of dialogue, in this period there 
is little evidence of bridging or other framing work between the different groups 
represented in the documents analysed.  The approach seems rather to be an all-inclusive 
one, all arguments are admitted.  
 
To sum up the story of framing at the European level in this campaign, the start of the 
campaign sees a very limited number of groups necessarily united in terms of frames as 
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joint authors of documents.  With the second phase, which sees the real kick-off of the 
campaign in the GM-free initiatives, the core demand of the campaign evolves as do other 
frames.  There is good evidence in this phase of frame bridging between environmental 
groups and regional representations.  In the final phase of the campaign, however, this 
unified moment of joint actions dissipates, with frames diversifying among different actors. 
 
3.2.2  Frames at the European and national levels 
 
Shared frames among the EUSMOs do not give us a complete analysis however.  In order 
to complete the picture, the following examines the extent of shared frames between the 
EU national groups involved in the coexistence campaign.  In the first phase of the 
campaign the few European level groups involved delivered a highly united message.  The 
two national documents analysed for the same period, from the French and UK Friends of 
the Earth groups, mostly, but not entirely, mirror this impression.  The French document is 
in fact a reproduction of the joint press release albeit with some re-wording and additions to 
the original text.  The document thus faithfully reproduces the framing of the European 
level document, with the addition of frames stating that organic farming would be rendered 
impossible under the current approach, and that clearly defined safety measures are needed, 
neither of which contradict nor weaken solidarity with the arguments presented at the 
European level.  The reproduction of this document is explained by the fact that FoEE 
regularly circulate their press releases and other material to national groups in order to 
allow them some voice on issues they may not otherwise have the resources to cover 
(interview 2).  Although this means that frames were not constructed together, it does show 
that shared understandings of the coexistence issue exist between the French and European 
levels.  This is less so for the UK however.  The Friends of the Earth UK document refers 
to its European counterpart, signalling dialogue between the two levels, but the document 
does not share the central frame demanding European level legislation.  The frames 
condemning the Commission and calling for the polluter to pay are shared, but the 
emphasis here is placed on purely environmental arguments.  In keeping with the lack of a 
demand for European legislation, and also with the fact that the European groups 
subsequently took up the national GM-free campaign, there is a more local focus to the 
framing used in this document.   
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Moving on to the second period, the frame grid presents a slightly misleading picture (see 
Appendix I).  Because one of the documents analysed (the French petition) is much longer 
than the others, frames have more space to be repeated.  However, once this difference is  
been taken into account, the only significant change is a swap of the frames in first and 
second place in terms of frequency.  Accordingly, the most important frames at the national 
level in the second phase of the campaign are various formulations of the observation that 
the GM-free movement has widespread support and is growing steadily – a frame that finds 
just two mentions at the European level.  This could be a result of the specific aims of the 
different documents – while the national documents may aim more at spreading the GM-
free initiative, the EU level groups’ documents are mainly designed to inform EU 
institutions of the initiative and its message.  However, the fact that the European level 
groups adopt the GM-free approach and work to incorporate it into their central demand 
furnishes evidence that the European level has worked alongside national and local groups 
on this issue.    
 
Following this frame in importance is the contamination risks argument against GMOs, a 
frame faithfully reflected at the EU level, although here less prone to fading out as the 
phase moves on.  The polluter pays frame is also very frequent at the national level, 
showing that both European and national level groups share their criticisms of GMOs.  
Another interesting point for the European to national level comparison is the situation 
regarding the central demands of the campaign, which were bridged at the European level 
during this phase to include both the call for European legislation and the call to allow for 
GM-free zones.  Neither of these demands features very strongly in the national level 
documents – again due to their aim of strengthening the movement as a direct solution to 
the problem of GMOs rather than making claims on institutions.  Nevertheless, they do 
come up several times, although they are not bridged as at the European level, with the 
exception of the Friends of the Earth UK group, who explicitly publicise the EU level 
campaign and make comments about the European Commission.  While there is still 
evidence of the GM-free zone frame being developed in dialogue between the European 
and national levels then, demands are not repeated to the same extent at both levels.  Rather 
than representing a clash of interests, however, this seems more indicative of the different 
aims at the different levels, as already described.      
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During the third period of the campaign, the frames put forward by the European level 
groups became more diverse, reflecting the broadening EU level coalition.  There were 
only two frames shared across three of the four documents at this level: ‘GM-free 
movement widespread’ and ‘allow GM-free zones’.  The first of these is found in every 
single national document analysed, as consistent with the frame’s importance in the 
previous period.  This also indicates, however, another instance of the European level 
groups taking up a frame originating at the national level.  The second of the most frequent 
European frames, ‘allow GM-free zones’, appears in only one of the national documents.  
On the other hand, the European legislation demand, found only twice in the European 
documents (once in its bridged form), appears in half of the national documents analysed.  
This suggests that both levels are picking up on each others original demands – the 
European level stressing GM-free zones, and the national level beginning to do the same 
for the European level demand, complementing their emphasis on the widespread nature of 
the movement by seeking EU level rules.  The contamination frame continues in its 
importance at both levels, and across time, and although the polluter pays frame becomes 
much less important, this is so for both levels, it being mentioned in only one European 
document and only one national.  One apparent example of national groups taking up 
frames more commonly found at the European level is seen in this period with arguments 
related to ‘quality food’.  This frame began with the regional governments before being 
taken on by European environmental groups and finally, in this period, pops up in the 
discourses of national environmental groups.  This may be due to the publicity given to the 
Network’s successes on the GMO-free Europe website, or it may correspond to the fact that 
the groups have now begun to pick up the EU legislation demand.  The quality food frame, 
which has more to do with regional markets than any environmental or public health 
concerns, may be judged as more convincing for EU actors.  In any case, there is more 
evidence of dialogue in this frame shift.    
In addition to these instances of frames moving between the European and national levels, 
the different national level documents also share a number of prominent frames (more so 
than in the previous period).  This may indicate that the European coordination of national 
campaigns is contributing to their shared understandings, or that national groups are also 
directly in touch – likely as a result of the GM Free Europe website aiding in the loose 
linking of organisations over a single common goal (see Lance Bennett 2005).  The frame 
‘GM-free movement widespread’ is seen in all of the documents analysed, while 
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‘contamination risks’, ‘quality and organic food products’, ‘regional right to choose’, and 
‘majority consumers do not want GM’ are all shared across three of the four.   
The frame analysis carried out for the coexistence campaign suggests an argumentatively 
rather complex issue, where the frames and even the central demands shift across time.  No 
strong line of argument, with the exception of the single frame on contamination risks, 
comes to the fore throughout the duration of the campaign as seen in the Bolkestein issue, 
for example.  The analysis also turned up evidence of frames shifting not only from the 
European to the national level, but also from the national to the European, with the latter 
category including the assumption of a new campaign demand by the European groups.  
There is also evidence that as the campaign went on and became stronger the frames of 
different national groups also began to converge.  There thus seems to have been more 
identity-building work (if such work is accepted as inherent in framing work) done during 
this campaign than in any of the others presented here – frames were consciously worked 
on in order to allow collaboration, as seen in other transnational campaigns (Juska and 
Edwards 2005:201).  This, however, was not enough to secure the outcomes the 
campaigning groups desired. 
3.3  Close but no cigar:  political opportunities in the coexistence campaign 
In this section, I shall describe how the various groups responded to both the fixed and the 
dynamic political opportunities and threats provided by the EU arena and the peculiarities 
associated to this campaign.  For the sake of clarity, I shall begin by looking at the most 
important aspects of the campaign in the light of fixed political opportunities, and then 
move on to first describe and then narrate reactions to the campaign-specific dynamic 
political opportunities.    
In the coexistence campaign, the environmental EUSMOs face a threat from the 
Commission in that they are not dealing with what I have termed their ‘natural partner’ 
DG, that is DG Environment.  Instead, responsibility for the coexistence issue lies with DG 
Agriculture which, at the beginning of the campaign, showed its disregard for these groups 
by excluding them from the stakeholder discussion organised in April 2003.85  This initial 
threat of being shut out from the official dialogue on coexistence saw two main reactions 
                                                 
85 Indeed, Skogstad states that with the advent of the Prodi Commission an era of slack leadership on GM 
issues ended, fitting with the forthright attitude of the Commission before the change of 2004 (2003:330-31). 
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from the three environmental groups: they sought both to broaden their coalition, and to 
secure the support of another institution to bolster their position.  In their immediate 
reaction to the fact that they had not been invited to the discussion, the groups joined forces 
with the IFOAM and the CPE – both of whom are, beyond the shadow of a doubt,  
‘stakeholders’ in the coexistence issue.  By uniting their call for inclusion with that of 
farmers’ groups, the environmental groups attempted to legitimise their claim to be 
included.  Coalition building continues to be an important tactic throughout the campaign.  
For example, in addition to the bridging between the environmental and regional sides of 
the campaign through the coalition of the FoEE and the AER, the AER also branched out in 
its coalitions, beginning a series of annual conferences of GM free regions with the 
Foundation on Future Farming and Genet.   Such conferences and parallel meetings were 
also been found to be important in expanding networks in the campaign against 
deforestation in Brazil by Keck and Sikkink (1998:140).  On the environmental groups’ 
side, joint press releases in response to Commission actions were also extended to include 
EuroCoop.  Broad as well as flexible (in that groups are in no way bound to participate in 
all actions or statements, but may choose to act together as and when they wish to do so) 
coalitions are thus an important and useful feature of this campaign in common with other 
transnational campaigns (Bandy and Smith 2005:244-245).    
Indeed, coalition building emerges in interviews as the EUSMOs’ general reaction to the 
EU’s political opportunity structure – regardless of the content of the campaign.  As seen in 
other case studies presented here, by forming coalitions the groups pool many different 
types of resources, such as staff, expertise, contacts with actors in institutions, national 
networks, and finances, so that they stand a chance of acting on an equal footing with their 
adversaries.  In this particular campaign, one advantage of forming coalitions with other 
groups is particularly important: access to allies’ national member bases of EU citizens, 
without which the GM-free zone approach would not have seen any success - this will be 
explored more fully in the following sections on discursive opportunities.  Sticking with the 
theme of the GM-free zone tactic, this can also be characterised as an adaptation to the 
political opportunity structure of the EU, in that it aims at making the most of its multi-
level design.  Since opportunities at the supranational level were scarce (the Commission 
closed – especially in the light of the Recommendation, the Council weak86 and the 
                                                 
86 In that throughout this campaign the Council did not manage to reach a qualified majority either for or 
against any motion connected with GMOs in general. 
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Parliament largely irrelevant in this non-legislative case) the groups move back to the 
grassroots level in an attempt to influence the EU from the bottom up, much as seen in the 
(albeit more successful) Bolkestein campaign.  The importance of multi-level actions has 
also been noted by scholars of other EU campaigns (for example Hellferich and Kolb 
2001:151).  With the additional actions aimed at publicising the campaign at the European 
level, the groups thus hoped to achieve a ‘sandwich’ effect, placing pressure on the 
institutions from both above and below (interviews 3 and 8).  For example, the Parliament, 
despite being formally powerless on the issue, was nevertheless sought out as a venue and 
an ally for the campaign, mostly by environmental groups who used it as an arena for 
‘making noise’ (interview 6).  The Commission, on the other hand, was subject to 
lobbying, especially following the change of Commission in 2004, mostly from the 
Network (interviews 5 and 7, Seifert 2006/7).  These tactics can also be seen as exploiting 
the separation of powers in the EU. 
 
Moving on to consider the EU’s need for ‘outside’ information sources as a result of the 
small size of the Commission in particular, the campaigning groups in this case are not 
considered as possessing information relevant to Commission decisions.  The 
environmental groups in particular feel strongly about this, seeing comitology as a threat 
because of its lack of transparency, and its distance from ordinary citizens who, they 
sustain, have very different opinions (interview 9).  The European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA), mentioned in connection with authorisations for cultivating GM crops, is also 
highly mistrusted.  Those groups who can (usually Greenpeace) continue to provide 
scientific evidence, but feel that this is either ignored or discounted (interview1).  Amongst 
the regions, only Upper Austria provided scientific evidence in order to support its regional 
law prohibiting the cultivation of GM crops.  This was, however, reviewed and 
subsequently overturned by the EFSA.  The campaign is thus deprived of the advantage of 
being able to provide useful information to those with the power to act in their interests.  
Once again, the tactical response can be found in the turn to the grassroots campaign, a sort 
of ‘reverse boomerang’ (the boomerang pattern, developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998:12-
13), describes a situation where national and/or local groups resort to the international level 
because national opportunities are closed)  where the national and local levels are resorted 
to since the supranational level is closed.  Fairbrass and Jordan have also noted such 
episodes, dating from as early as the 1970s, where environmental coalition of groups have 
exploited the European level in order to strengthen the Birds and Habitats directives, using 
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“EU opportunities to outflank politically the British government and achieve policy 
outcomes that may not have been secured through national channels of representation” 
(2001:514).    
 
Altogether, the groups active in this campaign sought to exploit all the opportunities 
provided by the EU arena, especially by acting at the transnational, national, and local 
levels and by using a variety of tactics.  This combination of a wide variety of tactics and 
actions at multiple levels has also been observed in other transnational campaigns led by 
environmental groups, for example in Smith’s (1999) study of the Greenpeace-led 
campaign on toxic wastes.  The remaining variables pertaining to the EU’s political 
opportunity structure are not so helpful in analysing the tactics of the campaign, since they 
are both more suited to assessing legislative campaigns.  I shall now turn to consider and 
describe the dynamic opportunities and threat of the coexistence campaign. 
 
Table 5: Dynamic Political Opportunities in the Coexistence Campaign 
 
Intra-elite 
conflict 
No real conflict observed. 
Proximity of 
elections 
Mid-campaign.  EP somewhat overlooked at beginning as a result.  
Commission become a little more open with change. 
Electoral 
Instability 
Not relevant for this campaign (non-legislative) 
Contingent 
events 
Ongoing WTO trade dispute, legal decisions on Upper Austrian 
case, attitudes of new member states to GMOs. 
Position held 
by ally 
European Parliament; regional governments; Austrian presidency. 
Ability of ally 
to fulfil 
promises 
EP have no power to initiate legislation, regions have more leverage 
with Commission, presidency able to steer debates and prioritise 
GMO issues. 
Hostile elites Commission (DG Agriculture) 
Presence of 
counter 
movements 
None present. 
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Because the coexistence campaign is long and somewhat more complex than the other case 
studies presented here (due to the fact that it does not deal with the progress of a legislative 
proposal), the dynamic opportunities vary more.  Nevertheless, I shall stick to the order of 
the variables as presented in chapter one, as far as those variables are useful for analysing 
the campaign.   
 
No significant intra-elite conflict was observed in this particular campaign, and so I shall 
begin by looking at the role of elections in the campaign.  The most significant change 
signalled by the elections in 2004 was of course the change in the Commission that 
accompanies them.  An apparent upturn for the campaign thus took place in the second 
period of the campaign with the appointment of the new Commissioner for agriculture, 
Mariann Fischer-Boel.  As the former Danish minister for agriculture, she was responsible 
for the drafting and passing of the very first member state coexistence law, mentioned as 
useful for the campaign in the sense that the Commissioner was familiar with the 
intricacies of the issue (interview 1).  More importantly, however, and referring back to 
opportunities for dialogue, the new Commissioner signalled a re-opening of possibilities 
for dialogue, albeit mostly with the regions (interviews 2, 5, 7 and 8).  This apparent (but, 
in the event, inconsequential) opening up in the Commission is immediately followed by 
the launch of the joint campaign of the FoEE and the AER for a legislative framework on 
coexistence.  Following a period very much focussed on the bottom-up GM-free approach, 
this indicates their appreciation of a change in opportunities.  A new Commission is also 
perceived as obliged to assert their identity as distinct from the old Commission: “..but the 
new Commission has one problem – that they need to move on.  So they have to take into 
account the feelings of the Europeans.  So this is why, at the end of the day they are more 
or less prepared to change” (interview 8).   
One contingent event played a particularly important role in the campaign in terms of its 
impact on outcomes.   This was the complaint brought against the EU in 2003 within the 
WTO over the de facto moratorium on GMOs and other related issues, or more precisely 
the ruling on it.87  It should be noted that this contingent event could also be classified as a 
transnational hostile elite, as will be further discussed in chapter seven.  This dispute is 
                                                 
87 For more detailed information on this trade dispute see 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds293_e.htm 
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very useful in explaining the Commission’s stance at both the beginning and the end of the 
campaign.  In 2003, it is easy to imagine the Commission feeling constrained in their 
actions by WTO obligations - if previous European restrictive actions were being disputed, 
the Commission would logically be unwilling to expose themselves to further risks in the 
future by introducing yet more restrictive legislation.  Towards the end of the campaign, as 
the first reports of the WTO panel’s ruling leaked out at the beginning of 2006, the 
Commission hastily withdrew the hints it had been making about European level 
legislation, with Commissioner Fischer-Boel stating that this would not take place at the 
Austrian presidency’s Vienna conference.  The WTO case thus neatly explains the twists 
and turns of the Commission’s stance in this campaign, because the EU, as the 
representative of all EU member states at the WTO, must take its obligations there 
seriously, considering them more binding than any duty to react to public opinion within its 
borders.  Although it is not, of course, the only factor in explaining the overall outcome of 
this campaign, since many other obstacles, both legal and practical, also play their role, it 
certainly seems plausible that this ruling against the EU was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.  In terms of reactions to this situation amongst the campaigning groups, the 
ruling was widely condemned by both national and European groups in various press 
releases and newsletters, not least because of the secrecy of the process.  In addition, the 
case was the subject of a separate, even more active and widespread protest campaign, 
again headed by the FoEE.88   
 
Highlighting the legal constraints on the Commission vis-à-vis the GM-free zone 
movement is the Upper Austrian ban – again an event which could be reclassified by 
describing the European Court of Justice as a hostile elite.  As Seifert succinctly puts it, the 
rejection of this blanket ban “had to be expected; a blanket veto imposed on all GMOs (…) 
is at odds with key principles of EU regulation” (2006/7:22).  The path chosen by Upper 
Austria, as opposed to the more practical path chosen by Carinthia, he notes, was admitted 
to be a test case to see how far a ban could be pushed (ibid:31).  This aside, Upper 
Austria’s determination to push the issue of GM-free zones also led it to form the Network 
– a move recalling social movement tactics decidedly unusual for a regional government 
(ibid).  In addition, the Upper Austrian legal challenges were lauded by the environmental 
                                                 
88 The “Bite Back” campaign against the WTO, which included the launch of a touring monster GM tomato 
across Europe.  Local groups used this resource to stage their own anti-WTO protests (the common slogan 
being “WTO hands off our food”.  More information on this is available from the Friends of the Earth Europe 
website: www.foeeurope.org. 
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groups, and perhaps contributed to their decision to explore the legal possibilities of bans 
through their GMO-free Europe site.   The website set up by the FoEE, GM-free Europe, 
draws on the legal guide developed by the Austrians, and also provides other examples of 
regional bans.  In another legal challenge at the very end of the second period, FoE UK 
published a legal opinion declaring that the Commission’s approach to coexistence was not 
in line with existing Community legislation, and therefore illegal.  This was taken up by 
FoEE, who linked this opinion to the Commission communication on GMOs marking the 
beginning of the third period.  Although interview evidence reveals no direct link between 
these two groups of actions, some indirect inspiration (or diffusion) between the two can 
certainly be supposed.     
 
A final contingent event of some import to the campaign, that straddles the classifications 
of contingent event and elite allies, was the attitudes of the majority of the new member 
states to GMOs.  The environmental groups assert that not only they, but the Commission, 
had erred in their judgement that the new members would tend to be pro-GM (interviews 2, 
8).  In the event, as shown by their votes on GM application dossiers for cultivation, as well 
as the widespread nature of the GM-free movement in several of these (the most prominent 
example being Poland), the new member states were quite the opposite.  There is no 
reaction to this as such in terms of campaigning techniques (the decision to ask a Polish 
MEP to sponsor the AER and FoEE’s conference perhaps aside) but it is interesting to note 
that this probably prolonged the campaign, in that it had the effect of continuing the split in 
the Council of Ministers in votes on GM issues.   
In general, elite allies are more numerous than would be expected for a campaign that does 
not reach its desired outcome if compared to other cases presented in this study.  This only 
holds, however, if we do not also take into consideration each ally’s ‘ability to fulfil 
promises’, i.e. what degree of power they have in securing the campaign’s desired 
outcome.  The Parliament can thus also be considered as an elite ally of the campaign.  
Considered by all the groups, in all the campaigns studied for that matter, as a natural 
partner - or at least more open to campaigns by NGOs - the Parliament is chosen as the 
arena for many of the conferences that took place during the campaign.  More specifically, 
the Parliament also adopted an own-initiative report on co-existence in December 200389.  
                                                 
89 The Council show no sign of either opposition or support for the Commission’s approach on GMOs in 
general. 
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This placed the Parliament in firm opposition to the views of the Commission, as the 
document mirrors the opinions of the environmental groups as well as the Network.  
Although the groups were not involved in drafting the report (interviews 1 and 2), the MEP 
responsible for it, Graefe zu Baringdorf, is seen as a “friend” (interview 2) and the 
Greens/EFA group to which he belongs consider themselves as close to the environmental 
groups (interview 3).  However, there was no reaction from the campaigning groups aimed 
at maximising this report’s effect.  In fact, interview material shows that although they 
were happy about the report, and generally consider the Parliament as an important 
institution to pit against the Commission, the groups did not consider the document a 
campaign tool.  This lack of consideration for the Parliament as an important ally is also 
seen in the Lisbon agenda campaign, but is surprising considering the importance of the 
Parliament in the outcomes of the legislative cases.     
On the other hand, contributing to this apparently missed opportunity is the fact that the 
environmental groups were concentrating on building up the GM-free approach at the time 
of the report’s adoption, as well as the fact that elections were close.  Elections to the 
European Parliament took place in July 2004, and resulted in a swing to the right in the 
body’s composition.  The result of this outcome in terms of elite allies may be argued to be 
one of watering down the Parliament’s highly critical position, since voted for by a 
previous body of MEPs.  In confirmation of this view, the FoEE, who may be said to have 
relied more passively on the previous Parliament’s support after the publication of the 
opinion in December 2003, now returned to the Parliament, with the sponsorship of a 
centre-right Polish MEP, to launch their new joint project with the AER in September 2004 
– that is immediately after the resumption of Parliament business following the election.  
This move combines two uses of the Parliament – on the one hand a right-wing ally is 
sought in order to demonstrate the non-ideological nature of the issue (see below), and on 
the other the Parliament is used as an arena, a sounding board for launching the campaign.  
This rather minimal use of the Parliament as an ally can be explained by considering the 
variable examining allies’ ability to fulfil their promises.  In terms of real leverage with the 
Commission the Parliament is not able to force a legislative proposal.  In a certain light, we 
may also consider the regions of the Network as elite allies, due to their positions as elected 
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representatives rather than EUSMOs in a strict sense.90  They certainly provide a new lease 
of life to the campaign in terms of the authority with which they invest the GM-free 
approach, and also gain an important foothold with the Commission (after the 2004 
change), who meet with and officially recognise their efforts – tinting the environmental 
groups’ efforts by association.   
Towards the end of the campaign, the cards seem to be stacked in the campaigning groups’ 
favour.  An apparent opening up in the Commission, the widespread nature of the GMO-
free zone movement, a supportive European Parliament and finally the Austrian presidency 
seem to spell the good fortunes of the anti-GMO lobby.  The Austrians were openly in 
favour of EU level coexistence legislation, and stated that they would treat GMO issues as 
a priority for their presidency.  A more tangible opportunity was provided by the 
Presidency in the shape of the GMO conference in Vienna held in April 2006.  Invitations 
to participate and contribute were, for the first time by an EU institution, extended to the 
various campaigning groups at the conference of European GM-free regions in January 
2006.  This ally was unique in its ability to fulfil its promises – the presidency may steer 
discussions within the Council to some degree, bringing the possibility of legislation closer 
(since the Council may request the Commission to initiate legislation).  Relations between 
the campaigning groups and the presidency also ran deeper than simple conference 
participation - indications were given of some ‘behind the scenes’ work with presidency 
representatives (interview 8).  This apparent alliance between a member state and an 
EUSMO campaign recalls Warleigh’s findings on the Auto Oil directive (Warleigh 
2000:233).  However, here an alliance with the member state holding the EU presidency is 
deemed more important than alliances with other member states by the coalition.   
The Commission, and more specifically DG Agriculture, are of course the number one elite 
‘enemies’ in this campaign – although this position shifts during the campaign as seen 
above.  Following the appointment of the new Commission in 2004 there is a degree of 
friendliness and openness between the institution and the Network.  The reactions to this 
hostile elite are clear from a very early point for the environmental groups.  As noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, resorting to a grassroots campaign reminiscent of the successful 
tactics that brought about the de facto moratorium is the logical as well as tried and tested 
                                                 
90 I include the Network here in the list of ‘elite allies’ not only because of their positions as elected 
politicians, but also because it is also clear that such campaigning activities are highly unusual for these 
actors.  See Seifert (2006/7).    
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reaction to a closed Commission.  The regions, on the other hand, secure favour by 
exploiting their position as elected representatives, as will be seen in relation to discursive 
opportunities.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Commission in this campaign is 
perhaps less hostile and intransigent than merely constrained by legal commitments – i.e. 
the Treaties and WTO rules.  Finally, no real counter movement is present during the 
campaign.  Although the biotechnology industry is sometimes seen as having an effect on 
the outcome of the debate, for example through stakeholder meetings, and over-
representation on scientific committees and in the European Food Safety Authority, they 
did not actively campaign against the environmental groups. 
To sum up this section on the fixed and dynamic political opportunities and how these are 
exploited or avoided during the campaign, we can note that, similarly to the other 
campaigns included here, the political opportunity structure of the EU is well known to the 
groups, who act accordingly.  The main threat of a closed Commission is, again as in other 
campaigns, contrasted with a return to the grassroots and the bottom up tactic of the GM-
free zone approach.  In addition, a broad and loose coalition of groups is built up around 
the issue.  In terms of dynamic opportunities, these are certainly more abundant than in the 
REACH campaign, the other case where the desired outcome was not achieved: the 
campaign disposes of several weighty allies towards the end of the period of analysis in the 
shape of the Parliament, the regions (also a part of the campaign) and the Austrian 
presidency, and even the hostile Commission seems to be open to persuasion by the 
regions.  However, one contingent event seems to scupper all of these chances – the 
unfavourable ruling by the WTO.  Other studies have also noted the importance of 
contingent opportunities (although without labelling them as such), for example – in a 
positive sense – Juska and Edwards (2005:193).  As seen in the Lisbon and Bolkestein 
cases, where the positive effects of the rejected Constitutional Treaty secure the efforts of 
these campaigns, this contingent event appears to break the coexistence campaign with its 
superior claims on the attention of the Commission and member states alike. 
 
3.4  Repeating tactics: discursive opportunities in the coexistence campaign 
 
The first of the fixed discursive opportunities outlined in chapter one is the legitimacy 
discourse.  It is interesting to note that this discourse is understood by the campaigning 
groups in a similar manner, that is they are aware that they may provide a source of extra 
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legitimacy to a Commission seeking to improve its democratic image, as is illustrated by 
the following quote from an interview with Greenpeace: 
 
“the Commission is not an elected body, they don’t have legitimacy by themselves because 
they are not elected, they are criticised, they have been criticised a lot for the measures they 
were taking, you know and it’s just basically full of technocrats taking the decisions.  So 
the Commission in order to ensure the legitimacy of the decision has to be more open than 
a national government and has to be seen as widely consulting so-called civil society in 
order to legitimise the decision basically.” (interview 1, emphasis added) 
 
As may be guessed from the tone here, however, this need for legitimacy is not seen as an 
opportunity by Greenpeace.  This perceived threat to open discourse with the Commission 
is very closely linked to the conditions presented in relation to the openness of the latter 
institution to dialogue.  In fact, from the interviews conducted it appears that whilst the less 
confrontational groups (such as the EEB) are more satisfied with their dialogues with the 
Commission, the more confrontational groups are not.  Greenpeace in particular are sharp 
in condemning the fact that groups such as theirs, “which defend the general interest”, are 
placed in the same ‘stakeholder’ box alongside industry groups (interview 1).  FoEE are 
also suspicious, for example: “Because I have been in the meetings with DG Trade, and I 
always have the impression that we are very strong, but that the biotech companies are 
never there.  So in the end they are going by other circles or in another way to lobby the 
Commission” (interview 2).  In other words, the supposed discursive opportunity linked 
with the legitimacy discourse does not come to light in a straightforward manner in this 
campaign.  Instead, the groups feel threatened by the discourses of industry groups, 
similarly to the REACH campaign.   Group level reactions to this situation vary - groups 
who are more satisfied with their relations with the Commission emphasise the importance 
of contacts (on the importance of personal contacts with employees of institutions see Keck 
and Sikkink 1998:148, Caniglia 2001:50-52).  Other groups with more difficult 
relationships do not abandon attempts to talk to the body though, although they do 
concentrate on more protest-based tactics (this is the case for Greenpeace in particular).  
The idea behind the groups’ approaches is very much related to transparency: 
“… if you want, the big difference between our lobbying activity and the industry activity 
is that they need to lobby behind closed doors.  And they are successful.  When we open, 
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when the institution, when the decision-making process is like glass, a building of glass, 
transparent, and peoples, citizens, are one of the key players, then they have lost!” 
(interview 8). 
 
Another main reaction has already been explored under the heading of political 
opportunities.  Coalition building is also seen as giving lobbying efforts more weight, 
“…because like that we have billions of EU citizens behind us and that gives us more 
power, more weight and helps influence some things” (interview 4, for similar findings see 
Keck and Sikkink 1998:22).  Legitimacy is thus, although not seen as an automatic 
opportunity, brought in to bolster the groups’ position.  By arguing that their members are 
interested EU citizens rather than profit-seeking businesses gives gravitas to arguments 
outweighed in number by those of industry groups.  Legitimacy is also one of the reasons 
behind the bridging of the campaigns by the regions and the environmental groups.  The 
regional governments joined in the Network are elected by EU citizens, unlike the 
Commission itself.  As an available ally regional governments are theoretically highly 
desirable, bringing more than the usual advantages of a broad coalition, they are also 
directly representative in the classical democratic sense. 
 
As for the opportunities that may derive from stressing the non-ideological character of the 
GMO issue, the groups were, as already mentioned, careful to ensure that MEPs from both 
the Greens and the EPP were used as sponsors for their conferences at that institution.  
There was no other evidence that the non-ideological nature of the issue lessened the 
controversy surrounding the debates at all.  Indeed, according to the interviews each 
member state appears to be firmly pro (Finland) or anti (Austria) GMOs regardless of the 
political persuasion of their government.  Few opportunities thus flowed from this variable.  
Moving on, the perception of the ‘unknown effects’ discourse is, as we have already seen, 
prominent in the groups’ arguments for strict European legislation and GM-free zones, 
especially in the contamination risks frames.  However, neither the precautionary principle, 
nor the inability of scientists to identify all possible risks, are arguments drawn on to any 
great extent.  This is indicative of a more long-term discursive shift in the wider GMO 
campaign.  While at earlier stages groups had been adamant that GMOs should not be 
cultivated at all, with the passing of the labelling and traceability legislation and 
discussions on ‘coexistence’, the possibility of cultivating GM crops was admitted, thereby 
reducing the relevance of the precautionary principle.  If the latter were to be absolutely 
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applied to the letter, GMOs would be banned entirely, since their possible effects cannot be 
predicted.91  As for previous events or campaigns contributing to the increased salience of 
public health issues, in the coexistence case the interview evidence shows that previous 
health scares have provided if not opportunities as such, then a context that makes the anti-
GMO discourse possible in the first place.  For example, the following quote from an 
interview with the EEB makes it clear that previous events such as BSE render certain 
arguments more salient. 
“For instance, biotechnology is one field where there has been a clear change.  I remember 
in the very beginning I sometimes went to some of the meetings in the Commission, all 
simply because we didn’t have an expert working on it but wanted at least to keep updated 
on what was going on. […] industry was very strong, and I remember the frustration from 
the other organisations saying we participate in the meeting, we submit our points, and 
nothing has actually been taken up in the next version of the official text.  With BSE this 
changed a lot.  Because that created public awareness, and also public concern.  And that 
put pressure on the Commission to take this concern more into account, and that also 
showed people how things can happen with biotechnology.” (interview 4) 
That said, parallels between the coexistence campaign and the previous anti-GM 
campaigns that led to the de facto moratorium are visible.  The interviews made it clear that 
a more general argument used by the Network in meetings with the Commission is  that of 
there really being no market left for GM products in the EU, since the public are so against 
them (interviews 5 and 6).  This argument, backed up by the proliferation of GM-free zones 
which so physically confirm its reality, appears to be an attempt to place the Commission 
and the EU in general in a position similar to that in which it found itself prior to declaring 
the moratorium.  Individual member states, faced with massive opposition from their 
citizens expressed effectively through pressure on large food retailers, who in order to 
preserve their clientele progressively banned GM products from their shelves, found 
themselves forced to react by making official a situation that was already an effective fait 
accompli (Kettnaker 2001).  In this sense, a parallel is clear – it was hoped that the EU 
institutions, faced with a growing number of GM-free zones and the reality of a shrunken 
market, would be forced to legalise an existing situation.  Although they do not expressly 
                                                 
91 On this discursive shift, as well as a discussion of the use of the term ‘coexistence’ and its peaceful 
connotations as derived from its use during the cold war, see Levidow and Boschert (2007).  On the reasons 
behind the environmental groups’ decision to cease their outright opposition to GMOs, see Skogstad (2003). 
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draw this comparison, there is evidence that the groups share this idea (interviews 1, 5, 8).  
Keck and Sikkink make a similar comment on how the campaign against deforestation in 
Sarawak in Malaysia drew on the successful form of the recent campaign on whaling 
(1998:150, 154).  Both the co-existence campaign and the previous campaign on GM foods 
counter the view that the sub-national level is “unpromising” in terms of leverage over EU 
issues (Rucht 2001:134), indicating that this tactic is both innovative and recent in the 
repertoire of EU campaigning.  Another example of the campaign’s benefiting from 
previous campaigns – although it does not strictly fit into the category of discursive 
opportunities, was the opportunity to draw together pre-exisiting national and local 
campaigns against the cultivation of GM crops in the GM-Free Europe campaign site.  By 
drawing on the strength of grassroots campaigns already underway for some time, a new 
boost and a ready spring of local level support was brought to the EU-level campaign.  
I shall now turn to look at the more dynamic and campaign-specific discursive 
opportunities and threats.  At the beginning of the campaign, discursive threats are 
contained in the first Commission communication.  First is the Commission’s definition of 
coexistence itself – as a purely economic issue.  The reasoning behind this is that other 
legislation on GMOs has already dealt with environmental and health aspects, and therefore 
coexistence rules should deal exclusively with economic consequences, such as liability, 
payment for protective measures and so on.  This definition is obviously a threat to the 
environmental groups’ discourse on GMOs, since it implies that ‘peaceful’ coexistence is 
already possible (interviews 1, 2, and 7).  What is most interesting about this threat is the 
additional logic it supplies to the subsequent bridging of the environmental groups’ 
campaign with that of the Network – for these regional groups such a definition is less of a 
threat, as for them the whole logic of GM-free zones is economic gain - they want GM-free 
zones in order to protect their quality food production.  Bridging the two campaigns thus 
has the bonus of bridging the environmental and economic discourses as well.92 
The second important aspect of dynamic discursive opportunities in this first period is the 
lack of response on the environmental groups’ part to the Commission discourse of GMO-
free zones.  Although far from uniformly favourable to these, they are raised by the 
Commission in response to their proliferation as one possible solution to the problems of 
coexistence.  The communication dismisses the possibility of there being any legal basis 
                                                 
92 Again, for an account of the coexistence campaign as a clash of discourses, see Levidow and Boschert 
(2007). 
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for them, seeing any such zones as based on voluntary agreements only.  Nevertheless, this 
is a clear opportunity, even an invitation, to push the GM-free argument.  Yet as we already 
know, there is no mention of this approach at this stage in the campaign.  Perhaps this is 
connected to a bigger threat implied in this communication – that those opposed to the 
cultivation of GMOs should foot the bill for protective measures.  This is of course 
strenuously denounced by the environmental groups who invoke another generally 
applicable EU policy principle – ‘polluter pays’.  Indeed, the swift disappearance of this 
suggestion from subsequent Commission documents may qualify as another outcome of the 
campaign. 
The GM-free zone campaign that comes to the fore in the second phase of the campaign 
brings to light a new discursive threat at the European level – the threat of the very label of 
‘coexistence’ itself, a term seldom used outside the Brussels arena.  The GM-free approach 
thus allows the issue to be more easily ‘sold’ to grassroots members, in turn helping the 
campaign react better to the multi-level design of the EU.  “There are local groups who 
don’t like to speak about coexistence but they like to speak about GMO-free zones.  So 
they are going to do more work on that, because coexistence at the end is a legal term that 
is used in the EU.  …if you want to work with the grassroots it’s probably too scientific and 
legal issues, so the GMO-free zone aim is more concrete so they will prefer that” 
(interview 2).  The narrow definition of coexistence is also tackled on another front by the 
Network via their aforementioned frame of quality food production, backed up with the 
argument that different legislation in every member state will lead to the distortion of the 
internal market.  The Network use a series of economic arguments to wrong foot the 
Commission on their own discursive ground – regional particularities are highlighted in 
response to the institution’s assertion that the particular conditions in each member state 
require separate national laws.  Continuing that line of logic, regional particularities should 
therefore also be respected (by allowing GM-free zones)!   
 
The third period of the campaign brings some significant discursive opportunities contained 
in the new Commission’s communication.  A close look at this documents shows that, apart 
from the more obvious opportunity brought with the express recognition of the Network, 
which opened the door to a series of meetings with Commissioners, the document even 
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takes on some of the movement’s own frames from previous periods.93  To take some 
examples, the document recognises that ‘public and political concerns with GMOs 
continue’, and that major retailers are reluctant to market GM food (Commission 2005a).  
Such points have been shown to be important factors for the groups during the campaign, 
and factors that the Commission has never before drawn attention to.  However, this period 
also brings the contingent political threat of the WTO ruling, and judging by the amount of 
press releases devoted to the attempt to rubbish this, all efforts were at this point being 
poured into this rather than into the exploitation of the discursive opportunities provided by 
the Commission communication – especially since the April conference saw the agriculture 
Commissioner withdrawing from her previously more open stance. 
 
Another discursive tactic of the Commission that also becomes clear when looking back 
over the campaign as a whole is that, as compared to the social cases, there are an 
inordinate amount of meetings, conferences and discussions on the coexistence issue 
involving the Commission or other European institutions.  From the first of the 
Commission’s stakeholder meetings, to the campaigning groups conferences set up in 
reaction to this, to the Austrian presidency’s conference at the end of the campaign, it is 
remarkable that much talking and little action takes place.  In addition, the Commission 
stalls its review of the recommendations continually at the end of the campaign, after 
waiting for one report on the implementation of member state legislation in March 2006, it 
ordered another due this year (2008) but yet to be published.  This would seem to echo the 
filibustering techniques employed to delay the publication of the REACH proposal – by 
extending consultations almost indefinitely, the Commission may be theorised to be 
deferring the point at which they must take a decision sure to provoke the ire of some party 
or other while in the public eye.  By delaying, the issue may lose steam, diffusing the 
tensions surrounding the decision.  In this case, the Commission was most likely playing 
for time whilst awaiting the WTO panel’s decision over the trade dispute.  Whatever their 
intentions, however, the campaigning groups’ tactic, as already described, of attempting to 
force a decision corresponding to an already existing reality of GMO-free zones, did not 
triumph against this long and drawn-out discussion. 
 
                                                 
93 The agriculture Commissioner even went so far as to go to the offices of the Tuscan region for a meeting 
with the Network, highlighting her apparent willingness for dialogue at that stage of the campaign. 
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In conclusion, discursive opportunities in the coexistence campaign were – as with political 
opportunities - plentiful and indeed exploited, but to little avail once the WTO’s negative 
ruling became clear.  Fixed opportunities such as the legitimacy discourse were 
acknowledged by the campaigning groups, although generally suspicious of the 
Commission paying only lip-service to real dialogue, but perhaps the most important of 
these was the attempt to re-create some of the circumstances of the previous campaign that 
had led to the de facto moratorium some years before.  An important discursive threat in 
the shape of the Commission’s framing of the coexistence issue in economic terms was 
overcome by the Networks own framing work, and the bridging of the two campaigns, 
leading to opportunities for the Network in particular (opportunities also linked to their 
status as elected representatives) which was subsequently recognised by the Commission in 
an official document.   
 
3.5  Recognition not legislation: the outcomes of the coexistence campaign 
 
The real question arising from these analyses if of course how did these actions on the part 
of the EUSMOs contribute to outcomes in the coexistence case?  Before tackling this 
subject, however, we must specify exactly what those outcomes were.  Of the three types of 
outcomes of interest in this study, two are seen during the campaign.  At the beginning of 
the second phase of the campaign, marked by the publication of the Commission’s 
recommendations on coexistence, the idea that those opposed to the cultivation of GMOs 
should foot the bill for protective measures disappears from the text.  This may be 
classified as a policy outcome of the first phase of the campaign.  With the beginning of the 
third phase of the campaign, on the other hand, we see an access outcome for the Network, 
who are explicitly recognised in the 2005 (Barroso) Commission communication, a fact 
which leads to several meetings with Commissioners.  This outcome may also be applied to 
the EUSMO campaign as a whole, since the communication also admits that “The 
Commission continues to receive an important amount of correspondence from regions and 
municipalities declaring themselves ‘GMO-free’” (Commission 2005), a statement that 
almost certainly also applies to ‘GM-free zones’ created as a result of the campaigns of 
local environmental SMOs.  Regarding the explicitly stated aim of the campaign, i.e. 
European level legislation on coexistence rules, and the recognition of the right to declare 
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GM-free zones,94 neither of these is forthcoming at the end of the campaign as defined in 
this case study.95   
 
To trace the processes that led to these outcomes, as well as the failure to secure the policy 
outcome that formed the essential goal of the campaign, we must look back at the results of 
the theoretical analyses presented in this chapter.  The following table provides a succinct 
summary of each these for each phase of the campaign in order to facilitate the exercise.   
  
 
 
Table 6: Summary of the coexistence campaign by phase  
 
 
Phase 
 
Extent of shared frames 
 
Political Opportunities 
 
Discursive Opportunities
1 
High congruence at EU 
level – frames condemn 
Commission and demand 
EU legislation.  National 
level largely in line with EU 
level. 
Threat closed 
Commission – seek to 
widen coalition and use 
EP (separation of powers 
exploited). 
Threats in Commission 
communication language 
– limit to economic 
effects.   
2 
Frame bridge EU legislation 
and GM-free zones, frames 
less congruent than phase 1.  
Pick up quality food frame.  
National level focus on 
widespread nature of 
movement.  Diagnostic 
frames similar to EU level. 
Coalitions strong between 
regions and envi. Groups, 
also strong multi-level 
campaign (GM-free 
Europe), ally in Austrian 
Presidency.  New 
Commission more open to 
discussion esp. with 
regions. 
Exploit legitimacy 
opportunity / respond to 
economic arguments by 
linking campaign with 
regions’.  GM-free 
approach recalls 
previous campaign that 
led to moratorium.  
Commission continue to 
delay reports. 
3 
EU level frames very 
diverse, core demand 
overtaken by motivational 
frame on widespread 
movement.  National level 
picks up EU legislation 
Opportunity in Austrian 
Presidency conference – 
inclusion in official 
discussion.  Commission 
closes following WTO 
ruling. 
Commission 
communication 
expressly recognises 
Network and widespread 
movement.  Filibustering 
continues (until WTO 
                                                 
94 The Commission does recognise the possibility for GMO-free zones on a strictly private basis.  The 
campaign explicitly asks for legal recognition or the right to make blanket bans at the level of local 
authorities. 
95 The end of this campaign is of course somewhat artificially imposed for the purposes of this study, 
although there is certainly a serious scaling down of activities that coincides with this imposed end.  
Nevertheless, the demands of the campaign may be granted at some later date.  At the time of writing 
(February 2008) this is not the case.   
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demand, quality food frame, 
emphasise widespread 
movement.  Diagnostic 
frames similar to EU level 
and amongst national 
groups. 
ruling). 
 
 
It is relatively easy to trace the processes leading to the policy outcome of the concession 
on liability contained in the Commission Recommendations that mark the beginning of the 
second phase of the campaign.  Glancing at the synoptic table, the relative weakness of the 
campaign is notable.  Discursive and political threats are present in the Commission’s 
words and actions, especially their exclusion of EUSMOs from the roundtable discussion 
that is publicly credited as the source of the Recommendations (Commission 2003: 7).  The 
campaigning groups do share frames to a great extent at this early phase, however it should 
be remembered that the campaign was still fairly low key at this point.  The biggest event 
that had been held was the conference at the European Parliament.  According to the 
conference report, the point that GM authorisation holders rather than those wishing to be 
protected from GM admixture should pay is certainly made, in keeping with the findings 
from the frame analysis that showed the unity of the campaign’s message at this early 
stage.  It is also true that people from the Commission (from various DGs), MEPs, farmers’ 
unions, national government advisors and experts and regional government representatives 
attended this conference, alongside the environmental groups.  A member of Fischler’s 
cabinet was even a speaker.96   
 
Yet the fact remains that the Commission’s stakeholder meeting, from which the 
campaigning groups were excluded, is the explicitly acknowledged source for the 
Recommendations.  While receiving a similar message from EUSMOs may have added 
another reason for the Commission’s change of heart, it is unconvincing to apportion any 
real credit for this policy outcome to the work of the EUSMOs when the contents of the 
Recommendations had to all intents and purposes already been decided when the 
conference took place, and none were present at the roundtable meeting.  In line with such 
a conclusion, none of the campaigning groups interviewed claimed any part in this 
outcome, in either interviews or public documents.  Summing up this conclusion in 
                                                 
96 Information from the conference report ‘GMOs: co-existence or contamination’?  Drafted by Friends of the 
Earth Europe. 
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theoretical terms, the actions taken by the EUSMOs in response to the prevailing discursive 
and political threats they faced came too late to be causally linked in any convincing 
manner with the policy outcome observed. 
 
The second outcome of the campaign, the access outcome for the Network as a result of 
their recognition in the second of the Commission’s communications, follows the 
completion of the second phase of the campaign.  The number of factors that could 
plausibly have contributed to this outcome is correspondingly higher, but many are 
attributable to the regions themselves.  As the summary table reminds us, the second phase 
of the coexistence campaign is a theoretically near-perfect scenario.  In terms of shared 
frames the second phase saw the adoption of the GM-frame (that is the frame demanding 
that local and regional bans be allowed) from national campaigns that had already secured 
some success, and its bridging with the EUSMO demand of European legislation.  This 
evidence of dialogue and a united front in terms of the understanding of problems was 
echoed in the responses to the threats posed by a closed Commission: by adopting the GM-
free approach the EUSMOs secured a forceful multi-level tactic, and at the EU level they 
broadened their campaign by building bridges to the parallel (and complementary to the 
GM-free approach) Network.  This approach also solved the discursive threats of the 
Commission’s argument that the issue be limited to economic issues, since this was a major 
frame in the region’s work.  Elite allies in the shape of the Austrian Presidency, not to 
mention the change of the Commission bringing hope through signals that the coexistence 
issue was once again open to discussion, delivered yet more opportunities to the now 
strong, widespread campaign.  All this would lead to the conclusion that the access 
outcome observed had much to do with the EUSMO campaign. 
 
Nevertheless, a closer examination does reveal some caveats to such a conclusion.  It is 
important to remember, for example, that the Commission had already recognised the 
possibility of GM-free zones, albeit on a strictly voluntary basis between private citizens, in 
their first communication on coexistence in 2003.  Since then, they had also approved 
numerous local and regional laws prohibiting the cultivation of GMOs on a case-by-case 
basis, as compatible with European legislation (see Seifert 2006/7).  Awareness of GM-free 
zones and their growing popularity was therefore relatively old news to the Commission.  It 
was therefore not the EUSMO campaign (as defined as beginning in 2003) that originally 
brought the movement to the institution’s attention, but notifications from the regions and 
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municipalities of the member states and therefore indirectly the campaigns of local SMOs 
that were subsequently linked through the efforts of the EUSMOs.  Even taking this nuance 
into account, however, the fact remains that the outcome remains attributable to the work 
of a campaign rather than other circumstances or actors.   
 
The very specific mention bestowed on the Network leads us to surmise that the latter’s 
political efforts were also a significant factor leading to this outcome, combined with the 
fact that regional governments are made up of elected representatives, and are therefore in 
an optimal position to exploit the discursive opportunity of legitimacy according to which 
such actors will have a stronger claim on the Commission’s attention.  The Upper Austrian 
region’s attempts to secure a blanket ban through its legal challenges also drew attention to 
their resolve to remain GMO-free, which helped to keep the issue on the Commission’s 
agenda.  And of course the work of the wider GM-free campaign had a similar effect of 
keeping the issue visible and salient, blurring the distinctions between the Network and an 
even more widespread phenomenon stretching throughout the EU.  It is therefore safe to 
conclude that the Network’s recognition was indeed a consequence of the campaign’s 
work, even if the GM-free issue pre-dates it – no actions by any other actors took place 
between the actions by the EUSMOs and this access outcome, nor did any particular 
circumstance unconnected to the campaign contribute to the heightened salience of GM-
free zones.  The causal path is unusually direct.  It is difficult to judge exactly which of the 
factors mentioned as relevant to the outcome was relatively more significant, but since all 
are attributable to the campaigning groups, this is less important for the purposes of this 
study.   
 
The real dilemma in discussing the outcomes of this campaign however is the lack of the 
final outcome sought by the campaigning groups.  If we compare the coexistence case to 
the other campaigns presented in this study, for example, we see that the campaign has 
many of the ingredients that contributed to the positive outcomes of the social campaigns – 
relatively few political and discursive threats, which are, where met, mostly overcome with 
skill.  Looking back at the glittering evaluation of the campaign in the second phase, it 
remains difficult to pin down the reason for the ultimate lack of the policy outcome sought.  
In addition the coexistence campaign also has the strongest levels of identity through 
shared frames of all the cases presented, as it is the only to present real evidence of framing 
work, and thus meaning creation, taking place between the campaigning groups.  
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Considering all of this, it is logically to the third phase of the campaign that we must turn in 
order to discover the reason for this lack.     
 
The framing work seen in the second phase of the campaign seems to begin to come 
undone in the third and final phase.  As the number of EUSMOs involved rose, the 
messages of the campaign became more and more diverse.  Although the strength and 
coherence of the national and local movement continued, the European level groups failed 
to continue to deliver a consistent message in the third phase.  It is interesting to note that 
this situation coincides with the Austrian Presidency’s conference on coexistence and the 
long-awaited inclusion of the EUSMOs in the official discussions on the issue, the fact that 
this shortcoming in framing occurs at this particular point in the story means that it could 
be one of the reasons behind the ultimate failure to secure the policy outcome.  Yet this 
conclusion does not stand up to close scrutiny – firstly because the conference may (despite 
the best intentions of the Austrian presidency) be seen as simply another episode in the 
Commission’s filibustering of the issue, rendering the actual content of EUSMOs’ 
messages redundant; and secondly because as rumours of the negative WTO trade dispute 
ruling spread during that very conference, the agriculture Commission Mariann Fischer-
Boel promptly quashed the possibility of European level legislation in her speech, thus 
backtracking on previous signs of her inclination for such a move.97   
 
Bearing this reasoning in mind, the conclusion that the contingent event of the WTO’s 
negative ruling on the trade dispute over the moratorium is the only remaining explanation 
according to the analytical model presented in chapter two.  All other possible causal paths 
have been considered and discarded, and because it is a non-outcome that we are seeking to 
explain it is to this circumstance, the only other remaining threat apparent in the third 
period of the campaign, that we must turn.  Indeed, the conclusion that the unwelcome 
outcome of the trade dispute over GMOs within the auspices of the WTO was instrumental 
in convincing the Commission not to legislate on coexistence, or to attempt any legalisation 
of local cultivation bans, makes perfect sense considering the sudden u-turn by the 
agriculture Commissioner at the Vienna conference in April 2006, despite her previous 
recognition of the Network and the wider GM-free movement.  In addition, this conclusion 
                                                 
97 The Agriculture Commissioner Fischer-Boel confirmed at the Austrian Presidency’s April 2006 conference 
that there would be no legislation on coexistence.  At the same conference the Environment Commissioner 
Dimas made a speech underlining his worries about the issue. 
 124
makes sense not only in terms of the strict universe of this case, but also in terms of the 
importance of WTO membership to the EU.  The EU’s legal obligations to this 
organisation, as well as its dependence on good economic relations with the rest of the 
world, easily overruled the efforts of regional governments and environmental groups.  As 
will also be seen in other case studies included here, a contingent event proves itself the 
crux of the campaign, making, or in this case breaking, its fortunes. 
 
3.6  Conclusions 
 
The coexistence case got off to a slow start in early 2003, with environmental EUSMOs 
reacting to the Commission’s 2003 communication and their exclusion from stakeholder 
discussions with press releases and a conference.  Yet these rather tame European level 
actions masked behind the scenes work to coordinate the efforts of national campaigns to 
create GM-free zones at the regional and local levels, most visibly through the construction 
of a website providing information and a central point of reference for different national 
campaigns.  At the same time, regional governments had formed a network to protect their 
own GM cultivation bans through lobbying work at the European level.  The environmental 
groups, and FoEE in particular, worked to bring these two strands of the campaign together 
by launching an initiative with the AER, an organisation representing many of the members 
of the Network, as well as by adding the call to recognise regional and local bans to its 
previous calls for European legislation.  In this second phase of the campaign the strong 
coalitions worked well together, with frame bridging and evidence of dialogue between EU 
and national groups abundant.  Opportunities were also on the increase, with the new 
Barroso Commission proving more open to discussions with the campaigning groups, even 
going so far as to explicitly recognise the GM-free movement and the Network, and the 
upcoming Austrian presidency also supplying a powerful ally.  These positive 
circumstances were once again turned around in the third phase of the campaign, where an 
ever-expanding coalition began to lose the unity of its message, and, more importantly, a 
ruling against the EU in a WTO trade dispute on the previous moratorium on GMOs put an 
end to the possibility of EU legislation and legal local bans. 
 
Two outcomes were identified in the campaign – a policy outcome following the first phase 
of the campaign where the Commission backtracked on their previous assertions on 
liability and an access outcome following the second phase of the campaign in the shape of 
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the recognition of the Network and the GM-free movement in an official communication.  
Using the process tracing method outlined in chapter two, I showed that while the first of 
these could not be traced to any of the actions taken by the campaigning groups, the second 
was very much linked to their work, although the Commission had already begun to take 
note of the movement before it was expressly picked up by the EUSMOs.  As for the stated 
goal of the campaign, to secure European legislation and, later, the legalisation of local 
bans, this was not achieved for the above mentioned reason of the WTO ruling – after 
assessing all other possible paths to this outcome, including the dissipation of the 
campaign’s message in the final stages of the campaign, this remained the most plausible 
and logical conclusion.  Nevertheless, the near textbook campaign observed in the second 
phase did secure an outcome, showing that consequences will be seen in strong campaigns.  
Nor, to be fair, did the campaign ‘fail’ in its real aim: that of stopping the cultivation of 
GMOs.  By securing so many bans and keeping opposition to GMOs alive, the campaign 
contributed to the fact that today very few GM crops are actually to be found growing in 
European soil.     
 
At its strongest point, that is in the second phase, the coexistence campaign recalls findings 
on several other successful transnational campaigns.  First and foremost, parallels can be 
drawn between this campaign and the previous one that led to the moratorium.  As 
Kettnaker’s (2001) study shows, here European authorities were faced with successful 
campaigns that had worked from the bottom up to force their hands over the GM issue – by 
creating the de facto moratorium, the EU was obliged to institutionalise it until legislation 
was passed.  Similar tactics were of course also seen in the GM-free initiative – the linking 
and encouragement of national and local campaigns in order to bring them to the attention 
of EU authorities, and to create effective widespread bans on GM crops.  Drawing on the 
forms of other connected campaigns is not a phenomenon limited to GMOs.  Other 
transnational campaigns have also drawn inspiration from previous successes, for example 
the campaign against deforestation in Sarawak, Malaysia, which drew on a previous 
campaign on whaling (Keck and Sikkink 1998:150), or indeed the nuclear freeze 
campaign’s diffusion to Europe from the United States in the early 1980s (Tarrow and 
McAdam 2005:135-140). 
 
Focusing on other particularities of the campaign, the findings on frame bridging also recall 
other research on transnational campaigns.  The need to consciously engage in framing 
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work in order to facilitate collaboration has been noted not only in EU coalitions (Cullen 
2005) but in others too, for example in Juska and Edwards’ (2005:201) study on a 
transnational campaign against intensive pig farming.  Linked to this finding on framing 
work was the observation that the broad coalition forged in this campaign, especially 
between the regional governments and the EUSMOs, remained flexible.  The groups 
worked together so far as they agreed, but with no binding commitments or the like – a 
feature of transnational campaigns noted as common and important to the cases included in 
the volume edited by Bandy and Smith (2005:244-5).  The coexistence case thus confirms 
findings from other research, and also contributes to one of the main findings of this thesis, 
i.e. on the paramount importance of dynamic opportunities in general, and contingent 
events in particular, in the campaigns examined here.   
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4. REACHing out: strong coalitions around European chemicals legislation98 
 
“I would say REACH is a case where the coalition work has been most cohesive 
and most brilliant.  […]  And I’ve heard people saying, people who have been working on 
different issues, for many many years, saying that what we have here, in terms of the 
REACH coalition, is something that never happened before.” (interview 16) 
 
Coalitions were also important, flexible, and strong in the REACH case, although here too 
the EUSMOs were unable to secure the policy outcome they desired.  The EU had decided 
to review its ageing chemicals legislation in 1999, and the Commission duly published a 
White Paper on the subject in early 2001 – a document generally praised by the EUSMOs 
who would later criticise the legislative proposal.  Unsurprisingly, industry was less 
impressed by the rather stringent rules floated in the White Paper, and were vigorous in 
their responses to the raft of consultations that followed its release.  Indeed, the EUSMOs 
accused them of pressing the Commission to hold the public internet consultation of 
summer 2003 in order to ensure further delays to the legislative proposal.  Such a delay 
would be likely to mean the proposal would be received by a more right-wing and industry 
friendly European Parliament following the 2004 elections.   
 
It was, more or less, from this point in the proceedings that a coalition of environmental, 
consumers, health and women’s EUSMOs began to campaign to ‘save’ the REACH 
proposal, which when finally published reflected the views of industry more closely than 
they would have liked.  A coalition, the aptly monikered chemical reaction, was set up in 
attempt to involve national and local groups, but the campaign was mainly carried on at the 
EU level with a barrage of scientific reports, press releases, media stunts (mostly carried 
out by Greenpeace) and events in the Parliament, and lobbying.  Much time was reacting to 
the even more ferocious campaign simultaneously being carried out by industry groups, 
who had managed to shift the discourse away from environmental and human health issues 
onto the ground of employment and economy.  Out-campaigned, outnumbered, and out-
argued, the EUSMOs were disappointed with the legislation finally adopted in late 2006, 
                                                 
98 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the conference ‘The “Establishment” Responds – The 
Institutional and Social Impact of Protest Movements During and After the Cold War’ in Heidelberg, 
November 22-24 2007.  I would like to thank the participants of this conference for their valuable comments 
and insights. 
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despite the brave face they put on in public.  Once again, a dynamic political threat played 
a big role in scuppering the fortunes of a campaign – in this case a strong counter-
movement. 
 
The REACH case features many of the EUSMOs encountered in the coexistence campaign, 
but in the different setting of a campaign concerning legislation.  There are similarities 
between the two campaigns, in the importance of coalitions in particular.  Yet the REACH 
case shows tactics that were not encountered in the coexistence campaign – media-oriented 
stunts play a larger part, as, on the other side, does serious scientific research.  Another 
interesting feature of the campaign is that it unfolded almost simultaneously to the 
Bolkestein case, and is singled out by many interviewees (alongside Bolkestein, of course), 
as a landmark in terms of campaigning methods at the EU level despite its ultimately 
disappointing outcome in the eyes of the environmental EUSMO coalition.  As the case 
concerns legislation, its periodisation is relatively straightforward in that the most logical 
divisions follow the legislative stages.  Taking the White Paper as the starting point of the 
campaign (phase 1: February 2001 – October 2003), the following two phases correspond 
to the first and second legislative readings (October 2003 – July 2006 and July 2006 – 
December 2006). 
 
4.1 A reactive campaign 
  
REACH, standing for the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals 
legislation in EU jargon, is the only of the four case studies included in this work whose 
story begins with support for a European proposal from EUSMOs.  Discussions on new 
European chemicals legislation had begun as early as 1999 in both the Council and 
Commission,99 partly as a result of the relatively new ‘precautionary principle’, itself in 
turn a result of previous public health crises including BSE.  The main objective of the new 
legislation would thus be to secure a high level of protection for human health and the 
environment, although without forgetting the importance of the internal market.  With these 
goals in mind, the Commission published a White Paper on the theme in February 2001, 
which was then followed up with intensive consultation by the two responsible DGs within 
the Commission: Enterprise and Environment (headed at this point in the story by 
                                                 
99 For an in-depth description of the run-up to REACH, see Lind, G (2004). 
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Commissioners Liikanen and Wallström respectively, replaced in 2004 by Commissioners 
Verheugen and Dimas), beginning with ‘stakeholder conferences’, and ending in an open 
and public internet consultation during the summer of 2003.  This consultation was hotly 
contested by environmental EUSMOs, who viewed it as a tactic of the industry coalition to 
ensure the new legislative proposal would not reach the European Parliament before the 
elections scheduled for the summer of 2004, widely expected to result in a more right wing, 
and therefore more open to industry, composition in the institution.  In the event, this was 
indeed what happened.  The final legislative proposal of the Commission was presented in 
October 2003.   
 
The EUSMOs active on the REACH issue were relatively quiet during this first phase of 
the campaign.  Several of the larger organisation involved, such as the WWF, Greenpeace, 
and FoEE, had carried out previous campaigns related to the introduction of the new 
legislation, but with the publication of the White Paper by the Commission in February 
2001 shifted gear to accommodate this fact.  Indeed, it is unsurprising that the groups 
remained relatively quiet on the subject, since they were by and large very supportive of 
the content of this document.  The European chemicals industry, and the groups 
representing them (who will also be referred to as the ‘counter-movement’ here), however, 
were equally unsurprisingly not so quiet about the prospect of the new legislation.  Their 
work aiming to influence and change the content of the final legislative proposal was the 
main trigger for the EUSMOs’ subsequent campaign. 
 
The first EUSMO documents concerning the REACH campaign (according to the 
periodisation applied here that is) appeared a few months after the publication of the White 
Paper in the form of position papers and general comments on its content.  It is interesting 
to note that even at this early stage a joint paper containing the key arguments on REACH 
in the eyes of several EUSMOs (namely WWF, the EEB, FoEE, and Eurogroup for Animal 
Welfare) appeared, presumably for the attention of the Commission in light of the many 
stakeholder conferences taking place at the time.  In 2002 the contributions of the EUSMOs 
active on the issue increased, detailing joint views and key priorities once more in jointly 
published documents now including Greenpeace as well as, occasionally, BEUC (the 
European Consumers’ Organisation).  This acceleration in the publication of press releases, 
discussion papers, and the like is linked to the campaign simultaneously being carried out 
by industry groups, who had by now succeeded in delaying the publication of the 
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legislative proposal by advancing arguments on the potential loss of many jobs in the 
chemicals sector as a result of the rules envisaged in the White Paper.  For example, in a 
joint letter dated 25 October 2002, the EEB, BEUC, Friends of the Earth Europe, 
Greenpeace, and the WWF express their concerns over the delay in publishing the 
legislative proposal and the influence of ‘certain business sectors’.  They go on to recall the 
urgency and support for the White Paper from the other EU institutions in a plea to stop 
further impact assessments and an internet consultation. 
 
This rather paradoxical standpoint (EUSMOs more often speak out in the name of 
transparency and increased consultation) is explained, as mentioned earlier, by their belief 
that industry was seeking to delay the publication of the legislative proposal in the hope 
that a change in the Commission and Parliament following the 2004 elections would be 
favourable to their opinions.  The EUSMOs, on the other hand, were keen to see an early 
publication, closer to the content of the White Paper, and discussion in the Parliament 
beginning before the elections.  It was in 2003, then, that the campaign began in earnest 
with the consolidation of joint work seen in many collaborative efforts, such as a study by 
WWF and the EEB refuting some of the claims then being made by the industry groups on 
the repercussions of REACH.  Work by separate organisations continued, with the first of 
many media-oriented stunts being held by Greenpeace in June 2003 in Hamburg outside a 
business meeting where Commissioner Liikanen and the then German Chancellor 
Schroeder were in attendance.100 
 
The extended period of consultation on REACH culminated in the public internet 
consultation held during the summer of 2003.  This consultation saw the first instances of 
efforts to mobilise grass roots members by the EUSMOs involved, as well as further efforts 
to extend the (already quite large) coalition on the issue.  A joint contribution was made by 
the EEB, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace, WWF, BEUC, Women in Europe for a 
Common Future (WECF), and the European Public Health Alliance (EPHA), along with a 
jointly sponsored ‘Declaration for a Toxics Free Future’, signed by 22,000 citizens, which 
was handed over personally to Commissioner Wallström with an accompanying press 
conference.  ‘Cut and paste’ answers to the on-line consultation questionnaire were also 
                                                 
100 An activist inside a giant test tube filled with green liquid was installed outside the meeting venue.  The 
test tube was decorated with the names of companies producing chemicals subsequently found in dust, breast 
milk and other household objects. 
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circulated on various groups’ websites, authored by the EEB, FoEE, Greenpeace and the 
WWF.  These efforts meant that despite the strong presence of industry groups (who 
formed two thirds of the contributors, while NGOs made up only 6%), the EUSMOs were 
successful in mobilising their members, since they made more submissions per participant 
than industry (Persson 2005).  The internet consultation was followed up with various press 
releases and discussion documents, mostly focussing on discrediting claims made by 
industry groups.  The final public action of the first phase, days before the publication of 
the legislative proposal and its communication to the European Parliament, was carried out 
by Greenpeace.  The group vacuumed the offices of several MEPs and then tested the dust 
for potentially hazardous chemicals in an effort to bring home the salience of the issue for 
those who would take the next decisions on how REACH would shape up. 
 
The most important feature of the EUSMO campaign on REACH during the first reading 
of the legislative proposal was the launch of a more permanent coalition structure under the 
title ‘Chemical Reaction’.  Existing through a website providing a point of contact for 
many different NGOs active on the subject, this idea came from a staff member of Friends 
of the Earth UK, who then convinced both the EEB and Greenpeace to join the project, 
which came to fruition in 2003 (interview 23).  Although nominally a project by just these 
three organisations, Chemical Reaction provided an umbrella for publicising many other 
joint and individual initiatives.  Amongst the press releases archived on the website 
(www.chemicalreaction.org), for example, few feature the logos of less than 5 
organisations (the 3 directly involved, plus WWF and the EPHA or EEN101).  Chemical 
Reaction was also important in broadening the coalition on REACH, most notably 
recruiting and funding the women’s group WECF (interviews 23 and 24), as well as 
working to spread grassroots activism on the issue by ensuring that at least one 
organisation had an active national level group in each member state, and by providing 
some funding where possible.   
 
Working in a coalition was considered important in this case for reasons similar to those 
seen in coexistence, and indeed in the other cases included in this thesis.  It should be 
underlined that Chemical Reaction in itself was not seen as the basis for coalition work, 
                                                 
101 The European Public Health Alliance (EPHA) set up the EEN – the EPHA Environment Network – in 
response to the clear links between environmental damage and public health risks.  The EEN is now the 
Health and Environmental Alliance (HEAL).  Press releases participated in by either the EPHA or the EEN 
are thus understood to amount to the same thing. 
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officially it represented only those three organisations that were directly involved in its 
creation.  Nevertheless, the site gives the impression of representing the wider coalition, 
since it gathers all the joint material published around the subject of REACH.  This is the 
first reason for which coalition work was seen as useful – quite simply it allows one press 
release instead of five or six.  Working together also allowed the organisations to agree 
general strategies, thereby avoiding any overlap in their actions (i.e. by not organising 
major actions by separate organisations on the same day).  Common positions, such as the 
five NGO demands that will be seen below, were also made possible through the coalition, 
although they were by no means easy to negotiate, and sometimes led to exclusion where a 
more radical message was preferred (interview 16).102  In this vein, the flexibility of the 
coalition’s working relationship was also stressed – where one organisation had the 
capacity or will to carry out some individual action this was perfectly possible, as it was to 
opt out of those statements that a group could not agree with. 
 
The strong coalition formed around the REACH issue was also important for sharing 
resources - not only financial, but also expertise, knowledge, contacts, information, and 
even active grassroots groups.  The coalition was cited by all interviewees as extremely 
important for filling in these gaps – where they existed – for each group.  WECF, for 
example, cited contacts as an important advantage of the coalition, since the group is based 
in Utrecht rather than Brussels, making it difficult to cultivate the personal contacts seen as 
necessary for interacting with the Commission (see Murphy 2005:235 for a similar 
remark).  On the other hand, the interviewee felt that the organisation brought certain 
contacts with conservative MEPs that the coalition might not otherwise have had, partly 
through their own work alongside the European Women’s Lobby (interview 24).  Another 
form of resource pooling mentioned by all interviewees was expertise, not only because of 
the complexity of the REACH legislation, but more particularly in light of the strength of 
the industry lobby in terms of sheer numbers.  By dividing expertise on different areas of 
REACH, the EUSMOs felt more able to cover the same ground as industry, although never 
to the same extent.  Finally, coalition work is described as important geographically – for 
covering the areas and citizens most affected by the legislation – and in terms of 
communication – with different groups providing more active networks or groups in 
different member states.  In this sense, as will be discussed further in the section on 
                                                 
102 This appears to have been the case with BEUC, who appear in early joint documents but then disappear 
from publications with the beginning of the first reading and the launch of a more direct campaign. 
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political opportunities, working in coalitions can be seen as a strategic move in the 
campaign. 
 
After a lull at the beginning of the second phase the REACH campaign resurfaced again in 
the spring of 2004.  This gap in proceedings is explained both by the fact that, as will be 
seen in the Bolkestein case, it takes time for organisations to digest and form positions on 
legislative proposals, and by the fact that the European Parliament wrangled for some 
months first over which committee should be awarded the report, and then over which 
political group it should be assigned to.  In the event, the Environment committee retained 
its title as lead committee, although in line with the enhanced Hughes procedure equal 
weight would be given to the reports produced in the Internal Market and Industry 
committees.  Nevertheless, the Parliament decided to postpone the important report until 
after the elections of summer 2004.  In these months then the campaign remained dormant, 
with few actions taking place: the EEB held a conference in March, while Greenpeace 
publicised some of their work  testing consumer products and house dust for the presence 
of chemicals about which little is known, as well as praising ‘progressive’ companies that 
had already taken steps to substitute such chemicals in their production processes.  In terms 
of coalition work, as part of a larger election effort Chemical Reaction published the results 
of a ‘vote watch’, exposing how various candidates had voted in key environmental votes, 
including a vote on REACH, as well as urging candidates to sign a ‘safer chemicals 
pledge’. 
 
In September 2004, with the new Parliament beginning its term of office in earnest, a joint 
report was released by Greenpeace, the EEN, Chemical Reaction (unusually featured as a 
separate logo), the EEB, and FoEE entitled ‘Chemicals Beyond Control: Ensuring EU 
Chemicals Policy Protects Human Health and the Environment’.  This report spells out in 
detail the groups’ views on how the legislative proposal should be changed.  In the same 
month various joint press releases also appeared, targeting the European Parliament and 
calling on MEPs to ensure health and environmental protection, with similar calls 
addressed to the Presidency, and finally attacking the business association UNICE’s 
position on REACH.  At the end of the month the groups usually found gracing the press 
releases published through Chemical Reaction (the EEN, EPHA, WECF, WWF, FoEE, 
Greenpeace, and the EEB) held a meeting in the European Parliament to officially launch 
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their campaign for safer chemicals.  The meeting was followed up the day after with 
coalition visits to individual MEPs. 
 
The focus of the campaign at this point is thus clearly on the European Parliament, as is 
logical given the moment within the legislative process.  Other institutions, and especially 
industry targets, however, were far from ignored.  The EEB and the WWF were, for 
example, both active members of a Commission working group on REACH during this 
period,103 alongside industry representatives, although in January 2005 they withdrew their 
support for the impact assessment commissioned by the body from external consultants, 
stating that they had been refused access to key parts of the study, and that they were in any 
case in disagreement with other members over the methodology employed.  Greenpeace, in 
the meantime, continued their work on exposing ‘suspect’ chemicals in consumer products, 
publishing new work headed ‘my toxic Valentine’, or ‘eau de toxins’, in February 2005.  
National level actions were also beginning to take off at this juncture, as will be seen in the 
next section devoted to contact with national groups.   
 
In March of 2005 the coalition returned to the spotlight with the release of the EUSMOs’ 5 
key demands for REACH, as agreed by the EEB, EEN, FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF, and the 
WWF.  The main demands for the campaign were now as follows: 1) the phasing-out of the 
most hazardous chemicals unless no alternative is available and their use essential, also 
implying the deletion of the ‘adequate control’ loophole104 ; 2) the provision of safety 
information for chemicals produced in quantities of 1-10 tonnes per year; 3) obligatory 
checks on information supplied by industry by independent third parties; 4) that imports be 
subject to the same rules as chemicals produced within the EU; and 5) the public right to 
know and transparency – i.e. any hazardous chemicals found in finished consumer products 
should be labelled.  These five demands now officially formed the basis of the campaign, 
and thus of all the subsequent actions, which continued similarly in both intensity and style 
throughout the year: reports, actions by Greenpeace highlighting progressive industry or 
                                                 
103 Cited as an example of division of labour within the coalition by several interviewees – as the most 
‘conservative’ groups, places on the Commission working group were procurable, although the EEB had to 
insist more than the WWF (interview 23). 
104 In the legislative proposal chemicals representing hazards to the environment or human health and thus 
required to apply for authorisation would not have to be replaced by safer alternatives available at a 
comparable price where existing provided that the applicant could demonstrate that the chemical was 
‘adequately controlled’, or that the socio-economic benefits of using the chemical outweighed its hazards.  
The EUSMOs involved in the campaign insisted instead on obligatory substitution of such chemicals where 
safer alternatives were available. 
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problem products, briefing lunches (EEN and WWF for MEPs), and press releases refuting 
industry claims.  WECF also became more conspicuously active during this period, 
bringing the weight of their close links with the influential European Women’s Lobby 
(EWL) to the campaign by jointly sending the EUSMO demands to MEPs, as well as 
concentrating on contacts with the national level through a new kind of action – bringing 
grassroots members to Brussels for seminars and lobbying sessions on REACH – events 
made possible thanks to funding supplied by coalition members and supporters.105  In 
September 2004 the organisation also employed a member of staff to work specifically on 
the REACH issue (interview 24). 
 
During the summer of 2005, the new enterprise Commissioner Verheugen came under 
attack from the environmental EUSMOs (Greenpeace and FoEE in particular) for what was 
seen as an attempt to make a more ‘business friendly’ deal on REACH within the 
Commission while the text was still working its way through the European Parliament.  
The reaction to this rumour, which came about as the result of a leaked internal 
Commission document, was however contained to press releases condemning the move.  
The main target of the campaign moving into the second half of 2005 remained the 
European Parliament, with actions taking the form of letters from organisations addressed 
to those MEPs sitting on the committees that would vote important reports on REACH.  
FoEE also held an action with its German member group, Bund, where 100 garden gnomes 
were brought to the European Parliament on the day of the environment committee vote.  
The reports and the groups’ reactions to them were as to be expected – because each 
committee showed a preference for its domain, the report from the environment committee 
was by and large welcomed, while reports from the Industry and Internal Market 
committees were criticised. 
 
Similar letter-writing and lobbying actions continued as the first reading plenary vote, 
scheduled for November 2005, approached.  Here the coalition changed slightly with the 
addition of a new logo to its jointly signed letters – that of EuroCoop, which as the 
European association of cooperatives could be described as an organisation that straddles 
the divide between industry and consumers.  Actions at the national level were also seen 
during the run-up to the vote, with an on-line action being organised through the Chemical 
                                                 
105 The EEB, and the Rausing Trust UK – a funder of Chemical Reaction. 
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Reaction website, national level actions organised by different groups (see section below), 
and on the day of the vote itself the presence of more Friends of the Earth garden gnomes, 
of large banners organised within the coalition (interview 16), and national representatives 
of the WECF network involved in last-minute lobbying.  Lobbying actions were also 
stepped up in the weeks preceding the vote in an effort to influence the compromise 
package negotiated mainly between the environment and internal market committees, by 
rapporteurs Sacconi and Nassauer.  In a more radical stunt back in Brussels, Greenpeace 
activists offered to move President Barroso and Commissioner Verheugen from the 
Commission’s Berlaymont building into the German chemical producer’s BASF’s offices 
nearby, alleging that they were really working for them.   
 
The European Parliament’s first reading vote duly took place on 16 November 2005, and 
was rather cautiously received by the EUSMOs – that a step had been taken towards 
replacing hazardous chemicals had been taken was recognised, although the many 
exemptions approved by the Parliament were regretted.  Campaigning efforts now turned 
towards the Council of Ministers in line with the legislative process.  This institution was 
targeted, both as a whole and in terms of individual national ministers by national level 
groups.  As the body began to discuss the proposal, joint letters from the coalition groups 
were sent to ministers (22 November 2005 by the EEN, EuroCoop, FoEE, Greenpeace and 
WECF), while national groups were encouraged to target ministers from below.  Other 
institutions were (at least publicly) left aside as targets during this stage of the legislative 
process in favour of more media or public opinion-oriented ones.  For example, in 
December 2005 Greenpeace and the EEN took up the opportunity offered by an incident in 
Italy to draw attention to their arguments on REACH.  The withdrawal of a large quantity 
of powdered baby milk from the market following the discovery that chemicals used in 
printing labels had seeped through into the product was thus taken as an example showing 
the need for a strong REACH, since little was known about the chemical concerned and its 
potential effects on humans.  In a similar effort, FoEE released a report in the same month 
entitled ‘Toxic Inheritance’, with a press release entitled ‘Will your government allow the 
pollution of breast milk to continue?’.  These efforts to mobilise public opinion were 
ultimately aimed at the Council of Ministers, with last minute actions taking place at the 
Council building itself, where the WWF’s ‘toxic family’ met with ministers. 
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Nevertheless, the Council’s common position, published in December 2005, was a great 
disappointment to the campaign, bringing the loss of the substitution principle in favour of 
adequate control – the demand that had been number one on the EUSMO’s list.  As the first 
reading concluded with the Commission’s opinion, the groups continued to target 
Verheugen as the puppet of the chemical industry, whilst meeting to discuss their strategies 
for the second reading, including the re-negotiation of their demands in reaction to the 
reality of what had been lost in the first reading (interview 16).  The five NGO demands 
thus became four.  The first and most important point remained substitution, now followed 
by a more general demand for safety information, chemical manufacturers’ duty of care 
(replacing the more stringent demand that REACH apply to imported products) and finally 
transparency or the right to know for citizens.  However, because the second reading lasted 
much less than the first, and began in July 2006 just before the European Parliament’s 
annual break, campaign actions were necessarily reduced.  Chemical reaction organised an 
action aimed at reminding MEPs about REACH during their holidays (“Think about 
REACH while on the BEACH”), handing out organic cotton towels emblazoned with 
slogans recalling the importance of substitution.  Other on-line actions were also organised 
through the Chemical Reaction website. The Parliament did, in the event, support 
substitution in the environment committee vote, but the principle as favoured by the 
campaigning groups did not make it into the final version of the legislation, following a 
compromise deal brokered by the Finnish Presidency in a bid to avoid conciliation.  
Actions at the European Parliament therefore took on a tone more akin to protest than 
encouragement, with Friends of the Earth declaring the ‘patient to be barely alive’.  Indeed, 
the campaigning groups already considered the most important points already lost with the 
completion of the first reading. 
 
The campaign continued a little after the legislation entered into force (1 June 2007) with 
the Chemical Reaction website providing a more upbeat description of the adopted 
legislation and information on how to exploit it, although it is now closed.  To conclude 
this brief description of the tactics seen during this campaign, several points deserve 
mention.  Firstly, a strong coalition of different groups is apparent from the very 
beginnings of the campaign, and only becomes wider as the campaign progresses.  This 
coalition publishes most of the campaign’s publicly available documents jointly, unlike the 
more separate campaign strands seen in the GMO campaign.  At the same time, this 
campaign also presents a larger number of targets for the campaigning groups – not only 
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must they address each and every one of the institutions according to the legislative 
process, but also the arguments of the strong counter-campaign mounted by industry 
groups.  The technical nature of many of the arguments employed also led to some 
difficulties in translating the campaign to the national level, as will be seen below. 
 
4.1.1  Thin on the ground: the role of national groups 
 
Before describing how national groups acted in and contributed to the REACH campaign, I 
shall briefly describe the structures of each of the EUSMOs in an effort to shed light on 
how national groups are more generally involved in European level work.  Greenpeace, 
FoEE and the EEB were examined in the previous chapter on coexistence, leaving the 
WWF, the EEN, and WECF.  The WWF, one of the biggest environmental organisations 
present in the EU arena alongside Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, describes its 
Brussels office as the “embassy” for the organisation’s global network in the European 
Union.  The office provides a point linking the network of national WWF groups in the EU 
to the European level, and brings their input through participation in thematic working 
groups.  This arrangement could be described as lying somewhere between the FoEE’s 
more organic processes of dialogue with national groups and Greenpeace’s more 
hierarchical structure – while national groups are involved, there is no annual general 
meeting, executive committee or other more formal guiding mechanisms.106   
 
The EEN (now the Health and Environmental Alliance - HEAL) has more of these formal 
institutions.  Its policy priorities are decided at an annual general assembly, and its day to 
day work overseen by an executive committee elected by members at the general assembly.  
In addition, members are involved in thematic working groups that draft the group’s 
positions on various issues.  Finally, the WECF (one of the most important groups in terms 
of organising national group actions in this case) grew from a meeting of women’s groups 
at the UN Earth summit in 1992.  It describes itself in looser terms as a network of 
women’s groups concerned about environmental issues.  Perhaps the best description of 
this more organic network is their guiding principle; that they seek solutions “From local to 
global: WECF implements solutions locally and influences policy internationally by 
                                                 
106 For a brief overview of the WWF’s organisation, see van der Heijden 2002:193-4). 
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presenting their experience and recommendations to policy makers”.107  This approach 
means that most of its European actions, as will be seen below, involve or are aimed at 
empowering its members.       
 
Actions by national groups were seen by all interviewees to be of paramount importance to 
a successful campaign.  In particular, national groups with good contacts with national 
ministries were considered vital for the legislative stages involving the Council of 
Ministers, as were national delegates in the lobbying of MEPs.  In the REACH campaign, 
however, evidence of more independent or spontaneous national level work, like the GM-
free movement in the coexistence campaign, is somewhat limited.  Although a previous 
campaign to incite the EU to make changes to the chemicals legislation had involved 
national level involvement particularly from the UK FoE (interview 23), this campaign was 
separated from the later, reactive campaign that followed the substantial changes to the 
previously approved White Paper.  Indeed, some interviewees mentioned that they met 
with some difficulties when attempting to convey the importance of the legislation to 
national members (interviews 23 and 24), and indeed a more general lack of action on the 
EU level on their part (interview 23108).  There is, nevertheless, some evidence of a 
network of organisations used for disseminating information on the actions of Chemical 
Reaction, which are listed on the website.  The affiliation of each group varies, according 
to the coordinator of the project, according to the strength of each national group: “And we 
actually compare, with WWF and with Greenpeace, where do you have an active group, 
what are our weakest points, what can we do to change that?” (interview 23).  One tactic 
for involving national groups in the coalition is thus this conscious choice of the group 
strongest for each country, and even the funding of groups or activities where needed. 
 
Involving national groups through each of the separate organisations of the coalition 
necessarily depends on the internal structure of each.  Greenpeace, for example, 
concentrates more on the diffusion of cyber-actions to be carried out by individuals, due to 
its hierarchical organisation, as does the WWF, while the EEB has no national members as 
                                                 
107 http://www.wecf.eu/english/wecf/index.php 
108 “I started working for Friends of the Earth in 2001 in the UK, and then we were saying yes, we recognise 
EU politics is made in Brussels.  So if we recognise this it means, for me, that we have to take concrete steps, 
how to change our own campaigns to reflect that.  How are we going to communicate with our national 
ministry, and what attention are we giving to Parliamentarians in Brussels?  And the reality is that most 
people do not give much attention to what goes on in Brussels.  That's still the case.” (interview 23). 
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such.109  Greenpeace also concentrates on producing reports and evidence, work that may 
be managed due to their higher levels of funds and academic resources.  Friends of the 
Earth Europe presents a more network-like structure, with independent national and local 
groups deciding themselves whether or not to become involved.  The German Friends of 
the Earth group, Bund, was for example very active alongside the Brussels office on the 
REACH issue, while the idea for a joint campaign on REACH itself came from a staff 
member of Friends of the Earth UK and Northern Ireland.  The strongest group in the 
coalition in terms of organising various national level actions was the WECF.  This 
organisation is less rooted in Brussels than the others (in fact its offices are in the 
Netherlands) and generally appears more committed to grassroots actions than EU level 
lobbying – something the organisation finds difficult – although their success in convincing 
member groups to act was also imputed to the strength of arguments concerning chemicals 
and their particular effects women’s and children’s health (interview 24).  Not only did the 
WECF sponsor its member organisations’ events in Greece, the Netherlands, and Germany, 
it also organised information and training seminars, as described above (education and 
information used as a campaign tactic has also been employed in another campaign by the 
European Women’s lobby where national mobilisation was a problem, although it took 
several years for such a tactic to produce results.  See Hellferich and Kolb 2001:150).  The 
EEB, Greenpeace, WWF and FoEE also hold an annual chemical working group in 
Brussels for national members, where strategy is discussed, representatives of the 
institutions are invited, and lobbying actions are encouraged (interview 23).   
 
Much contact with national groups is therefore aimed at educating them on European issues 
which may not by very visible at the national level, as well as on chemicals themselves.  A 
point mentioned frequently when speaking of involving national organisation was the need 
to convince these of the campaign’s importance: “each NGO on the national level, they are 
all independent, so you can't tell them that this is really important, you can only try to win 
them over with different arguments when you want them to work on an issue.  And then 
also there comes the money side of it.” (interview 23).  As this quote shows, while the 
more ‘democratic’ organisations may have good relationships with national members, the 
latter will not automatically take up a European campaign, often for the mundane reason of 
not having enough resources, and more immediately pressing national issues to deal with – 
                                                 
109 Although interviewees also mentioned their attempts to promote work between national groups, as well as 
the recruitment of unaffiliated national groups (WECF). 
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hence the funding offers where possible through Chemical Reaction.  Here the aim was to 
fund national delegates’ trips to Brussels at strategic points in the campaign, and again to 
encourage them to visit their MEPs and the like, as well as to contribute towards translation 
costs in order that national groups would be able to provide information in local language 
as well as carry out cyber actions.  On a more passive level, European groups ensured that 
all documents concerning the case were at least provided to their national and local levels.  
This, however, also means that in many of the EUSMOs documents are drafted with the 
sole input of the other EUSMOs active on the campaign, which reduces the role of national 
groups to advertising. 
 
4.2  Shared but inconstant: frames in the REACH Campaign 
 
The REACH campaign presents a peculiar picture when it come to frame analyses.  
Because so much time was spent in negotiating joint documents, with hardly any of the 
EUSMOs drafting their own separate positions, evidence of framing work is not to be 
found in the finished documents analysed but rather in their preparation.  Taking this into 
account, the highly unified messages of the campaign are clear, although their constancy is 
less so.   
 
4.2.1  Frames among the European level groups 
 
The documents selected for each phase of the REACH campaign amongst the European 
level groups are different from those seen in other case studies presented in this thesis 
because, as mentioned above, they are all jointly authored documents.  This presents a 
problem in that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about frame bridging or other 
processes vital to establishing whether or not we are faced with an instance of identity 
building.  However, the selection of documents is faithful to the characteristics of the 
campaign, and in itself presents conclusive evidence of a strong coalition present from the 
very beginning of the campaign.  While the environmental groups do not form so tightly 
bound and permanent a network as seen in the social cases (i.e. the Social Platform) they 
do meet regularly through the Green 10 network, and divide responsibility for following 
areas of European legislation  according to expertise.  In addition, while the first documents 
mostly concern environmental groups, others join the campaign later on, meaning that 
dialogue with new groups must be taking place, since press releases are jointly drafted. 
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During the first phase of the campaign, stretching from the publication of the 
Commission’s white paper to the publication of the legislative proposal, very few campaign 
documents could be located.  This is due to the fact that on publication of the White Paper 
the campaigning groups were satisfied, and no campaign had yet been launched.  However, 
a year on the letters and press releases began to appear.  The analysis of this admittedly 
small number of documents shows that no strong line of argument has really been 
developed as yet.  The most frequent frame is, unsurprisingly, anger that the Commission is 
allegedly delaying reform of the chemicals legislation.  All of the documents also insist on 
the importance of substituting dangerous chemicals, a frame that later reveals itself to be on 
the whole the most important of the whole campaign.  Yet this is the only frame shared 
across the board.  Although mentions of the hazards of chemicals, of the positions of the 
Parliament and Council and of evidence showing the dangers of chemicals are also found 
in two of the three documents analysed, these are the only frames found in more than one 
document, and a great deal of arguments mentioned only once make up the rest of the grid 
(see Annex I).  In sum, few frames are repeated to any large extent, although this may be 
attenuated by the fact that most of the single frames are arguments sustaining these main 
points.  Frames pointing the finger at industry for ruining REACH are fewer than would 
have been expected.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is an extremely early point 
in the campaign pre-dating the real launch of the coalition’s work. 
 
Many more documents were available for the analysis in the second and most intense phase 
of the campaign.  It is interesting to note that BEUC, the European consumers’ 
organisation, now disappears from the campaign, while the hard core of the EEB, FoEE, 
Greenpeace, WECF and the EEN remain.  For obvious reasons the frame blaming the 
Commission for delaying the reform now disappears, and is replaced with arguments 
highlighting the importance of the substitution principle, closely followed by the call for 
industry information to be independently audited.  In fact five of the six most frequent 
frames relate to either substitution (phasing out, adequate control etc.) or to information 
requirements.  There is thus continuation from the first phase in terms of the importance of 
substitution, accompanied by the introduction of more concrete arguments on what 
REACH should contain – it is interesting to note that the five most frequent frames are in 
fact prognostic rather than diagnostic.  The large amount of frames used very infrequently 
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are explained by the fact that they relate to different parts of the legislative process.  In 
substance, many raise very similar arguments.   
 
Once again, there is less evidence of reactions against industry groups than would have 
been expected - more frequent at the beginning of the first reading, references to business 
die out as the process moves on.    This may be imputed to the fact that industry arguments 
were answered more in the private domain, that is in Commission working groups and 
lobby meetings, than in press releases.  Or it may be construed as an oversight of the 
campaigning groups, or as a signal of their difficulties in addressing multiple actors.  The 
first of these explanations seems more convincing when considering that interviewees all 
stressed how much time had been spent responding to industry arguments.  Overall for this 
phase of the REACH campaign the extent of shared frames is low, with only two frames 
shared in more than two documents.  This finding requires a different interpretation to 
those that may apply in the other cases included in this study as a result of the fact that all 
of the documents analysed are jointly authored.  The low number of shared frames across 
documents and time at the EU level does not therefore indicated an absence of framing 
work – as mentioned in the introduction to this section, framing work was carried out in the 
drafting of these documents.  This finding indicates the lack of a strong message carried 
throughout the EUSMO campaign on REACH (with the partial exception of the 
substitution frame, which appears in five of the eight documents analysed) – a lack that was 
theorised in chapter one as potentially very damaging for the outcomes of EU level 
campaigns.   
 
In the third and final phase of the campaign, the substitution argument becomes less 
important as the ultimate content of the legislation becomes clear.  In fact the most frequent 
frame, although closely followed by substitution, is a warning that the new legislation will 
allow the continued use of dangerous chemicals even where safer alternatives exist.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these two ‘top’ frames are only found in two of the 
documents analysed for this third period of the campaign.  Continuing the overview of the 
frames used in the third phase, however, we can also note the disappearance of prognostic 
frames in favour of diagnostic, i.e. the frames now tend to point out what is wrong with the 
draft rather than suggest what it should contain - the emphasis now appears to be on 
‘damage control’ rather than active participation.  That said, not all frames are pessimistic, 
reflecting the groups’ (public) post legislative stance on REACH, which emphasises that it 
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is a first step and that vigilance may lead to improvements.  Generally the third period of 
the campaign is also characterised by a large number of frames used only once or twice, 
where even those frames found twice then to be within the same document.  While 
similarly large numbers of unique frames certainly feature in other cases, these have been 
offset by a small set of frames with high frequency and continuity.  REACH does not 
display a strong thread of frames running throughout the campaign, or at least not 
according to the frame analysis.  This may of course be imputed to the coalition’s reaction 
to the facts and the adaptation of their arguments, but may also suggest that the lack of a 
strong and repeated argument contributed to the less than perfect outcome. 
 
As already mentioned above, it is impossible to draw any real conclusions from this 
analysis on the presence, absence or nature of framing processes.  However, we do know 
that each press release, and the five, then four, NGO demands were negotiated jointly by all 
of the groups (interview 24).  Evidence on dialogue must then come from which 
organisations lend their names to each document.  As already noted, BEUC disappears 
from press releases after the first phase of the campaign, while a hard core of 
environmental groups formed by the EEB, Friends of the Earth Europe and Greenpeace 
(the sponsors of chemical reaction) grace every single document (bar one).  In addition to 
these groups, the WECF, WWF and the EEN (also appearing as the EPHA and HEAL) 
come and go, although appearing very often - confirming the comments on the flexibility of 
the coalition made earlier.  Later in the campaign, EuroCoop also appear as a joint author 
of press releases, although this was confirmed by a representative of the group as a passive 
action.  All in all then we may say that the groups, at least on the subject of REACH, 
worked to form a shared understanding or analysis of the subject, and remain united in their 
message as testified by the joint authorship of every single document analysed here.     
 
4.2.2  Frames at the European and national levels 
 
Significantly, not a great deal of documents concerning national level actions on REACH 
were found.  As described earlier, several national level actions involved groups that are 
members WECF, and most took place in Germany.  The vitality of the German national 
level in terms of work on REACH can be attributed to the fact that the largest chemicals 
producers are German (BASF and Bayer), and they were also active in lobbying the 
German government on the subject.  As a result of the small number of documents 
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available for this analysis, the national level frame grids are amalgamated into a single 
table for all phases of the REACH campaign (see Appendix I).  The low number of 
documents available does present a problem in terms of interpreting the frame analysis – 
but as with the first phase of the EU level campaign this is a faithful interpretation of the 
actual situation.  Taking into account the significance of the low number of documents 
published speaks volumes about the lack of a widespread national level campaign on this 
issue. 
 
Similarly to the frames seen at the EU level, the national level documents also display few 
widely shared or durable frames.  Not one document was located for the first phase of the 
campaign, although admittedly this was also a slow phase at the European level.  Only one 
frame is shared across nearly all the documents (all bar one of which concern the second 
phase of the campaign), corroborating previous hypotheses and findings about the 
difficulties of negotiating strong positions amongst heterogeneous groups (for example 
Rucht 2001: 137, Hellferich and Kolb 2001:149, Lahusen 2004, Cullen 2005). This single 
frame is the argument that health and environmental concerns should be at the centre of the 
REACH legislation.  This is a frame that, although present in the EU level documents, is 
weak.  Substitution, the most important frame throughout the campaign at the European 
level, is however mentioned more than is apparent at the national level.  It is mentioned in 
different contexts, usually in a language different than that of the EU level documents, for 
example by noting that industry has no incentives to develop alternatives, that chemical 
which damage foetuses will be allowed under the REACH proposal, or that it is the 
German government’s fault that compulsory substitution was blocked.  We can therefore 
say that, despite its different wording, the substitution frame remains strong at the national 
level.  Indeed, looking at the most frequent frames of the national level documents, there is 
a more general trend of less technical language.  This falls in with comments made in 
interviews about the difficulty of translating highly technical EU issues to the national level 
in a way that convinces the latter to mobilise.   
 
But what can be said of the evidence of dialogue between EU and national levels?  Firstly, 
the small number of documents located is eloquent – the campaign was not widespread and 
well known at the national level, perhaps with the exception of Germany.  The German 
Friends of the Earth groups, BUND, was certainly considered as an expert partner in the 
European level campaign, and they lent their name and activists to several actions on 
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REACH, as well as being very active in lobbying at the national level (interview 16).  In 
line with this, it is also interesting to note that every single one of the national actions 
looked at involved a European organisation as well – either the WECF or Friends of the 
Earth Europe.  Therefore there is certainly evidence of dialogue between the EU and 
national levels, but with the outcome that national actions seem less independent and 
spontaneous than in other cases (namely Bolkestein).  This also matches the many 
comments made in interviews of having to convince national groups to take part in the 
campaign.  Actions at the national level, in the end, seem more sponsored than 
spontaneous.  The repetition of a coordination website similar to that seen in the 
coexistence campaign seems to have worked less effectively here in creating links, a fact 
attributable to the main difference between the two campaigns in this aspect, i.e. that while 
the GM-free Europe site picked up on existing national and local campaigns, the chemical 
reaction website would have had to create them from scratch.    
 
4.3  A strong counter-movement:  political threats in the REACH campaign 
 
Following the diagram of the political opportunity structure of the EU outlined in chapter 
one, the first category to consider in sketching a picture of the campaign that pays attention 
to political contexts is dialogue with third parties, especially in connection with ‘natural 
partner’ DGs in the Commission.  As in other cases, the groups interviewed confirm this 
view that the Commission is open where contacts are with the group’s ‘natural’ DG, in this 
case DG Environment.  This rule is reconfirmed by WECF, who comment that contact with 
DG Environment is more difficult for them as a women’s organisation, although they 
believe this would not be the case for, say, DG Employment where women’s issues are 
more commonplace.  In DG Environment however “we are not considered a key player” 
(interview 24).  The confirmation of this rule is a threat for the campaign in this case since 
power over the dossier is seen as lying mainly with DG Enterprise.  The groups try to 
overcome this threat by securing places on expert groups, by participating in consultations, 
and by ensuring that they provided technical expertise (interview 23).  However, as will be 
seen in more detail in the comments on hostile elites, a great deal of rancour builds up 
towards the DG and its Commissioner Gunter Verheugen (Commissioner in the most key 
points of the campaign, i.e. after the beginning of the first reading).   
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Access to the Commission in general is seen in quite a different manner by different 
groups.  The institution is seen as more inviting to participation from the more conservative 
groups, in this case the WWF and the EEB, and the interviewee from Friends of the Earth 
Europe confirms this by commenting that she finds the Commission difficult to access.  
However, these views of the Commission’s accessibility, as well as the views of DG 
Environment as a natural partner, are tempered by the perception that a good relationship 
with the Commission always depends on the maintenance of contacts (interviews 16, 23, 
24, Keck and Sikkink 1998:148, Caniglia 2001:50-52), and that these vary from dossier to 
dossier.  Once again the WECF highlight an interesting point in that the interviewee 
stresses the difficulty of making and maintaining contacts with the Commission when 
based outside Brussels, even if only in nearby Utrecht (interview 24).  One of the most 
obvious ways of ensuring good contacts is thus being present in Brussels and able to follow 
up on meetings personally.  The need for contacts also leads to comments on the 
institution’s transparency.  One interviewee cites an incident where a group was refused a 
document listing the members of an expert group:  “And I think on hotly debated issues I 
think it's probably less transparent, but we do know that industry has the access and they 
have the documents, but I suppose you can't prove it” (interview 23).  Which brings us to 
the point that while access and response are perceived as variable for the EUSMOs, they 
are convinced that this is not the case for industry groups.  In this case, however, this may 
simply be the continuation of the natural partners rule, since we are dealing with DG 
Enterprise. 
 
Dialogue with the Council does not take place to any great extent at the EU level proper – 
all of the interviewees confirm that this is more the business of their national groups where 
these can be convinced to participate in a campaign.  There are some meetings with 
government advisors present in Brussels (interview 16), but targeting the Council through 
the national level is seen as far more logical since this is where EU groups have less 
contacts and influence than their national counterparts, and thus “this is where they can 
have the most impact” on EU legislation (interview 16).  Responding to the opportunities 
presented by the multi-level EU design thus requires not only EU level contacts and 
expertise (for the Commission) but also good grassroots contacts (for the Council).  The 
fact that the REACH issue did not provoke any kind of widespread action at the national 
levels of the EU therefore damaged the campaign’s attempts to influence the Council.  
Without the apparent backing of grassroots members the European campaign floundered 
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with the Council’s first reading opinion – it was here that points central to the campaign 
were irrevocably lost.   
 
Dialogue with the Parliament, on the other hand, is perceived as the easiest to achieve in 
comparison with the other main institutions.  This Parliament is seen as highly accessible in 
general, although some individual MEPs are described as simply not interested in the 
opinions of Green NGOs (interview 16).  The Parliament thus provided a good opportunity 
for dialogue in this campaign, also because of its powerful role in the co-decision 
legislative procedure.  Indeed, the groups carried out many actions in the Parliament, from 
information meetings and one on one lobbying by national members, to blood testing and 
analysing the dust from MEPs’ offices. 
 
The professionalism and resources of the different institutions also provide threats and 
opportunities for the campaigning groups.  For the European Parliament, for example, the 
campaigning groups must present their arguments in less technical detail than for the 
Commission.  MEPs’ resources are stretched and therefore often do not have the time to 
follow certain subjects in great depth, which makes it necessary to present arguments in a 
quick and simple way.  Another response to this situation is the organisation of information 
seminars or training sessions for members, although these did not, in this case, attract a 
great turnout.  MEPs were also targeted by e-mail actions through the Chemical Reaction 
site, where one MEP complained that even the 50 or so e-mails he had received created too 
much extra work (interview 23).  Perhaps as a result of the sheer complexity of the REACH 
legislation, or at least its highly technical character, the groups also found that despite their 
efforts MEPs tended to simply vote according to the suggestions of their respective 
(shadow) rapporteurs, since unable to follow the dossier themselves due to heavy 
workloads (interview 23). 
 
While the Council is mostly addressed from the national level rather than by EUSMOs in 
this campaign leaving little to discuss in terms of this particular variable, the Commission 
presents a very different picture to that of the Parliament.  As described in the research 
design, the Commission is, relatively speaking, resource poor and therefore seeks to consult 
on legislation it drafts.  Nevertheless, as a drafter of legislation the information the body is 
interested in is of a much more technical and detailed nature than that required by the 
majority of MEPs in the Parliament (interview 16).  Participating in consultations with the 
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Commission therefore requires groups who can provide the kind of technical expertise 
needed to draft legislation, a need also noted by various scholars of interest representation 
(Warleigh 2000:231, Skogstad 2003:330, Bouwen 2004:476-7).  What this means 
essentially is that the smaller groups of the campaign coalition are unable to participate, 
leaving the job to the larger groups who also rely on stable and secure funding – in this 
case the EEB, Greenpeace, and the WWF in particular.  As WECF put it: “I’m trying to be 
detailed in the text and stuff but I’m not WWF who can talk to, I don’t know, whatever 
expert and have the time to look for weeks into only one particular aspect of REACH.  I 
don’t have the resources nor the time to do that.  But that also means you don’t have the 
possibility to talk to the Commission on certain things” (interview 24).  This threat jointly 
posed by the very different tactics and knowledge needed to successfully address both the 
Commission and the Parliament are thus answered by joining with other groups in a 
coalition, which also allows for a certain division of labour where each group most suited 
to each task contributes.  Forming coalitions in order to enjoy the expertise another group 
may bring to a campaign is a tactic also noted in studies of other transnational campaigns, 
for example in coalitions of Mexican and US and Canadian groups against the North 
American Free Trade Alliance, where groups based in Washington were able to provide 
significant information and lobbying expertise to the others (Foster 2005:11).  However, 
here the groups rely on one another to produce information for the consumption of the EU 
rather than the other way around, unlike the aforementioned example.   
 
This last comment applies generally to the responses to the opportunities and threats posed 
by the EU as a multi-level system, with well separated powers.  The groups use their 
coalition at the EU level in order to be sure to address each institution appropriately, and 
also use each other’s different national level groups in their attempts to kick start action at 
the national level.  Again, this is especially important for the participation of smaller 
groups with closer links to national levels than the European, to whom the structure of EU 
power is not particularly clear (interview 16).  In terms of the degree of centralisation in the 
EU, the campaigning groups’ actions follow the logical pattern of targets provided by the 
passage of the legislation, thus following the power allocated to each institution at each 
specific point (interview 16).  Finally, on the subject of coalitions in each of the 
institutions, little is said in the interviews.  As will be seen below in the section on dynamic 
political opportunities, the majorities in each of the institutions were, in this case, firmly set 
against the campaign by the environmental groups and their allies, mostly as a result of a 
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strong and convincing counter movement.  This particular threat was very difficult to 
respond to.   
 
The final variable on fixed political opportunities is the EU institutions’ attitudes to 
differing opinions, judged to be on the whole inclusive, is more or less confirmed by the 
responses of the groups interviewed.  Here again, however, divisions of labour come into 
play, with more ‘conservative’ groups taking part and making contacts with more 
institutional players, and others concentrating on more unconventional actions.  The 
Commission’s attitude to the groups’ opinions is seen as more than a greenwash (interview 
16), with many interviewees convinced that “the intention is there and the goodwill is 
there” (interview 24) when it comes to listening to others.  However, when it comes to 
actually accommodating different standpoints in a final text, the outlook is more 
pessimistic.  Not only do the groups believe that industry beats them on this point because 
there are so many of them, they also believe that in the final instance decisions are purely 
political in the Commission (interview 23).  The Parliament’s attitude to differing opinions, 
on the other hand, is surprisingly seen in a more pessimistic light by the groups active in 
this campaign.  While the institution is generally seen as accessible, some MEPs are seen as 
completely untouchable and unwilling to hear different opinions.  However, some room for 
manoeuvre is available by using the more conservative, or non-green, groups to approach 
the right wing members. 
 
All in all, the most important resource for responding to the varying structural opportunities 
offered by the EU in this case has been the coalition of groups, each suited to several 
different tasks.  Greenpeace’s history and strong funding, for example,  allow it to 
coordinate more spectacular media events whilst also supplying highly detailed technical 
information, while the WECF as a women’s group has access to some MEPs that other 
groups find difficult, as well as strong links with national groups.  In turn, the other groups 
that are stronger than the WECF at the EU level help this group to make contact with the 
Commission (on coalitions for access see Keck and Sikkink 1998:141).  Broad coalitions as 
a feature of transnational campaigns more generally thus also emerges in this case (see 
Bandy and Smith 2005: 244-5).  The different qualities of each group thus allowed the 
campaign to respond to the opportunities and threats of each institution – however, as will 
be seen below, more difficulties were encountered in this than in other campaigns because 
of an active industry lobby – a lobby with more resources, more members of staff, and 
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more expertise.  These threats become particularly clear when we examine the dynamic 
political opportunities of the REACH campaign, briefly detailed in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Dynamic political opportunities in the REACH campaign 
 
Intra-elite 
conflict 
More within institutions than between.  Between DGs Environment 
and Enterprise within the Commission, also between Commissioners 
and President Barroso.  Between similar committees in the European 
Parliament. 
Proximity of 
elections 
Legislative proposal delayed until after 2004 elections, after which 
European Parliament swings to the right.  Reflected in new 
Commission. 
Electoral 
Instability Stable (and against the campaign) in the most important stages. 
Contingent 
events None as such. 
Position held 
by ally 
Wallström before 2004 elections; Green group in EP; ‘progressive’ 
member states (Nordics, Belgium) 
Ability of ally 
to fulfil 
promises 
Change of Commission takes away Wallström’s power on REACH, 
Green group small, member states too few. 
Hostile elites DG Enterprise / Commissioner Verheugen; President Barroso. 
Presence of 
counter 
movements 
Strong industry lobbying opposed to the environmental campaign’s 
demands. 
 
Following the above table, which briefly outlines the dynamic political opportunities of this 
campaign, the first theme to be examined is intra-elite conflict.  Within the Commission at 
the start of the campaign the main tensions seem to have been between DGs Enterprise and 
Environment, although any antagonism was not particularly public.  Following the change 
of Commission, however, more public evidence of internal tensions appear, between the 
former environment Commissioner Margot Wallström (now a vice-President of the 
Commission) and the Environment and Enterprise Commissioners (Dimas and Verheugen) 
over a supposed deal on REACH that had been presented to the Council, but had not been 
discussed in the College.110  In a direct manner, this split was exploited by the campaigning 
                                                 
110 Cover story of the European Voice, ‘Wallstrom vents fury at Barroso’s REACH retreat’, 13-19 October 
2005. 
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groups in a press release authored by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth Europe, in 
which they accused the Commission of “contempt for the democratic process”, since the 
Commission should have waited for the Parliament’s first reading report before further 
discussion.111  In a more general sense, however, any internal splits were hard for the 
coalition to exploit due to the ‘natural partners’ rule.  In other words, while DG 
Environment were certainly sympathetic to the groups’ position, DG Enterprise held the 
reins and was correspondingly unreceptive (interview 16). 
 
Another intra-elite conflict, along similar lines, was seen within the European Parliament 
between the Environment committee on the one hand and the internal market and trade 
committees on the other.  The most public manifestation of this was in the struggle over to 
whom the dossier would be allocated.  In the end the enhanced Hughes procedure was 
used, sharing the dossier between all three of the committees.  According to the coalition, 
this procedure should not have been used, and the final first reading deals were due to the 
Environment committee rapporteur’s (Guido Sacconi, Italy PES) feeling that a compromise 
would have to be reached.  Here again little could be done by the coalition to prevent a 
compromise deal being struck – had the environment committee alone led on the dossier 
they would have been satisfied with that committee’s report.  In comparison with the other 
legislative case, however, the lobbying of MEPs comes across as a little less strategic, or at 
least less well received.  Whilst obviously targeting key figures such as rapporteurs, the 
groups stated that even where promises were made by MEPs, the votes told a different 
story. 
 
The proximity of elections within this campaign also proved decisive to the fortunes of the 
EUSMOs.  At the beginning of the campaign, coinciding with the publication of the White 
Paper, elections seemed far away, and the Commission’s position favourable.  With the 
continued delays, however, the elections came closer and it became clear, according to the 
campaigning groups, that industry lobbying was aiming for the European Parliament 
receiving the text for discussion after the elections widely expected to return a more right 
wing outcome.  A more right wing Parliament, in turn, was seen as unfavourable for the 
campaign in that industry arguments would be more likely to receive a more open audience 
(see the section on discursive opportunities).  The groups were quick, however, to exploit 
                                                 
111 Friends of the Earth Europe and Greenpeace: ‘Commission Sticks Boot into REACH’ 23 September 2005. 
Available at: http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/AK_23_Sept_REACH.htm 
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the chance to link environmental issues in general, and REACH in particular, to MEPs’ 
electoral campaigns.  On the Chemical Reaction website, then, a section entitled ‘vote 
watch’ was established where citizens could see how their MEPs had voted on key 
environmental issues, including a previous vote on chemicals legislation.   
 
Following the elections, however, the groups were faced not only with a more right wing 
Parliament, but also with a Commission that reflected the majority of right wing 
governments in the EU’s member states.112  Here the only option was to attempt to work 
with these more hostile institutions, since they would be in place throughout the rest of the 
campaign.  As already seen, many attacks were made by the groups on the new 
Commission, in particular on its new President Barroso and the Enterprise Commissioner 
Verheugen.  They were seen as interfering with REACH despite its legally being in the 
hands of the European Parliament.  Within the Parliament, on the other hand, more 
important splits were seen between committees than between parties, as already seen 
above.  Nevertheless, party lines are seen as responsible for many MEPs revoking on their 
promises to vote according to the demands of the campaigning groups (interview 23).  To 
these twin threats, especially that of the Commission, the groups found it difficult to 
respond.  One attempt was to make their points more personal through actions such as the 
vacuuming of MEP’s offices and the testing of their blood in order to demonstrate the 
extent of chemical presence, thereby overcoming both industry arguments and political 
lines, and cyber actions of citizens uploading their pictures to demand a strong REACH 
(interview 23).  But in the end campaigners still felt they were leading a reactive campaign, 
spending most of their time answering industry arguments rather than creating their own. 
 
Turning to the variable of electoral instability, majorities in favour of a industry’s vision of 
REACH were in place during the more critical moments of the legislation’s passage – i.e. 
at the first and second reading decisions.  The Commission is seen as unshifting in its 
position, a fact that will change only with its renewal (interview 23).  The Council, 
especially following the German national elections and the departure of the Greens from 
government, is also seen as fairly immobile in its votes (Howarth 2007:97).  The European 
Parliament, on the other hand, shows some scope for manoeuvring during votes.  Yet even 
                                                 
112 The German elections which took place during this campaign were also mentioned as a setback for the 
REACH campaign, as the new right-wing German government was also seen as keen on delaying reform 
(interviews 16 and 24).  
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this hope is tempered by the aforementioned compromise deals between the leading 
committees.  Even where groups were not too disappointed with Parliament votes, the 
ensuing Council decisions overturned these.  Overall then there are few opportunities for 
swinging majorities in this campaign, and attempts to do so in the European Parliament did 
not come to fruition.  For example, the campaigning groups organised information 
meetings in the Parliament for MEPs with expert speakers in an attempt to engage a cross-
party audience, yet such events did not attract many members (interview 23).   
 
The category of contingent events has little effect on this campaign, with no events being 
particularly linked to its fate.  A health scare in Italy where infant formula milk was 
withdrawn from the market after the discovery that chemicals from its packaging were 
seeping into the powder was drawn on, but the event did not make enough headlines to 
swing the debate, and not much evidence of REACH activities were found in Italy.  
Interestingly, however, one interviewee does dwell on the difference such a contingent 
event could have made on the campaign, demonstrating an awareness of their importance 
as demonstrated by their presence in the Bolkestein campaign in particular.  “I mean we 
were saying recently is there any kind of chance that we could get exactly what we wanted 
in REACH, and we would say well, if there was this big chemical contamination disaster 
then probably people would get scared and give us what we want..” 
 
We can now move on to look at the campaigning groups’ allies, and their ability to hold 
promises, although, significantly, little is said about these either.  In the Commission, to 
begin with, DG Environment as the groups’ ‘natural partner’ is seen as an ally, and the 
previous Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström in particular.  Any opportunity 
this relationship would have given however fades with the change of the Commission and 
the decisions on the dossier being essentially transferred to DG Enterprise.  In addition, the 
new Environment Commissioner Dimas is not regarded as particularly knowledgeable on 
environmental problems in general (interview 23).  The Green group in the European 
Parliament is similarly regarded as an ally, but again this group holds little sway over vote 
outcomes in the Parliament.  Finally, some member states, namely the Nordic members and 
Belgium, are named as allies within the Council (interview 16).  Once again, though, these 
countries hold too few votes and are too few in total to swing Council votes.  All in all, the 
campaign presents few opportunities in the form of allies for the campaigning groups. 
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The campaign also suffered from the presence of hostile elites in the form of the new 
Commission from 2004 onwards, at the most important stages of the REACH legislation.  
Both President Barroso and even more so Commissioner Verheugen are seen as very much 
against the kind of REACH that the groups wished to see.  Verheugen is described as 
having had a “huge impact on making REACH weaker” (interview 16), while Barroso’s 
Commission as a whole is seen as friendly towards industry thus making light work for the 
latter’s lobbying efforts.  Even potential allies within the new Commission, i.e. 
Commissioner Dimas, are seen as crushed by these hostile elites: “But, you know, she 
[Wallström] would have fought for REACH and Dimas wasn't.. given that opportunity.  I 
think, my impression when I met him in Berlin, and I addressed the registration issue with 
him, he was sincere about it, because the Commission experts said exactly the same thing 
as we had been saying.  But he was under so much pressure and it was clear that he wasn't 
the one calling the shots” (interview 24).  In addition to this, the hostile DG Enterprise is 
also described as disposing of more expertise than other more friendly departments 
(interview 23).  In response to this threat, the campaigning groups attempted to convince 
other Commissioners to stand up for a different kind of REACH (interview 16) whilst 
being sure to meet with each cabinet member of each DG responsible for environmental 
issues (interview 23), as well as their frequent denouncing of Barroso and Verheugen in 
press releases, and in actions targeted to attracting the media (Greenpeace’s office removal  
stunt in particular comes to mind).  In the end, though, these efforts did not change the 
Commission’s outlook on the subject. 
 
The final variable to be inspected in terms of dynamic political opportunities is the most 
important (in conjunction with discursive threats in particular) to the outcomes of this 
campaign.  It is, of course, the presence of a strong counter movement in the shape of a 
very active industry lobby.  To begin with, the industry lobby enjoys far greater material 
resources than the those available to the campaigning groups, both in terms of expertise, 
funds, and sheer numbers of people engaged: according to interview 16 as many as 100 
lobbyists worked for the industry campaign as compared to around 10 people for the social 
one.  The strength and omnipresence of the industry campaign also manifested itself in 
other ways, with many interviewees pointing out that whenever they met with an MEP, 
they had always met with an industry representative before.  Some had been invited to 
dinner parties, and been offered gifts by the chemicals lobby  – tactics that the campaigning 
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not only could not but would not resort to (interview 16).113  This strength in terms of 
numbers led to the aforementioned complaint that the EUSMO campaign was constricted 
to answering the criticisms of the industry campaign rather than building its own, more 
positive and proactive campaign concentrating on points seen as more important for 
environmental arguments (interview 23).  This threat, i.e. controlling the campaign agenda, 
is most obvious in the industry lobbies argument that the original, White Paper, REACH 
would lead to the loss of many jobs in the EU.  Combined with the generally higher 
salience of social and employment issues in the EU at the time of the campaign, this 
argument in particular placed environmental groups on the defensive, and on unfamiliar 
ground, since they were obliged to frame their arguments in terms of SMEs and economic 
arguments.114  The campaigning groups also accused the industry lobby of inventing  
arguments, or of pulling out totally irrelevant ones, placing the environmental campaign on 
the defensive whilst believing that the true facts were really on their side (interviews 16 and 
24).   
 
In terms of clear threats, then, the counter movement of industry presented numerous 
obstacles.  At the very beginning of the campaign, for example, they were seen as behind 
the successful push to extend consultation on the White Paper, thereby delaying the 
legislation for more than a year.  This tactic forced the campaigning groups into the 
paradoxical situation of having to denounce a public consultation – something they should 
logically have been in favour of but were forced to oppose.  Their response was to raise a 
petition, to circulate instructions on contributing to the consultation among their groups, 
and a public handover of their petition.  In fact, as noted earlier in this chapter their efforts 
meant that they trumped industry in terms of mobilisation, although not in terms of 
numbers of contributions.  Yet still the White Paper was stripped of many of the points the 
campaigning groups were in favour of as it was reworked into the legislative proposal, a 
result of the Commission’s perceived openness towards industry groups to the detriment of 
social ones (interviews 23 and 24).  As the proposal moved into the Parliament, the 
numerical and argumentative strength of the industry lobby made it nearly impossible for 
the campaigning groups to achieve the engineering of any majority in favour of their 
position.  Although the Parliament’s first reading vote was far from disastrous, the groups 
were forced to rethink their demands as it became clear that some points had been 
                                                 
113 Since transparency is a factor also very important to these groups. 
114 Smith (2006) makes a similar argument for the REACH case on this point. 
 158
irrevocably lost.  Finally, industry lobbies were also perceived as strong at the national 
level, making the Council vote move even further away from the campaigning groups’ 
ideals.  In Germany especially lobbying from giants such as BASF and Bayer was seen as 
extremely detrimental to the campaign.  Although the groups made efforts to counteract 
these lobbies by implementing direct citizen e-mail actions, as well as by encouraging 
direct national actions by their member groups and others, this did not turn out to be 
enough. 
 
4.4  Shifting the environmental to the social: discursive threats in the REACH campaign 
 
The discursive opportunities and threats in the REACH campaign are particularly 
interesting, as the industry lobby borrows the more salient, social arguments in order to 
derail what the campaigning groups would have liked to be an environmental issue.  
Paradoxically then it is not the fixed discursive opportunities on the environment and 
public health outlined in chapter one that determine to a great extent the outcomes of this 
campaign, but the argument put forward by industry groups that REACH could spell 
unemployment for thousands of Europeans.  This, along with other discursive threats 
connected to the industry counter movement, will be looked at in more detail below.  
Before turning to those more dynamic discursive opportunities, I shall briefly describe the 
few elements relating to the fixed discursive opportunities provided by the EU arena on 
environmental and public health issues. 
 
On the discursive opportunities offered by the EU’s search for democratic credibility, a 
quote from Friends of the Earth Europe is the most eloquent: 
 
“…one positive aspect is having all those groups across Europe working on REACH as 
well and being in touch with both their MEPs and their national governments and national 
experts, basically saying we represent all those people.  And obviously when we do cyber-
actions through Chemical Reaction, it's showing that it's citizens outreach, and citizens' 
concerns for certain chemicals to be phased out, or for a stronger REACH in general.  We 
kind of tried to use this grassroots base also for lobbying purposes.  Because it, well, it 
doesn't always work, but sometimes it works pretty good” (interview 16). 
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This quote shows that apart from the need for expertise on the EU and technical 
information for the Commission in order to exploit structural political opportunities, it is 
vital for groups to have good grassroots contacts, and for national groups to work in the 
member states on European issues.  These conditions are important not only for political 
opportunities at the national level, but also for exploiting discursive opportunities at the 
European.  Since the largest ‘global environmental mass organisations’ (van der Heijden 
2002: 193) are involved in this campaign, bringing the combined weight of their large 
memberships (so large that it has been argued that they may take over some functions of 
political parties in interest aggregation and representation, ibid 2002) some clout is likely.   
In this case, however, the (albeit limited) actions of national groups are too effectively 
counteracted by industry, and are in any case on a lower scale than seen in other cases.  The 
full weight of national membership cannot be brought to bear on the campaign because of 
the failure to mobilise enough at the national and local levels. 
 
The theoretically non-ideological nature of environmental / public health issues is 
completely disproved by the REACH case.  The involvement of industry as a result of the 
potential effects of the legislation on the European chemicals sector meant that the issue 
was highly politicised from the word go.  As in other areas, the industry groups worked 
effectively to seize and create opportunities flowing from this, both by delaying the 
publication of the legislative proposal until a more right-wing Parliament (more open to 
their views) was elected, and by shifting the discursive basis of the arguments around 
REACH away from technical questions on chemicals and onto the ground of employment.  
By asserting that the legislation would mean widespread unemployment in the sector, the 
industry groups also ensured a sympathetic ear amongst left wing actors, traditionally the 
defenders of the goal of full employment.  Whilst ideology definitely played a large role in 
the discursive landscape of the campaign, it did not furnish the EUSMOs with 
opportunities but threw them into unfamiliar landscapes of discourses on employment and 
business viability. 
 
On events and campaigns contributing to the increased salience of environmental and 
public health issues, the main comments from the coordinator of Chemical Reaction focus 
on the fact that such discursive opportunities were conspicuous by their absence in this 
campaign, indicating that the wave of popular concern on such issues is either abating, or 
that REACH simply did not catch the imagination of citizens or journalists.  Comments 
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similar to those made on contingent events and how they may have helped the campaign 
are made on this subject too, since health scares are easier to sell to journalists.  Although 
coverage was initially promising according to interviewees, developments in the REACH 
campaign (developments favourable to the environmental view that is), such as new 
scientific research and the like, were simply “not sexy, ..not easy to grasp for journalists” 
(interview 23).  Efforts mainly by Greenpeace to grab the attention of the media, mostly by 
testing various popular consumer goods such as children’s clothing, became less interesting 
for the media with repetition (interview 23).  A lack of big public moments for exploitation 
by the coalition groups was also bemoaned as a threat:  
 
“There were times when we thought, for example when the Verheugen paper was leaked, 
and then the week after the European Voice headline was, you know, Wallström mad about 
Verheugen paper and that this paper was not cleared with the Commission, with other 
cabinet members.  But those moments were so tiny, and we couldn't, we weren't even able, 
although we really tried our best..” (interview 24) 
 
This problem with discursive opportunities continues in a similar vein when it comes to 
unknown risks and public distrust in scientists.  In this case instead of playing to the favour 
of the campaigning groups, as with GMOs, the fact that scientific research has so far been 
unable to link specific chemicals to particular health risks is used to claim that further 
regulation is not needed.115 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, more campaign specific discursive threats 
were posed by the active industry lobby on REACH.  Although the industry lobby were 
undoubtedly strong and skilful in their campaign, the generally higher salience of economic 
issues such as employment and competitiveness on the European agenda are also 
recognised as having contributed to the effective industry campaign.  Nevertheless, this 
climate had to be interpreted and exploited by the industry lobby, and in this they were 
particularly successful.  Putting specific arguments as discursive threats aside, the main 
problem for the environmental coalition groups was that they were obliged to answer 
industry arguments: “So we haven't been actually, we're always responding … rather than 
                                                 
115 Whereas in the case of GMOs unknown risks are successfully exploited as a reason for extra precaution.  
The difference between the two cases here may be only in spin – again the presence of a strong counter 
movement seems to have worked to the detriment of the environmental coalition. 
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actually … being active ourselves and saying this is what's happening.  We spend a lot of 
time dealing with industry arguments, like workability, like the jobs issue, the cost issue, so 
we wasted our time and energy.  Rather than driving forward our own messages, our own 
campaign, we spent our time actually responding to industry positions” (interview 23).  In 
addition, the industry lobby’s successful tactic of placing the discussion firmly in the 
sphere of economic issues also wrong footed the environmental groups, who were forced to 
frame their arguments in appropriate terms, focussing on the benefits of a strong REACH 
for SMEs for example.  Clearly this is not the home ground of such groups, although they 
recognise that it must become so in the future. 
 
The discursive side of the EU institutions’ need for technical information is also raised as a 
clear threat in the REACH campaign for several reasons.  Firstly, the constant production 
of reports is, in the end, doubted as a successful tactic, since “you think well, what’s the 
point of doing another report if it’s not even being picked up by Parliamentarians?  It’s just 
another report.  And then it comes down to who do I believe?  And if I’m a conservative 
then I am more inclined to believe a business representative than some Green NGO” 
(interview 23).  Even here, it is interesting note, the successful production of knowledge 
depended on the presence of a strong industry lobby or not.  Had the campaigning groups 
had a clear field, their technical knowledge may have been acceptable even to conservative 
members, as was the case for Trade Union arguments in the Bolkestein campaign.    
 
In addition, concentrating on the production of technical information is also raised as a 
problem in keeping up grassroots links and links with the public at large (interview 23).  
Because social campaigning groups are usually small in terms of staff, often a decision 
must be made over contributing on the policy level, i.e. with amendments and so on, or on 
employing a campaigner in order to mount a more public action when in truth both are 
needed for a strong EU level campaign.  Here once again forming a coalition with other 
groups helps overcome the more practical side of the problem, while discursively the 
groups tried to make sure that their demands were framed in such a way as to bridge the 
different targets (citizens, institutions).  This, however, is seen as a difficult task to 
accomplish: “I mean you cannot just make totally general remarks about REACH because 
then you are unprepared, and you don't do justice to the intrinsic delicacies of REACH 
also, but on the other hand if you do it too detailed, I cannot sell this to women, that's for 
sure.  They will not understand it, I will lose them” (interview 24).  This campaign thus 
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confirms the link between the knowledge of EU policy and the willingness to participate in 
campaign actions posited by Klandermans et al in their study of Dutch and Spanish farmers 
(2001: 92).  In this work, the authors found that those farmers, for the most part Spanish, 
who were unaware of issues linked to the common agricultural policy were far less likely to 
take part in protest actions than there better informed Dutch counterparts (ibid:2001).  The 
REACH campaign echoes this finding, since the REACH issue is defined by several 
interviewees as particularly difficult to explain to national groups, who consequently 
concentrated on other campaigns.   Linked to these concerns is that of losing the core 
message of the campaign in technical detail – again responded to by sticking to a few 
central demands.  This, however, is seen as a more general problem when working with 
legislative texts.   
 
The technical nature of the legislation itself is also raised as constituting a difficulty when 
communicating the environmental impact of REACH.  Technical details, it seems, tend to 
drown out the link between chemicals and environment: “People are usually surprised that 
what boils down to our environment, there is a problem.  But to actually then make this 
connection and say therefore we have to do this and this in REACH, I'm not sure if this 
works” (interview 23).  Continuing in this vein, the groups also feel a discursive threat 
from the fact that they had to change their demands throughout the campaign according to 
what had been lost in previous stages.  Such changes were necessary in order to keep 
realistic goals, but also meant that the groups kept lowering the bar, and at the end, at some 
point, REACH will not do what it is meant to, we may even have to change and say we do 
not support REACH anymore” (interview 23).  As seen in the section on shared frames, 
these reactions also meant that the campaigning groups did not manage to present a clear 
message throughout the campaign, although this may also be due to the intrinsic 
complexity of REACH.   
 
To sum up, the most striking feature that can be drawn from this assessment of discursive 
opportunities in the REACH campaign is that almost all are threats.  Very few exploitable 
opportunities were available, placing the campaigning groups on the defensive.  The 
structural opportunities offered by the EU arena did not provide much scope for effective 
discourses, and the presence of a strong industry lobby meant that the coalition groups met 
only with obstacles in terms of campaign specific threats, obstacles that were more 
generally parried through a division of labour among the groups of the coalition or, in the 
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case of industry arguments, not overcome at all.  The industry lobby was, on REACH, 
successful in terms of placing the discourse on its own terms, forcing the campaigning 
groups to spend time in answering their arguments rather than creating their own.   
 
 
 
4.5  Outnumbered and out-argued: campaign outcomes 
 
All of the analysis of the campaign on REACH has, of course, served to allow an attempt at 
tracing the processes that led to the campaign outcomes.  Now that these different aspects 
of the campaign have been examined in depth, from internal arguments and dialogues to 
reaction to discursive and political contexts, some such attempt may be made.  Firstly, 
however, it is necessary to outline just what those outcomes were.     
 
To recall, the three categories of outcomes of interest here were access, agenda, and policy 
outcomes.  Concerning the first of these, the campaign does not seem to have changed the 
levels of access to institutions already enjoyed by EUSMOs.  Different groups in the 
coalition take part in lobbying and in Commission expert groups, and all confirm that 
access is possible, even if this does not automatically mean that arguments will be listened 
to.  In terms of agenda outcomes the campaign also appears to have had no great effect if 
we only consider the period of time included in this analysis.  It may be argued that 
EUSMOs’ work on REACH before the White Paper had some effect of bumping the issue 
up the agenda, but for the legislative campaign industry was more effective, changing what 
had been a satisfactory White Paper in the eyes of the environmental groups into a very 
different piece of legislation by moving discussions away from health and environmental 
issues and towards those of employment and competitivity.  Finally, the policy outcome of 
the REACH campaign was much closer to the wishes of the industry lobby than those of 
the environmental coalition, although in their public reactions the EUSMOs did put a brave 
face on it, characterising the legislation as a valid first step towards the kind of regulation 
they would wish to see.  Other outcomes of the campaign for the coalition groups relate 
more to campaigning techniques.  As the quote heading this chapter shows, the REACH 
issue saw one of the closest instances of coalition campaigning ever seen at the EU level, 
even if in the end it was not enough to secure the desired policy outcome.  For the groups 
taking part in the campaign, both at European and national level, this was seen as an 
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important learning experience, and an incentive to carry on working on EU issues with 
national level groups.  This, in the eyes of the coordinator for Chemical Reaction, was one 
of the more important outcomes of the campaign:  
 
“..for these groups who have been taking part, for them it's a really good experience.  For 
me it's also a matter of how you can get the involvement and the enthusiasm for EU 
politics.  And then for people to continue working on EU politics.  Because of course if 
you're in a country like the UK or Italy, we are used to focussing on our immediate 
surroundings.  And you really need to widen the horizon and that's why we need to get 
people out of their national offices and coming to Brussels, so that they understand.” 
(interview 23) 
 
It is the access, agenda, and policy non-outcomes that are of most interest here however.  
What can be said about why no outcomes of importance to the environmental coalition 
were seen  as a result of the campaign, especially with its unprecedented coalition?  The 
following table provides a summary of the analysis in order to recall the features of the 
campaign considered in process tracing. 
 
Table 8: Summary of the REACH campaign by phase  
 
Phase 
 
Extent of shared frames 
 
Political Opportunities 
 
Discursive Opportunities
1 
Only one frame 
(substitution) shared across 
the board.  Many single-use 
frames, but very early point 
in campaign.  No evidence 
of national level framing 
work found.  
White Paper approved, 
Commissioner Wallström 
an ally, but industry 
counter-movement secure 
extended consultation and 
text changes.  Campaign 
begins in earnest only 
with mobilisation for 
internet consultation.  
Lack of national 
movement means no 
exploitation of 
legitimacy opportunity.  
Industry shift discourse 
from environment to 
unemployment. 
2 
Framing work strong in the 
joint drafting of all 
campaign documents, but 
no strong message carried 
through over time with the 
partial exception of 
substitution.  National level 
frames similarly weak, and 
most frequent frame not 
DG Enterprise seen as 
leading, hostile 
relationship with 
Verheugen after EP and 
Commission swing to 
right.  EP use Hughes 
procedure.  No 
exploitation of multi-level 
design through strong 
Lack of national 
movement means no 
exploitation of 
legitimacy opportunity.  
Industry shift discourse 
from environment to 
unemployment, 
EUSMOs’ on defensive.  
Resources sunk into 
 165
strong in EUSMO 
documents, although 
substitution frame strong. 
national actions, Germany 
elect right wing 
government.  Stronger 
actions in EP, but 
lobbying unstrategic.  
Coalition division of 
labour allows 
participation in technical 
groups as well as more 
media-oriented actions.    
Industry lobby remain 
extremely strong. 
production of technical 
information.  General 
shift of saliency to 
economic arguments in 
EU.  Media largely 
ignore the subject, no 
previous campaigns 
contributing to saliency. 
3 
Substitution and warnings 
on legislation frames most 
frequent, but still not shared 
across majority of 
documents.  Lack of strong 
message continues.  
National level frames as 
phase 2, more critical of 
legislation than EU level. 
No strong national level 
campaign to influence 
Council / Presidency deal.  
Commission hostile.  
Industry lobby remains 
extremely strong. 
As phase 2.  Campaign 
demands change to 
accommodate losses of 
first reading. 
 
Non-outcomes for the EUSMO campaign translate to some extent into outcomes for the 
industry campaign here.  At the end of the first phase of the campaign, the industry lobby 
saw their preferred outcome of an extended period of consultation, as well as a legislative 
proposal that was in their eyes an improvement on the White Paper.  The second phase also 
brought a policy outcome for the industry lobby with the further altered legislation, as did 
the third phase in which the legislation was finally adopted.  Tracing the processes of the 
non-outcomes of the EUSMO campaign is therefore also enlightening in understanding the 
success of the industry lobby to some extent, although more information on their campaign 
would of course be required to draw more thorough conclusions.     
 
In the first phase of the campaign, the EUSMO camp got off to a slow start, since they 
were essentially pleased with the content of the White Paper.  The frame analysis showed 
that as the consultation period dragged on and the campaign began in earnest, the coalition 
groups began to work together immediately, calling attention mainly to the delays in the 
publication of the legislative proposal and to the call for substitution of the most hazardous 
chemicals.  Despite their scanty message at this point, then, the coalition was already 
working as a unit, showing that framing work was certainly taking place behind the scenes.  
The situation regarding political and discursive opportunities, however, is less positive.  
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The industry lobby began work earlier than the EUSMOs, since they were unimpressed 
with the White Paper.  They successfully convinced the Commission to extend their 
consultation period and to carry out a public internet consultation – a move that the 
campaign’s only elite ally, Commissioner Wallström, could hardly oppose.  On the 
discursive side, the industry lobby had already shifted arguments away from environment 
and health issues and towards the unemployment threat posed by the legislation.  Added to 
this was the lack of a strong national level campaign on the EUSMO side to counteract 
such arguments at the Council level, which also left them in a more difficult position for 
exploiting the legitimacy discursive opportunity.  Considering this combination of the 
strength of the industry lobby and the initial relative weakness of the EUSMO campaign, 
the non-outcome for the latter at the end of the first phase of the campaign can be attributed 
to a mix of the campaign’s shortcomings as well as the strengths of the industry counter-
movement.  At this point, hostile elites and other situations more directly connected with 
the EU institutions played less of a role. 
 
The most intensive phase of the campaign corresponded to the first reading of the 
Commission’s legislative proposal in the European Parliament.  Here both the EUSMO 
campaign became stronger – the coalition grew, and actions became much more frequent.  
The frame analysis reflected the continued unity of the coalition, with all of the documents 
analysed jointly authored.  Framing work is thus assumed to have continued behind the 
scenes.  The message put across in the campaign documents, however, is scattered, with no 
small cluster of frames remaining constant throughout.  In addition, the national level 
members of the EUSMOs were, for the most part, oblivious to the REACH issue.  The 
industry lobby continued to be strong, carrying out an intense lobbying campaign at the 
European Parliament with its superior numbers of staff.  While the EUSMOs also targeted 
the Parliament, this was necessarily on a less grand scale.  More importantly, the second 
phase of the campaign saw the European elections, the change in the Commission, and a 
change of government in Germany.  All of  these resulted in more right-wing 
configurations more open to the arguments of the industry lobby.  The new President of the 
Commission Barroso, and his Enterprise Commissioner Verheugen, were particularly 
loathed by the EUSMO campaign, who saw them as extremely hostile to their goals and 
over-friendly with the industry sector. 
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Industry continued to make headway with their unemployment discourse in the meantime, 
which obliged the EUSMO campaign to follow their lead in responding to such arguments 
rather than advancing their own.  In addition, although their strong coalition allowed them 
to divide labour and carry out not only more media-oriented actions but also participate in 
expert commission, the numbers were simply not enough to match the industry campaign.  
Sinking resources into the production of technical knowledge whilst simultaneously 
attempting an all-out public campaign and to respond to industry affirmations was simply 
too much to cover.  Added to this was the continued lack of a strong national level 
campaign backing up their efforts.  All in all, the lack of outcome at the end of the first 
reading of the legislation is a more complicated affair than in the first phase of the 
campaign if we take all of these factors into consideration.  It is true that the industry 
campaign was strong and the EUSMO campaign weaker, but a plethora of political and 
discursive threats were added to this.  As the situation in the third, much shorter phase of 
the campaign is in all aspects extremely similar to the second, I shall now discuss the non-
outcome of the overall campaign in general.  
 
The structural opportunities of the EU were navigated well by the EUSMO coalition, who 
were perfectly aware of how to work with the complicated multi-level system, of where to 
concentrate their efforts at which point of the legislative procedure, and of the importance 
of a strong coalition when searching for the resources to achieve all of this.  Here, as in 
other cases, it was dynamic political opportunities that were more important in deciding the 
outcome of the campaign, and of these the strong counter movement of industry lobbies 
was the deal breaker.  Similarly, it was the dynamic discursive threats arising from the 
industry lobby’s dominance of the discourse on the REACH issue, alongside threats 
stemming from the highly technical nature of the legislative proposal, that scuppered the 
environmental groups’ efforts to raise the points most important to them in an effective 
way.  Discursive opportunities in the campaign, whether structural or dynamic, were few 
and far between. 
 
Looking back at the previous summary of the different features and threats encountered in 
the campaign, the links between the majority of these and the presence of a strong industry 
lobby stand out.  Despite strong internal dialogue, indicated by the joint authorship of 
almost every single press release seen in the campaign, it was noted that the campaigning 
groups did not carry a strong message throughout the campaign – they were, instead, forced 
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to react to the losses conceded at each point of the legislative process.  Losses that can also 
be characterised as gains for the industry lobby.  In terms of political opportunities, again, 
few were to be had for the campaigning groups, and the presence and success of industry 
were often mentioned.  In addition, there were no strong allies for the campaigning groups 
within the institutions – a condition commonly judged paramount to the success of a social 
movement campaign (Tarrow 1990; Kitschelt 1990; Giugni and Passy 1998).  Here too, we 
may conjecture that a lack of strong allies for the campaigning groups may be a 
consequence of the presence of strong allies for industry lobbies.  Finally, a strong 
discursive threat to the campaign, to the detriment of the strong work within the coalition in 
terms of framing work, was of course industry’s appropriation of the REACH discourse, 
which was moved away from environmental issues and towards employment and 
competitivity arguments.  Another strong discursive threat, with repercussions for the EU 
levels groups’ links with the national level counterparts, lay in the intrinsic complexity of 
the REACH proposal, and the necessity of devoting time to the production of technical 
knowledge.  As already mentioned, it appears that the coalition simply could not convince 
national level groups of the importance of the REACH campaign, both as a result of its 
technical nature per se and as a result of their resources being stretched, also partly because 
of the highly technical nature of the proposed legislation.   
 
In the case of REACH, then, it is clear that the efforts of an apparently strong coalition 
were continually scuppered by the work of an even stronger, more resource rich, and better 
connected industry lobby.  The successful work by this lobby was responsible for the 
transformation of many opportunities into threats for the environmental groups.  A useful 
way of understanding this campaign’s failure to secure any of its desired outcomes despite 
the strength of the coalition is provided by Warleigh (2000).  In an article examining four 
cases of NGO campaigns in the EU, Warleigh finds that being a member of the ‘policy 
coalition’ is vital to securing impact – he sums up the situation of the REACH campaign 
succinctly in observing that “those seeking to break into policy networks outside their 
traditional spheres of expertise can find their path blocked by existing insiders, 
necessitating the construction of extremely complex alliances in order to achieve goals” 
(ibid:235).  This applies well to the REACH campaign, where industry insiders (at least 
with DG Enterprise once responsibility was placed there) managed to block the 
environmental coalition’s entry to the ‘policy coalition’ of actors that were credibly 
contributing to the legislation.  Combined with this was the threat of losing resources and 
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contacts with grassroots members due to the highly technical nature of the legislation, and 
the resources sunk in producing contributions to Commission consultations and expert 
groups, as well as the production of numerous reports.   
 
4.6  Conclusions 
 
This chapter looked in detail at the campaign which took place around the European 
chemicals legislation REACH, beginning with the publication of the Commission’s White 
Paper in 2001, and ending with the adoption of legislation in December 2006.  A wide 
variety of tactics were employed by the EUSMOs campaigning on the subject, from more 
traditional lobbying techniques and participation in Commission consultations, to more 
spectacular actions such as testing the blood of MEPs for dangerous chemicals.  Few 
actions were seen at national level, although national members were brought to Brussels on 
several occasions either to demonstrate or to take part in training sessions and lobbying at 
the European Parliament.  Meanwhile, the campaign was faced with the challenge of a 
strong and resource-rich counter-campaign from the industry lobby. 
 
The documents selected for the frame analysis were all jointly authored by coalition 
groups, a reflection of the unprecedented degree of close coalition work on this issue 
between groups that usually work in looser coordination.  National level documents were 
extremely difficult to locate, again a faithful reflection of the general lack of any 
widespread movement or awareness of the issue at that level – the actions that did take 
place were mostly the result of EU level sponsoring rather than spontaneous involvement, 
since all involved an EU level group.  In the long term, the tactic of bringing national 
members to Brussels for seminars and lobbying exercises may secure outcomes in other 
campaigns.  Hellferich and Kolb (2001:150) for example note the role of education and 
information for national level women’s groups in the campaign for a legally binding article 
on equality in the EU Treaty.  In that long-running campaign however this strategy took 
several years to produce the result of spontaneous and informed actions by national groups.   
 
As for the content of the frame analysis of the REACH campaign, the messages of the 
campaign were constantly shifting and no strong demand or message shone through the 
duration, perhaps with the exception of the demand for the substitution of hazardous 
chemicals, although even this was weak when compared with the strength of core frames in 
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other campaigns presented here.   This corroborates findings from numerous scholars about 
the difficulties of negotiating strong positions amongst heterogeneous groups (for example 
Rucht 2001: 137, Hellferich and Kolb 2001:149, Lahusen 2004, Cullen 2005), although I 
would argue that here the successes of the counter-campaign also played a large role in 
obliging the EUSMOs to change their message. 
 
The EU level groups were evidently aware of the best ways to engage with the EU political 
opportunity structure, but were faced with dynamic threats, most of which were linked to 
the industry lobby’s campaign, that stretched their already meagre resources as well as 
obliging them to shift away from their usual discursive ground.  Non-outcomes in the first 
phase of the campaign could be attributed to both the strong industry lobby and the 
weakness of the EUSMO campaign, which got off to a slow start.  In the second and third 
phases, hostile elites in the Commission, the committees of the Parliament, and in Germany 
combined with the continuing failure to kick-start national actions that was at least partly 
due to the very technical nature of the legislation, the absence of elite allies (a factor found 
to be paramount to the success of social movement campaigns by many authors, e.g. 
Tarrow 1990; Kitschelt 1990; Giugni and Passy 1998), and all the threats stemming from 
the strong industry campaign (both discursive and political) resulted in the EUSMOs’ 
disappointment with the version of REACH that was eventually adopted in December 
2006.     
 
The case suggests, then, that where a strong and resource-rich counter-movement is present 
in the EU arena, small groups such as those seen in this case have little chance of 
influencing policy as they would like, no matter how close a coalition they form.  The 
coalition observed in the REACH campaign, where groups pooled resources, contacts, and 
divided labour in an attempt to cover all aspects of the issue, is a tactic that has also been 
noted as an important factor in transnational campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998:141, 
Bandy and Smith 2005: 244-5, Foster 2005:11).  Yet in the end this coalition was simply 
not strong enough to overcome the host of political and discursive threats the campaign 
faced.  The conclusion that a strong counter-movement was the most instrumental factor in 
the non-outcomes of the REACH campaign also receives confirmation from the Bolkestein 
campaign, where the industry lobby is conspicuous by its absence (see chapter six).  In 
addition, the technical character of REACH was difficult for the groups to boil down into 
any simple slogan or one strong line of argument that could be carried through their 
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campaign and aid in mobilising grassroots members.  To conclude, then, the REACH 
campaign is a good example of a strong coalition, but faced with too strong an opposition.  
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5.  The Lisbon Campaign: a short, sharp shock 
 
“..It was a bit clearer than usual that there was something to be really protected.  So often 
these processes are very complicated and complex, and so it's quite difficult to mobilise people 
around it.  But here you had a very clear choice where you were being presented with an approach 
that economics will solve everything…” (interview 12) 
 
In March 2000, the European Council met in Lisbon to discuss the future of ‘social 
Europe’.  At that meeting they agreed a new, overarching strategy for the future of the EU, 
dubbed, for obvious reasons, the Lisbon agenda.  The goal of this agenda was to make the 
EU “the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the 
environment by 2010”. 116  This all-encompassing message proved popular with a range of 
organisations involved in those areas the agenda would affect – environmental, social, and 
trade union organisations in particular.  In February 2005, these groups formed a coalition 
to protest against a move made by President Barroso of the European Commission to limit 
the scope of the original Lisbon agenda to economic growth and jobs at its mid-term review 
(Commission 2005).  While the other parts of the Lisbon strategy, social cohesion and 
sustainable development, would not be forgotten, they would take a back seat for a period.  
In his own words, as he defended the communication to a plenary session of the European 
Parliament, "If one of my children is ill, I focus on that one, but that does not mean that I 
love the others less".   
 
These rather ill-judged words only served to spur on the social groups and trade unions that 
were already much worried and opposed to this proposed change.  These EUSMOs,  
members of the Social Platform and the ETUC, took Barroso’s words as a signal that the 
parts of the Lisbon strategy concerning social cohesion and sustainable development were 
to be abandoned.  This would threaten the very basis on which they worked at European 
level, and they began to act to try and stop such a move.  The time available was very short 
- Barroso’s communication was published on 2 February 2005, and the Spring Summit that 
would endorse or discard it took place on 22-23 March 2005, giving the campaign around 
seven weeks to make their case in an effective manner.  For this reason, groups opted for 
                                                 
116 The environmental dimension of the Lisbon agenda was officially added by the Council at its meeting in 2001 in 
Gothenburg. 
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simple, strong messages and a show of numbers by launching a petition, a day of action, 
and organising a demonstration two days before the European Council meeting that took 
advantage of the contemporary mobilisation around the Bolkestein directive (see chapter 
six) – actions made possible in a short time span because of permanent coalition structures 
and awareness of the issue in hand amongst national members.  High level meetings were 
also sought with member state leaders, the Commission, and the Presidency.   
 
These bottom-up tactics, usually identified more closely with national level social 
movement campaigns than EU level campaigns, combined with favourable circumstances 
including the debate over the Constitutional Treaty and the mobilisation on the Bolkestein 
directive and the support of the Luxembourg presidency, are found to have helped the 
EUSMOs to secure the positive policy outcome they sought.  In the Council conclusions, 
the member states reiterated their commitment to the Lisbon agenda as it was originally 
worded.  Although the year to come would prove that those words were somewhat empty, 
the groups had at least secured the outcome of this short, sharp campaign.  Because of its 
short duration of just seven weeks, the Lisbon campaign is not split into separate phases, 
but analysed as a whole.  The case is interesting precisely because of this short time span, 
which pushed the EUSMOs to draw on their national networks and national-style tactics in 
order to target the European Council.  It is also a good example for showcasing the 
importance of contingent events, permanent coalition structures, and contemporary 
campaigns. 
 
5.1  Instant mobilisation in the Lisbon  campaign 
 
As the marker of the halfway point to the Lisbon agenda’s deadline of 2010, the 2005 
social summit provided the opportunity to take stock of progress – for both European 
institutions and EUSMOs.  Before the campaign began, an expert group (the Kok group) 
had been set up to provide a detailed report on progress towards the agenda’s goals, with 
the Commission producing an additional mid-term evaluation report of its own – the report 
that would trigger the case under investigation.117  The Social Platform was unenthusiastic 
about these arrangements for the review of the Lisbon strategy.  They were unhappy that 
                                                 
117 The overlap between the Lisbon and Bolkestein cases can also be noted here, since one of the conclusions 
of the Kok report was to pursue competitiveness by ensuring the quick adoption of the Services directive 
(Howarth 2007:94). 
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social NGOs would have no representation in the Kok group despite the fact that many of 
their members were responsible for implementing parts of the agenda through ‘Partnerships 
for Reform’.  The ETUC was  represented in the Kok group, and did not therefore question 
the methods of the mid-term review.  Nevertheless, when the final report was published in 
November 2004 neither the ETUC nor the Social Platform were impressed with its 
conclusions.118  Already before the campaign proper then, these two groups to some extent 
expected strife over the review of the agenda.   
 
The main EUSMO actors in the Lisbon campaign are, or are members of, two permanent, 
institutionalised coalitions of groups.119  Since these groups are organised very differently 
to those loose coalitions seen in the environmental case studies, it is useful to provide an 
overview of them here.  The first is the European Platform of Social NGOs (the Social 
Platform).  This organisation, set up in 1995 with funding from the European Commission, 
brings together many different kinds of social NGOs working on many different issues – 
poverty, humanitarian aid, and the representation of minorities for example.  Despite 
numerous problems during its early days, when members found it difficult to define the 
common ground on which they could work, and procrastinated over the issue of the 
institutionalisation of the coalition (see Cullen 2005:71-75), the Social Platform now 
maintains a permanent secretariat in Brussels.  Its  main functions are to facilitate 
information exchange and dissemination, to facilitate common campaigns on those broader 
issues allowing common positions, as well as some capacity-building work and facilitating 
access to the European institutions for its members.  The ETUC, on the other hand, is a 
federation of national Trade Unions.  Founded in 1973, long after the formation of a similar 
federation by employers (UNICE, now Business Europe, founded in 1958), the body only 
began to come into its own as a vehicle for representing workers’ point of view on European 
level legislation in 1991.  This owed much to the activism of the Delors Commission, who 
provided large sums of funding for the ETUC (for a summary of the ETUC’s history, see 
Martin and Ross 2001).  Nevertheless, divisions between member Unions, ranging from 
Christian to Communist, have often formed an obstacle to the development of transnational 
positions in the organisation (Balme and Chabanet 2002:66).  In 1991, the ETUC became an 
official legislative player alongside UNICE in the Social Dialogue.   
                                                 
118 The Social Platform, having had no luck in securing representation, instead provided the group with their 
own detailed review of progress in particular towards the goal of greater social cohesion. 
119 These comments also apply to the Bolkestein case, which involves the same coalitions. 
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The two organisations, the main actors in the Lisbon campaign, also have regular contact 
with one another, a result of the activism of the former president of the Social Platform, 
Giampiero Alhadeff, and his links with the Trade Union movement through Solidar (Cullen 
2005:77).  The organisations meet not only through such bodies as the Civil Society 
Contact Group (interview 12), but also meet to exchange information on a monthly basis 
(interview 10), and, importantly, to coordinate their positions.  The fast reactions of the 
groups to the perceived threat in Barroso’s early February 2005 speech and the subsequent 
mobilisation thus avoided the more arduous work of building coalitions by drawing instead 
on existing, well-established networks. 
These extremely brief descriptions highlight an interesting difference between these two 
coalitions.  While much of the impetus for the development of the ETUC came from the top 
down, that is from European institutions, the Social Platform was (albeit problematically) 
created through the volition of its members.  The ETUC has thus experienced some problems 
with creating real connections with its grassroots members. In more recent times, however, the 
organisation has been seen to take up more ‘independent’ strategies such as the coordination of 
collective bargaining, the development of closer links and alliances with a variety of other 
EUSMOs, and the organisation of public demonstrations, following the successful examples of 
European trade union sectoral organisations (Bieler 2005:478).  Connecting with the grassroots 
is not in the immediate remit of the Social Platform, which is after all a coalition of European 
level groups.  While working together at the European level may be difficult, links with 
grassroots members are the responsibility of individual members.  The high levels of 
mobilisation among trade unionists seen in both of the social campaigns (i.e. also Bolkestein) 
are therefore particularly interesting. 
Returning to the story of the campaign in hand, in the Commission’s contribution to the mid-
term review of the agenda, published on 2 February 2005 and entitled “A new start for the 
Lisbon strategy”, the President outlined the idea that first and foremost, the Lisbon strategy 
should concentrate on the issues of economic growth and jobs within the EU, as without 
strength in these areas the remaining Lisbon ‘pillars’, social cohesion and sustainable 
development, could not be achieved.  This view was not shared by a majority of social 
NGOs, nor by the ETUC.  The Social Platform reacted quickly to the communication with 
a press release, and Solidar – a member of the Social Platform – was already working on a 
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more publicly directed response to the apparent change of direction.  This group, the 
European secretariat of a network of social service providers and groups working on 
development issues and humanitarian aid with close links to the trade union movement, is 
one of the key members of the Social Platform.120    The usual protocol for Solidar, and 
indeed the Social Platform itself, is to provide detailed comments in the form of an 
evaluation or resolution for each social Summit.  A similar procedure was also followed for 
the Kok report.  However, with the publication of the Barroso communication, Solidar’s 
steering committee felt that something more drastic was needed.  The thought of “wasting 
their time” on drafting detailed comments did not appeal, and so it was decided to “just 
make a strong call, let’s try to initiate a strong message” (interview 13). 
The action took the form of an online petition entitled SOS Europe (Save Our Social 
Europe).  The idea behind the petition was to exploit the citizens’ initiative article in the 
draft Constitutional Treaty, despite the fact that the short timeframe of the campaign 
precluded the collection of individual signatures.121  Instead, Solidar wrote a short text 
calling for the original version of the agenda to be respected.  An important aspect of the 
petition was that although initiated by Solidar, the organisation opted for a ‘no logo’ 
petition – Solidar was not visible as the author or initiator of the petition anywhere on the 
website or any other formats in which the petition subsequently appeared.  The logic 
behind this choice, also seen in the ‘Stop Bolkestein’ petition in the Services Directive 
campaign, was that a no logo petition would overcome any objections to signing on the 
basis of authorship – any groups who would feel uncomfortable about linking their names 
with the authors’ could then sign without problems, not to mention diffuse the petition.  
Rather than having the glory of any result, Solidar decided it was more important to “have 
a lot of big organisations taking ownership of that, and actually getting the message across” 
(interview 13).  Having Solidar take the initiative on the petition also avoided the lengthy 
processes of setting up working groups and the like within the framework of the Social 
Platform – this would have taken up too much of the precious little time the groups had in 
which to react (interview 12).   
                                                 
120 Solidar is the new name for what was International Workers Aid.  Its roots lie in the humanitarian effort 
within Europe following the Second World War.  At the time of this campaign, the group supplied the Social 
Platform’s vice-president.  It is named as one of the Platform’s strongest members, alongside the European 
Anti-Poverty Network and the European Women’s Lobby, by Cullen (2005:77). 
121 This article stated that any petition bearing 1 million signatures from citizens from a minimum number of 
European member states, would have to be acted upon by the EU.   
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Once the petition had been drafted, it was circulated to other Social Platform members, 
who diffused it among their own networks.122  By the time of the social summit, the 
petition had the support of around 7000 organisations.  Judging from the indicative list of 
signatories printed in the European Voice newspaper of 17-23 March 2005, all of these 
organisations are either European organisations belonging to the Social Platform, or (the 
majority) national organisations belonging to European organisations who are, in turn, 
members of the Social Platform.  The only individuals listed as signatories are MEPs, in 
virtue of their positions as elected representatives at the European level.  The reasoning 
behind the petition had very much to do with showing the European organisations’ roots at 
the member state level.  “[SOS Europe] grew out of this recognition that actually we 
needed to show that we are more than just this office in Brussels, you know, that we are 
actually a much broader movement, engaging lots and lots of national organisations.  
Because that’s the only way that national governments will actually sit up and listen” 
(interview 13).  Relying on national organisations where the Council is a major target is 
thus the additional logic behind this strategy.  In order to grab the attention of national 
governments, organisations well known in national contexts needed to be mobilised. 
The day after the Social Platform’s public reaction to the Barroso communication a 
delegation from the organisation met with the Presidency of the Council, then held by 
Luxembourg, and their Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker.  Interestingly, the Social 
Platform did not seek this meeting but were invited.  The fact that Juncker was seen to be 
seeking out allies in his efforts to steer discussion in the Council away from the direction 
set out in the Barroso communication are in fact seen as crucial to the campaign (see below 
on political opportunities).  According to the Social Platform, the meeting was fairly 
lengthy, one and a half hours, and the parties discussed the group’s opposition to Barroso’s 
proposed approach in detail.  These sorts of high-level meetings, in combination with 
public and contentious actions, characterise this campaign throughout its short duration.  
As the main target is the European Council, any access to the top-level of politicians is 
exploited in order to get the message straight to the horse’s mouth.  
In a further demonstration of this combination, another large-scale public action was also 
being planned at this point in the campaign.  The ETUC hold a march every year for the 
                                                 
122 For the petition, the Social Platform is thus used less as an organisation in itself than as a network of 
European groups and their links to the national level (interview 11).  The Social Platform as a unitary body 
state that when working with EU institutions they restrict themselves to lobbying.   
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social summit (interview 10), but on this occasion they too felt that extra effort was needed 
both as a result of the Barroso communication, the draft directive on Services in the 
Internal Market (see chapter five) and the generally more right-wing climate in the EU.  All 
of these factors were stressed in their call to demonstrate.  The demonstration is therefore 
linked to other issues from the very start by the ETUC: “[t]hese things happen, and you 
plan to have a demonstration before the European summit because you know that they will 
review the Lisbon agenda, but we were also aware of the fact that there was a lot of 
popular, a lot of unrest amongst people and trade unionists on this Bolkestein Directive.  
And of course it’s related, it ties in, it’s this model of open the economic frontiers” 
(interview 10).  By linking the two subjects, the ETUC hoped to see a bigger turnout from a 
larger number of countries than on most previous occasions, where a ‘core’ of Belgian 
trade unionists provided between 10 and 20,000 participants, but few came from other 
countries (interview 10).  The march itself took place immediately before the summit, on 
19 March 2005.   
Apart from organising their demonstration, the ETUC also made contacts with high-level 
players in both the Council and the Commission in order to press their point.  Their 
position as a social partner and rather privileged interlocutor at both European and national 
levels is clear from the level at which contacts were made.  Meetings or contacts were 
made by the secretary general of the ETUC (John Monks of the UK’s Trades Union 
Congress) with Jacques Chirac, the President of France, Guy Verhofstadt, the Prime 
Minister of Belgium, Gerhard Schroeder, the German Chancellor, as well as Commission 
President Barroso, and Commissioners Spidla (Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal 
Opportunities) and Verheugen (Vice-President and Commissioner for Enterprise and 
Industry).  Jean-Claude Juncker was also invited to the ETUC’s Executive Committee to 
discuss their position.  Contacts between the ETUC and the Presidency were frequent, and 
considered to be particularly “helpful in steering the discussion and the conclusions in 
another direction than the one Barroso would like to see” (interview 10).  It is interesting to 
note that, the Presidency aside, the national leaders targeted are all either naturally inclined 
to the views of trade unions (left-wing politicians), or, in the case of Chirac, from a country 
with a traditionally strong trade union movement calling for a ‘yes’ vote in the upcoming 
constitutional referendum (more on this in the political opportunities section).  Apart from 
these efforts, national trade unions were also carrying out their own meetings at the 
national level (interview 10).   
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Despite the view that the usual repertoire of tactics were not enough for this campaign, the 
Social Platform nevertheless produced its usual Resolution for the Spring Summit on 21 
February 2005, as well as another co-authored with the EEB and the ETUC.  This 
resolution not only called for the re-balancing of the agenda, but also drew on arguments 
linked to the vision of the Union according to its citizens.  Further public actions still 
accompanied these resolutions however, for example a call for action on the Platform’s 
website on 1 March 2005.  This call includes several options for action.  First, it asks for 
signatures for the now up-and-running SOS Europe petition (thereby proving that although 
Solidar initiated the project, the Social Platform and its members drove it (interview 12).  
Secondly, it provides a model letter to be sent to heads of state and/or permanent 
representatives in Brussels in several languages.  Thirdly, it asks for support for a ‘day of 
action’ on 21 March 2005 organised by the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN),123 
where the organisation asked its members to arrange events raising awareness on the 
campaign, and making their objections known.124  Shortly after these events, the Social 
Platform was extremely surprised to receive an invitation to discuss their concerns with 
President Barroso himself (interviews 11, 13, 14).125  This unprecedented invitation was, 
according to Solidar, most likely due to the fact that the usually serene Social Platform had 
raised such a public voice in opposition to the President’s communication (interview 13).  
According to the press release reporting the meeting, it was helpful in the sense that the 
Platform had the chance to underline their idea that social, economic and employment 
policies should not be seen as competing choices.  In concrete terms, however, little came 
of the meeting (interview 14).   
The campaign now entered its last stages, and all three of the groups made a final push to 
publicise their various events through press releases, calls to demonstrate and, in the 
Solidar’s case, a one page advertisement in the European Voice reproducing the petition 
                                                 
123 It is interesting note that, like Solidar, the director of the EAPN is also a Vice-President of the Social 
Platform.  This would seem to suggest that their roles as active members of the Social Platform has somehow 
influenced the fact that they then provide the core of the efforts towards more public actions around the 
Lisbon agenda campaign.  In addition, the EAPN were very active in defining the Open Method of 
Coordination on social inclusion, and feel a strong ownership of this part of the implementation of the agenda 
(interview 12), which may also contribute to a stronger reaction to any threat to that process.  That an active 
member of the Social Platform takes on public actions also fits with the problems encountered by the Social 
Platform itself in engaging in such actions – with no contacts with grassroots members it questions not only 
its ability in such matters, but also the appropriateness of even attempting to do so (interview 14). 
124 The EAPN’s call also includes calls to sign the SOS Europe petition and to support the ETUC’s 
demonstration. 
125 The meeting is cited in a press release from 15 March 2005 – therefore it may safely be assumed that it 
either took place on this date or the day before. 
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and lists of organisations and MEPs who had signed.126  Another important factor in 
spreading the petition was its translation into all EU languages, making it more accessible 
at national levels.  Following this final drive to gather support, the petition was handed to 
the President of the Council.  At the end of the campaign, the petition had garnered support 
from around 7000 organisations, the majority of which were national organisations.127  The 
demonstration called by the ETUC took place on 19 March.  The President of the Social 
Platform addressed the protestors at the beginning of the day, along with the secretary 
general of the ETUC.128  On the day, turnout was even higher than expected, with around 
75,000 people marching through Brussels “for the defence of employment and social rights 
and to show their opposition to the Bolkestein directive”.  The composition of the crowd, as 
estimated by the ETUC, was the usual core of Belgian trade unionists, but with larger 
contingents of trade unionists and others from other countries – around 20,000 from 
France, and 10,000 from Germany.  “So it was a really European manifestation, in the real 
sense of the word” (interview 10).  After the summit, the Luxembourg presidency’s press 
release re-affirmed the Council’s commitment to the original Lisbon agenda, meaning that 
the campaign had achieved its immediate objective of conserving the three-pillar 
approach.129  
 
5.1.1  Driving the campaign: the role of national groups 
 
A swift assessment of how the core groups active in the Lisbon campaign (the Social 
Platform; the ETUC; Solidar; and the EAPN) went about involving their national members 
is particularly important for the present case as a complement to the frame analysis, since 
some problems were encountered in locating national level documents. 
                                                 
126 The petition was sent directly to MEPs in order to secure support from elected politicians (interview 13).   
127 The SOS Europe petition was continued after the end of this campaign with a conference in February 2006 
in partnership with the Austrian Solidar in order to continue activism on Social Europe.  See 
www.soseurope.org. 
128 Despite some discussion of this decision to involve NGOs, with a few members feeling that these would 
‘take over’ the march (interview 10), the need for a large turnout apparently won the day.  Indeed, from the 
moment the ETUC called for a demonstration, this was taken up by the network of European social forums – 
starting from the Belgian social forum.  Their call is more centred around opposition to the ‘spread of neo-
liberalism’, but is explicitly a call to support the ETUC, and Social Europe.  In the event then, the trade union 
demonstration is also proffered for shared ownership with NGOs and grassroots organisations. 
129 Similar conclusions on this story are drawn by Daly (2006:471).  According to this author, as well as 
interviewees, however, the social objectives of Lisbon did suffer a certain “watering down” following the 
mid-term review (ibid:471), while others seem unaware that the presidency conclusions ever made such a 
statement (Howarth 2007:89).  Legislation following the conclusions thus continued with the growth and jobs 
emphasis.  Indeed, it has been argued that Lisbon as a “strategy towards ‘competitiveness’ (ibid:103) was an 
important tool in advancing both the Services directive and the REACH regulation (Smith 2006) 
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The Social Platform presents a peculiar structure with respect to national membership, in 
that the organisation must pass through its European level members in order to reach the 
national level.  Strictly speaking, the Social Platform has no national level of membership, 
only European.  Contacts with the national level depend on its individual members, 
although the organisation must still communicate effectively with its members if it is to 
ensure that information is passed down through the network.130  Therefore the decision-
making structures of the Social Platform must be almost more democratic and open than 
those of its members in order to be able to claim that a common campaign represents the 
views of all of its members – indeed the importance of democracy and participation in its 
work are very much stressed.  Thematic working groups, made up of members’ 
representatives with special interest in the particular area, produce position papers in 
dialogue with one another, which are then adopted by the Steering group, which may 
amend, and in which all members are represented.  Due to the location of most members in 
Brussels, these groups may meet regularly.  A management committee, including the 
President and Vice-Presidents, takes responsibility for the administration of the body, while 
the President and Vice-Presidents represent the Platform as a whole when necessary.   
Quick reactions are not then the Platform’s speciality, and the more public actions of the 
campaign are all carried out through the members of the Social Platform rather than the 
Platform itself.  The Social Platform members most active in this campaign, and both of 
which provide a Vice-President for the organisation, are Solidar and the EAPN.  Both of 
these organisations are European offices for networks of national groups – their staff in 
European offices are there to serve these members.  In this campaign, as already seen, the 
EAPN’s main mechanism for involving national members was the coordination of national 
actions of a variety of types in a single day of action.  Solidar plays an important role in 
coordinating the efforts (both political and humanitarian) of its members.  In the Lisbon 
campaign, it was those members that make up the steering committee that decided to draft 
the petition.  Indeed, both Solidar and the EAPN state that their decisions are decided 
alongside their members.  Solidar works on the basis of two thematic committees, each 
member deciding whether they should participate in one or both.  Within these committees 
actions and positions are decided, with a general assembly holding the final decision.  Day 
                                                 
130 Most members of the Social Platform are federations of national groups who fund a small office in 
Brussels to monitor EU events on their behalf. 
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to day decisions are taken by a board, elected by the general assembly.  The EAPN splits its 
decision-making work amongst task forces and working groups, again made up of national 
members.  Similarly, a general assembly elects the executive committee and the board.   
The ETUC is also very much controlled by its members, as seen in the brief description at 
the beginning of this chapter.  The ETUC discusses issues in thematic working groups, 
where national experts in each policy area meet.  Positions and plans of action, however, 
must always be approved by the Executive committee, where the top level of national 
members have the final decision on all actions – including those held jointly with other 
organisations.  With regard to diffusing EU information to national members, the ETUC’s 
role in this respect is limited.  Most national trade unions, as long established and well-
resourced organisations, research EU issues for themselves through other sources, or even 
maintain their own Brussels offices (often on a sectoral basis) (interview 10).  Even when 
the ETUC calls on members of the Executive committee to contact national governments or 
diffuse information (a rare occurrence), there is no real follow-up to ensure information is 
sent through to grassroots members (interview 10).  This however is not the case in the 
campaign in hand – the call to demonstrate on 19 March was well diffused by national 
members, and turnout was (for a European demonstration) high.   
To summarise, the Lisbon campaign was triggered by Barroso’s communication in early 
February 2005.  The aim of the campaign was to ensure that the European Council would 
reaffirm its commitment to the three-pillar approach of the original agenda.  The campaign 
was characterised by a combination of high-level lobbying and other more conventional 
tactics and a very public campaign including a mass internet-based petition, and a sizeable 
demonstration two days before the summit itself.  These public actions relied on short, 
generalised messages in order to mobilise members (see the quote at the beginning of this 
chapter).  While the Social Platform used lobbying tactics, writing resolutions and meeting 
with relevant actors, its most active members dedicated themselves to more public 
approaches such as the petition and a day of coordinated national actions (organised by the 
EAPN).  The national level was therefore mobilised by Social Platform members working 
with one another rather than the Social Platform as an individual organisation.  The ETUC 
also carried out both sorts of tactics, lobbying a number of very high-level actors,131 as well 
                                                 
131 The difference between the meetings with these high-level actors held by the ETUC and the Social 
Platform was that while the latter was invited, the former arranged the meetings themselves, indicating that 
access to such high-level actors is, for them, more routine.    
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as organising a mass demonstration with the participation of the other groups already 
mentioned, national groups, and national trade unions.  In calling for this demonstration, 
they linked the campaign to the  directive on Services in the Internal Market, which greatly 
enhanced mobilisation levels. 
 
5.2  Simple and constant: frames in the Lisbon Campaign 
 
Because the Lisbon campaign is so much shorter than the other case studies presented here, 
no separate phases were singled out.  In order to ensure that the frames in this short 
campaign could be accurately traced, the documents selected for this frame analysis are 
more numerous than in other, longer case studies, and are closely spaced in a chronological 
sense.  This short timeframe also constituted a problem when locating national level 
documents, as will be explained more fully below.   
 
5.2.1 Frames among the European level groups 
 
The core demand of the various organisations involved in the campaign is the same: that 
the European Council should not abandon the social pillar of the Lisbon agenda in line with 
the approach advocated by Barroso.  Although missing in this strict form from the EAPN 
documents, this line is also implicit in the frames ‘put social / environment back into 
Lisbon strategy, and ‘reaffirm commitment to social inclusion strategy’, both of which 
appear prominently in these.  The basis for common action – a shared demand – is 
therefore present.  The core diagnostic frame is the argument that the Lisbon pillars are 
mutually reinforcing.  The image is one of a pyramid of three pillars supporting one 
another – removing one will cause the entire structure to fall.  This frame is found, at first, 
only in documents authored by the Social Platform, and not in the documents of its 
members.  Nevertheless, the separately authored documents from Social Platform members 
analysed here are all some form of call for action.  They are thus directed internally to 
members, and more concerned with the details of actions to be carried out.132  With the 
publication of the only jointly authored document of the campaign (by the Social Platform, 
                                                 
132 The arguments behind the actions are skipped, we may assume, because Solidar and the EAPN both state 
that their members are very well aware of the Lisbon agenda since they are often involved in its 
implementation (interviews 12 and 13). 
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the ETUC and the EEB), however, the mutual reinforcement frame begins to spread.133  
After this, the frame appears in an ETUC press release publicising the spring summit 
demonstration.  This is a good indication of an instance of frame diffusion from the social 
to the trade union side of the campaign.  It is, though, an instance of a frame being adopted 
by the ETUC, who include it with reference to the main claim of a balanced approach.  
Looking for the movement of a frame in the opposite direction, which would complete the 
dialogue, no evidence is found.  This is indeed the story for most of the frames – they either 
stay put in one organisation’s output, or migrate only as far as the joint document. 
As a result of the short-term nature of this campaign, the frames employed during this 
campaign do not develop much.  The impression is less one of framing work between the 
groups engaged in this campaign as one of the activation of a pre-existing relationship.  Of 
course, it is also evident that the core organisations all share the same demand – to reinstate 
(or rather not to abandon in the first place) the original Lisbon agenda.  To back up this 
view of a pre-existing basis for common actions we can draw on what has already been 
said about these organisations.  The Social Platform, providing a permanent framework for 
the coordination of actions, in itself proves framing work between its members prior to this 
particular campaign.  The specific issue of the Lisbon agenda campaign is seen as an 
obvious area where all groups in the Social Platform will hold the same opinions.  “..for 
those sorts of bigger things, wider things, it’s very good to work with the Social Platform.  
the next one was around this mid-term evaluation” (interview 12).134  The petition diffused 
through the Social Platform network by Solidar shows how this pre-existing identity was 
activated without further work.  Actions by the other main player, the ETUC, however, are 
carried out separately, and although there is evidence of the two organisations informing 
one another of planned actions, there is nothing to show that they coordinate positions or 
do any joint work.  The SOS Europe petition, for example, was signed by the ETUC, but 
not diffused, while the ETUC demonstration did include the NGOs but did not involve 
them in its organisation.   
In conclusion, it may be said that there is scant evidence of framing work in this campaign, 
despite the fact that the definitions of problems are obviously shared by the groups 
involved.  It is the very organisational forms of the main campaigning groups, as well as 
                                                 
133 Although the Social Platform documents are really jointly authored, this document is singled out since it 
visibly displays the support of three separate organisations. 
134 And in line with comments by Cullen (2005). 
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the bodies used for regular dialogue, that provide an explanation for the shared frames in 
the campaign.  The main demands are similar for all groups, and while the diagnostic views 
are slightly different, none are contradictory, and some do migrate from the social 
organisations to the ETUC documents.  The Lisbon campaign thus drew on pre-forged 
identities and like-mindedness between organisations, underlining the importance of 
permanent structures for transnational organising also identified by Passy (1999:164).  
Proof of this lies in the types of organisations involved: the Social Platform, which is in 
itself the example par excellence of an institutionalised European-level coalition; Solidar 
and the EAPN, both providing vice-presidents for the Social Platform and taking care of 
the more public social actions; and finally the ETUC, who in any case have close contacts 
with the Social Platform quite apart from any naturally close standpoint.  The case 
therefore provides a good example of a long-term coalition mobilised in a short period of 
time in the face of a serious threat – the permanent coalition structures allowed for a swift 
mobilisation which was required because of the time limits in this case (for a similar 
finding see Juska and Edwards 2005:203) -  thereby highlighting the importance of regular 
contacts and the maintenance of identities between likeminded groups at the European 
level. 
 
5.2.2  Frames at the European and national levels 
 
Before the discussion of frames at the European and national levels, a note on the selection 
of national level documents is necessary.  These were difficult to locate for this particular 
campaign.  This may be for several reasons: 1) the short timeframe of the campaign; 2) the 
nature of the organisations involved; 3) the ETUC’s demonstration being scheduled 
alongside anti-war marches (seemingly just a fortunate coincidence – with the Spring 
Council beginning on the Monday, the Saturday was bound to attract some activity).  The 
first reason was that the SOS Europe petition was launched only (approximately) 7 weeks 
before the Spring Council, and spread by organisations via e-mail.  While many signed the 
petition (up to 7000 according to Solidar) few published the call on their websites (the aim 
being to gather organisations as signatories), or where they had it was the exactly the same 
call, and thus offered little in terms of comparison to the European level document.  
Similarly, the Trade Unions publishing the call to demonstrate in Brussels with the ETUC 
tend to reproduce their same arguments, although with different emphases.  Nevertheless, 
these are the documents that most represent what was available at the national level, and 
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the convergence of frames between European and national levels is in that sense justified.  
In addition, the vast majority of organisations who signed the SOS Europe position are 
service providers.  These kinds of groups may be said to be far less likely to publicise their 
policy work than Trade Unions, who have a strong tradition of fulfilling this role on behalf 
of their members.  Thus, the numbers of documents analysed that relate to SOS Europe are 
in turn lower than those for the ETUC demonstration.  These points must be born in mind 
when analysing the framing work between the European and national levels.135   
 
The most common frame arising from the analysis of the European-level documents, 
‘balanced approach in all original pillars’ falls to fourth place in the analysis of the national 
level documents, appearing in only three of the seven analysed.  Indeed, amongst the most 
shared frames no mention of the actual Lisbon agenda appears at all.  Instead, we find 
wider, mostly motivational frames.  The most widely shared and frequently mentioned 
frame is ‘oppose Bolkestein directive’, confirming that the coincidence of the two cases 
provided a strong opportunity for this campaign (see below).  The ETUC were in fact 
working more on the anti-Bolkestein campaign than on the Lisbon agenda issue, although 
the two issues were both considered symptomatic of what was wrong with the Union.  It 
therefore made sense for the ETUC to draw on both of these issues in it call to march.  The 
national trade unions, in turn, were also much more concerned with the more concrete 
threat posed by the Bolkestein directive, and thus favour frames concerned with this over 
those on the Lisbon agenda.  It is much more likely that national trade unions marched not 
for Lisbon, but against Bolkestein.   
 
Mirroring the situation at the European level, we also find a split between the motivational 
frames in the documents at national level.  While the ‘oppose Bolkestein directive’ takes 
first place, second place goes to ‘Social Europe (support, fight for, save)’.136  Looking more 
closely at how the frames are distributed, however, reveals that while the Bolkestein 
motivational frame is found mostly in trade union calls for action, along with other 
organisations calling for support for the demonstration, the Save Social Europe frame is 
found in the documents of social groups whose Brussels offices are members of the Social 
Platform.  ‘Bolkestein’ as the most popular motivation is therefore due to the higher 
                                                 
135 Here, for the difficulties mentioned above, the documents are less systematic than for other campaigns, 
where effort was made to sample documents from each organisation over time. 
136 The various different expressions of this frame were amalgamated into one category.  Fighting for, 
supporting, and saving can easily be argued to have the same message in the context of a call for action. 
 187
number of calls for participation in the demonstration of 19 March 2005.  The frames do, in 
this sense, reflect the goings on at the European level.  The split between the public actions 
is re-created, with trade unions focusing on the demonstration, and the social on the 
petition and, to a lesser extent, the EAPN day of action.  The higher number of calls for 
participation in the demonstration is also reasonable – the aim of bringing people to 
Brussels to demonstrate obviously necessitating a more public diffusion of the message 
than is the case for SOS Europe, whose goal is to secure the support of organisations.   
 
The frame analysis comparing European and national frames suggests a top-down 
repetition of frames mainly through the diffusion of various calls to action.  The message 
from the European level is passed down, and altered only to make it more salient to 
grassroots members, where it is passed down at all.  The overall impression is again one of 
the mobilising of pre-existing identities for a short campaign.  For the ETUC this is 
particularly interesting when we consider the image of the organisation as distant from its 
membership.  By drawing on a frame it knew to be shared by grassroots members, the 
organisation succeeded in bringing many of its members onto the streets of Brussels to 
demonstrate over several linked issues, demonstrating the idea that flexible frames and 
identities can often bring “multiple issues into the same protest event” (Lance Bennett 
2005:205).  The Social Platform also succeeded, indirectly, in canvassing its twice removed 
national members (the members of its members) by delegating the responsibility for public 
actions to its active European level members.  Although not reflected particularly in the 
frame analysis for the national level (for reasons already discussed), the number of 
signatories to the SOS Europe petition bears witness to this.  In the Lisbon case, then, as a 
short, sharp campaign, long-term alliances and coalitions, and the identity-ties they create, 
are more important than the construction of new alliances and problem definitions.   
 
5.3  Powerful allies: political opportunities in the Lisbon campaign 
 
The fixed opportunities and threats applicable in the EU arena were reflected in the tactics 
of the groups campaigning on the Lisbon agenda in a variety of ways.  However, before 
looking specifically at the tactical responses of the rather short Lisbon campaign, it is 
useful to look at some of the evidence gathered on the involved groups’ more normal or 
day-to-day methods of working in the EU.  This point of comparison is worthy for a 
campaign of such as short duration, as it underlines the very different nature of the 
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mobilisation the groups achieved around the Lisbon campaign when juxtaposed with their 
more ordinary methods of working in the EU.  
 
All of the groups involved in the campaigning confirmed that they more generally use 
lobbying strategies when targeting the supranational EU institutions.  The reasons for this 
are strongly related to the opportunities the Commission in particular presents for certain 
kinds of groups who become involved in formal consultations (see chapter one).  All of the 
groups involved in the campaign around the Lisbon agenda fall into this category, whether 
directly (ETUC and EAPN) or through membership in the Social Platform (Solidar).  The 
ETUC is an official partner in the Social Dialogue, and recognised as such in the Treaties.  
This organisation perceives itself primarily as a lobbyist (interview 10), although as is 
evident in this campaign also draws on the national traditions of the trade union movement, 
organising demonstrations – although these are rarely particularly confrontational.  The 
Social Platform, as well as many of its members, also holds the place of a ‘valued 
interlocutor’ (although more unofficial) of the Commission, attending bi-annual meetings.  
In addition, many of its members are involved with implementation (EAPN), or on the lists 
of those consulted for certain areas of work.  Indeed, the Social Platform even point out 
that often they are contacted to participate in various consultations and other events, rather 
than having to seek meetings (interview 11).  Murphy points out the various advantages 
(and drawbacks) of such permanent coalitions: shared resources lead to an elevated 
bargaining position, as seen in the last point, as coalitions may claim to represent broader 
constituencies (2005:237).   
 
There is therefore an element of the lobbying tactics more usually used by these 
organisations being caused by a privileged position with the Commission rather than being 
a reaction to its structure.  The groups are also aware of this situation of their privileged 
access (interview 11), and in the case of the Social Platform this translates to a long term 
strategic decision, allowing them to facilitate access and aid information production for 
those groups that do not fall into this category of privileged partner.137  Yet the Platform 
also mention that this can go too far, that they provide an all too convenient ‘one stop shop’ 
for the Commission, who often believe that their job is done after consulting them.  This 
may cause tensions with individual members, who are often overlooked in favour of the 
                                                 
137 This is less the case for the ETUC who, as seen in their brief history presented earlier in this chapter, were 
to some extent created by Delors with the function of Social Partner in mind. 
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more visible Social Platform.  The Social Platform as a tactic also makes it difficult, and 
even inappropriate, to attempt more public actions.  This relates not only to its position vis-
à-vis the Commission, but also to its distance from grassroots members.  Because there is 
no direct contact with the members of their affiliates, more radical forms of action are 
problematic (interview 14), and must be left to single member organisations.  In this sense 
this organisation is a near perfect example of the description of the idea outlined in chapter 
one that being a recognised interlocutor of the Commission can be a double-edged sword.   
 
Continuing with the theme of lobbying versus more public actions in the EU arena, many 
of the organisations involved in the Lisbon agenda also express reservations as to the 
effectiveness of public actions, and more specifically demonstrations, at the European 
level.  Demonstrations are seen as very rarely being truly ‘European’ in the sense of the 
nationalities of those participating, and are therefore seen as more effective at the national 
level, an opinion in line with Marks and McAdam’s (1996, 1999) views (interview 13).  
Nevertheless, demonstrations are seen as important in a more long term sense, in that they 
physically show the individual support base behind lobbying actions: “..as I said, to 
mobilisation at the European level there are limits.  So probably on the day-to-day political 
work lobbying is more effective.  But you will never succeed with the lobbying if you can't 
make the institutions believe or see the organisations and the people that are actually 
behind that” (interview 13).  This is seen as important because the organisations believe the 
Commission often forget the national membership element when they consult European 
level groups (interview 13), and contributes some explanation to the logic behind the 
demonstration in this campaign.   
 
These more general comments on the ways in which the groups involved in the Lisbon 
agenda operate in their day-to-day business serves as a good backdrop for explaining their 
campaigning tactics in the short, sharp, campaign they organised between February and 
May 2005.  Starting with the theme of dialogue with third parties is a good basis for 
interpreting their actions.  There are two aspects particularly relevant in attempting to 
explain the more public course of action taken by the groups on this occasion.  The first of 
these relates to the problem (or opportunity) of ‘natural partners’ within the Commission.  
The DG within the Commission usually dealt with by these groups, their ‘natural partner’, 
is DG Employment and Social Affairs.  This section of the Commission is described as 
having an agenda very close to that of the social NGOs (interview 12), and is seen as 
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fighting the corner of these groups within the Commission.  The groups even see 
themselves as a tool employed by DG Employment in discussions within the Commission, 
where they are “used … to help influence other parts of the Commission”, reinforcing the 
view of this department as an ally (interview 13).  However, as seen in all of the other case 
studies presented in this thesis, this good relationship with a ‘natural partner’ DG is 
accompanied by a bad one with other departments, who “all push you back to Employment 
and Social Affairs rather than meeting you face to face” (interview 12).  One reaction to 
this is building coalitions between different kinds of EUSMOs, especially on issues such as 
the Lisbon agenda – a tactic also seen in the broad coalition formations of the 
environmental cases.  This was the logic behind using the Civil Society Contact Group to 
bring the EEB into the campaign, which was useful for its contacts with DG Environment 
(interview 13).   
 
The second view of the Commission as a partner for dialogue that also contributes to 
explaining the course of this campaign is the perception that the institution uses dialogue 
and consultations selectively, paying only ‘lip service’ to the idea.  Several of the social 
groups make such comments in relation to both the Lisbon agenda and the Bolkestein 
directive (interview 14).  Comparable comments were made by the ETUC in relation to the 
outcomes of their participation in the Social Dialogue, and, more pertinently for this 
campaign, the Kok group.  Despite winning important concessions within these forums, the 
documents subsequently released no longer reflected the decisions made (interview 10).  
Similar comments on the Commission’s only paying lip service to consultation are raised in 
all the case studies and will be further discussed in the conclusions.   
The combination of these two factors contributes to explaining the campaign tactics.   
Although DG Employment and Social Affairs is a campaign ‘ally’, it did not have any role 
in Barroso’s communication and was therefore in no position to ‘uphold promises’.  With 
their ‘natural partner’ unavailable, the campaigning groups’ response was to tap into 
another resource – their grassroots members.  Since the ultimate decision would be taken at 
a European Council, which I argued to be one of the EU institutions providing a clearer 
point of reference for public protests, more public events were chosen as the best 
alternative path to more usual lobbying actions, opportunities for which were closed since 
the Commission did not consult on this communication.  Although many other factors 
contribute to the unfolding of the campaign, a basic picture of closed doors at the 
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supranational level and the consequent return to more ‘traditional’ (i.e. protest, letter 
writing, petitions, and other actions that have been called unconventional or contentious) 
social movement actions is seen in this campaign, and repeated in other cases also included 
in this study (more or less successfully).  The beginnings of a reverse boomerang effect as 
detailed by Keck and Sikkink (1998:12-13 – see page 91), where groups facing difficult 
circumstances at the international level revert to the national and local levels rather than 
vice versa, can thus be made out.  
 
Looking at the campaign’s reactions to the EU as a multi-level structure there are fewer 
useful observations to be made, since although a variety of different actions are employed, 
most are directed towards the European Council or individual heads of State and 
government.  The relative absence of the Commission as a strong campaign target has 
already been discussed, but another actor is clearly missing from the descriptions provided 
so far – the European Parliament.  This is because the European Parliament’s role in this 
issue was, officially, limited to a resolution.  Any influence that might have been exerted 
on a political level was destroyed by the fact that their resolution was seen to be very weak.  
This will be explored more fully below as a ‘dynamic’ threat more specifically related to 
this campaign than the structure of the Parliament in general, although of course this does 
play a role.  Were there not so many committees involved in the drafting of a resolution on 
the Spring Summit, it is alleged, the outcome may have been much stronger (interview 14).  
The only targeting of the European Parliament was through seeking its individual members 
as signatories to the SOS Europe petition – the only individuals to sign.  Their support was 
seen as important since “people recognise MEPs.. It’s true they don’t have a clear say 
because it’s the Council, and they can’t do anything there.  But on the other hand I think 
people know that they are the elected people on the European level” (interview 13).  
Turning the focus to the different actions of the campaign does however reflect the multi-
level structure of the EU, adding to the more general picture of moving back to national 
resources and strategies in the face of threats and closed doors at the European level 
outlined above.  While the groups continue their lobbying efforts, they also attempt to 
mobilise their grassroots members, thus mirroring the structure of the EU in the sense that 
they are active at the multiple levels simultaneously at work in this organisation.  Where an 
issue may be affected by the actions of any one of the institutions, campaigns must reflect 
this situation by acting to try and influence all of these.  As Solidar put it, “Usually we 
 192
really try to operate on both levels.  Because I think if we look at decision-making in the 
European Union, that is the most effective way” (interview 13).  Multilevel action has also 
been found crucial to the success of EU campaigns by other authors (Hellferich and Kolb 
2001:151).   
The below table summarises the dynamic opportunities and threats applicable to the Lisbon 
agenda campaign, according to the parameters laid out in chapter one.     
 
Table 9: Dynamic political opportunities in the Lisbon campaign 
 
Intra-elite 
conflict 
None publicly perceivable during the campaign – possibly between 
Commission and Council Presidents.  EP resolution seen as weak, 
plus no very official role, campaign waiting for Council reaction. 
Proximity of 
elections 
Far.  Elections took place less than one year before the campaign 
began.  Both Parliament and Commission are relatively new. 
Contingent 
events 
Luxembourg Presidency – sympathetic to campaigning groups.   
The existence of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Impending national referenda (France and Holland in particular) 
scheduled for the end of May / beginning of June.  Both countries 
have strong ‘no’ campaigns. 
Position held 
by ally Luxembourg Presidency.   
Ability of ally 
to fulfil 
promises 
Able to steer debates in the direction wished by the campaigning 
groups.  A strong ally, but non all-powerful. 
Hostile elites Commission.  A powerful actor, but the decision sought by the campaign lies with the European Council. 
Presence of 
counter 
movements 
None perceivable  
 
The first topic in discussing dynamic opportunities in the Lisbon campaign is intra-elite 
conflict.  This is only slightly applicable here, because in one sense the goal of the groups 
was to create inter-elite conflict between the European Council and the Commission.  No 
evidence came to light of any public conflict between these two institutions in the period 
immediately preceding the formation of the European Council’s position, although the final 
outcome of the campaign certainly shows that there was some disagreement on how to 
continue with the Lisbon agenda.  Conflict with either of these institutions and the 
European Parliament was a non-issue, since the mid-term review of the Lisbon agenda did 
not foresee any real role of the Parliament with the exception of a Resolution that in the 
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event contradicted neither the original Lisbon agenda nor the Commission communication.  
The variable proximity of European level elections, on the other hand, is useful in that it 
draws attention to the general climate surrounding the campaign.  Elections to the 
European Parliament and the appointment of a new Commission had taken place less than 
one year before, and both had resulted in changes unfavourable to the campaigning groups’ 
agendas in a general way.  Views on new governments in many of the member states were 
also  pessimistic, which may be interpreted as having contributed to the campaign’s heavy 
targeting of heads of state and government.  This theme is discussed further in terms of 
discursive threats, as will be seen below.   
 
Although not strictly a ‘contingent’ event, and although it pre-dates the campaign proper, it 
is important to underline that the Kok group played a decisive role in the launching of both 
the SOS Europe campaign, and in sparking the spate of public actions by other 
organisations.  When the Kok group was set up, the Social Platform and its members 
attempted to secure a place in the high-level group for a Social representative.  This request 
was denied, and combined with the disappointing (in the eyes of the Social groups) 
conclusions the group then reached proved an important threat for the campaign to rally 
around (interviews 12 and 13).  This also applies to the ETUC, who despite their 
representation in the group expressed their disappointment over the conclusions, which did 
not reflect their input or the outcome of various discussions.  This said, several other 
contingent events also contributed to the campaign.  Indeed, we may go so far as to 
question whether these events would have sufficed to secure the groups’ desired outcome 
without their taking other actions. 
   
The first of these was the Luxembourg presidency.138  Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker was from the very first sympathetic to the views of the campaigning 
groups.  As already seen, he contacted the Social Platform extremely early on in the 
campaign in order to meet with them.  The ETUC also state that they had good contacts 
with the Presidency and met with Juncker.  The role of the Luxembourg presidency as an 
ally of the campaign echoes Warleigh’s findings on the campaign around the Auto Oil 
                                                 
138 Of course, the sympathetic Luxembourg presidency could equally be classed as an elite ally of the Lisbon 
campaign.  However, discussing the presidency in the category of contingent events serves to highlight the 
transient nature of the presidencies, and the mere coincidence that the campaign found an ally in this 
institution at the time of the mid-term review of the Lisbon agenda.  As mentioned previously, the 
possibilities for redefining the category of contingent events will be discussed in chapter seven. 
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directive (Warleigh 2000:233).  However, the timing of these meetings suggests that 
Juncker was seeking an ally or support for his own point of view rather than convinced by 
arguments presented by the campaigning groups, an interpretation which is also 
corroborated by interview data.  All of the groups involved cite the support of Juncker as 
important to the final outcome, and the Social groups add that an invitation from a 
President of the Council was absolutely unprecedented for them.  Meeting with the 
President was seen as useful in that the groups may have firmed up his resolve to act, and 
drawn extra attention to resistance to the proposed changes to the Lisbon agenda 
(interviews 10, 12, 14).  The President’s favourable eye was also mentioned as a spur to the 
use of more public actions.  His support provided an extra impetus to take a more public 
course of action, thereby providing him with clear cases on which to draw on in supporting 
his claim that citizens would not accept a changed agenda.  The request for a meeting with 
the social groups as represented by the Social Platform also boosted the groups more 
generally, by confirming them to be actively sought out by high level actors in the EU as a 
source of information on ‘social’ opinions.  The Presidency was also important to the 
campaign in terms of an important and powerful elite ally.  In terms of his or her ability to 
fulfil promises, the President of the European Council is certainly in an important and 
powerful actor in steering debates in certain directions, bringing up certain points on the 
agenda, and drawing attention to some facts rather than others (in this instance, perhaps, the 
public actions of the groups against the Barroso communication).  Juncker in particular was 
a Council President with an unprecedented amount of previous experience, and is generally 
seen as a gifted ‘fixer’ of difficult issues within the body (Hearl 2006:51).  High-level 
lobbying has also been noted as an important factor in campaigns focusing on 
intergovernmental conferences, similar in composition to the European Council (Hellferich 
and Kolb 2001:156). 
 
Another relevant factor to the campaign was the upcoming referenda in several member 
states on the new European Constitutional Treaty.  The French referendum was particularly 
important.  France, as one of the founding states of the EU, and home to the principal 
architect of the organisation, Jean Monnet, was the litmus test for the Constitutional Treaty.  
Many were worried at the time, and not least the French government, about the strength of 
the ‘no’ campaign in that country.  While a rejection of the Treaty by a smaller country, or 
one known to be sceptical of the European project could be weathered as had been done 
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before,139 a rejection from France would indicate a more deeply seated problem to be 
overcome.  The campaign in France against the Constitution was based (not solely, but 
including) on accusations about ‘Social Europe’.  The Bolkestein directive in particular was 
linked to a rejection of the Constitution by the large French Trade Unions.  There was 
therefore the perception that other heads of state and government would respond to 
President Chirac’s alleged plea to reach a ‘social’ conclusion at the European Council, 
allowing him to present that as evidence in the ‘yes’ campaign.  This interpretation was 
also shared by the campaigning groups: “The other thing that I think was also exerting 
pressure was the referendums on the Constitution that were coming up at that time.  So 
Chirac, for example, was having problems - or Chirac was having an interest in supporting 
social Europe in order to appease his own public, his own public voice, in order to have a 
yes vote for the Constitution.  So that probably also played a role in the Council 
conclusions” (interview 10).   
 
In the documentary evidence studied in piecing together the story of this campaign, 
however, arguments related to the Constitutional Treaty and its possible rejection as a 
result of abandoning the original Lisbon agenda are extremely scarce.  While the 
favourable circumstance of the debates over the Constitutional Treaty is therefore 
perceived by the campaigning groups, it is not especially exploited.  The exploitation of 
this opportunity fell to the trade unions acting on the Bolkestein directive, as will be seen in 
the next chapter.  Here, groups worked to link the Bolkestein issue to the referendum 
debates, with particularly strong outcomes in France – arguable contributing to Chirac’s 
position at the spring summit at the heart of the Lisbon campaign.  Added to this is the 
relevance of the Bolkestein campaign in the high turnout at the demonstration.  It was thus 
the Bolkestein campaign and its work on this subject that were, apparently, the decisive 
factors in the outcome of the Lisbon campaign.  The only direct link between the 
Constitutional Treaty and the case in hand was that it provided the impetus for the SOS 
Europe petition, as seen earlier.  The clause in the draft Treaty on the ‘citizens’ initiative’, 
where a  million-strong petition would force action by the EU institutions, was the idea 
behind the petition.  Of course, in the event, gathering such a high number of individual 
signatures was unrealistic in the time available, but the basis of the action remained. 
                                                 
139 For instance with the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, i.e. a euro-sceptic member state, 
and the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001, i.e. a small member state.  In both cases amendments were 
made to these Treaties, with new referenda subsequently approving them.    
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Of the remaining variables, none are particularly useful for unearthing important political 
opportunities and threats in the Lisbon campaign.  Hostile elites as a category has been 
covered in comments on the Commission.  No counter movement as such exists in the 
present campaign.  To summarise the Lisbon campaign in terms of political opportunities 
and threats, it can be noted that no serious threats were encountered (such as strong counter 
movements, or a complete lack of influential elite allies as seen in the environmental 
cases), while opportunities, especially those created by the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Bolkestein campaign were present but not explicitly exploited.  The groups were, however, 
able to rise to an occasion calling for more public actions, most notably planning a 
successful petition and demonstration. 
 
5.4  Exploiting the Bolkestein debate: discursive opportunities in the Lisbon campaign  
 
As in other cases, the discursive opportunities in the Lisbon campaign are closely  linked to 
political opportunities, and especially the perception of a threat to ‘social’ discourses as a 
result of a more right-wing, or free market, political climate in Europe after 2000.  
However, I shall begin the section according to the order laid out in  chapter one, and begin 
with the legitimacy discourse. 
 
The legitimacy opportunity arising from the discourse on the democratic deficit in the EU 
is seen by the groups in this campaign as a problem for the Commission which has caused 
them to seek dialogue not only to create legitimacy, but also to diffuse their own messages, 
or information.  For example, on the subject of the openness of the Commission: “They 
[the Commission] know the democracy gap.  And I don't know if they see it so much 
because they are not elected or just because they are remote, they are far away from people, 
and I think in that sense they know that it's important to have that link, also to transfer their 
message” (interview 13).  The Commission therefore uses the groups as their own 
discursive opportunity in turn: there is, to some extent, a two-way understanding (interview 
11), or “lobbying on lobbyists” as it is termed in the Bolkestein campaign (interview 22).140  
This two-way flow of understanding may be seen in a positive light, as helping the 
campaigning groups understand the limits faced by those they target.  Others, however, see 
the situation more negatively, as one of the Commission exploiting the participation of civil 
                                                 
140 A similar situation is mentioned by Caniglia (2001:44) between TSMOs and the UN and other 
International Governmental Organisations – “We use them, they use us” (interview quote, ibid 2001:45). 
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society (see below on the ETUC and social dialogue, as well as papers from the symposium 
Mountain or Molehill?  A critical appraisal of the Commission White Paper on 
Governance, 2001). 
 
In this equation there is also, of course, the element of groups changing in order to fit the 
Commission’s view of a partner for dialogue.  The Social Platform can, in one view, be 
seen in this light.  The organisation was founded as a result of a joint response to the 
Commission’s wish to develop dialogue with social NGOs expressed in the 1993 Green 
Paper on European Social Policy.  And the organisation can be said to have heightened the 
visibility of Social NGOs – several interviewees give this reason to explain the invitations 
to meet with Juncker and Barroso.  However, this opportunity for dialogue has also caused 
problems for the individual groups of the Social Platform (especially the smaller, lesser 
known members).  The Social Platform is intended to represent members on cross-cutting 
issues rather than issue specific themes, yet the Commission often overlooks individual 
members (interview 11).  This perception of the Commission as forgetful of both collective 
and individual members in its simplistic search for ‘interlocutors’ is also used to justify 
public actions – these can serve to remind the institutions of the national bases of the 
European offices (interview 13). 
 
Opportunities related to ideology stem from the fact that the Lisbon agenda is an extremely 
broad (and has been described as a very vague) policy, which also means it is a relatively 
easy one to support.  This goes as much for institutional actors as it does for the 
campaigning groups.  “It was a bit clearer than usual that there was something to be really 
protected.  So often these processes are very complicated and complex and so it's quite 
difficult to mobilise people around it.  But here you had a very clear choice…  So it was 
possible to mobilise people around it in a way - normally we can mobilise the people who 
are active in our network who are following it and know the detail or whatever but at this 
moment it was a bit clearer” (interview 12).  Thinking back to the ideas presented in 
relation to this characteristic of the EU in chapter one concerning ideology,141 the nature of 
the Lisbon agenda means that it is unlikely to meet serious opposition, or in other words, is 
                                                 
141 i.e. the idea that broader issues, difficult to split into small technical questions, are often connected to 
ideological positions.  Standpoints more traditionally belonging to the left may therefore face opposition from 
the right and vice versa, while other issues falling outside of ideology may find broader support.  The Lisbon 
agenda, focussing on economic growth, social cohesion, and sustainable development, contains elements 
acceptable to all political colours. 
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easy to create a consensus around.  This translates less into a discursive opportunity than 
into the removal of a discursive threat in the shape of ideology and the entrenched positions 
that this can evoke – although there are also clear links with political opportunities, most 
notably the reduced chances for strong counter movements.  The groups therefore benefited 
from this situation without really having to act in order to exploit it. 
 
The ETUC’s role as a social partner provides the organisation with significant discursive 
opportunities in terms of access to high-level actors and their legal obligation to consult 
them about certain issues.  This position is clearly exploited during the Lisbon campaign, 
where the ETUC’s secretary general John Monks (TUC, UK) met with several of the 
member states’ heads of state and government as well as Commissioners and President 
Barroso.  A trade union representative was also present in the high-level Kok group.  
However, this privileged position is not always seen to be all that helpful to the 
organisation.   
 
“What's the use underwriting reports like the Kok report, or underwriting the social 
partners' agreement, if afterwards the press strategy of UNICE, of the Commission, of 
right-wing politicians, simply abuses this?  If that's the way the game is being played then 
we should say no.  But that's a difficult message to tell internally because for the ETUC this 
is also a kind of an organisational thing, of survival of the organisation.  They tend to see 
the European social dialogue as one of the basic pillars, activities of the ETUC.  And of 
course if you look at it like that then you have an interest in keeping it alive and continuing 
it.  But there's, as I say, a reflection to be made on this.” (interview 10) 
 
As this quote shows, this particular representative of the ETUC sees consultation as pure 
strategy on the part of the Commission and other EU actors – they are accused of twisting 
outcomes to fit with their own views, and then announcing that they have secured the 
support of workers.  Numerous examples of this are cited – for example the Kok group 
Commission press releases following the Spring Summit.  The EAPN and Solidar, on the 
Social Platform side of the equation, also comment that even in the case that a policy text 
contains ‘nice words’, subsequent legislation and policy remain completely dislocated from 
these statements.  “So all the signs were that there was a growing lack of concern for the 
social cohesion element of it which in all cases was never as deeply lead politically as the 
other aspects of Lisbon.  And that's been the essential contradiction in Lisbon, between the 
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words that are on the page and what people and the political leaders did was something 
else” (interview 12).  Political opportunities for dialogue between the EU institutions and 
civil society are therefore perceived to translate into a discursive threat – groups are 
pacified with words, but betrayed in actions.    
 
This view is also connected to the swing to the right in many governments across Europe in 
the early 2000s.  Most of the comments cited above are, naturally, related to the current 
situation with the Lisbon agenda, and every interviewee spoke extensively of the discursive 
problems met in recent years as a result of governments more interested in the economy 
than with social protection.  This has led, firstly, to new discursive ploys in bringing 
forward their arguments.  While more traditional arguments are far from abandoned – 
human rights and social protection in particular – there are efforts to ‘re-package’ these 
discourses in order to fit the political climate.  “We were used to a certain style, and we 
were used for example to bring in the human rights dimension as being a reason good 
enough to act, to do something.  We know that this is not good enough, it is on paper, but if 
you really want to make a change you have to demonstrate that there is also a business case 
for that change.  And that it will benefit the public authorities, that it will benefit the 
economic objectives as well the social objectives.  What we are trying to demonstrate more 
and more is actually that the two should go together and reinforce each other” (interview 
11).  This discursive threat has also led to a more fundamental self-questioning among the 
Social groups about their role.  This means that they are attempting to carve out a role in 
agenda-setting rather than always reacting to the EU’s work programme.   
Concerning other events or campaigns contributing to the salience levels of the Lisbon 
issues, the main effect for this campaign is from the contemporary campaign on the 
proposed directive on services in the internal market (Bolkestein).  This will be discussed 
below as a dynamic discursive opportunity, leaving us to move on to look at the next more 
stable discursive opportunity variable – the rise of the global justice movement. 
 
The idea that the existence of the global justice movement and other such movement 
organisations may work to counter the effect of more right-wing governments by proposing 
a more ‘social’ discourse from another source is not borne out in this case (or indeed the 
Bolkestein case).  In reality, the presence of the global justice movement is not seen as an 
opportunity (if commented on at all).  Indeed, comments are more interesting in that they 
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paint a picture of, if not rivalry, then at least a big divide between the kinds of organisations 
involved at the EU level and this movement, suggesting that the discourses of the global 
justice movement are perceived as damaging groups’ chances of success at the EU level. 
(for similar findings see Lance Bennett 2005:125).  This is not seen as entirely the fault of 
the movement and its organisations, but also of the media, who fail to convey or misreport 
social discourses whatever their source (interview 12).  Nevertheless, there is an element of 
blame towards these organisations for not really understanding the processes they oppose.  
The comments below, made by the EAPN, show this perception and link it to public action, 
providing further support for the hypothesis that the knowledge requirements imposed by 
the EU arena on EUSMOs pulls them away from grassroots members and organisations 
based on mobilisation, negatively affecting their ability to mobilise to any great extent.   
 
“I think the other thing that one would want to look at is the gap between the sort of type of 
social movement that has grown up in Europe, and our type of organisation here.  And if 
you were talking to somebody from social movements, whatever, they have a much better 
record of mobilisation than we ever manage.  You might get a different view.  And when I 
talk with them I find them very ill-informed, very often, on some of the things that they're 
campaigning on.  …And I mean for us that's a huge challenge, to try and build that bridge 
as well.  Because it's not one that we've been so successful in building as well, I mean we 
make a big effort at our general assembly to try and build contacts with ATTAC, to at least 
engage in a dialogue, but even more than the businesses they didn't turn up.  Maybe they 
wanted to, that came not long after the Paris Social Forum, and they may have been 
exhausted from it…  But I think for me it's something incredibly striking this huge gap.  I 
would feel myself naturally part of that social movement, but at the same time I find myself 
very distant from the role that they're playing.  And so I think that this is, if you're talking 
about real mobilisation, they're able to it in a way that we can't.  And maybe..  I don't 
know what it is.  Maybe, if you know too much about the process you get nuanced views, 
but not very mobilised.  Whereas if you're just free and able to give the big messages then 
it may be more mobilising.” (interview 12, emphasis added)   
 
Because the campaign is so short in length, there are few significant dynamic discursive 
opportunities to be examined.  In parallel to the contingent events seen in the political 
opportunity section earlier on in this chapter, the Bolkestein campaign that was playing out 
simultaneously with the Lisbon campaign plays an important part in discursive terms too – 
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lending numerous ready-exploited opportunities to the campaign.  Not only did this other 
campaign provide more salience by generally bumping social issues up on the European 
agenda, it also provided a more concrete opportunity in that the more abstract and perhaps 
less well known Lisbon issue was linked to an issue more pressing and concrete in the eyes 
of grassroots members at the national level.  Similar findings on the importance of parallel 
campaigns on related issues have also been communicated by other scholars of 
transnational campaigns (Juska and Edwards 2005:202; Keck and Sikkink 1998:150).  This 
was indispensable in the high turnout at the March demonstration that played an important 
part in this campaign.     
  
Overall, both of the main coalition groups involved in the campaign have difficult 
relationships with the EU in terms of dialogue, and both are fighting against a generally 
more right-wing culture in the Union.  Potential opportunities for social discourses from the 
work of the global justice movement did not transpire.  In the event, more dynamic 
opportunities closely related to political opportunities in the form of the contemporary 
Bolkestein campaign and the nature of the Lisbon agenda as a vaguely formulated policy 
incapable of generating serious opposition were the only ones to be had, perhaps 
suggesting that political opportunities were altogether more important in the outcomes of 
this campaign.  This shall be looked into more extensively in the next section, where I shall 
attempt to trace the processes that link the spring summit’s conclusions and other outcomes 
with the short campaign waged by the EUSMOs.   
5.5  An apparent success: campaign outcomes 
 
Tracing the processes that led to the outcomes of the Lisbon campaign is a less daunting 
task than with the other longer campaigns analysed here since it was short and analysed as 
just one phase.  As ever, though, before tracing those processes, the outcomes need to be 
identified.  In terms of access outcomes, the Social Platform, and thereby its members, 
were (according to interview evidence) for the first time sought by both the President of the 
European Council at the time, Jean-Claude Juncker, and by the Commission’s President 
Barroso for meetings.  Process tracing is not needed to explain this outcome – the 
Presidency’s invitation to the Social Platform pre-dates their first campaign actions.  
President Barroso was likely influenced by this meeting in his invitation, although the 
vocal opposition of the EUSMOs may also have been a factor.   
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The results for agenda and policy outcomes are a little less clear.  The case for classifying 
the overall outcome of the Lisbon agenda campaign as a policy one can be made, but based 
on the interview data I argue that it may more correctly described as an agenda outcome, 
since no direct policy outcomes were seen in the sense that no legislation was affected.  
The decision to classify the effects in this way will become clear in discussing the groups’ 
perception of their ‘success’.  The agenda outcome of the campaign was of course that the 
Presidency conclusions of the Spring Summit in March 2005 reaffirmed the Council’s 
support for the original formulation of the Lisbon agenda, i.e. the version including not 
only economic growth, but also social cohesion and sustainable development as equally 
important goals.  The campaigning groups were, on paper, very positive about this state of 
affairs.  The SOS Europe website declared that “a famous victory” had been won, and the 
ETUC and other groups also penned similarly positive press releases.  All, however, 
stressed that continued work and mobilisation would be needed to ensure legislation would 
reflect the goals of the agenda.  The following months, however, proved that results in the 
form of more socially oriented legislation were not forthcoming, although it was stressed 
that it was important to claim some success in order to make subsequent mobilisations 
possible (interview 12). 
 
The following table provides the usual summary of the campaign analysis in order to guide 
the discussion of the paths that led to the agenda outcome. 
 
Table 10 – Summary of the Lisbon campaign by phase 
 
 
Extent of shared frames 
 
Political Opportunities 
 
Discursive Opportunities 
Main demand shared by all 
EUSMOs, and remains 
constant throughout the 
campaign.  Some evidence 
of frame diffusion of the 
‘mutually reinforcing’ 
argument from social to 
trade union organisations.  
Any need for framing work 
attenuated by pre-existing 
basis for common action in 
Commission closed to 
dialogue on the subject in 
hand and EP weak – 
EUSMOs turn to 
grassroots to target 
European Council and its 
components (‘reverse 
boomerang’) and engage 
in high-level lobbying.  
Strong and powerful ally 
in the Luxembourg 
General strength of right 
make social discourses 
difficult.  Grassroots 
actions used to remind 
EU of citizens’ wishes 
(legitimacy opportunity).  
Broad scope of Lisbon 
made it an easy and clear 
cause for national groups 
to support.  ETUC social 
partner exploited for 
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permanent coalition 
structures.  National level 
calls to demonstrate stress 
Bolkestein directive rather 
than Lisbon, social groups 
stress Lisbon.  Suggests 
top-down diffusion and pre-
existing ties.   
Presidency.  French 
debate on Constitutional 
Treaty, linked with view 
on Bolkestein, meant 
Chirac seeking social 
credentials to take home – 
exploited in Bolkestein 
campaign.  Bolkestein 
campaign ensured high 
turnout at march. 
high level contacts.  
Global justice movement 
provided no 
opportunities. Bolkestein 
campaign raised salience 
of social issues, and 
linked social issues to 
the Constitutional 
Treaty. 
 
 
A glance at this summary shows us that the campaign benefited from quite a dazzling array 
of political opportunities, although less discursive ones.  The EUSMOs involved were able 
to effectively mobilise a bottom-up campaign in little time by activating existing ties and 
identities built through years of work in their permanent coalition structures, and also kept 
up a strong, simple message.  Since the European Council was the only body with real 
power to decide the outcome of this campaign, we may use the hypotheses of chapter one 
to list the factors that were most likely to influence this institution: 1) a Presidency 
sympathetic towards the original Lisbon agenda (as the Presidency has power to steer 
debates within the Council, and because elite allies have been found to be important in 
social movement campaigns142); 2) an unusually public campaign, including a significant 
level of grassroots mobilisation, against the Barroso communication (as the members of the 
European Council, as elected leaders, must ultimately react to their electorates), and; 3) 
upcoming referenda in key member states on the Constitutional Treaty, and a strong no 
campaign in France that accused the EU of not being ‘social’ enough (for similar reasons of 
electoral returns, as well as the wish to see the Treaty pass).       
 
These factors constitute the major strengths and opportunities of the campaign.  The more 
complicated issue, however, is the comparative importance of each of these factors – if all 
of them were indeed important.  Had one or more of these conditions not been present, 
would the result have been the same?  In other words, was any one of these factors decisive 
for the final outcome, or did a combination of the three lead to the result?  Definitively 
answering this question is of course impossible, but theoretically informed attempts at 
process tracing can at least lead to an educated guess.  I shall take each of these factors in 
turn, laying out their respective power to influence the European Council, before proposing 
                                                 
142 For example Tarrow 1990, Kitschelt 1990, Giugni and Passy 1998. 
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the conclusion that the most important factor was in fact the upcoming referendum in 
France (although alone this may not have sufficed to produce the outcome).   
 
Firstly, the sympathetic Presidency.  The Presidency of the European Council is a 
powerful, but not an all powerful, institution.  The President, who chairs the Council 
meeting, may steer the debate towards themes or areas that they consider important.  In the 
Lisbon case, we may speculate that, since the President sought meetings with the Social 
Platform and had good contacts and worked with the ETUC, opposition to the 
Commission’s proposal was a theme that he drew attention to during meetings.  This alone 
could not secure the outcome however – where a majority of other members of the Council 
do not agree or do not find such themes important a decision wished by the President 
cannot be guaranteed.  The Presidency conclusions, the only source of knowing the shape 
of the discussions inside the Council, must be agreed by consensus by all members of the 
Council.  Therefore the Presidency was certainly a useful factor leading to the agenda 
outcome, but is unlikely to have been enough to secure it alone.  The coexistence 
campaign, for example, showed that faced with other threats, a willing Austrian Presidency 
was not enough to carry a policy outcome of coexistence legislation.   
 
The second factor was the public aspects of the campaign carried out by the different 
groups.  Because the lobbying strategies mainly concerned the Commission and the 
Presidency, with only the ETUC directly contacting members of the European Council, and 
because the Commission has no role in the European Council and the role of the Presidency 
is considered separately, these public actions are considered most important.143  Yet it is far 
from easy to prove what effect these actions had.  Some clues may nevertheless be found.  
One is the fact that Barroso sought to meet with the Social Platform, an invitation that has 
already been classed as an access outcome of this campaign.  Had the groups not made 
their opposition public, Barroso would not have had reason to meet with them.  If we can 
assume that Barroso took note of the opposition to his communication, then it may also be 
suggested that others were also taking note.  (For the European Council, again, this is 
compounded by the role of the President.)  Another source for judging the role of the 
campaign in the final outcome are the campaigning groups themselves.  Such a source may 
be considered questionable, but since none of the groups interviewed took a simple view of 
                                                 
143 The ETUC’s contacts with national leaders may come into the equation when discussing the French role in 
the campaign outcome.  See below. 
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the situation, or claimed that the outcome was due entirely to their work, and as one source 
among many, their views may be taken into account.  A particular advantage of the 
interview data as a source here lies in the fact that contacts in the institutions were given as 
a basis for conclusions on the campaign’s effectiveness.   
 
The opinions of the different groups interviewed on the role of their public campaign are 
similar.  Although they attribute importance to the other factors mentioned here in relation 
to the agenda outcome, they also believe that their campaign played an important role in 
creating pressure for the European Council to come to the conclusions it did.   
 
“I think the Commission felt the pressure, I think the publicity for example through the 
European Voice was quite effective, I think the Luxembourg Presidency realised what was 
going on.  But the demonstration definitely was one aspect as well. It is kind of hard to say.  
I think in most cases on European, I mean as I said to mobilisation at the European level 
there are limits.  So probably on the day-to-day political work lobbying is more effective.  
But you will never succeed with the lobbying if you can't make the institutions believe or 
see the organisations and the people that are actually behind that.  And of course to actually 
show them every now and then is a very good thing.” (interview 14) 
 
In addition, one interviewee gives evidence received from Commission officials and other 
players to the same tune: “I think it contributed quite significantly, because I heard..  As I 
say it's quite difficult for NGOs to assess the impact without being perceived as self-
boosting or, on the contrary, being always pessimistic about what we do.  But I've heard 
several people, including some national officials, and Commission people, saying, you 
know, behind the scenes, you did make a difference” (interview 11).  It can therefore be 
said that in a general sense the public actions of the Lisbon campaign at the very least drew 
attention to opposition to the Commission communication, which in turn mirrored the 
debate over the French referendum and Social Europe, as well as providing evidence for 
the Luxembourg Presidency’s view of the situation. 
 
The idea that the public events of the campaign drew on the advantage provided by the 
French situation is a likely one if we consider the actions taken by the ETUC, also the main 
player in the contemporary Bolkestein campaign.  Not only did this group meet with 
French President Chirac, but they also used the frame of the Bolkestein directive to 
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motivate workers to come to Brussels and demonstrate, adding the Lisbon agenda frame as 
an additional reason.  The Bolkestein directive was an important issue in France, linked for 
many members to opposition to the European Constitution.144  Linking the demonstration 
to this subject, brought to the attention of the French President by the ETUC themselves as 
well as the Luxembourg President and most likely by French trade unions as well, may 
have contributed to the French need to secure Council conclusions favourable to the desired 
result in the Constitutional referendum.  This exploitation of an exceptional situation where 
all the member state governments were anxious to see their Treaty adopted, and knew that 
a French rejection would mean the death of the project, may be judged as one of the most 
forceful factors behind the agenda outcome.  
 
The French situation may be judged the strongest factor in securing the outcome of this 
campaign.  Yet it must be noted that had the demonstration and other actions not 
specifically linked the Lisbon agenda and Social Europe to the Bolkestein Directive, linked 
in France to the referendum debate, it is hard to imagine that much notice would have been 
taken of the groups’ views by the Council, as these would not have been connected to 
either national citizens’ opinions or the Constitutional Treaty.  The role of the Presidency in 
this scenario, would appear to be outweighed in influence by the French factor, although it 
compounded the attention drawn to the campaigning groups’ actions.  The French situation, 
as well as the campaign’s transnational mobilisations (the fact that the French were a strong 
element in the demonstration also being noteworthy) can be seen as the two necessary 
conditions for the content of the Presidency conclusions: even if these were later judged to 
be just ‘nice words’, and devoid of any real commitment. 
 
5.6  Conclusions 
 
This chapter described the short, sharp campaign that took place during the run-up to the 
March 2005 spring summit of the European Council.  The campaign was launched in 
reaction to a communication by President Barroso of the European Commission intimating 
that the Lisbon agenda, as part of its mid-term review, should concentrate more on issues of 
growth and jobs.  The campaigning groups feared this would mean the neglect of the 
                                                 
144 See, for example, the CGT call for participation in the ETUC demonstration, which clearly states that the 
demonstration is not connected to the Constitution (thereby proving that for many, it is).    Communiqué du 
11 fevrier 2005, Appel à participer à la manifestation syndicale organisée par le CES, le 19 mars a Bruxelles.  
Available through http://www.cgt.fr/ei/html/presse/com/.   This link is also mentioned in interview 19. 
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original agenda’s emphases on social protection and sustainable development, and sought 
to convince the European Council to reiterate its support for the original version.  The main 
actions of this short campaign were publicly oriented: a no-logo web petition authored by 
Solidar, a member of the Social Platform, which was then diffused through the Social 
Platform network and which gathered around 7000 organisations’ signatures by the time of 
the spring summit; and the ETUC’s (annual) march on the occasion of the spring summit, 
particularly strong on this occasion as a result of mobilisation around the Bolkestein 
directive.  In addition, a string of high-level lobbying meetings took place between trade 
unions and national leaders, the Commission President, and the President of the Council – a 
tactic that has also been noted to be an important factor in campaigns focusing on 
intergovernmental conferences, similar in composition to the European Council (Hellferich 
and Kolb 2001:156).  The Social Platform was also invited to meet with the President of 
the Council, and then with the President of the Commission. 
 
In terms of process tracing, following the model introduced with this aim in chapter one, 
we can note the presence of simple slogan-like frames carried throughout this short 
campaign.  There is no evidence of the construction of shared frames, but rather the 
presence of previously (painstakingly) constructed solidarity through permanent coalition 
structures – the ETUC and the Social Platform.  The case therefore provides a good 
example of a long-term coalition mobilised in a short period of time in the face of a serious 
threat, and highlights the importance of regular contacts and the maintenance of identities 
between likeminded groups at the European level.  These findings on the advantages of 
more permanent coalition structures corroborate Passy’s (1999:164) and Juska and 
Edwards’ (2005:203) findings.  Political opportunities were created by converting the 
threat of a closed and hostile Commission into an opportunity for grassroots mobilisations 
aimed at influencing the European Council.  A sympathetic Presidency also provided a 
significant opportunity since the President may steer debates within the Council.   
 
Crossing between political and discursive opportunities, the important contextual element 
of the Lisbon campaign was the parallel mobilisation on the Bolkestein directive and its 
linking to the debate on the Constitutional Treaty in France.  Very briefly, in political 
terms, this contributed to a high turnout at the ETUC demonstration, where broad frames 
about Social Europe in calls for participation brought the different issues together into one 
action (see Lance Bennett 2005:205 for similar findings on linking issues in broad frames).  
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The debate over the Constitutional Treaty and the threat of a no vote in the French 
referendum also contributed to the disposition of other European Council members to 
produce a ‘social’ conclusion.  In discursive terms, this situation meant that the salience of 
‘social Europe’ ran generally high during this short campaign, contributing to its visibility.  
Similar findings on the importance of contemporary or recent campaigns on related issues 
have also been noted by other scholars of transnational campaigns.  Juska and Edwards 
(2005:202) comment on the importance of the “growing criticism of the industrial model of 
agricultural production throughout Western Europe” as an important factor in raising the 
salience of issues of intensive animal farming in Poland, while Keck and Sikkink make 
similar comments in a more general manner (1998:150).  Because power over the outcome 
sought in this case lay with the European Council, we can conclude that the most important 
factors leading to the outcome of the Presidency conclusions (which reiterated the body’s 
support for the original Lisbon agenda formulation) were the opportunities connected to the 
debate over the Constitutional Treaty – an issue of paramount importance for the majority 
of the Council’s members – and the effective bottom-up style campaign carried out by the 
EUSMOs, which vocalised the wishes of grassroots members to their national leaders.   
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6.  No Valentine For Bolkestein: the Directive on Services in the Internal Market145 
 
“..if you ask me, no directive has ever seen such a high level of conscience as the 
Bolkestein directive.  You can take the whole history of Europe, you won’t find a level of 
conscience so high, there isn’t any, never has been.” (interview 18)146 
 
The campaign on the Directive on Services in the Internal Market, better known as the 
‘Bolkestein Directive’ has been hailed as one of the strongest instances of cross-national 
and European level mobilisation in the history of the EU thus far.  The campaign was 
visible not only at the EU level, where a more traditional EU lobbying campaign was 
combined with protests and the mobilisation of national level groups, but also at the level 
of various member states of the Union, such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, and especially 
France (where the issue became entangled with the impending referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty).  Most remarkably, the campaign ended satisfactorily for the 
European level groups, as significant changes to the legislation were made by the European 
Parliament and accepted by the Council.   
 
In 2004, when Bolkestein’s legislative proposal was published, trade unions (the major 
actors in this campaign) were caught somewhat off guard, since very little of the usual 
consultations that precede legislative proposals took place.  This meant that several months 
passed by before the campaign really began to take off, as the EUSMOs trawled through 
the proposal and formed their positions.  It then became clear that trade unions recognised a 
serious threat to social protection and even the right to strike in the directive, and a wealth 
of actions, including a sustained and strategic lobbying campaign at the European 
Parliament, well-attended demonstrations at both the European and national levels, and a 
web petition began to take place.  The campaign was certainly strong, indeed the strongest 
of the case studies included here, in terms of its actions and awareness at both the European 
and national levels, which was paradoxically aided by the fact that the Commission was 
unwilling to talk.  Yet it also met with a fortunate set of political opportunities, the most 
important of which was the debate over the Constitutional Treaty in France.  French trade 
                                                 
145 Versions of this chapter were presented at two conferences: the XX Congresso della Societa’ Italiana di 
Scienza Politica, Bologna 12-14 September 2006, and the fourth annual ESPAnet conference in Bremen, 21-
23 September 2006.  I would like to thank the participants of both for their valuable comments and insights. 
146 My own translation from the original Italian: “..secondo me, il livello di coscienza su una direttiva non e’ 
mai stato cosi alto che sulla direttiva Bolkestein.  Tu puoi prendere tutta la storia dell’Europa, non troverai 
un’altra dove il livello di coscienza e’ stato cosi alto, non c’e’, mai stato.” 
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unions were against the Treaty and campaigning for a no vote in the then upcoming 
referendum.  The Bolkestein directive provided a perfect example of the fact that the EU 
was going in the wrong direction in their eyes, and the fate of the directive became 
entangled with the fate of the treaty.  A strong European Parliament seeking to carve itself 
a decisive role in the outcome of the controversy also aided the campaign, as actors in this 
institution dedicated themselves to finding a compromise acceptable to all.     
 
The campaign is therefore an interesting ‘extreme’ case of campaigning in the EU, not only 
because of the level of mobilisation it caused, but also because of the near non-existent 
dialogue with the Commission before the draft legislation’s publication, and the rare 
atmosphere of the debate over the Constitutional Treaty during which it unfolded.  For the 
purposes of this analysis the campaign is split into just two phases.  This is because the 
analysis ends with the first reading vote of the European Parliament, which saw the 
adoption of extensive changes to the draft directive that were supported by most of the 
campaigning EUSMOs.  Following this the campaign wound down significantly, since the 
second reading saw the swift and problem-free adoption of all but few of the Parliament’s 
amendments to the text, and preliminary analyses of this phase added nothing to the study.  
As with the other cases included in this study, different phases of the campaign are singled 
out according to relevant institutional actions.  However, unlike the REACH case the 
phases of the Bolkestein campaign do not strictly follow the legislative process.  The first 
phase stretches from the publication of the draft directive on 13 January 2004 until 
February 2005, when President Barroso of the European Commission announced that the 
directive would be altered in line with the European Parliament’s amendments.  This phase 
was singled out because Barroso’s announcement coincided with a decrease in mobilisation 
levels in the campaign.  The second phase lasts until the Parliament’s first reading vote, 
which took place on 14 February 2006, and saw the final large protest event of the 
campaign. 
 
6.1  Mobilisation throughout the Union  
 
On 13 January 2004 the European Commission, drawing to the close of Romano Prodi’s 
Presidency, presented its draft directive on services in the internal market.  The draft 
directive came as a great surprise to many of the European actors interested in such 
legislative goings-on, as there had been very little of the usual consultation procedures that 
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normally precede the publication of proposed legislation.147  The aim of the draft 
legislation, brainchild of the Commission’s Internal Market Directorate General, then 
headed by Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (hence the popular name of the directive), 
was to achieve an open, common market in services. 
 
The draft contained many points to which a number of interested groups objected.  These 
groups were mainly composed of trade unions and services confederations, and especially 
their umbrella organisation, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).  Social 
NGOs were also opposed, and mostly acted through their umbrella organisation the 
European Platform of Social NGOs (the Social Platform) led by that organisation’s 
Treasurer, the Secretary General of the European Liaison Committee for Social Housing 
(CECODHAS).148   The central point of contention was the ‘Country of Origin Principle’ 
(COP), which stated that service providers operating in other countries of the EU would 
only have to adhere to the laws governing their activities in their homeland, rather than 
those of the country in which they would provide their services.  This idea is by no means a 
new one in the EU, but has thus far only been used in legislation related to goods, where 
the harmonisation of national legislation has already reached an advanced stage.  In the 
opinion of the groups opposed to the project, employing the principle in relation to services 
would result in a ‘race to the bottom’ and ‘social dumping’, where service providers from 
states with lower levels of social protection would successfully force those states with 
stricter laws to loosen them or face the consequences in terms of lost business.  In addition, 
the groups called for the exemption from the directive of various sectors, either because of 
potential clashes with existing European and international legislation, or because the 
directive treated “mobile phone contracts in the same way as the relationship between a 
                                                 
147 Or, indeed, any consultation with the social partners, considered necessary by the trade unions and the 
CEEP (European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and Enterprises of General Economic Interest) in 
this case as the proposed legislation, in their view, touched on matters of labour law.  Parallel consultations 
had taken place on services of general interest, but these did not relate to the Services directive.  Although 
some meetings with DG Internal Market and Services did take place at a late stage after significant efforts by 
the campaigning groups, these were seen as unfruitful since the DG appeared unwilling and patronising 
towards them (Fazi and Smith 2006:62-63) 
148 The interviews carried out for this study correspond to this assessment of the groups most active on the 
subject at the European level.  There are actually four European service confederations at the EU level: the 
European Transport Workers Federation (ETF), the European Trade Union Committee for Education 
(ETUCE), the European Regional Organisation of Union Network International (UNI-Europa), and the 
European Public Services Union (EPSU).  Of these, only the latter two organisations were interviewed.  
Attempts to arrange similar interviews with the remaining two were unsuccessful.  Nevertheless, the two 
interviews carried out concern the broadest of the four confederations, representing workers from several 
sectors, and appear (based on internet research) to have been more active in the campaign as a result of this.  
For the full list of interviews carried out, see the end of this article. 
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carer and an elderly person” (Social Platform:21/2/2005149).  The final major objection was 
that the directive risked impinging on national labour law – i.e. on national collective 
agreements, workers’ rights, and labour codes.  Workers from other member states could 
be paid different amounts than their colleagues, and national authorities would find it 
difficult to check their status or treatment.   
   
Unsurprisingly, the Commission did not agree with such an evaluation of the draft 
directive, maintaining that the groups had misunderstood the directive and declining to 
change any of the content (interviews 19 and 22).  The arguments of the trade unions in 
particular were understood as blatant protectionism, and as lacking solidarity with workers 
in the less rich countries of the Union in central Europe.  The media largely picked up on 
this negative image of the campaign, especially in light of the widely spread image of the 
“Polish plumber” originating in France (interview 22).  Returning to a more chronological 
description of events, after the draft directive was so unexpectedly announced in January 
2004, the first task of the groups was to analyse the proposal and come up with their 
positions.  First off the mark was the ETUC (interview 19), closely followed by its 
affiliates.  The social groups, on the other hand, were slower to develop positions and begin 
actions.  Both sets of groups followed a common tactic in that most set up special working 
groups in order to deal with the issue.  This, according to the ETUC, was a result of the 
lack of consultation – with no pre-planning the groups were caught by surprise.  While 
trade union networks were activated extremely quickly, having decided as early as March 
2004 that the directive represented a serious threat, social groups took formal positions 
only in 2005.   
 
The earlier actions of the campaign thus belong to the trade unions.  The previously 
mentioned working groups (with various names and structures) seem to have played some 
role in shaping the campaign.  A good example is UNI-Europa’s ‘electronic network’ on 
services.  Because of the urgency of the matter, partly due to the directive’s content and 
partly due to the lack of forewarning, normal nomination procedures were skipped and an 
open network disseminating information to all interested affiliates was established 
(interview 22).  In addition, the normal position taking mechanisms of unions, through 
executive boards and congresses, always involve national members.  This meant that the 
                                                 
149 See Appendix II. 
 214
European and national levels worked together with greater synergy than usual, according to 
interviewees.  For example, as the EPSU put it: “Things were different and more organic in 
the services directive.  The campaigns only really work when they’re from the bottom-up.  
And that’s the case for two reasons: because you have direct member involvement, which 
is a positive thing in and of itself, but much more importantly you have local or regional 
pressure on MEPs, and on national parliament representatives as well.  And particularly in 
our case, in this case study, the local or regional pressure on the MEPs was extremely 
important” (interview 17).   
 
In addition at this early point in the mobilisation, the European level groups were also 
engaged in building coalitions.  The EPSU, for example, recruited the support of many 
health groups (representing patients as well as professionals and employers) through its 
participation in a Commission working group (the European Public Health Forum) that was 
highly critical of the directive (Fazi and Smith 2006:65).  CECODHAS cite the use of 
existing information networks established between social NGOs and trade unions, and 
working on joint statements with the CEEP.  UNI-Europa, in another example of ‘covering 
the corners’ made several statements related to specific sectors alongside employers.  The 
logic behind this is simple yet (hopefully) effective: “once you’ve got those three, the 
workers, the users, the employers saying more or less the same thing it’s a pretty strong 
message.  And what exactly is the objection then?”150 (interview 17).  The only real bone of 
contention apparently came towards the end of the campaign between latecomers and the 
veteran campaigning groups, in particular the ETUC: “..in the end when everybody saw, 
OK, that is a big demonstration, Attac is going against it, then they all wanted to jump on 
the train..  let’s say we don’t like too much if people jump on the train when all the work is 
done, only for publicity reasons.”  Coalitions in this campaign are nevertheless mostly 
permanent and formal, existing through the structures of the ETUC for trade unions, and 
the Social Platform for social NGOs.   
 
Apart from formal coalitions, a strong link to the national level was seen in this campaign, 
as illustrated by the fact that the Belgian trade unions (together with the Belgian Social 
Forum) held their first demonstration against the directive as early as June 2004.  In fact, 
Belgian activism played an important role at the European level as well.  Through their 
                                                 
150 That workers, (some) employers and users found common ground to object to the directive was cited as an 
unusual circumstance however. 
 215
official links to the bureau of the Belgian socialist party, Belgian trade unions had also 
sensitised this actor to the campaign in the months before their demonstration.  By October, 
partly as a result of the sensitisation of the European Socialist Party (PSE), the party was 
‘furious’ and took up the idea of launching a European level campaign (interview 18).  The 
idea took form as a ‘no logo’ – that is belonging to no one apparent organisation – web 
petition under the title of  Stop Bolkestein.  This rather hard line text, first published in 
French, English, and Flemish, and spread through the Belgian socialist party’s study 
institute, the Institut Emile Vanderwelde, gained notoriety at first in francophone Belgium 
and France.   
In the meantime, the directive had been passed to the European Parliament under the co-
decision procedure.  The Parliament, because of the directive’s broad connotations, chose 
to use the enhanced Hughes procedure, where more than one committee is allocated the 
draft with a view to drafting a lead report.  The important committees in this case were 
Legal Affairs and Internal Market,151 and Employment and Social Affairs.  Rapporteurs 
were quickly appointed, Evelyne Gebhardt and Anne Van Lancker respectively, both from 
the Socialist group.  The campaigning groups now shifted their efforts from activating their 
own internal networks to targeting the European Parliament, and these two figures in 
particular – although the rapporteurs themselves also sought out opinions for their reports 
(Fazi and Smith 2006:65).  Different opportunities and methods were adopted: while the 
ETUC concentrated on the two lead rapporteurs (interview 19), Uni-Europa 
(acknowledging a conscious division of labour with the ETUC) concentrated their efforts 
on those MEPs outside the PSE who, from previous votes, they felt could be persuaded by 
union arguments.  The responsible committee’s hearing on the draft directive, held in 
November 2004, provided an entry point for social NGOs into the campaign, with 
CECODHAS holding a special meeting with its members in order to prepare, and many 
other members of the Social Platform making presentations.  The hearing was seen by 
many groups as a turning point.  Here, in the words of the interviewees, expert after expert 
took the floor to condemn the same aspects of the draft directive, repeating the same 
arguments, and making it clear to one and all that worries were widely shared.    
 
                                                 
151 This committee was altered following the June 2004 elections, where internal market issues were moved 
to a newly created Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee.   
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Following a decision to postpone votes on the reports until after the elections, tactics 
targeted at the Parliament increased.  Both the trade unions (interview 22) and the social 
NGOs (interview 15) make it clear that the main aim at this point was to ensure the subject 
remained high on the agenda, and therefore present in MEPs’ minds.  “The seminars, it’s 
only a visibility event.  It’s just that there it’s something again on the screen on social 
services, again in the Parliament there is a debate…” (interview 15).  National contact is 
also cited as important (interviews 15 and 17) in convincing MEPs of the importance of the 
directive in their home constituencies (where such an electoral system exists).  Finally, the 
kinds of positions brought to Parliament are highlighted.  These, according to interviewees, 
must not be purely ideological, but based on legal arguments, concrete examples, and 
suggestions for amendments.   
 
The Parliament was not the only target of the campaigning groups however.  All those 
interviewed add that there were, from the beginning, contacts with Presidencies and thus 
the Council.  This is stressed as unusual, and attributed to the fact that the Commission 
remained so closed to any kind of action.  Demonstrations were also held by the European 
trade unions, first in November 2004, then again at the spring summit (the so-called Social 
Summit) of the European Council in March 2005, and finally at the European Parliament’s 
first reading vote in February 2006.  Many national demonstrations also took place 
throughout this period, some now using the Stop Bolkestein slogan launched by the 
Belgian socialists.  The petition had now been translated into many more languages, and e-
mail lobby campaigns directed towards the European Parliament, the Commission, and the 
heads of state and government of the member states had also been launched via the 
website.  
 
The levels of opposition to the draft directive began to pay off in 2005.  In February, the 
new Commission led by President Barroso had already decided to distance itself from the 
text.  Barroso indeed went so far as to announce the Commission’s intention to amend the 
text in line with the European Parliament’s opinion.  This was interpreted by campaigning 
groups as a ploy to stem the tide of protests springing up around the directive (although it 
did not work, the spring summit protest in March saw around 75,000 on the streets of 
Brussels), but may have contributed to the extraordinary effort the European Parliament’s 
political groups then put in to securing a compromise agreement.  Following the spring 
summit, the European Council reiterated the message, allegedly in order to bail out the 
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French President Jacques Chirac in his quest for a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty, threatened by opposition to the directive which had become a central 
tenet of the ‘no’ camp.  
 
Legal tactics were also employed in the campaign by Swedish, and later Finnish, trade 
unions.  This was the ‘Vaxholm’ affair, which came into the eye of the media in October 
2005 following some rather ill-judged comments by Commissioner McCreevy –
Bolkestein’s replacement.152  This served to highlight the legal problems in the directive as 
had been pointed out by many of the campaigning groups.  The case centred around a 
dispute between Swedish trade unions and a Latvian company employed to build a school 
in the Vaxholm region of Sweden.  Under Swedish law, the Latvian construction workers 
should have been paid according to the terms of a collective agreement between their 
employer and the Swedish trade union acting on the behalf of the workers.  The Latvian 
company, in this case, refused to abide by such an agreement, and court proceedings began 
to solve the issue after Swedish unions took industrial action in protest.  As is usual in such 
cases where EU law is unclear, the judge addressed a list of questions to the European 
Court of Justice.  These questions highlighted problems within the directive about existing 
collective agreements as well as the respective strengths of the European internal market 
and social legislation.  Interest in the case served to heighten interest in the directive, 
especially with new cases coming to light involving Viking Line, a Finnish ferry company, 
and Irish Ferries. 
 
Moving towards the end of the campaign, the groups continued to target the European 
Parliament, attempting to secure the best outcome of the first reading vote as possible.  The 
two main groups, the PSE and the European People’s Party (EPP) were now negotiating a 
compromise package for the final plenary vote which had been set for February 2006.  In 
order to drive their final message home, the ETUC began to plan a demonstration on the 
day of the vote, Valentine’s day 2006 (hence the slogan borrowed in the title).  The web 
petition had by now been signed by more than 100,000 individuals (although half of these 
came from France and Belgium) and more than 250 organisations from both national and 
                                                 
152 Commissioner McCreevy commented to the Swedish press that he would support the Latvian company’s 
stance in a legal dispute, and that the Swedish position was in breach of EU rules.  The Swedish government 
saw this as an attack on their social model.  The European Parliament subsequently summoned President 
Barroso and Commissioner McCreevy to discuss these comments. 
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European levels (interview 18).  However, splits (that had existed for some time153) 
between some of the European campaigning groups and the petition signatories now came 
to the fore.  The hard line text had, in the view of the ETUC in particular, placed the 
petition along the lines of groups opposed to the internal market and European integration 
per se (such as ATTAC, a group important in the debates in many national contexts 
including Belgium, Italy, and Germany, and France – where they have been named as 
responsible for the no-vote amongst left-wing voters in the referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty, according to della Porta and Caiani 2007:2).  They were therefore 
reluctant for the organisations linked to the campaign under the banner of Stop Bolkestein 
to demonstrate with them on the day of the vote.  Much time and energy had been invested 
in the compromise package, for which they had pledged their support.  A demonstration 
demanding the wholesale rejection of the directive would, in their view, now undermine the 
position of trust established with Parliamentary actors. 
 
In the final event two separate demonstrations took place, although the organisers of Stop 
Bolkestein and their Belgian trade union associates took part in both.  On Saturday 11th 
February 2006 the ‘social movement’ demonstration took place in Strasbourg, while the 
trade unions marched on the actual day of the vote, that is 14th February 2006.  Turnout for 
the latter was high at around 50,000 considering the inaccessibility of Strasbourg and the 
fact that this was a working day.  The Belgian trade union that had helped to trigger the 
Stop Bolkestein petition also used the march as an opportunity to present the petition to the 
President of the European Parliament.  Many left wing MEPs went so far as to join the 
trade unionists in their demonstration (interview 15).  The outcome of the vote, according 
to the reactions of the various campaigning groups, was favourable.  The Country of Origin 
Principle was deleted, and many exemptions secured, amongst other changes.  Reactions to 
the Commission’s re-drafting of the proposal published on 4 April 2006 were positive, as 
the latter respected the Parliament’s central compromise.  The Council, led by the Austrian 
                                                 
153 As detailed by Mathers (2007) in relation to earlier summit protests and other campaigns, “The ETUC 
offered a more moderate criticism of the lack of progress towards a ‘social Europe’ while the militant unions 
outside of its fold, as well as its internal critics, related more to the radical criticisms developed through the 
GJM [global justice movement].  The ETUC called its own demonstrations prior to several of the EU 
summits while the radical tendency participated in the European social Forums and the broader protests that 
coincided with the EU summits which continued to grow in size and scope.” (Mathers 2007:184).  With the 
exception of the organising of the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002, in which the ETUC was 
involved as an organiser, splits between more and less radical union groups were thus apparent prior to this 
campaign, and were also expressed during it through differing views on the Constitutional Treaty (see the 
following section on working with national groups). 
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Presidency, also respected the compromise in their common position, and the directive was 
quietly adopted in December 2006.154   
 
6.1.1  Showing the numbers: the role of  national groups 
 
Since the ETUC and the Social Platform’s organisational links with the national level have 
already been dealt with in chapter four on the Lisbon agenda campaign, I shall limit 
comments here to the other more active trade union sectoral organisations, Uni-Europa and 
the EPSU. 
 
Uni-Europa, which represents workers in the services and skills sectors (stretching from 
finance to hairdressers), is the European regional organisation of Union Network 
International, and a European Industry Federation of the ETUC.  The organisation has a 
fairly classic trade union structure - it is governed by its regional conference, held every 
four years and made up of delegates from its members, who are national trade unions.  
More day to day business is managed by the Regional Executive Committee, which is 
made up of various leaders of member unions, members of the European staff and elected 
delegates.  As seen in the text above, UNI-Europa also involves staff from its national 
member unions in thematic working groups and networks.  The EPSU – the European 
Federation of Public Service Unions, also has a classical trade union structure, consisting of 
an annual Congress, an Executive Committee, a Steering Committee, thematic working 
groups, and a European secretariat.  The EPSU is also considered to be one of the more 
active and successful sectoral organisations at the European level, in particular as a result 
of its willingness and previous experience in forming close alliances “with other social 
movements” including (in previous campaigns) the Social Platform and ATTAC (Bieler 
2005: 476).  Both of theses trade union federations can be said to reproduce the 
involvement of their national members in much the same way as their national members 
organise the involvement of individual members.  The federations are strictly there to serve 
the interests of their members, who have a great deal of control of their running as well as 
input into positions. 
 
                                                 
154 The Austrian presidency was clear about wishing to involve the social partners in adopting the directive.  
Their quest for a balanced piece of legislation can be attibuted to domestic circumstances (see Howarth 
2007:95) 
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The most important scenario of national mobilisation over the Bolkestein directive was in 
France, as will be seen in the analyses below.  A strong campaign against the Constitutional 
Treaty was already under way in France, made up of various different currents including 
the purely domestic issue of expressing dissatisfaction with the government, but also of an 
anti-European faction and dissatisfaction with an overly neo-liberal EU posing a threat to 
the French welfare state model (Brouard and Tiberj 2006).  It was for this reason that 
French trade unions campaigned against the Constitutional Treaty, using the Bolkestein 
directive as evidence of their view.  Very quickly the now notorious figure of the ‘Polish 
plumber’ came to symbolise the national debate (also spilling over into other countries) and 
fears of large numbers of foreign, cheap workers toppling national systems of social 
protection.  The Bolkestein issue was thus seen as a way of focusing the debate against a 
neo-liberal Europe in France, and played a not insignificant role in the French ‘no’ 
(Howarth 2007:94; Brouard and Tiberj 2006:262; Taggart 2006:16), at least in terms of no 
votes from the left (della Porta and Caiani 2007:2). 
 
In fact this caused problems between the ETUC and its French affiliates, whose linking of 
the two subjects led to tensions in that the ETUC supported the Constitution while it  
opposed the draft directive:  
 
“And then France you were confronted all the way, all the time you were confronted with 
these arguments.  Your own arguments that part III is not in our line, that this is a technical 
thing, which shouldn't be in the Constitution, and we agree to it.  And then they all the time 
made links with the services directive, they said: the Constitution is as liberal as the 
services directive, and the services directive is only a distillation of the Constitution, all this 
kind of nonsense.  And that made our campaign for the Constitution a real difficult task, a 
very difficult task, because we were always on the defensive, explaining we are against the 
services directive but that the services directive was on the basis of the Nice Treaty and had 
nothing to do with the Constitution. You can't win a campaign when you're all the time on 
the defensive.  You have to be offensive and that spoiled it.  I think not only our, but all 
people who were in favour of the Constitution who were confronted with this kind of 
situation that it was nearly impossible to go ahead with the argument due to the services 
directive.  Or due to the publicity done around the services directive by people who are 
against internal market or who are against the European integration.  Because the key 
players around this, le Monde Diplomatique or the Communist Party, were always against 
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European integration.  This is a sort of left nationalism and it's clear that for them it was a 
gift, a wonderful gift they got” (interview 19).155   
 
To sum up, the Bolkestein campaign is a story of mass mobilisation the like of which is 
rarely seen at the European level.  Protests and marches played a big role in the campaign 
at both the European and national levels.  In France in particular the debate about 
Bolkestein was very lively, as it had been linked with the debate over the Constitutional 
Treaty.  However, European level groups were also engaged in a thorough and carefully 
orchestrated lobbying campaign at the European Parliament, since the Commission had 
shut them out from the processes leading to the publication of the legislative proposal. 
 
6.2  A common critique: shared frames in the Bolkestein Campaign 
 
As may well be expected from the description already provided, no problems were met 
with when locating documents for the analysis of the Bolkestein campaign.  Yet the picture 
painted regarding framing work is not quite as strong as may have been imagined 
considering the level of mobilisation achieved in the campaign, as will be seen below.   
 
6.2.1  Frames among the European level groups 
 
In the first phase of the campaign, the European level groups use a very high number of  
different frames, but only a very few of these are shared to any great extent – a fact that 
would seem to suggest a lack of dialogue.  Indeed, the most common frame across the 
whole analysis, requiring the Commission to make a more in-depth impact analysis on the 
draft directive, is shared across only four of the eight documents analysed, with similar 
circumstances repeated for other high-ranking frames.  Thinking back to how the campaign 
unfolded, this may partly be explained by the fact that the EUSMOs took some time to 
formulate their positions as individual organisations, and took some time to begin to build 
coalitions and consequently to work on shared frames.  Nevertheless, the frames are not 
generally contradictory.  Instead, they tend to closely reflect the particular concerns of each 
organisation.  Thus, where the ETUC’s position remains slightly more general, other 
organisations include different demands or diagnoses linked to their particular fields of 
                                                 
155 See also Mathers (2007:188-192). 
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work, such as calls for the exemption of specific industries or services.  For example, while 
the social groups seem most concerned about the need for an impact assessment and the 
exclusion of services of general interest from the scope of the directive, the trade unions are 
more preoccupied by threats to collective agreements, social dumping, and the relationship 
of the draft with the Posting of Workers directive. 
 
Despite this split between the frames of social groups and trade unions, there are some 
frames that are shared by types of group, albeit not across the entire spectrum of 
documents.  Worries about the country of origin principle, for example, are shared by both 
trade unions and social groups, although this frame does not appear as frequently as 
expected from its apparent centrality to the debate.  Services of general interest are also a 
cause for concern for different types of groups, with calls for a halt to the Bolkestein 
directive until a framework proposal on these is delivered, as well as a general exemption 
for healthcare and social services from the directive.  To a lesser extent, the more high-
ranking frame expressing concern that the draft directive will lead to ‘social dumping’, or a 
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the quality of social protection, is also shared across both 
types of group.  The first phase of the campaign thus sees rather scattered frames among 
the EUSMOs, and presents no evidence of framing work. 
 
Later in the campaign, the European groups’ documents change their tone to match their 
more contentious approach, now – at least publicly - more based around demonstrations.  
The threat to collective agreements and workers’ rights remains high on their list of 
concerns, but is overtaken by the more general worry about the ‘race to the bottom’ in 
terms of social protection.  Worries about the country of origin principle also come to the 
fore and (along with the ‘race to the bottom’ frame) are shared by both trade unions and 
social groups, although once again the extent of shared frames is limited, covering only 
four core frames.  Apart from these, similar to the first phase of the campaign, we see a 
large number of organisation-specific frames, though none of these contradict the core of 
the shared argument centring around social dumping.  All in all, the frames at this stage of 
the campaign bear a close resemblance to those of the first phase, with the exception of 
more ‘technical’ frames about impact assessments and the relationship with the Posting of 
Workers Directive.  In fact, argumentation at this stage is more similar to that of national 
trade unions in the first phase, a signal that national frames are now working their way up 
to the European level rather than vice versa (see below).  The one exception to this is the 
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Stop Bolkestein site.  While the frames used by Stop Bolkestein bore some resemblance to 
those of other groups during the first phase of the campaign, in this second stage the split 
between the more organised trade union driven side of the campaign and the web petition 
becomes clear.  The frames of Stop Bolkestein now become much more hard-line, and only 
two frames in the whole document are shared by any of the other groups.   
 
6.2.2  Frames at the European and national levels 
 
As would be expected from the conclusion that European level groups were working on 
their individual positions during the first phase of the campaign leading up to the March 
2005 spring summit, the national documents analysed show that frames are widely shared 
between the European and national levels.156  European trade union organisations 
necessarily involve their national members in the formation of their positions, and therefore 
we can say that there was real dialogue between the European and national levels at this 
point.  This is shown in the frame analysis by the fact that, with the exception of the frame 
condemning the Commission’s lack of proper impact assessment (a frame too specific to 
the Brussels arena to be of much sense at the national level) the concerns expressed by 
national confederations exactly match those shown at the European level, albeit in a 
different order of frequency.  Social dumping, the threat to collective agreements and 
workers’ rights, the relationship with the Posting of Workers directive, services of general 
interest, and the country of origin principle are all highlighted in the national level 
documents, and subsequently seen in the European documents of the second phase of the 
campaign, indicating dialogue between these levels through trade union organisational 
apparatus. 
 
Two frames in particular are shared by both national and European organisations in the first 
phase of the campaign.  These are concerns about a ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘social 
dumping’, and the idea that the proposal threatens collective agreements and national 
                                                 
156 The documents analysed for the national level are position papers or similar statements made as early in 
the campaign as available by national trade union confederations who are members of the ETUC.  Trade 
unions are focused on since according to interview and documentary data they drove the campaign at the 
national level.  Confederations are selected since they theoretically represent more national sectoral unions.  
Finally, the four countries included (Belgium, France, Italy, and Germany) were selected on the basis of 
interview data.  Interviewees were asked which, if any, national campaigns or actions had contributed the 
most to the overall European campaign?  The answers were surprisingly uniform, focusing on these four 
countries. 
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labour codes.  In this, national priorities reflect European ones, with the exception of the 
call for the Commission to carry out a proper impact assessment, and a crossing over in the 
relative importance of one frame with the other.  The lack of calls for a Commission impact 
assessment on the part of the national groups is in addition understandable in terms of their 
distance from this body, and the fact that these documents are certainly not aimed directly 
at it.  Other frames at the national level are also found at the European, although wording is 
admittedly different.  There are concerns about the future of national social services (SGI), 
the relationship between Bolkestein and other European directives and such like.  The main 
difference between these less common frames at the national level, likening the documents 
to the Stop Bolkestein petition, is the larger presence of the idea that the EU is ‘ultra-
liberal’, or cares only about the market and competitiveness rather than social aspects.   
 
Turning to the national level frames for the second phase of the campaign.  Here the 
general aim and tone of the documents shifts towards mobilisational framing, consisting of 
more general arguments for ‘more and better jobs’ and the need to demonstrate against the 
Bolkestein directive.  The plight of social services and the country of origin principle 
follow these new frames however, and therefore remain high on the agenda, and shared 
across the board by all the organisations.  The most frequent frames now are ‘more and 
better jobs’ and ‘demonstrate against Bolkestein’.  Both of these frames come, for the most 
part, from the ETUC’s call to demonstrate at the 2005 spring summit, diffused amongst its 
members in early February 2005.  The fact that the ETUC’s call was the only document 
found for this phase in two of the national settings studied (Belgium and Italy) is in itself a 
good indicator of the dialogue taking place between the national and European levels.  
While these mobilisational frames are not repeated at the European level, those that follow 
in frequency are.  The mobilisational frames make sense in the context of the national 
documents, whose aim is after all to get members to turn out for the march.  The substance 
of the arguments against the directive remain shared with the European level. 
 
To sum up, we may say that from the frame analysis alone there is evidence that trade 
unions and social groups share central understandings of the problems with the directive, 
while there is a split between these groups and the Stop Bolkestein initiative.  Although 
high numbers of very sector-specific frames are seen, a core group of frames linked with 
services of general interest, the COP, and social dumping, are shared across the board.  
These ideas are borne out by interview evidence, where a basic level of contacts between 
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the trade union and social groups are confirmed.  Even where these two types of group are 
not involved in the joint planning of events, their positions share core features, and the 
social groups were invited to participate in trade union marches.  Indeed, the president of 
the Social Platform was invited to speak at the spring summit demonstration (interview 11).  
The frame analysis also provided some evidence of frame diffusion from the national to the 
European level during the campaign, a finding that is confirmed if we consider the 
evidence on the involvement of national members in European level trade union work.  In 
the second phase of the campaign, the ETUC’s call for action was also widely diffused at 
the national level, providing evidence of some top-down diffusion as well.  There is 
therefore good reason to suppose a lively dialogue between EUSMOs and their members, 
especially amongst the trade unions.   
 
6.3  Transforming threats: political opportunities in the Bolkestein campaign 
 
The first port of call for groups wishing to influence processes at the European level is the 
Commission, as the drafter of legislation, and it is to this institution that the variable rules 
on dialogue with 3rd parties mainly refers.  Unusually in this case, however, the 
Commission was seen as completely closed to dialogue, and efforts were almost entirely 
transferred to the European Parliament (interviews 15, 17, 18, 19, 22) and, to a lesser 
extent, the Council of Ministers and European Council – a tactic which may be interpreted 
as exploiting the opportunities offered by the EU’s strict separation of powers.157  Where 
attempts were made to meet with the leading DG internal market, groups felt that this 
service considered them unsophisticated and unable to understand the directive (Fazi and 
Smith 2006:63-65).  In other words, where contact with the Commission was made groups 
were not dealing with their ‘natural’ Commission partner DGs, and this spelled a serious 
threat to the carrying on of dialogue.  The Commission’s general attitude was extremely 
important to how the campaign then unfolded: with its institutionalised rules and 
mechanisms for dialogue, its (apparent) openness, and its need for specialist knowledge, 
the Commission has been said to contribute greatly to quashing protest and other more 
public actions in the EU arena (Marks and McAdam 1996:102; Imig and Tarrow 2001:8).  
Yet the Bolkestein campaign demonstrates that when this interlocutor is removed, 
campaigns at the EU level begin to look more like ‘traditional’ national campaigns in that 
                                                 
157 Comments in the data regarding the variable ‘inclusive towards differing opinions’ all relate to the fact that 
the Commission was closed, and therefore no further discussion of this variable is included here. 
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they return to repertoires of contention more usually seen at this level.  The European 
Parliament, the only directly elected European institution, the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council, both of which are composed of national politicians, are targets that may 
appear closer to home than the Commission.  This is qualified by the relatively high levels 
of turnout for European level demonstrations during this campaign.  As was said about the 
final Strasbourg demonstration: “the fact that so many people were willing to go to the least 
accessible place in Europe on a working day is really testament to an effective 
mobilisation, but also to basic concerns of people” (interview 10). 
 
The European Parliament is the primary target in this case.  Comments on tactics employed 
here mainly fall into two of the categories of the EU’s political opportunity structure as it 
was described in chapter one: professionalism and resources of the administration, and 
coalitions in institutions.  As already seen, the groups tended to rely on legal arguments 
(interview 10), propose amendments (interview 18), and wherever possible concrete 
examples of problems the draft directive would create (interview 17).  This may be 
interpreted as a response to the Parliament’s need for information from third parties, since 
individual MEPs must follow multiple dossiers and internal services are relatively small, 
leading them to rely on others to fill information gaps (interview 10).  There are two 
aspects to exploiting this opportunity.  First, effectively lobbying the Parliament means 
providing relevant information at the right time, which contributes to making an argument 
convincing; second, groups must seek to provide information that cannot be easily accessed 
by Parliamentarians, for example “a document from the Council working group, which is a 
really meaty document that shows you exactly how the different member states are 
thinking” as “then you're helping on a very basic level, you're reducing the pressure on an 
MEP's office” (interview 22).  This, that is providing timely information to the European 
Parliament / MEPs / rapporteurs, corresponds to what Keck and Sikkink (1998:16) call 
“information politics, or the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable 
information and move it to where it will have the most impact” – a tactic they consider an 
important one in determining the impacts of transnational campaigns.  Smith, for example, 
highlights how research carried out by Greenpeace filled a gap in the knowledge of those 
negotiating a ban on the trade in toxic waste (1999:182), while Caniglia highlights the 
importance of holding informal contacts with institutional actors in order to acquire such 
information (2001:44).  Proposing concrete amendments and providing information of 
affiliates’ views – through lobbying by affiliates themselves (see below) - has also been an 
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important element of other European level campaigns (see Hellferich and Kolb 2001:155, 
Warleigh 2000:233).  Unlike the information provided in the REACH campaign in this 
study, which appeared to simply add to an already saturated field, the information provided 
in this campaign followed the rules of information politics – it was timely and sought-after.  
     
Finally, the multi-level system variable leads to the conclusion that ideology – conspicuous 
by its absence from the actions employed at the European level (see the following section 
on discursive opportunities), is a resource left to the national groups, and therefore 
employed at the European level through national groups’ lobbying and other actions in the 
Council and Parliament.  All of those interviewed confirmed that national groups’ actions 
are indispensable when the Council of Ministers, or the European Council, is a target.  
Their links with national governments and knowledge of national systems are deeper, and 
their actions are more likely to be effective.  The importance of multi-level actions is also 
noted by other scholars of EU campaigns, for example Hellferich and Kolb (2001:151).  
Again, because the Commission was closed to dialogue, groups confirmed that they had 
earlier and more frequent contacts than usual with the Council and Presidencies, and 
underline the need for national members’ support for this.  The participation of national 
groups is also seen as crucial for working with the Parliament, since territorial links 
between regional members and MEPs can help to convince of the justness of an argument 
(interview 17), as well as reinforce the link between the national and local level and the 
otherwise apparently dislocated European office (interviews 15 and 22).  Briefly put, 
because normal channels for European level dialogue remained closed, exploiting the EU’s 
multi-level nature through a campaign including the close involvement of national groups 
took on an all-important role for the EUSMOs who were faced with a reduced scope for 
more conventional types of actions.   
 
The campaign in terms of the exploitation of structural political opportunities and threats 
can be summed up as follows: a closed Commission forced the groups to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the Council as much as 
possible.  These efforts were combined with the exploitation of the multi-level system by 
using national members to lobby and carry out other actions aimed at national governments 
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(and thereby the Council)158 and the Parliament (including demonstrations) – thus bringing 
ideology back in and backing up arguments with physical demonstrations of national 
support.  The conclusion of this brief analysis of the few categories of fixed political 
opportunities that apply in this campaign means we may now turn to examine the all-
important dynamic opportunities and threats.  Table eleven summarises the situation. 
 
The majority of comments about intra-elite conflict concern conflict within the 
Commission – either between different Directorates General (DGs), or between 
Commissioners and DGs.  Although this does not directly spell either a threat or an 
opportunity for the campaigning groups it did lead some sympathetic sections of the 
institution to allow leaks and drop other hints to interested groups with whom they were in 
regular contact, as is affirmed, for example, by Stop Bolkestein (interview 18).159  Another 
result of internal conflict was that, since the Commission as a whole must defend draft 
legislation once it has been published, dissenting members of staff resorted to encouraging 
campaigning groups to do their lobbying (interview 15).  Little evidence of how great an 
opportunity this afforded the EUSMOs could be gathered, since these are necessarily 
invisible allies – members of staff of the Commission cannot openly give information to 
some groups but not others, or of course show their personal preferences for one group’s 
opinion over another’s.  However, it provides an interesting insight into the webs of interest 
representation in the EU arena.  As UNI-Europa put it so succinctly: “in Brussels, there's a 
lot of lobbying on lobbyists on lobbying” (interview 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Recalling Smith’s observation that domestic opposition can inhibit international cooperation even where a 
government (France springs to mind in this case) would favour it.  She uses the example of the effects of 
strong domestic opposition to US participation in the NATO mission in Bosnia, and Greenpeace’s campaign 
to clinch an international convention banning the trade in toxic wastes (Smith 1999:178-9). 
159 “ Quindi, gennaio 2004 viene fuori questa direttiva.  Quando viene fuori, immediatamente noi al livello del 
partito siamo stati avvertiti da persone che ci sono favorevoli, per dirlo cosi, al livello tecnico dentro la 
commissione europea, che ci hanno direttamente avvertito, che ci hanno detto, guardate li, che succede 
qualcosa che al livello del funzionamento dell'Europa potrebbe avere un effetto molto in controsenso con una 
funzione progressista, socialista, o di sinistra.” 
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Table 11: Dynamic political opportunities in the Bolkestein campaign 
 
Intra-elite 
conflict 
Between DG Employment and DG Enterprise within the 
Commission, differing positions but no real conflict between 
Commission and other institutions (following change in 
Commission). 
Proximity of 
elections Close at the beginning of the campaign, elections held mid-2004. 
Electoral 
Instability 
Right-wing slightly weaker before elections, stronger afterwards.  
However, position generally stable. 
Contingent 
events 
Debate on and subsequent rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
(mid-2005), enlargement. 
Position held 
by ally 
European Parliament strong in an exceptional climate of weak 
Commission and Council. 
Ability of ally 
to fulfil 
promises 
Able to secure significant changes as co-legislator alongside the 
Council. 
Hostile elites Commission at the beginning of the campaign. 
Presence of 
counter 
movements 
Role of industry lobby slightly unclear, but certainly did not mount a 
strong counter-campaign. 
 
The Commission then was seen as closed and, in the view of many groups, weak in this 
campaign.  Following the common evaluation of this institution as open to dialogue and so 
forth from third parties, this should have constituted a serious threat to the campaign.  
Instead, however, the Commission’s situation was exploited successfully by concentrating 
efforts on the other European level institutions.  The Parliament was also important in 
exploiting the Commission’s position however, as was hinted earlier.  This deserves further 
comment in that it appears, along with efforts on another controversial piece of 
legislation,160 to signal a new push by the European Parliament for increased power in the 
institutional triangle.161  Several contingent circumstances apart from the Commission’s 
position combined to prompt the European Parliament’s actions.  First, the enlargement of 
the Union: “because of 25 EU member states now so the Council doesn't know really how 
to work yet.  The Parliament then have seen that if they really want to show their 
importance it's the moment for them..” (interview 15).  In the sense that the uncertainty 
created in the Council by the presence of the new member states was an opportunity for the 
                                                 
160 Legislation on the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals, or REACH, involving a less 
public (in terms of street demonstrations) but even more acrimonious debate due to a particularly vocal and 
present counter movement in the form of the chemicals industry.   
161 The Parliament’s power in shaping this piece of legislation in the absence of a strong Commission recalls 
Burns’ findings on the latter’s receding levels of influence under the co-decision procedure (2004). 
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campaign, this issues could also be discussed under the heading of elite allies (see chapter 
seven).  Second, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, which took place during the 
Parliament’s consideration of the directive, pushed the Parliament to try for a compromise, 
since they felt some duty to reconcile the Union and its citizens in some way: “because if 
we simply duplicate this model then we exclude for 4 years half of Europe from all the 
work to be done” (interview 19).162 
 
This cocktail of circumstances thus led the Parliament to carve itself out a new role in the 
legislative process.  More precisely, in terms of opportunities and threats, the Parliament’s 
attempt to seek a ‘grand coalition’ compromise163 on the Services directive meant a serious 
opportunity for the campaigning groups in terms of the acquisition of a powerful ally 
(bearing in mind that President Barroso of the Commission had announced that the draft 
would be amended in line with the Parliament’s report) that, although not necessarily 
always sympathetic, was willing to negotiate compromises and listen to all views for the 
greater prize of a stronger institutional role in the future.  In order to properly exploit such 
an opportunity, the campaigning groups ensured that their arguments were not only tailored 
to various MEPs, but also that public pressure was kept up through a string of public 
actions, making the duty for a compromise ever present in Parliamentarians’ minds 
(interview 22). 
 
Moving back in the story of the directive, the proximity of elections, in this case not only to 
the European Parliament but in a number of member states as well, was exploited by 
campaigning groups at the national level by linking the directive to electoral campaigns 
(interviews 19, 22).  This was helped along by the fact that the Parliament decided to 
postpone the voting of reports in committee until after the summer 2004 elections.  Other 
contingent events apart from those already mentioned in connection with the European 
Parliament’s activism also shaped the campaign.  As already mentioned, the Vaxholm case 
provided some opportunity in terms of a concrete example of a potential legal problem 
arising from the directive’s application, as well an embarrassment for Commissioner 
McCreevey and President Barroso, hauled up by the European Parliament to explain the 
                                                 
162 Considering the campaign’s role in promoting the Bolkestein issue in connection with the Constitutional 
Treaty in France, the campaign actually contributed to creating its own opportunities here.   
163 In this sense these comments also count for the variable electoral instability, including considerations of 
how many groups are needed to form an absolute majority. 
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former’s comments against Sweden.164  However, media reporting of the case, and indeed 
the directive as a whole, created threats for the campaign led by the trade unions.  The case, 
although according to unions “very clearly a question of equal treatment” was “turned on 
its head” by the media who “turned it into an issue of protectionism..” (interview 22).  An 
image was thus created of western European trades union fighting against a directive that 
would bring employment and economic benefits to workers in the eastern and central 
Europe.   
 
Efforts to dispel this image, mostly by actively involving central and eastern European 
affiliates in press conferences and the like in order to underline their unity in opposition, 
were not taken up by the press (interview 19), perhaps because the image of the ‘Polish 
plumber’ had by then taken root in the much publicised French debate on the Constitutional 
Treaty (for a similar example of attempting to dispel the image of protectionism through 
transnational coalitions see Foster 2005:216).  Indeed, many interviewees point out that this 
linkage between the French debate and the Bolkestein directive was exceptional in that 
never before had a piece of European legislation encroached to such an extent on a national 
debate (interviews 17 and 19 in particular).  The linkage has also been named as the reason 
for Barroso’s announcement that the directive in its current form would be amended 
according to the Parliament’s report (interview 15).165  The Treaty, enlargement, and 
Vaxholm mixed together to increase media coverage of the fact that many central and 
eastern European member states felt that long transition periods for full rights for their 
workers would be remedied by the Bolkestein directive, “and so they felt somewhat 
betrayed and wanted to have the pure Bolkestein” (interview 19).  In the end, although a 
good amount of the press was far from complimentary of the unions,  the publicity 
contributed to the increased salience of the directive, and thus indirectly to the final 
outcome. 
 
The remaining categories of variables are related to the presence of elite allies and enemies, 
as well as counter movements.  The actors considered as important and influential allies by 
the campaigning groups are all from the Parliament.  The first is the socialist group, 
considered important for their role in shaping the debate in general (due to the fact that they 
                                                 
164 See note 8. 
165 The new enterprise Commissioner McCreevy had also distanced himself from the legislation.  The 
Commission thus turns from a hostile a elite at the beginning of the campaign into at least a neutral party with 
the advent of the Barroso presidency. 
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held both of the key reports) from an early stage, and  especially in issuing invitations to 
hearings (interview 15).  This view of the socialist group as an important ally is shared by 
the unions, although with some reservations in that they perceive a more general erosion of 
the link between unions and socialist parties in some member states, and many members as 
obliged to support unions rather than union sympathisers (interview 22).  Similarly, the 
rapporteurs (Evelyne Gebhardt and Anne Van Lancker) are also viewed as powerful allies 
(interviews 14 and 19).  Other political groups seen as sympathetic and reliable are the far 
left political groups (interview 22), and the Greens (interviews 14 and 15), although these 
are not seen as particularly useful in that their bargaining power in forming compromise 
amendments is limited (interview 15).  Other Parliamentary allies were found in the small 
negotiating team of MEPs from the socialist and people’s party groups charged with 
hammering out the compromise package of amendments to the draft directive.  The group 
consisted not only of people that the campaigning groups had long been in contact with, but 
the conservative members were among those most sympathetic to the campaign.166  The 
Belgian member had long been clearly sympathetic to the unions’ position, while the 
French member was obliged to tow Chirac’s line against the directive.167  The Austrian 
member had been convinced by Austrian trade unions, and even the UK member had, over 
time, at least come to accept that issues did need to be resolved (interview 22).  Here again, 
however, the public side of the campaign was seen as important.  The conservative member 
was also persuaded by “..the groundswell of feeling about the directive [that] put a lot of 
weight on their shoulders” (interview 22). 
 
Finally, confirming the view of polarised but very much separated opinions during this 
campaign, come some comments on the counter movement, or indeed the lack of it.  The 
main protagonist here, where seen at all, is UNICE, the European Employers’ Association.  
Opinions on this group’s work differ however.  For example, according to CECODHAS 
there was no counter movement.  Similarly, UNI-Europa also dismiss the idea of any 
strong counter movement in UNICE, on account of their internal divisions (interview 22).  
According to the EPSU, however, the groups were “extremely aggressive” in their “very 
                                                 
166 The length of the campaign thus also weighs in here, at this point two years of work with the Parliament 
had passed, leaving ample time for entrenched positions to slowly change. 
167 Chirac had come out against Bolkestein in an effort to salvage the ‘yes’ campaign in the French 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, the debate around which was very much linked to the directive.   
 233
discreet lobbying” at the Commission (interview 17).168  This discrepancy between the 
groups on the subject of a counter movement may be explained by the following:  
 
“I think they [UNICE] realised too late that the Parliament was the key player.  They 
focussed on the Commission, they put a lot of pressure on the Commission not to revise 
before the Parliament.  And then they were somewhat taken by the time, when it was over 
they saw our press release, victory for the workers, and they were totally upset and told the 
Commission you can't accept this, you can't accept this, and they told the same to the 
United Kingdom and some other key players and they tried to build up a coalition against 
the compromise” (interview 19). 
 
If counter movement efforts were indeed focussed on the Commission, which remained 
closed to the campaigning groups, this would explain why some groups simply did not 
notice their presence.  If so, the counter movement made a serious misjudgement, since the 
directive’s fate ended up in the hands of the Parliament.  In sum, this ‘counter movement’ 
proved an ineffective threat to the campaigning groups.  To sum up this section, the 
circumstances peculiar to the campaign against the Bolkestein directive were for the most 
part conducive to the campaign’s success, albeit counter-intuitively in the case of the 
closed Commission.  The directive’s outcome fell to the European Parliament, which had 
chosen socialist rapporteurs sympathetic to the campaigning groups.  Most importantly, the 
Parliament sought a compromise on the directive in the wake of enlargement, a weak 
Commission and Council, and the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, thereby hoping to 
carve a more influential role for itself in the institutional triangle.  Contingent opportunities 
thus played a strong role in setting a context favourable to the outcome of the campaign, a 
fact that has also been noted in other transnational campaigns (Juska and Edwards 
2005:193). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
168 This is linked to a view that employers and industry in general have privileged access to the Commission, 
and that there is an increasing tendency to ignore the formal channels of access such as the social dialogue, 
and a ‘de-formalisation’ of lobbying.   
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6.4  ‘Unashamedly neo-liberal’: discursive opportunities in the Bolkestein campaign 
 
Political and discursive opportunities are closely linked to similar issues in this campaign, 
particularly in the case of dynamic opportunities.  Beginning with the fixed categories for 
discursive opportunities in the EU area concerning social policy, it is important to note the 
chances arising from the prominence of the European Parliament as a main target in the 
campaign.  Because the Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution, groups that 
are able to show they represent actual EU citizens may have a better chance of gaining 
MEPs’ attention.  By working through well-known and organised coalition structures, such 
as the Social Platform, and by providing real life examples of what the directive could do, 
as well as by actively involving national level members, the campaigning groups were able 
to hold the attention of key members of the Parliament (interview 15).  A most eloquent 
summary of why such tactics, including demonstrations, attract the attention of MEPs is 
provided by the EPSU.  “When MEPs saw that it wasn't just a Brussels specialist issue, that 
it was actually causing genuine anger on their home turf, in their own territory.  So seeing 
people with banners with Frankenstein, Bolkestein or logos in their own territory showed 
that the issue really had permeated down and the anger was still there” (interview 17).  And 
once the attention of the Parliament has been seized, they are more likely to act according 
to these actors’ wishes, since they “..are much nearer to these opinion trends, they want to 
be real actors, they thought we can't now push through a piece of legislation which is seen 
as an ultra-liberal Trojan horse to destroy the European social model.  And so they were 
much more open to social demands” (interview 19).169 
 
The earlier section describing how the campaign unfolded underlined the fact that for the 
European level groups the main tactic in relations with the Parliament consisted in  
providing relevant information at the right time.  In terms of discursive opportunities, 
ideology is conspicuous by its absence from this formula.  All the interviewees are aware 
that they cannot rely on one political group alone, as was demonstrated earlier by the fact 
that UNI-Europa concentrated their lobbying efforts on all groups except the European 
Socialists and the Greens.  This implies that the trade unions and social groups at the 
European level live a paradox: while they may rely on their historical partners, the 
socialists, as well as the Green party (according to interview 6, in matters of social policy at 
                                                 
169 We may recall Burstein’s (1999) arguments, mentioned in chapter one, about the essential preoccupation 
of MEPs with re-election at this point. 
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least) to support their positions and therefore remain connected to their left-wing roots, on 
the outside they must to some extent hide their history and left-wing sympathies in order to 
woo the centre and right-wing political groups.  This view of ideology as a threat to 
movements seeking to secure broad support is also noted by Ruzza in his work on the anti-
racist movement coalition in the EU, who were to some extent marginalized following the 
adoption of their discourse by the EU left (Ruzza 2003:144).  In more general terms, 
many of the interviewees also comment on the general lack of ideology in the European 
Parliament (as they do in the REACH case).  For example: “That again for me it's quite 
ideological.  But not ideology in the sense of right or left, it's ideology when you meet 
people from the internal market [committee in the European Parliament] that they really 
believe anyway it will be good for social services to be completely open” (interview 14).  
MEPs are seen to assume the priorities of the committees on which they sit, or more likely 
choose those committees accordingly.  In both cases, however, groups at the European 
level are obliged to steer clear of ideology if they wish to secure majority support in the 
Parliament, whose very elected make-up imposes the rule of coalition.  However, as seen in 
the previous section, ideology may be seen as being reintroduced into the campaign via the 
national level. 
 
The national referendum campaigns on the Constitutional Treaty served the function of 
heightening the salience of the Bolkestein directive as an indicator of ‘social Europe’, as 
already seen in previous sections.  The campaigning groups also worked to exploit this 
circumstance as much as possible, by holding up the directive as an example of the 
increasingly common accusation on the EU’s overly neo-liberal leanings (della Porta and 
Caiani 2007:1) in France, where this accusation was a central tenet of the campaign against 
the Treaty (Brouard and Tiberj 2006:262).  Since this issue will be discussed further below, 
however, we shall move on to look at the discursive context of the global justice 
movement.  Of all the cases presented in this study, the Bolkestein case is the only one to 
have attracted the involvement of elements of this movement, mainly through ATTAC and 
various national and local social forums.  The no logo petition Stop Bolkestein also 
provided a rallying point for other groups sympathetic to the movement.  However, rather 
than a link to a mass movement aiding the mobilisation, the trade union leaders of the 
European level campaign saw this link as a discursive threat to their carefully constructed 
compromise deal in the European Parliament (for similar findings see Lance Bennett 
2005:215).  Indeed, when ATTAC sought a joint campaign with the ETUC the latter 
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remained reluctant, since the group was seen to be virulently anti-internal market.  Other 
trade union groups felt the same.  “But the difficulty for us was the fact, and I think for the 
ETUC as well, this was always the debate around the demonstrations as well, was the fact 
that those organisations were largely calling for a halt to the internal market and a halt to all 
kind of market integration.  And avowedly anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation.  And our 
members aren't” (interview 22).  The Stop Bolkestein petition was therefore seen to be 
useful only insofar as it “alerted the public in some countries”.  It did not contribute to a 
better directive with its “nationalistic and protectionist attitudes” (interview 19), since 
according to unions the complete rejection of any legislation should not be seen as the first 
option.170  This discursive threat was avoided through a conscious separation of the trade 
union campaign from the wider anti-Bolkestein mobilisation, with two separate 
demonstrations on different days taking place in Strasbourg before the Parliament’s first 
reading plenary vote.    
 
The first of the more policy area-specific sources of discursive opportunities for EUSMOs 
in Brussels is the social dialogue.  Here, comments related to the directive obviously focus 
on the fact that no social dialogue was initiated.  In the view of the social partners, the 
Commission should have started the procedure, “because Article 138 says the social 
partners have to be consulted if [a directive is] related to social affairs, which was 
obviously the case, even if you deny it as the Commission did, that it has any impact on 
labour law, but there was Article 24 / 25 on posting, so it should have been consultation 
procedure” (interview 19).  This specific threat was overcome by seeking dialogue 
elsewhere, notably with the European Parliament, and by making their message 
unavoidable by using protest tactics.  More general comments about the social dialogue tie 
in with those from other cases.  In line with the Lisbon agenda case, the EPSU comment 
that even where the social dialogue is employed, this tends to be a token gesture since the 
Commission have already agreed content.  Meanwhile, in parallel to the REACH case, it is 
commented that the overall culture of consultation in the EU, particularly with reference to 
                                                 
170 The Stop Bolkestein authors admit that they were often seen as overly radical or extreme as a result of who 
signed their petition, and were understanding about the attitudes of European level trades union.  However, 
they valued the constancy of a strong message despite changes made to the legislative text.  “Pero ognuno 
adesso, visto questo pluralismo, la vede un po' come.. o una cosa positiva o una cosa negativa.  Per esempio 
l'ETUC, che nei confronti del voto del 14 febbraio ha avuto una posizione penso molto positiva e molto 
interessante.  Non poteva firmare la petizione, e dopo dire questo.  Per lui era impossibile.  Era come dire 
bianco e due minuti dopo dire nera. E quindi al livello europeo.. e poi dico anche questo, per esempio il forum 
sociale mondiale, o europeo, non e’ sempre visto bene della gente” (interview 18).   
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the Commission, is diagnosed as moving away from a formal one to a more informal, 
‘corridor’ one.  This means that groups are unaware of who exactly has been consulted and 
with what frequency, making campaign planning difficult.  “So if you have higher access, 
better access, if it's still transparent you can say OK, that's the way of the world.  But at 
least you can see it and at least you work out how you're going to deal with it” (interview 
17).   
 
The general swing to the right in terms of the make up of member state governments after 
2000 throughout the EU mostly affected the lack of dialogue with the Commission.171  
Even under Prodi, the internal market Commissioner Bolkestein was unashamedly neo-
liberal - “Well, Bolkestein was overt, he was a liberal, he didn't care, he had his colours on 
his sleeve, he wasn't at all bothered if people thought that market liberalism was the way 
forward, he did, and that was the direction he took with his directive” (interview 22).  Since 
the Commission must reflect the political spectrum of the member states, this right-wing 
outlook became even more pronounced following right-wing victories in several national 
elections that were reflected in the composition of the Barroso Commission.  In the view of 
the campaigning groups, the Barroso Commission’s main goals are “geared towards 
extending the reach and the efficiency of the internal market” (interview 17), and this 
approach is reflected in every text it produces (interview 15).  As to how the groups 
overcame this discursive threat – they did not.  Indeed, as the ETUC admit, “they [the 
Commission] thought that the tide in favour of liberalism was with them, and they didn't 
expect that there would be such a boomerang.  And it was imprevisible [sic], even in the 
months before the vote I wouldn't have said to anybody that the Country of Origin would 
disappear.  It's clear” (interview 19).  The success of their own mobilisation surprised even 
the campaigning groups.  Clearly, the salience of social issues grew fast and spontaneously 
around the time of the passage of this legislation in the shadow of the debate over the EU’s 
general mission and its new Constitution.  
 
Turning now to the dynamic opportunities that helped the campaign on its way.  The first 
and most general of these lay in the directive itself: it was seen as easy to explain to 
national collective members and in turn by them to their individual members in terms of its 
                                                 
171 A similar swing to the right was also seen in the Parliament following the 2004 elections.  However, the 
two leading rapporteurs were appointed before this, both from the Party of European Socialists, thereby 
avoiding the most serious potential discursive threat in that arena. 
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potential effects on everyday life.  Several of the groups interviewed point out that usually 
they come up against the challenge of having to ‘sell’ European issues to their national 
members, which can often appear as abstract and distant.  As the EPSU put it, “the proposal 
was so radical, it was actually in a way easier for us because we didn't have that barrier of 
explaining a complicated piece of legislation, what may or may not happen, or what it may 
or may not lead to in the future” (interview 17).  This discursive opportunity thus 
contributed to the campaigning groups’ ability to effectively mobilise their national 
members.  This mobilisation in turn contributed to creating another discursive opportunity 
– the intensity of the debate on the draft directive.  By successfully mobilising national 
members and by carrying on their own relentless campaign at the European level, the 
groups were able to ensure a virtuous circle where continuous meetings, seminars, debates, 
marches and other events kept the directive foremost in everyone’s minds, which in turn 
fed the mobilisation. 
 
Of course, other circumstances also contributed to the successful mobilisation, as was seen 
in the previous section on political opportunities.  In discursive terms, the fact that the 
Commission sprung the draft directive on the groups with almost no prior warning or 
consultation was a threat that, in the manner in which it was tackled, also contributed to the 
effective mobilisation.172  The trade union representatives interviewed pointed out that 
because they had no warning their internal mechanisms for forming positions and the like 
were not ready for the directive.   This led them, when faced with the challenge, to activate 
their networks in innovative ways, which contributed to a more effective mobilisation of 
national members.  The Commission’s attitude to dialogue is also a discursive threat that 
led to political opportunities in terms of pushing the groups to concentrate their efforts on 
other institutions.  While their efforts with the Parliament have already been described, the 
groups also sought – unusually – contact with the Council.  “What was new in our work on 
the services directive is that we almost immediately also contacted the Council and we had 
regular meetings with the competitiveness Council chair, depending on the Presidency, 
Irish etc.  But they all met us on a regular basis, even the UK, and tried to be friendly and 
we got some insights we would not had without these meetings.  So for the first time we 
really established a contact with the Presidency” (interview 19).   
                                                 
172 The lack of prior consultation on the directive was exacerbated by the delay of a separate proposal on 
services of general interest which was already being discussed between the Commission and social groups.  
This proposal would have formed a solid basis for insisting that services of general interest be considered 
under a separate framework (interview 15). 
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The most interesting array of discursive opportunities in the Bolkestein campaign stem 
from the contemporary debate and subsequent rejection of the Constitutional Treaty.  First, 
the debate over the Treaty drew out what the EPSU term as “a general malaise, or a general 
idea that citizens' needs aren't being catered for, that the EU is essentially a business 
project, that's the individual citizen's perception” (interview 17).  As a result, governments 
were keen to be seen to be doing something with “a little bit of a social flavour” (interview 
15), particularly where referenda were to be held on the Treaty – a circumstance also noted 
by Guiraudon in the run-up to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (2001:171), and 
therefore perhaps to some extent anticipated by the campaigning groups.  This climate of 
clamour for a more ‘social Europe’ was exploited by the campaign in its successful 
attempts to link the directive to European elections and the debate over the Treaty, 
particularly in France.   The result of this was an exceptional level of discussion of an EU 
issue in a national setting, which contributed to the widespread mobilisation over the 
Bolkestein directive.173  This increased saliency of the Bolkestein issue also created a 
discursive threat.  To some observers the trade unions’ line of argument against the 
legislation came across as overtly protectionist and to the detriment of workers from central 
and eastern European member states.  Uni-Europa in particular mention the press portrayal 
of strong western unions betraying their weaker members elsewhere (interview 22).  
Essentially this threat was not resolved, despite efforts on the part of the unions to include 
eastern and central European members in press conferences and the like.  Yet it did not, in 
the end, prove massively damaging to the campaign.   
 
The high position of the Bolkestein directive on the European agenda, stimulated by the 
situations mentioned above, in turn contributed to the eventual announcement by President 
Barroso of the Commission in February 2005 that the directive would not pass in its current 
form.174  As already seen, this inspired the Parliament to play the role of broker and 
                                                 
173 Bush and Simi provide another example of the French government suffering an electoral defeat following 
a strong protest campaign on a European issue, this time by farmers protesting the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy in 1992 (Bush and Simi 2001:112-4).  Indeed, they suggest that “the extent to which 
government officials defend their citizens’ interests in Brussels is a function of the lefel of domestic political 
oppostion at a given time.”  (ibid:118).  This would appear to be the case for Chirac’s actions in the European 
Council prior to the referendum.  The Bolkestein campaign is thus by no means an unprecedented phenomena 
for the French context. 
174 As with campaign effects, the mixture of circumstances that led to this announcement is complex.  
Chirac’s need for a boost to his yes campaign in France also played a role, for example.  Yet the high profile 
of the Bolkestein directive in the member states can certainly be said to have contributed. 
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champion of the citizens in the delicate issue of the directive, an important political 
opportunity for the campaign.  However, this announcement was interpreted by some of the 
groups as a discursive threat to the campaign, designed to convince mobilised citizens that 
the Commission had in fact scrapped the directive, when in reality it had already been 
passed to the European Parliament for scrutiny and eventual adoption.  Whether this was 
intended by the Commission or not, the consequences were a de-mobilisation that required 
much work to reverse according to the campaign and liaison officer of the EPSU, as 
detailed in the following quote. 
 
“When the Commission said that the message that was taken by ordinary members was 
we've beaten this thing.  And to a very significant degree the momentum stopped, because 
people thought we've mobilised, we've talked about it at national level, we've understood to 
a significant degree what this means, and the Commission has said OK, we hear you.  Now 
the Commission was extremely cynical in doing that, because at that stage they had already 
officially handed over [the directive to the European Parliament]. So it wasn't the 
Commission's right at that stage to do anything about it, they had to respect the legislative 
process.  It was in the hands of the Parliament, it was up to the Parliament to assess.  The 
Commission of course knew that.  They were just signalling political reality.  But also 
taking the opportunity to puncture some of the opposition by giving the false impression 
that they themselves were going to take on board, knowing full well that it was up to the 
Parliament to change” (interview 17). 
 
This threat to the campaign was not, however, mentioned by all interviewees, and the 
mobilisation continued despite the lull.  The groups now continued to exploit the 
opportunities presented at the European Parliament by employing tactics more usually seen 
at the national level, i.e. demonstrations, in order to ensure that the Parliament took notice 
of them as representatives of citizens’ wishes.  The discursive opportunity of being seen as 
doing something social also increased following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, 
strengthening these opportunities in the Parliament.  Discursive tactics towards the 
Parliament also included more subtle lobbying moves following the institutions’ realisation 
of its potential role in the affair.  In the negotiations of the compromise amendments 
between the major political groups, for example, CECODHAS mention manoeuvring away 
from their earlier demand for the wholesale exemption of social services, politically 
unacceptable for the European People’s Party, towards the proven tactic of requesting 
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sectoral exemptions, ending in the same outcome but without the perceived political 
backtracking of allowing a blanket exception (interview 15).  Tactics such as these ensured 
a compromise package acceptable to all but a few MEPs (interview 19). 
 
The EUSMOs active in the Bolkestein campaign essentially created many discursive 
opportunities for themselves through their reaction to the apparent discursive threat of the 
closed Commission.  By turning to the European Parliament they were able to make 
effective use of the legitimacy discourse opportunities, whilst carefully avoiding the traps 
of falling into ideological discourses, and by mobilising grassroots members (also aided by 
the radical nature of the directive) they were able to link the issue to debates on the 
Constitutional Treaty.  The fortunate coincidence of the latter was an especially important 
boon to the campaign during a generally right wing period and widespread preoccupation 
with the EU’s economy.  This campaign thus provides examples not only of an abundance 
of discursive opportunities, but also of their creation. 
 
6.5  A toothless directive: campaign outcomes 
 
At first glance the Bolkestein campaign has only one outcome – the sanitised version (in 
the view of the EUSMOs) of the legislation that was the result of the European 
Parliament’s first reading vote of Valentine’s Day 2006.  However, as was noted in the 
above analysis, it is unlikely the Parliament would have worked so hard to secure the 
compromise it did without the certain knowledge that the Commission was to re-draft its 
proposal in line with the outcome of that vote.  Barroso’s announcement in February 2005 
to this effect, which marks the beginning of the second phase of the campaign for analytical 
purposes in this study, may also be classed as a policy outcome.  Table twelve summarises 
the analysis of the campaign in terms of shared frames and political and discursive 
opportunities for each of these campaign phases, and serves to highlight the differences in 
the quality of the campaign leading up to these two policy outcomes. 
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Table 12 – Summary of the Bolkestein campaign by phase 
 
 
Phase 
 
Extent of shared frames 
 
Political Opportunities 
 
Discursive Opportunities
1 
Many different frames, with 
few shared to any great 
extent.  Frames are not 
contradictory – tend to 
reflect precise sector of 
author organisation and a 
split between trade unions 
and social groups, although 
most share worry about 
COP, SGI, social dumping.  
National level share frames 
with European, with 
exception of call for 
Commission impact 
assessment – national 
members involved in union 
position formation. 
Commission closed to 
dialogue, efforts mostly  
transferred to the 
European Parliament, less 
so to the Councils.  
Campaign draws on less 
conventional tactics 
identified with national 
level such as 
demonstrations, combined 
with provision of timely 
and useful information to 
the EP plus strategic 
lobbying.  Issue linked 
with electoral campaigns 
and debate over 
Constitutional Treaty.  
Lack of counter 
movement. 
Prominence of EP as a 
target heightens 
importance of legitimacy 
opportunities and 
involvement of national 
members appealing to 
ideological beliefs.  
Constitutional Treaty 
(linked to issue by 
campaign) increased 
salience of issue.  No 
social dialogue.  
Directive a clear threat to 
unions and social groups, 
easy to mobilise. 
2 
EUSMO frames reflect 
contentious approach, and 
recall national frames from 
first phase.  Frames on 
social dumping and COP 
come to the fore, and the 
split between social and 
trade union organisations 
disappears with the 
exception of the Stop 
Bolkestein action which has 
a much more radical 
outlook.  High number of 
single, but non 
contradictory, frames 
continues.  National frames 
focused on mobilisation, 
phase sees wide diffusion of 
ETUC call to action.  EU 
arguments follow calls to 
action and are shared by 
national groups. 
The weak Commission 
and Council (in the wake 
of enlargement) and 
rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty  
pushed the EP to seek the 
role of broker / grand 
coalition.  EP / PSE / 
rapporteurs therefore a 
powerful ally to the 
campaign -  Strategic 
lobbying.  Vaxholm case 
highlighted legal 
problems with legislation.  
Lack of counter 
movement.   
Barroso announcement 
threatens mobilisation 
levels.  Prominence of 
EP as a target heightens 
importance of legitimacy 
opportunities and 
involvement of national 
members appealing to 
ideological beliefs.  
Global justice movement 
seen as discursive threat.  
Rejections of 
Constitutional Treaty 
heightens salience of 
campaign.  Directive a 
clear threat to unions and 
social groups, easy to 
mobilise, debate intense.  
Media coverage of 
protectionist campaign 
apparent threat, but 
increased salience of 
issue 
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The earlier stages of the campaign leading up to Barroso’s pronouncement were driven by 
the fact that the Commission remained closed to all dialogue.  This meant that the 
EUSMOs did not begin their full campaign immediately, since they were obliged to spend 
time digesting the text of the proposal.  When they had, however, the threat to their 
constituents was clear.  This discursive opportunity helped not only in terms of the fact that 
despite the lack of time yet devoted to forming campaign coalitions the groups shared their 
core frames criticising the directive, it also helped them to quickly mobilise their national 
and grassroots members over the issue.  This tactic, not the usual path followed by these 
groups when campaigning at the European level (as was noted in chapter five), was a 
response to the Commission’s unwillingness to engage in any dialogue, and a logical 
choice for campaigning at the European Parliament and Council.  Table twelve also 
registers the wide range of political and discursive opportunities that aided the campaign, 
the most prominent of which were related to the contemporary debate on the Constitutional 
Treaty.  The strong and public campaign mounted at both the European and national levels 
helped to link the former with the Bolkestein directive, which was used as an example of 
the EU’s overly neo-liberal leanings, particularly in the French referendum debate.   
 
It was this combination that led to the policy outcome observed at the beginning of the 
second phase of the campaign, i.e. Barroso’s announcement that the directive would not 
‘fly in its current form’.  The campaign, like the Lisbon campaign analysed in the previous 
chapter, also had the advantage of drawing on ready-made coalitions and therefore framing 
work was not necessary to start the campaign off - national groups contributed to and thus 
shared the views of EUSMOs, especially amongst the trade unions.  The majority of the 
political and discursive opportunities may be linked with the providential circumstance of 
the contemporary debate on the Constitutional Treaty.  Unions were on the alert for what 
they perceived as further attacks on ‘social Europe’, and the Treaty also increased the 
saliency of social issues.  Linking the two debates also provided concrete political 
opportunities in the EU since all member states as well as EU institutions were keen to see 
the Treaty adopted, and therefore came out against the draft directive which was seen as 
hurting its chances.  The responsibility for this outcome is thus balanced between the 
campaign and the Constitution – the strong campaign was necessary to link the issues, but 
without the opportunities the Treaty provided it is unlikely the Bolkestein campaign would 
have convinced the Commission President to make such a statement, no matter what 
ulterior motives he may have had. 
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The overall policy outcome of the campaign means that we must also take into account the 
second phase, where the European Parliament came into its own.  To recap, the frame 
analysis as a whole showed that the EUSMOs shared their core understanding of problems 
in the text.  In the second phase, there was also evidence of dialogue between the European 
and national levels, with the priorities of national level trade union groups being reflected 
later on at the European level, and European documents being found on the websites of 
national level groups.  This phase also saw an increase in motivational framing (especially 
at the national level) calling for participation in direct actions.  As the strong turnouts at 
these events suggests, there was enough unity and purpose among the groups to effectively 
mobilise their members and keep the directive high on the public agenda – even if this 
unity was sometimes more apparent than real, as illustrated by the split between the trade 
unions and their French members, as well as with the groups that adopted the Stop 
Bolkestein initiative.   
 
Political opportunities were more numerous than political threats, and the most obvious of 
these – the closed Commission – was turned to the advantage of the EUSMOs, who instead 
turned their attention to the European Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the European 
Council to great effect.  The groups were able to coordinate their lobbying, and organise 
many debates and meetings in order to keep the directive foremost in Parliamentarians’ 
minds, and in the second phase of the campaign the Parliament became crucial as a result 
of Barroso’s announcement.  The institution rose to the challenge, and its activism in the 
face of a weak Commission and Council, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
importance of the debate on the directive in many national settings, and in particular for the 
French referendum, added an important factor to the previous mix of a strong campaign 
and the debate over the Constitutional Treaty.  
 
The structural discursive opportunity structure offered by the EU to social campaigns 
turned out, in this case, to be more of a hindrance than a help in this case.   With the 
democratic deficit discourse and its links with the European Parliament aside, the other 
variables provided precious few opportunities.  The social dialogue was never activated and 
in any case viewed pessimistically, a right-wing climate should not have allowed left-wing 
trade union arguments to flourish, the strength of the global justice movement led to a split 
in the heart of the anti-Bolkestein campaign.  The dynamic opportunities, on the other 
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hand, were more favourable as already seen in the above discussion.  The background of 
the debate on the Constitutional Treaty provided many opportunities for the campaign, but 
more emphasis should perhaps be placed on the fact that the combination of the intensity of 
the campaign and the context of the Treaty ended in the creation of dynamic opportunities 
in the form of a ‘virtuous circle’ where a lively debate continued to contribute to 
widespread mobilisation.  By ensuring that discourses on Bolkestein were repeated as often 
and in as many contexts as possible, the campaigning groups ensured that the issue 
remained high on the European agenda and the focus of attention. 
 
In order to trace the path that led to the policy outcome of the final legislation, the main 
elements of which were the strong campaign, the Constitutional Treaty and the activist 
European Parliament, a fundamental question is to what extent were favourable political 
opportunities created by campaign actions?  Or were they contingent or due to the actions 
of other actors?  In order to be as explicit as possible in the conclusions on this case, I shall 
discuss each of the major political opportunities of the campaign in turn.  The fact that the 
Commission closed itself to all dialogue with the campaigning groups, and their subsequent 
focus on the European Parliament, pre-dates the campaign itself and must therefore be 
attributed to the wish of the directive’s architect to speed up its adoption as his mandate 
drew to its close. 175  The nature of the European Parliament as a campaign target is itself a 
structural feature of the EU arena and in that sense cannot be affected by a single 
campaign.  The activism of the European Parliament in terms of its seeking an effective 
compromise on the other hand is rather more complicated.  The perceived weakness of the 
other two major institutions, both in some way due to enlargement, is another factor out of 
the campaign’s scope.  That the campaign’s intensity and widespread nature made the 
Parliament see this directive, rather than another, as an opportunity for such activism is 
however true, if we accept the conclusions drawn about the first policy outcome, i.e. that 
without the noise created around the directive by campaigning activities, Barroso would not 
have made it clear that the Commission would stick to the European Parliament’s version 
of the draft. 
 
Similar arguments also apply to the role of the directive in national debates, especially in 
France (which caused President Chirac to withdraw his support for the directive).  Without 
                                                 
175 As mentioned in the section on tactics, the groups took several months to react to the draft for this very 
reason – they had little prior knowledge of its content. 
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the campaign, it is unlikely that national groups would have had so heightened an 
awareness of this legislation.  The structures of the European groups representing national 
members are such that they are responsible for monitoring issues of interest at this level.  
This is less true for the ETUC, many of whose affiliates run their own offices in Brussels 
and monitor European issues for themselves in addition to their membership of the ETUC.  
Yet even they must then work to gain the attention of national structures preoccupied with 
often more pressing national and local issues.  In any case, the professed unity in 
opposition of the unions gives the same result – strong shared frames and a strong 
campaign at both the European and national levels.  It may also be hazarded that many of 
the smaller, nationally-based, groups active in the debate would also have remained 
unaware of the situation if it were not for the alerts sent by the unions in particular. 
 
Nevertheless, the debate over the Constitutional Treaty was not a result of the actions of the 
campaigning groups.  Yet the campaign shows that a strong campaign is needed if such 
contingent opportunities are to be effectively exploited.  In terms of dynamic opportunities, 
a strong campaign (and thus collective identity), was necessary to link the directive to the 
debate on the Constitutional Treaty in France.  Fixed opportunities also played a role in 
sparking this strong campaign and are also not affected by the actions of groups, at least in 
the short term.  EUSMOs must have the knowledge required to exploit the structural 
opportunities of the EU arena.  In this case, this meant overcoming the apparent threat of a 
closed Commission by successfully targeting other institutions and by employing tactics 
more suited to these.176  While the strong EUSMO campaign combined with the fortunate 
circumstance of the debate over the Constitutional Treaty, which in turn prompted 
Barroso’s announcement and the activism of the European Parliament are the major 
elements that led to the final policy outcome in this campaign, it was a structural threat that 
started the ball rolling.  Paradoxically, had the Commission remained open as a channel for 
dialogue on this draft directive instead publishing the directive without consultation, the 
campaign may have been a more ‘normal’, that is a quiet, European level one, remaining 
mostly invisible to the public at large. 
 
 
                                                 
176 In this case, the campaigning groups needed to know to turn to the Parliament in order to influence the 
directive.  This may seem obvious but for the fact that industry groups were evidently not able, or misjudged 
the importance of, this alternative opportunity.   
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6.6  Conclusions 
 
The radical nature of the directive on services in the internal market, combined with the 
fact that the Commission failed to carry out any real consultation prior to publishing the 
draft, meant that the Bolkestein campaign saw unprecedented levels of mobilisation.  The 
main groups involved in the campaign at the European level were trade unions and trade 
union federations, as well as some social groups.  In a cross-national perspective, an 
initiative begun in Belgium also spread throughout Europe in the form of a no-logo 
petition.  The frame analyses showed evidence that trade unions and social groups shared 
central understandings of the problems with the directive, but also of a split between these 
groups and the Stop Bolkestein initiative.  These ideas were corroborated by interview 
evidence, where a basic level of contacts between the trade union and social groups were 
confirmed.  Even where these two types of group are not involved in the joint planning of 
events, their positions share core features, and the social groups were invited to participate 
in trade union marches.  In addition, there is evidence of dialogue between national and 
European level groups, both in terms of shared frames and in terms of diffused documents. 
 
In terms of fixed political opportunities and threats, the campaign can be summed up as 
follows: a closed Commission forced the groups to exploit the opportunities offered by the 
Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the Council as much as possible.  These efforts were 
combined with the exploitation of the multi-level system by using national members to 
lobby and carry out other actions aimed at national governments (and thereby the Council) 
and the Parliament (including demonstrations) – thus bringing ideology back in and 
backing up arguments with physical demonstrations of national support.  This campaign 
thus corroborates Lahusen’s assertion that “while the national level remains an important 
frame of reference for international campaigning, this context does not exclude but rather 
fosters a complementarity between local events and internationally coordinated action” 
(1999:201).  In addition, this role of national groups recalls Imig and Tarrow’s (2001) 
hypothesis of the national government as a broker between citizens and the EU.  In 
apparently national actions, actors are in fact demanding better representation in the 
European Council of their demands.  This idea is also (partly) confirmed by findings on 
farmers’ protests by Bush and Simi in the same volume (2001:103).  The label of 
‘domestication’ applied to such events will be further discussed in the conclusions of this 
study, yet it should be noted that the combination of national and transnational action in the 
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Bolkestein campaign tends more towards confirming Passy’s assertion that “Social 
movements take advantage of supranational opportunities for protest without turning their 
back on the national ones.  Therefore, we may speak of a multi-level game played by social 
movements” (1999:152).  Combined with this situation of a strong multi-level campaign 
was the debate over the Constitutional Treaty.  The campaign successfully linked the 
Bolkestein issue with the latter, which led to the first outcome of the campaign – Barroso’s 
announcement.  In the second phase of the campaign, power over the directive’s fate thus 
fell to the European Parliament, which responded with gusto to the opportunity by working 
hard to achieve a ‘grand coalition’ compromise on the directive.   
   
The conclusions drawn on the overall policy outcome of the campaign focused on several 
points.  First, the campaign overcame the apparent threat of a closed Commission by 
launching a strong, multi-level campaign, using widely shared and repeated frames 
throughout that was able to take advantage of both political and discursive opportunities 
provided by the European Parliament and by national arenas (in line with the statement by 
della Porta and Rucht that campaigns may become “more dramatic when the political 
opportunities are closed” (2002:8)).  One of the most important opportunities exploited in 
the campaign was the linking of the issues of the directive to the contemporary debate on 
the Constitutional Treaty in France, leading to the intertwining of domestic and European 
issues (della Porta and Caiani 2001:2).  This in particular led to a host of other 
opportunities for the campaign’s message, but most importantly it galvanized the 
Parliament to act as a broker, diffusing tensions around the issue.  The role of the campaign 
in the outcome was therefore significant – without the noise created around the directive, 
these linkages may never have been made and powerful actors would not have felt the duty 
to reach a compromise.   
 
The outcomes of the Bolkestein campaign could thus reflect the beginnings of a pattern in 
EU campaigning – another more recent and visible campaign to have a serious impact, the 
anti-GM campaign of the late 1990s, has also been described as unusually successful 
because (among other things) of  “an EU splintered between a technocratic Commission, a 
divided Council, and a Parliament searching for an identity and a role as democratic 
tribune.” (Imig and Tarrow 2001:30).  The campaign for the insertion of a clause on gender 
equality led by the European Women’s Lobby in 1996 also, according to the scholars 
Hellferich and Kolb, owed its impact to the combination of multilevel campaigning and the 
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favourable opportunities offered by enlargement to the Nordic countries, the crisis over the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the victory of the Labour party in the UK – 
another set of circumstances that recall those seen in the Bolkestein campaign (Hellferich 
and Kolb 2001:146).  Finally, it may be argued that the campaigning groups contributed to 
creating their most important discursive opportunities through their reaction to the apparent 
discursive threat of the impossibility of engaging with the Commission.  By turning to the 
European Parliament they were able to make effective use of the legitimacy discourse 
opportunities, whilst carefully avoiding the traps of falling into ideological discourses, and 
by mobilising grassroots members (also aided by the radical nature of the directive) they 
were able to link the issue to debates on the Constitutional Treaty.   
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7.  Conclusions: the paths to success in EU campaigning177 
 
Before looking at the possible conclusions that may be drawn from a comparison of the 
cases presented in this study, and evaluating the theoretical conjectures outlined in chapter 
one, it is useful to briefly recall each of the cases, their outcomes, and the factors that led to 
these.  I shall also draw attention to the similarities that may be observed between the cases 
in each policy area.  The subsequent sections of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion 
of what the cases tell us about the analytical model presented in chapter one, especially in 
terms of which combinations of variables appear to end in which outcomes.  To this end, a 
table including the ‘scores’ for each case on each of the variables is presented.  This table is 
also useful in that it highlights interesting points to be discussed in relation to each of the 
theoretical approaches.  Finally, some broader suggestions about the nature of campaigning 
in the EU are discussed.  Although the conclusions presented in this chapter are of a limited 
nature, given that they are based on just four cases, these do find confirmation in existing 
literature and are, if nothing else, useful for guiding future larger N research. 
 
7.1  The environmental cases 
 
The first of the cases was about genetically modified (GM) crops and coexistence with 
normal and organic crops – that is what rules and regulations are needed to keep one kind 
of plant from cross-pollinating the other.  In this campaign, a number of environmental 
groups worked to convince the Commission of the need for strict EU level legislation on 
this issue.  Starting from a Commission communication on the issue in 2003, reactions 
came from a hard core of three environmental NGOs – Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, 
and the European Environmental Bureau.  By the time the Commission confirmed their 
approach in an official recommendation, these groups had begun to widen their campaign 
coalition to include other types of actors encompassing the ‘stakeholders’ in the issue: 
farmers groups and retailers / consumers.178  At the same time, other kinds of groups were 
also mobilising on this subject – local and regional governments.  This mobilization began 
at the instigation of the Upper Austria and Tuscany regions, who worked to create a 
                                                 
177 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 8th Annual Conference of the European Sociological 
Association and at the CINEFOGO workshop ‘The Governance of the European Union: theories, practices, 
myths’.  Many thanks to the organisers and participants of both for their insightful comments and input. 
178 Through EuroCoop – an organisation representing cooperatives across the EU.  This organisation sees 
itself as representing consumers as well as retailers. 
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Network of European GM-free regions.  The environmental groups, and in particular 
Friends of the Earth, were soon alerted to their work and created a bridge between the two 
branches of the campaign by working with the Assembly of European Regions, and by 
setting up a website providing information on how to convince local and regional 
governments to declare themselves ‘GM-free’, www.gmofree-europe.org.  The campaign 
now assumed an additional goal – the legal recognition of regional and local bans on GM 
cultivation.  The frames of the campaign reflect this story, with the main demand of the 
campaign, for EU legislation, incorporating that on GMO-free zones.  Frames emphasising 
the widespread nature and strength of the GMO-free movement also became prominent.  
 
At the beginning of the campaign, the main target was of course the Commission, as the 
institution with the power to draft legislation, and also as the main decision-taker on GM-
related issues in light of the Council being unable to produce a qualified majority on the 
subject.  Here the groups stuck for the most part to more traditional lobbying actions and 
press releases.  The European Parliament was used as a venue to help the visibility of 
various actions, mostly conferences, but was otherwise largely overlooked as a relevant 
campaign target.  The national level of the EU was the most important to the campaign, 
which focused on the more hands-on path of securing local and regional bans on GMO 
cultivation.  Here, apart from those regional and local governments already ‘on side’ and 
taking part in the Network of European GM-free regions, local environmental groups were 
encouraged to convince their local authorities to make similar declarations and bans where 
possible.  The following coordination of these smaller-scale, local achievements into 
different networks, conferences, and finally Europe-wide days of objection, make it clear 
that in this case the local as well as the national melded with the European arena.  This 
work eventually led to an apparent opening up in the relatively new Commission, which 
finally seemed to be coming around to the campaign’s ideas. 
 
Two outcomes were identified in the campaign – a policy outcome following the first phase 
of the campaign where the Commission backtracked on their previous assertions on 
liability and an access outcome following the second phase of the campaign in the shape of 
the recognition of the Network and the GM-free movement in an official communication.  
Using the process tracing method outlined in chapter two, I showed that while the first of 
these could not be traced to any of the actions taken by the campaigning groups, the second 
was very much linked to their work, although the Commission had already begun to take 
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note of the movement before it was expressly picked up by the EUSMOs.  As for the stated 
goal of the campaign, to secure European legislation and, later,  the legalisation of local 
bans, this was attributed to a negative ruling in a WTO dispute – after assessing all other 
possible paths to this outcome, including the dissipation of the campaign’s message in the 
final stages of the campaign, this remained the most plausible and logical conclusion.     
 
The second environmental policy case study was the campaign on the REACH 
(Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals) legislation.  The proposed 
REACH legislation followed from a White Paper published by the Commission in 2001, 
but was only adopted as a concrete proposal in 2003 following extensive consultation.  
Environmental groups had been relatively satisfied with the White Paper, but this was 
substantially changed following consultations with interested parties, and the actual 
legislative proposal prompted them to build a wide coalition in order to make their 
demands about what the legislation should contain heard.  This coalition included not only 
environmental groups (the WWF, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the European 
Environmental Bureau), but also public health (the European Public Health Network) and 
women’s (Women in Europe for a Common Future) organisations.  Three of the 
organisations, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the European Environmental Bureau, 
also built a campaign site for gathering information on actions as well as for organising on-
line campaigning, named Chemical Reaction.  Faced with an extremely strong industry 
lobby with demands often directly opposing their own, however, the campaigning groups 
mentioned here were unhappy with the legislation finally adopted in December 2006, 
which they felt left too many loopholes for the continued use of allegedly dangerous 
chemicals in the EU.   
 
The campaign’s logic followed the EU legislative process – in this case co-decision.  
Initially, therefore, the groups attempted to bolster their position vis-à-vis the Commission 
by submitting opinions and petitions to the latter’s several consultation fora on REACH.  
As the draft legislation was passed to the European Parliament, this became the number one 
target of the campaign, which used (scientific) reports, letters, lobbying (including actions 
by national members to their respective MEPs) and other more media-oriented actions 
(mock fashion shows, blood and office-dust testing for example) to put forward their point 
of view.  As the legislation moved on to the Council reading, the European groups shifted 
their attention to this institution.  However, rather than working from the European level to 
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target the Council the idea was much more to leave this job to national members,179 
although in comparison to the other case studies there is not much evidence of a 
widespread mobilization at national levels on the subject.  There are many examples of 
lower-scale protests and stunts, however, as well as of more classical lobbying tactics, in 
particular in the Netherlands and Germany.   
 
At the end of the day, however, the groups were disappointed with the legislation adopted.  
Indeed, there are few positive outcomes from the analyses.  The frame analysis shows that 
no strong argument was carried constantly throughout the campaign, although the coalition 
was strong and unified in terms of shared frames, since almost all documents were jointly 
authored.  The major threats to the campaign all stemmed from the presence of a strong 
counter-movement in the shape of the European chemicals industry, able to exploit the 
opportunities offered by the Commission and other institutions more effectively than the 
coalition, thereby creating threats for the environmental campaign.  The industry lobby also 
disposed of more resources than the environmental coalition – in terms of expertise, staff, 
and finances.  In particular they were able to prolong the publication of the legislative 
proposal at the beginning of the campaign, lobbying hard for further consultation.  This led 
to the substantial revision of what had been included in the White Paper.  The coalition was 
faced with a hostile DG Enterprise, especially under Commissioner Verheugen, and with a 
more right wing European Parliament more receptive to industry arguments, to name just 
some of the political threats.  An extremely important discursive threat was also attributed 
to the industry campaign, namely their tactic of creating and building on fears of 
widespread unemployment in the sector as a result of the originally proposed rules.  In 
addition, the highly technical nature of the legislation made it difficult for the European 
level groups to mobilise their grassroots members. 
 
To conclude these short descriptions, we can note three major similarities between the 
cases.  Firstly, both cases see environmental coalitions faced with hostile DGs within the 
Commission, and an important role for the latter in determining the outcome of the issue.  
Secondly, both cases see delays on the issues concerned in the Commission, either through 
seemingly endless meetings, or through extended consultations.  Thirdly, for both cases the 
technical nature of the issue makes it hard for the groups to translate the importance of the 
                                                 
179 National member groups are seen as better informed for targeting national actors, as well as having 
existing contacts etc. 
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campaign back to the national level.  On the side of movement controlled resources, we can 
also note that both cases saw the building of strong and wide coalitions (i.e. they include 
groups other than environmental groups).  There are notable differences between the cases 
in terms of levels of national mobilisation (stronger in the GMO case than in REACH), and 
the presence of a counter movement.  Finally, in terms of outcomes, neither of the 
environmental cases secured the policy goals they had explicitly set out to achieve. 
 
7.2  The social cases 
 
Which brings us to the two (broadly defined) social campaigns.  The first of these 
concerned the Lisbon agenda.  This campaign is much shorter in time span than the others, 
and looks at the actions taken mainly by members of the Social Platform and the ETUC 
after a move by President Barroso of the Commission to re-shape the Lisbon agenda 
around purely economic goals (growth and jobs), pushing social objectives (social 
protection and inclusion, as well as sustainable development) to one side.  The focus of the 
actions against Barroso’s suggestions was the 2005 Spring Summit, traditionally the 
‘social’ summit of the European Council.  Actions had to be planned in a matter of weeks, 
and the two main organisations involved drew on their well-established and organised 
coalition structures, the Social Platform and the ETUC, in order to achieve this.  The Social 
Platform member Solidar designed and diffused a ‘no-logo’ web petition through the Social 
Platform network, gathering the support of around 7000 organisations by the time of the 
summit. The second main event of the campaign was a large (by Brussels standards – 
approximately 75,000 strong) demonstration led by the ETUC just before the summit.  As 
this event is organised every year and is a fixed date on the organisation’s calendar, and 
especially since turnout was high as a result of mobilization over the Bolkestein directive 
(see below), the Lisbon agenda argument was added on to the demonstration’s agenda and 
contributed to the apparent success of the actions. A sympathetic President, Jean-Claude 
Juncker of Luxembourg, also meant that the groups met with the President prior to the 
Council (i.e. the groups were invited, rather than having sought, the meeting). Following 
the summit, the Communication reiterated the Council’s commitment to the original 
wording of the Lisbon agenda. Whether words would then be followed up with actions was 
another matter, but the campaigning groups felt that at least the basis for subsequent 
demands had been retained. 
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The main target of the Lisbon campaign was therefore the European Council, and more 
precisely its Spring Summit of March 2005.  Despite the fact that many of the documents 
available on the campaign were heavily critical of President Barroso, the European Council 
was clearly the real intended audience, as the institution holding the power to change the 
wording of the overall policy goals of the Lisbon Agenda. The main actions, although both 
directed at the European Council as a body, were of a kind more associated with the 
national level than the EU level (if we accept that the EU is perceived as a lobbying-heavy 
arena, while national arenas in the EU have traditions of public actions such as marches, 
petitions, etc.). We can therefore say that the decision of the campaigning groups, when 
faced with the European Council, an institution very closed to dialogue in terms of 
lobbying, was to rely on tactics most often used when seeking to influence the component 
members of the European Council, that is the heads of state and government of the member 
states. Referring back to ordinary citizens and citizens’ organisations, to bottom-up 
approaches and shows of numbers and unity, was the choice.   
 
The outcomes of this campaign can be summed up as follows.  Strong and simple frames 
(‘Save our Social Europe’) were easy to carry through the campaign which was short and 
sharp, and tactics that relied on less wordy documents were used.  Apparent threats to 
dialogue flowing from the fact that the institutions most open to this were relatively 
unimportant in this case were overcome by referring back to the national level, both in 
terms of gathering support and in terms of repertoire.  Another opportunity was that the 
presidency at the time of the summit (Luxembourg) was sympathetic to the arguments of 
the campaigning groups, arranging for meetings with both the ETUC and the Social 
Platform (which also prompted Commission President Barroso to organise similar 
meetings).  In terms of discursive opportunities, the atmosphere of opposition to the 
Bolkestein directive also contributed to a favourable context of high salience, in particular 
because of its being linked to the fate of the Constitutional Treaty (a contingent political 
opportunity).  This tacking of the Lisbon issue onto another very much in the public eye 
contributed to the positive policy outcome in this case – although of course linking the 
issues in the first place was the work of the campaign.  In this context, then, the more 
grassroots-oriented actions of the campaigning groups helped them to overcome apparent 
threats and exploit opportunities in order to contribute to their sought outcome. 
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The final empirical example of campaigning at the EU level concerns the Directive on 
Services in the Internal Market, more commonly known as the Bolkestein directive after 
the Commissioner who proposed it in early 2004.  This piece of legislation saw a large 
wave of mobilization across the EU culminating in a demonstration in Strasbourg on 
Valentine’s day 2006.  The directive, which aimed at creating a free market in services 
similar to that functioning in the EU for goods through the Country of Origin Principle, 
was strongly opposed by European trade unions, affiliated at the EU level through the 
ETUC.  Social groups were also set against the directive, although their actions were less 
important to the campaign.  European citizens were also mobilized through movement 
organisations such as ATTAC and a no-logo online petition and cyber-action website 
named Stop Bolkestein (www.stopbolkestein.org).  The campaign, which opposed the 
directive because it was feared the Country of Origin principle would lead to ‘social 
dumping’ and the successive reduction in  levels of social protection in the Union, saw 
many direct actions taking place at both European and national levels.  Several 
demonstrations, including that mentioned in connection with the Lisbon agenda and the 
final Strasbourg demonstration, were held to directly target the European institutions, along 
with numerous petitions, and e-mail campaigns directed at MEPs and national 
governments.  Various European trade union offices also carried out intense lobbying 
activities in the European Parliament, while national counterparts did the same with their 
heads of state or government.  In the end, the favourable results of the European 
Parliament’s first reading vote were carried through the second reading of the legislation 
with little to do, and the bill – now perceived as more acceptable by the majority of the 
campaigning groups – was adopted in December 2006. 
 
Two policy outcomes were identified in the case – Barroso’s announcement at the 
beginning of the second phase, and the overall legislative outcome.  Process tracing showed 
that a combination of a strong multi-level campaign and the favourable context of the 
debate over the Constitutional Treaty led to the first of theses.  The main opportunities that 
contributed to the overall policy outcome, on the other hand, resemble those of the Lisbon 
case in several ways – not least because this case itself contributed to the outcomes of, and 
provided the backdrop for, the latter.  First was the apparent discursive threat constituted by 
the fact that the Commission remained entirely closed to dialogue during the drafting of the 
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proposal.  This led the usually rather co-opted ETUC180 to encourage a grassroots trade 
union mobilisation at the member state level in order to target the Council and Parliament, 
which in turn may be seen as mobilising the other organisations involved.  The new 
Commission then explicitly stated that it would re-draft the proposal according to the 
European Parliament’s first reading.  The Commission’s statement inspired an otherwise 
predominantly right-wing Parliament to attempt to fulfil a rather noble role, now in the 
wake of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and a seemingly weak Council.  If it 
could carve out a reputation for itself as the body that resolved of the Bolkestein problem, a 
greater institutional role may follow.  This tangled path to the main policy outcome of the 
campaign hinged, in my opinion, on the linking of the Bolkestein issue to the 
Constitutional Treaty which in France in particular forced a reaction from the head of State.  
However, without the strong campaign around the issue instigated by the ETUC and its 
members, this issue linkage would not have come about.  A strong campaign thus saw 
victory clinched by a contingent political opportunity which then had a domino effect on 
the opportunities of the rest of the campaign (i.e. the Parliament’s strong role). 
 
Because they overlap and provide contexts for one another, many  similarities can be noted 
between the two social cases.  Unlike the environmental cases, the Commission plays a 
relatively small role in both.181  Conversely, while the role of the European Parliament 
varies across the cases, the role of the European Council is pivotal to both, in that members 
of national governments, or their heads, are strongly targeted and hold a great deal of sway 
over outcomes.  Linked to this is a choice of more traditional, direct actions by the 
campaigning groups in both cases – with protest marches and popular petitions and letter 
writing campaigns featuring heavily (albeit alongside lobbying actions).  This in turn is 
partly the result of the fact that both cases see the heavy involvement of the ETUC, an actor 
with some clout at the European level (as a social partner) and, arguably, able to tap into 
the national trade union movements and their traditions of demonstrations.182  Both of the 
campaigns thus concentrate their efforts on more citizen-based, grassroots events rather 
                                                 
180 See Martin and Ross (2001).  The main thrust of their argument is that because the ETUC was more 
created by the Commission itself than by national Trade Unions, the organisation is more geared to the needs 
of the former than the latter (i.e. for participation in the Social Dialogue). 
181 While the Commission plays an important part in the outcome of the Bolkestein campaign, this is 
connected with its lack of activity rather than its strong presence. 
182 This particular similarity, and the strength of the position the ETUC is seen to hold at the European level, 
was pointed out by Reggula Heggli, the Coordinator of the Civil Society Contact Group.  My thanks for this 
input. 
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than on lobby-style information-producing techniques.  The situation regarding the 
Constitutional Treaty also plays an important role in both cases, where it was successfully 
linked to the question of a more ‘Social Europe’ in the French context in particular.  
Indeed, the latter is perhaps the most important context-setting circumstance in both of the 
cases, since it led to reactions from the most powerful actors in the EU as a whole – the 
heads of State and government. 
 
7.3  What do the outcomes of these cases suggest about campaigning in the EU? 
 
At this point we may return to the analytical model presented in chapter one, and begin to 
look at what the cases tell us about the paths to outcomes in the EU.  First, and most 
obviously we can conclude along with Giugni (2007) that the “joint-effect” model, 
whereby movement mobilisation and other actions must combine with relevant 
opportunities in order to have some (policy) impact, gives the best explanation for 
outcomes of movement campaigns.  None of the cases showed EUSMO actors who 
believed they could secure impacts on the basis of their actions alone – nor did they feel it 
safe to leave their interests purely in the hands of institutional actors once expressed.  The 
outcomes displayed in these cases cover only two of the three types of outcomes that were 
envisaged in the model: access and policy outcomes.  However, only two access outcomes 
were seen in the cases, one at the end of the second phase of the coexistence campaign 
(hence its inclusion in the table as a separate case), and one in the Lisbon campaign.  The 
first was mostly attributed to the campaigning groups’ actions, while the second was 
attributed to the Luxembourg presidency’s predisposition for the campaigning groups’ 
claims, since the meeting sought with the campaigning groups fell towards the beginning of 
the campaign.  This means that conclusions cannot be drawn for access outcomes alone, 
since these two instances point in different directions.  The second phase of the coexistence 
campaign will nevertheless be included as an instance of a ‘desired’ outcome in the 
following discussion.     
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Table 13: Campaign outcomes by variable 
                                                                                        Campaigns 
                                                                      Variables 
 
 
C
oex t1 
C
oex t2 
R
EA
C
H
 
Lisbon 
B
olkestein 
t1 Bolkestein 
t2
Strong frame throughout? + - ++ - + ++ 
Dialogue with national level? ++ ++ - - ++ ++ Shared Frames 
Framing work? ++ ++ - + - - 
Dialogue with 3rd parties (natural partners) + + + + + + 
Information provision? - - N/A ++ ++ ++ 
Multi-level design exploited (national level 
campaign)? ++ ++ ++ - ++ ++ 
Separation of powers ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Coalitions within institutions N/A N/A N/A - ++ ++ 
Claims included? - ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Intra-elite conflict N/A N/A N/A + N/A N/A 
Electoral instability N/A N/A N/A - ++ ++ 
Proximity of elections ++ ++ + - ++ ++ 
Contingent events - - +- N/A ++ ++ 
Elite allies ++ ++ ++ - ++ ++ 
Allies’ ability to fulfil promises - - ++ - ++ ++ 
Hostile elites ? - + - + + 
Fixed and 
Dynamic 
Political 
Opportunities 
Counter Movements N/A N/A N/A - N/A N/A 
Legitimacy discourse ++ ++ - +- ++ ++ 
Ideology   - - +- - + + 
Past (or contemporary) events heightening salience ++ ++ ++ - ++ ++ 
Unknown risks +- +- N/A - N/A N/A 
Precautionary principle +- +- N/A - N/A N/A 
Social Dialogue N/A N/A ++ N/A + + 
Swing to the right across EU N/A N/A - N/A + + 
Fixed and 
Dynamic 
Discursive 
Opportunities 
Movement for globalisation from below N/A N/A - N/A - - 
Access outcome  ++  ++   
Agenda outcome    ++   
 
Campaign 
Outcomes 
 Policy outcome ++    ++ ++ 
 
Key: ++ = Strong evidence / opportunity exploited / outcome; + = some evidence / threat overcome;  
+- = opportunity present but not exploited; - = no evidence / threat; N/A = not applicable to case / not 
observed; ? = unclear.   
 
Before commenting on the paths to outcomes indicated by these cases, the above table also 
serves to highlight some other interesting points.  First, the table highlights the fact that in 
 260
all of the campaigns, groups were able to overcome the problem of carrying on dialogue 
with DGs within the Commission that they did not habitually deal with, usually by seeking 
out alternative institutional partners for dialogue, or by expanding their coalitions to 
include groups more acceptable to these DGs (both of these being followed with varying 
degrees of success).  Similarly, and obviously linked with these tactics, all groups were 
able to successfully exploit the EU institutions’ separation of powers, by adopting tactics 
tailored to each institution, and, again, turning to others where faced with closed doors.  
This shows that no matter the outcome of their campaign, the groups campaigning at the 
EU level are knowledgeable and skilled in navigating the EU’s political opportunity 
structure.  Or, where some coalition groups are not so well-equipped to navigate the 
political opportunity structure of the EU, those groups that are offer their expertise.  This is 
more usually the case for national and local groups, for example those that are helped to 
notify their local GM-bans with the information provided on the GM-free Europe website 
in the coexistence campaign, but is also seen to some extent for European level groups in 
the REACH case with WECF.  The organisation of groups thus plays some role in 
achieving access outcomes in particular.  They are also all aware of the discursive 
opportunity of the legitimacy discourse, and attempt to exploit it (with the exception of the 
Lisbon campaign183).  The fact that groups are well acquainted with the EU’s political and 
discursive opportunity structures thus leads to the conclusion that it is dynamic 
opportunities and threats that make or break a campaign, as will be discussed below.    
 
This approximative summary of the cases highlights a basic core path leading to a desired 
outcome (i.e. scores are positive in the ‘successful cases’ and negative in the 
‘unsuccessful’): strong shared frames, dynamic opportunities in the shape of some 
contingent event, elite allies with the power to fulfil their promises, and – rather counter-
intuitively, the presence of hostile elites.  On the basis of the cases presented in this study, 
no desired outcome is achieved without the presence of these factors.  What this means in 
the most general terms is that both context and what campaigning groups do matters for 
campaigning in the EU: as sustained by Tarrow (1994), an opportunity alone is not enough, 
it must be perceived and exploited in order to count, and may equally be perceived and 
exploited by opponents to a campaign who may turn it into a threat, as was demonstrated in 
                                                 
183 This is listed as a threat for the Lisbon campaign, where groups spoke of the various problems they had 
encountered in being enlisted as props to support the Commission’s claims of wide consulting.  Nevertheless, 
they did also speak about how this situation could be exploited (interview 13). 
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the REACH case.  However, it also shows that political threats in particular are more 
important than the campaigning groups’ efforts: even where strong shared frames and a 
national level campaign are present (I will argue that the latter is also important below) 
serious dynamic political threats render these impotent.  The presence of elite allies as a 
necessary component in campaigning has also been widely proven in the literature (for 
example: Tarrow 1990; Kitschelt 1990; Giugni and Passy 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998).   
 
The cases included in this study also suggest that elite and powerful allies outweigh the 
presence of hostile elites.  Indeed, the two social campaigns provided evidence for the 
premise that hostile elites may even be positive for campaigns.  This is not likely to be a 
generalisable result, in that it is very much linked to the decision to launch strong national 
level campaigns with the aim of targeting the Council (see below).  Without the contingent 
circumstance of the debates over the Constitutional Treaty, however, these national level 
campaigns may not have been so strong and, in any case, the coexistence case shows us 
that a strong national campaign without a supportive context is not enough to guarantee an 
outcome.  In addition, the coexistence case also demonstrates that where hostile elites are 
not balanced with powerful allies, these contribute to scupper the campaign, usually pushed 
on by some contingent event.   
 
Continuing this discussion of the factors that support this core path, the cases that attained 
their desired outcomes were also all characterised by the campaigners’ ability to overcome 
problems with dialogue with the Commission (see above); by their strong national 
campaigns; their ability to exploit the EU’s multi-level design and separation of powers; 
the exploitation of elections (whether imminent or distant); and by previous or 
contemporary campaigns that heightened their salience.  Strong national campaigns have 
already been linked to both the ability to exploit the EU’s political opportunity structure 
and as reactions to the threat of hostile elites.  In this sense, they are in my opinion as well 
as that of the interviewees inextricably linked to successful campaigning in the EU 
arena.184  Issue salience also comes up as an important boon to a campaign, in that all of 
those that saw outcomes also benefited from a heightened salience due to other campaigns, 
whether previous or contemporary – this point is bolstered by the REACH campaign’s lack 
of an outcome if we consider the simultaneous counter campaign as a discursive threat in 
                                                 
184 This also corroborates the comments by Hellferich and Kolb (2001) mentioned in chapter one. 
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this sense.  These themes will be explored further in the text below, in which I will discuss 
in more detail the conclusions that may be drawn with reference to each of the variables 
employed in this study.  Before tackling this, however, a word on the proximity of 
elections, which also appear as beneficial to campaigning.  It is difficult to draw 
conclusions on this point, since for each campaign, and indeed within each campaign (as 
all, with the exception of the Lisbon campaign, include the summer 2004 elections and 
change of Commission) the proximity of elections was different – all of the cases bar 
Lisbon began before elections and finished after, while Lisbon took place almost one year 
on from elections.  Other elections in member states also had repercussions for campaigns, 
for example the German elections that took place during the REACH campaign.  All that 
can be said is that awareness of how to exploit the opportunities offered by an election, and 
perhaps even more so of a new and fresh Commission, is important in EU level 
campaigning.  The comments made below on dynamic political opportunities also apply 
here.   
 
7.3.1 Shared frames 
 
In chapter one, three aims were described for the frame analyses.  These were designed to 
uncover the presence of strong and durable frames, dialogue between the national and 
European levels enabling a multi-level campaign and, finally, evidence of framing work 
between groups through mechanisms such as frame bridging and diffusion.  Frame bridging 
was described as the most important point for indicating the construction of collective 
identities, and therefore as positive for outcomes, following theories of national level social 
movements.  In the event, however, framing work was not only a difficult trait to locate in 
the cases presented in this study (going against the assertions of, for example, della Porta 
and Rucht 2002:7), it also appeared, contrary to my expectations, to be relatively 
unimportant for the campaign outcomes.  Following the logical path of the claim that 
collective identity (operationalised here as shared frames) is essential to the success of 
social movement campaigns in that it facilitates mobilisation (e.g. della Porta and Diani, 
1999:14-16), it would be expected that evidence from the frame analyses showing that 
understandings were built between groups, would have a positive influence on the 
campaign outcomes sought by the protagonists.  Yet the actual results of these analyses for 
each of the case studies appear to refute this hypothesis.  The case that shows the highest 
levels of framing work between groups, the coexistence case, and that showing the most 
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close-knit temporary coalition, the REACH case, both lack positive outcomes defined as 
the goals sought by the campaigning groups.  The ‘successful’ social cases, on the other 
hand, both demonstrate that while frames are essentially shared, there is no evidence of 
their being built, leading to the conclusion that they are the result of previous work through 
more deeply rooted and permanent coalition structures (the Social Platform and the ETUC).    
This apparent finding falls into line with the opinions of interest representation scholars, 
who rate shared values as relatively unimportant to short-term, issue-oriented coalitions 
(Warleigh 2000:240).  However, a closer look at the case evidence shows that although the 
hypotheses are refuted, shared frames still play an important role in securing outcomes.   
 
These observations lead to two possible, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
conclusions.  The first has already been mentioned: that political and discursive 
opportunities are more important for these case outcomes than shared understandings 
within the campaign coalitions.  In other words, without (creating) a favourable context, or 
in the presence of an unalterably hostile context, a campaign will not see the desired 
outcome.  I shall discuss which political and discursive opportunities in particular seem to 
be the most important in the next section.  In terms of conclusions relating solely to shared 
understandings, these observations also seem to point to the conclusion that building 
coalitions for separate campaigns is less effective than drawing on more permanent 
coalition structures – an observation that ties in with the importance attached to the 
presence of strong frames throughout a campaign.  The environmental groups that spent 
more time on building coalitions and developing arguments did not do so well as the two 
campaigns that drew on existing coalitions based on many years of work towards 
developing shared understandings.  Looking at the evidence in this light, it can be said that 
shared frames are in the end important for outcomes, but not so directly as hypothesised in 
chapter one.  The years of work that the social groups put in to form their permanent 
coalition structures provided them with important resources that helped secure their desired 
campaign outcomes.  Because they did not need to spend time building frames, they were 
able to mobilise quickly and effectively when faced with threats.  Overall then, shared 
frames are important in securing outcomes – strong frames throughout the campaign were 
factors common to all three of the cases displaying outcomes, and dialogue enabling multi-
level campaigns was present for two.  It rather underscores the fact that shared 
understandings that can simply be tapped into seem to be more useful.   
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This conclusion goes against the reasoning of social movement theory developed for the 
national level, but corroborates findings in the literature about the difficulties of building a 
collective identity in transnational social movements (let alone a temporary single issue 
coalition).  Here, theorists have stressed the point that the views of collective movement 
identities as described in much of the nationally based literature are too all-consuming and 
exclusive.  At the transnational level identities that are more connected to individuals and 
more tolerant of differences, multiple organisational alliances and such like are important.  
Only such tolerant, or ‘multi-layered’ (Hunt and Benford 2004) identities will allow many 
organisations to come together in one transnational movement.  In forging new, loose 
identities based on individual or organisational contributions and collectively constructed 
meanings, transnational movements of movements may be bound together (della Porta 
2003b).  In keeping with the findings on framing work presented here, Rucht (1999:207) 
has asserted that “Transnational movements hardly exhibit a distinct collective identity as 
opposed to national movements.  It is best to conceptualize different layers of identities 
which are not mutually exclusive.  Thus a single group can be at the same time part of a 
local, national and international movement.”.  Unfortunately, the limited frame analyses 
carried out here do not allow any more detailed conclusions – a wider study of identity 
formation between the European and national levels over longer periods of time, and 
including more national contexts, would certainly be a fruitful theme for further research.    
 
7.3.2 Political opportunities 
 
Turning to political opportunities, and their apparently pivotal role in determining the 
outcomes of EU campaigns (Hellferich and Kolb 2001:158), it is instructive to begin from 
a comparison between the environmental and social cases.  Both of the environmental cases 
showed similarities in terms of important political threats - these came from hostile elites 
(DGs within the Commission), and from open - to the point of becoming endless - dialogue 
with third parties.  Comparing these circumstances with the more effective campaigns in 
the social cases, hostile elites were also a factor for both of these, although obviously to a 
lesser degree.  More interestingly, if we concentrate less on the presence of hostile elites 
and more on the lack of elite allies, then we can note that in the two social cases elite allies 
were indeed present, even if hostile (though less powerful) elites were too, whilst the 
reverse is true of the environmental cases.  More explicitly, in the environmental cases, 
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hostile DGs in the Commission proved formidable threats to each because the Commission 
had an important role in both.  Elite allies, on the other hand, were where present not ‘able 
to fulfil their promises’, in other words they did not dispose of the power to decide the 
outcomes of the campaign.  In the two social cases, hostile elites were also present: the 
Commission President in the Lisbon case, and Commissioner Bolkestein in the case of the 
same name.  However, allies were present in the institutions that mattered more for the 
outcomes of each of these campaigns: the presidency in the Lisbon case, and the socialist 
group in the European Parliament (as well as this institution more generally) in the 
Bolkestein case.  In terms of the hypothesis posited in chapter one, which stated that where 
campaigns were dealing with their ‘natural partner’ DG in the Commission they would see 
a helping hand and vice versa, these findings belie such a simplistic statement.  The cases 
show that a hostile DG in the Commission can sometimes kick start a national-style 
campaign with effective results where other powerful targets are available, underlining the 
importance of the perception of political opportunities and threats.  Following the ideas 
presented by Gamson and Meyer (1996:283-7), the presence of a hostile elite can allow 
those arguing the benefits of a more extra-institutional approach to a campaign to frame 
their case more strongly – as the elites are already hostile, more will be lost by doing 
nothing extraordinary than may be lost by doing so.  The more general finding that allies 
are more important than enemies, on the other hand, concurs with other studies using 
political process approaches which conclude that the presence of elite allies is paramount 
for a successful movement (albeit with the added condition that these elite allies hold the 
power to make the decision sought) (for example: Tarrow 1990; Kitschelt 1990; Giugni and 
Passy 1998).    
 
Turning to the role of open dialogue with third parties, in particular with the Commission, 
it is first and foremost interesting to note that in both of the environmental cases, where the 
Commission played an important role, what was overall judged to be a structural political 
opportunity of the EU in chapter one (albeit with significant connotations in terms of 
knowledge production) turns out to be a threat.  Similarly, the apparent threats posed by a 
Commission apparently closed to all dialogue as seen in the two social cases turn out to be 
blessings in disguise, as they prompt groups to use apparently more successful grassroots 
tactics.  All of the cases also show that EUSMO coalitions also use many different types of 
tactics to target the EU in an attempt to exploit its multi-level structure, in line with recent 
findings by della Porta and Caiani (2007), who underline that SMOs tend to combine both 
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‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies in such efforts.  Together, then, the four cases provide 
some anecdotal evidence overturning the widely shared idea that the EU arena, with its 
Commission so open to dialogue, means that campaigns directed more towards lobbying 
actions and the Commission will be more effective in the EU arena.185  This observation 
will be discussed at greater length below.  A final point that I wish to make in connection 
with political opportunities and the EU arena is a more general one.  Looking at the four 
cases presented here, it is also interesting to note that in all four not only can we only 
identify one pivotal political opportunity or threat that appears to have been a very 
important factor (albeit still one among several) in the outcomes of each campaign, but 
every one of these is a dynamic, that is a case-specific rather than a structural political 
opportunity or threat.  The evidence presented here thus points to the conclusion that it is 
dynamic political opportunities that make or break a campaign although, as seen most 
clearly in the Bolkestein case, where this is an opportunity it must be exploited.  Keck and 
Sikkink, albeit at the domestic level, posit a similar conclusion in their work on 
transnational campaigns (1998:202).   In more straightforward terms, a healthy dose of luck 
is also paramount to a successful campaign outcome.  
 
In terms of the theoretical contribution to the study of political opportunity in the EU, the 
nuanced approach to identifying these as laid out in chapter one of this study also draws 
attention to the importance of remembering that within the EU, as within the national state, 
different issues will meet with different opportunities according to a plethora of 
circumstances, and according to which institution, or even department or committee within 
an institution, they come up against (Warleigh 2000:236, Balme and Chabanet 2002:44).  
Just as national arenas should not be considered unitary, neither should the EU arena – 
attention needs to be paid to each individual institution as well as dynamic contexts in order 
to explain why apparently similar campaigns see different outcomes in apparently similar 
contexts.  As Keck and Sikkink put it, “By disaggregating national states into component – 
sometimes competing – parts that interact differently with different kinds of groups, we 
gain a much more multidimensional view of how groups and individual enter the political 
arena.  (…) These theoretical approaches travel well from domestic to transnational 
relations precisely because to do so, they do not have to travel at all.  Instead, many 
transnational actors have simply thrown off the fictions of the unitary state as seen from the 
                                                 
185 See in particular Marks and McAdam 1996, della Porta and Kriesi 1999, for a more general view Smith et 
al 1997 
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outside” (1998:32). 
 
This said, one improvement to the categories presented for guiding the identification of 
dynamic political opportunities at the EU level presented in chapter one would clearly need 
to be made for future work.  This is of course the rather vague category of contingent 
events.  As seen in the case studies, many of the circumstance classified as contingent 
events could also be fruitfully discussed under other headings.  The negative WTO and ECJ 
rulings of the coexistence case could be included in a new category of transnational hostile 
elites (accompanied by a partner category for transnational allies), while the unexpected 
attitudes of the new member states observed in both the coexistence and Bolkestein cases 
could also be discussed as elite allies.  Nevertheless, the category still remains valid for 
those events that were both unexpected and are difficult to subsume under other headings.  
The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the nature of the debate over the same in 
France, for example, I would argue to be best classified as contingent events.  Obviously 
further study is necessary in order to properly respecify this category and, if necessary, 
create other additional categories to be included in the indicators for dynamic political 
opportunities.   
 
7.3.3  Discursive opportunities 
 
In the social cases similarities were seen in the linking of arguments to the Constitutional 
Treaty on the one hand, and to the Bolkestein Directive on the other, and for both more 
generally to ‘Social Europe’.  In the environmental cases however it was noted in that the 
technical nature of the issues made it difficult for the groups to translate the importance of 
the campaigns back to the national level.  Mobilising the national level was difficult, whilst 
it was in comparison relatively easy for the social campaigns.  Yet blaming this difficulty 
purely on the technical discourses of the environmental cases does not quite fit.  While for 
the Lisbon campaign it was possible to use broader and less complicated slogans, even if 
the actual content of the Lisbon agenda is not entirely straightforward, this was certainly 
not the case (at least at the beginning) for the Bolkestein campaign.  Here, the main 
complaint was the risk of social dumping as a result of the ‘country of origin principle’ – 
not exactly a crystal clear concept for most of us.  The difference between the cases could 
suggest that discursive threats springing from technical language only hold where the 
Commission has a larger role.  This interpretation also confirms the view of the 
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Commission as an institution that tends to break down complicated issues into series of 
limited, technical questions (Mazey and Richardson: 1993), thereby making it difficult to 
convey the ‘bigger picture’ of the Union's direction to its citizens.   
 
The successful mobilisations enjoyed in the social cases also suggest an alternative (or 
additional) observation.  While it must be noted that these cases are very unique in terms of 
a highly favourable context, it is also true that their outcomes concur with those who have 
noted a resurgence of social or traditionally left-wing questions in Europe more generally 
(della Porta:2007; Mathers 2007).186  Continuing that line of thought, it is then also logical 
that issue salience is of fundamental importance.   Indeed, a glance at the Eurobarometer 
surveys for the years covered by the four cases (from about 2001 to 2006) reveals that 
social questions and in particular fighting unemployment have consistently topped the list 
of the issues judged to be most important in Europe.  Thinking in particular about the 
successful transferral of this social argument to the REACH case by the industry lobby 
provides anecdotal evidence that the generally higher salience of social issues in the EU 
during the period of the campaigns contributed to the case outcomes.  Which also leads us 
to think about the possibility that the environmental campaigns, had they taken place today 
during a period of particularly high salience for climate change and other environmental 
issues, might have met with more favourable outcomes.  
 
These reflections on traditionally left-wing questions and their salience bring our attention 
to the ideas introduced in chapter one about the role of ideology in the European sphere.  
The hypothesis here was that non-ideological subjects (i.e. the environmental/public health 
cases), that easier to split into series of small, technical questions, and to some extent stamp 
out the broader questions surrounding the subject, would have an advantage in that they 
would theoretically find a ready ear amongst actors of all political colours, with the reverse 
applying for the more traditional ideological issues (i.e. the social cases).  The evidence 
about this hypothesis provided by the cases is somewhat confusing.  The coexistence case 
                                                 
186 Della Porta (2007) notes the revergence to contentious methods by trade unions in recent years in response 
to issues linked with globalisation, citing, for example, strikes in the UK, Spain, France, and Germany.  
Mathers (2007) asserts that the 1997 marches against unemployment marked the beginning of a new wave of 
contention by labour against the neo-liberal EU, a wave subsequently pursued through the European Social 
Forum.  It is interesting to note that while these authors see the global justice movement as a new home for 
(national) organised labour, the cases presented here show that EU level organised labour considers this 
movement more of a threat than an opportunity.  Mathers (ibid) does note that the ETUC’s more timid stance 
vis-à-vis this movement comes despite its having been involved in the organisation of the first European 
Social Forum in Florence.   
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appears to overturn the idea, showing instead that environmental questions can be highly 
politicised, although not along the left-right continuum.  REACH, on the other hand, while 
showing once again that allegedly environmental issues can easily be made ideological (as 
a result of the work of the industry lobby), refutes the idea that non-ideological issues may 
fare better.  On the contrary, the industry lobby’s work in placing the debate firmly in the 
ideological sphere is important to the outcome of their campaign.  However, it was also 
noted that industry were careful to appeal to both left and right with different arguments.  
Turning to the social cases, Bolkestein was characterised by a carefully orchestrated 
attempt to avoid ideology at the European level, while ideology was ‘brought back in’ at 
the national level with more traditional left wing trade union marches.  Lisbon, on the other 
hand, did not include any specific actions on ideology, since the broad nature of the Lisbon 
agenda appeals to all political parties – this almost equates to a lack of ideology once more.   
 
The apparent conclusions that may be drawn from the evidence provided by the cases about 
the role of ideology is, however, not as mixed as may first appear.  The importance of 
ideology, understood in the sense of ranging issues along the left-right continuum, in the 
REACH and Bolkestein cases (and, in a more passive way, in Lisbon) show that ideology 
does indeed provide a source of potential threats to European campaigns.  In these two 
cases, the industry counter movement and the campaigning groups respectively worked 
carefully to ensure that their arguments would either appeal to both left and right wing 
actors, or to distance themselves and their arguments from their left-wing roots and beliefs.  
The fact that groups worked to overcome discursive threats proves the importance of 
ideology.  That said, the hypothesis on the non-ideological nature of environmental and 
public health issues is disproved.  The two environmental cases clearly show that such 
issues can become both ideological (REACH) and extremely controversial (GMOs) thereby 
politicising apparently small and technical questions.  The final and more general assertion 
of the ideology hypothesis was that the nature of the policy area structures the debate 
around the issue, and the form of the campaign, in the sense that environmental cases 
would be limited to more technical issues, and social cases to broader questions of 
ideological import.  Here, the cases provide limited support for such a statement, since 
despite the roles of ideology in the environmental cases, these can be said to have been 
shaped by more technical or scientific debates on detailed questions, with campaigning 
groups relying more on scientific reports and arguments than on protest.  The opposite can 
be said of the social cases, both of which saw campaigns (again, overall) characterised by 
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the importance of mass mobilisation.   
 
A final comment related to discursive opportunities that was raised by the social cases 
concerns the role of the ETUC, a social partner, in the outcomes of these.  As noted above, 
this actor is viewed by other groups at the European level as an organisation with particular 
influence over the EU institutions as a result of its position as a social partner, and is 
therefore considered an important member of campaign coalitions (for similar findings see 
Hellferich and Kolb 2001:157).  Yet interviewees either from the ETUC or from member 
and other interested organisations mention on several occasions that being a social partner 
means little now, since they consider that either their views are not taken into account or 
that the process is overlooked by policymakers.  Partly as a result of this, the organisation 
is seen to employ protest as an important tactic in its repertoire at the European level, 
belying its image as a rather timid, or co-opted actor in the EU (Martin and Ross 2001; 
Mathers 2007; Balme and Chabanet 2008:243).  This situation may suggest two things 
about this organisation: that it is becoming a more confrontational actor at the European 
level in that it is becoming more able to effectively mobilise individual members; and that 
to some extent it is taken more seriously by European institutions when it engages in these 
confrontational tactics alongside its more usual lobbying and participation in the social 
dialogue.  In this sense, the organisation provides additional evidence on the relevance of 
the legitimacy discourse in that shows of numbers contribute to its levels of influence in the 
EU arena.   
 
The cases also back up ideas about the kinds of ‘division of labour’ between more and less 
confrontational groups expressed, for example, in Gamson and Meyer (1996:288-9) in 
relation to the legitimacy discourse and access to the Commission.  This division came to 
the fore most clearly in the coexistence case, where ample evidence showed that more 
confrontational groups, in this case Greenpeace, were less satisfied with their relationships 
with the Commission than less confrontational groups such as the EEB.  Greenpeace, 
although they do not abandon their contacts with the institution, are aware and wary of 
their bureaucratic politics, noting that groups such as theirs, “which defend the general 
interest”, are placed in the same ‘stakeholder’ box alongside industry groups (interview 1) 
for the good of that institution’s reputation.  The Lisbon case also showed that social 
groups were very aware of these politics, where groups are to some extent used to the 
Commission’s advantage in return for privileged access.  Yet here again a similar division 
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exists between groups that see this as all fair and good, and those that see a threat of 
cooptation, and once more that division seems to fall along the lines of more and less 
confrontational groups.  These observations on the legitimacy discourse provide further 
support the idea that different kinds of organisations, with different strengths in terms of 
repertoires of contention, are helpful in mounting multi-level European campaigns. 
 
 
7.3  Broader conclusions: technical vs. political?   
 
I shall now discuss some possible broader connotations of these conclusions on 
campaigning in the EU.  While these comments are necessarily much more speculative, 
they are still interesting for discussion and open up potential paths for further research.  In 
chapter one of this study an approach for looking at varying opportunity structures was 
described.  One of the theoretical assumptions of this approach was that EUSMOs were 
likely to relegate the business of protest to other members of their extended networks, since 
this was a tactic seen in the literature to be more effective at the national or local level.  
EUSMOs would adopt tactics more suited to the European opportunity structure (i.e. 
lobbying), as the EU can be said to provide more opportunities for the latter, whilst 
presenting barriers to the former (della Porta and Kriesi 1999).187  As already mentioned, 
when we look at the four cases together they seem to provide some evidence overturning 
this idea that the EU arena, with its Commission so open to dialogue, means that campaigns 
directed more towards lobbying actions and the Commission will be more effective in the 
EU arena (Marks and McAdam 1996, della Porta and Kriesi 1999), although it should be 
stressed that overall, the cases do not suggest that protest is a tactic used as often as 
lobbying – on the contrary, all interviewees stressed that both tactics may be useful, but 
neither on its own will secure an impact (see also Cornwall et al 2007, Beyeler and Kriesi 
2005:107).  A wide range of tactics are used in the campaigns studied here,188 thereby 
                                                 
187 Della Porta and Caiani (2007:2-3) draw an interesting parallel between these conclusions and the empirical 
focus of scholars.  “..in the studies of protest, the emerging images are often influence by the empirically 
observed objects.  Thus, research on protest events reported in the (national) press has supported the realist-
intergovernmental image of the dominant role of the nation state, which remains the target of most protest.  
Research on the activities of public interest groups in the European institutions point, instead, to the 
emergence of a new polity.”  This renders the current study, which looks precisely at the coalitions acting 
along both of these lines, all the more useful in providing a more nuanced and accurate picture of the roles of 
protest and lobbying in EU campaigns. 
188 “.. a closer look at campaigns reveals that their action repertoire is much wider.  Depending on the 
campaign’s stage, they may focus on providing information, bargaining, lobbying, or seeking alternative 
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challenging the view of defined types of actions for different kinds of groups put forward 
by Balme and Chabanet (2002:89).  Yet it should still be noted that lobbying is still the 
major tactic used at the EU level (e.g. della Porta and Caiani 2007, Marks and McAdam 
1996, 1999), where levels of protest are low, albeit slowly increasing (Imig and Tarrow 
2001, Balme and Chabanet 2002:52).   
 
The evidence provided by the ‘successful’ social case studies instead points towards the 
idea that the most important political opportunities are still essentially provided by national 
actors within member states (an idea also expressed by many other scholars, for example 
Lahusen 1999:190, Rucht 2001:135, Imig and Tarrow 2001:18, Hellferich and Kolb 
2001:156, Tarrow and McAdam 2005:121), and that more traditional mobilisations, in 
particular when carried out at different territorial levels, are therefore the most effective 
where the Commission’s role is smaller.  In this sense the deduction that protest is an action 
more effective for national targets is not in any way shown to be untrue as a result of these 
studies.  What is highlighted, however, is that it is wrong to assume that national targets are 
purely national, and not sometimes part and parcel of the European level itself.  The cases, 
particularly Bolkestein, demonstrate that national protests and debates can in reality be a 
coordinated part of wider actions that are European in nature and scope.  They also seem to 
provide evidence that partly refutes one of the hypotheses presented in chapter one, which 
stated that groups that do not engage with the Commission may face problems in that they 
have not brought their message to the European level sufficiently early on.  On the 
contrary, the social cases show that more contentious campaigning brought their messages 
to the EU level with much greater force and more effect (therefore confirming the part of 
the hypothesis that stated they would have more opportunities at later stages as a result of a 
better relationship with their grassroots members).189 
 
This lesson can equally be transferred to the environmental cases.  Returning to the 
hypothesis mentioned above, these provide some proof of the remaining part of that 
                                                                                                                                                    
solutions – a wide range of activities that cannot be subsumed under the label of protest.  Research attention 
must be paid to the full array of activities in which the campaigners are involved.” (della Porta and Rucht 
2002:8).  The campaigns included in this study aim to pay attention to all the activities of the campaigning 
groups, even if conclusions about the role of protest are especially interesting.  
189 The social cases would also appear to provide proof to Burstein’s (1999) theory, also mentioned in chapter 
one, that groups with better relations with grassroots members may hold more sway in the Parliament and 
Council, both of whom are ultimately subject to re-election and thus more likely to be concerned about public 
opinion (Burstein 1999), represented to some extent by these groups.  Keck and Sikkink also highlight the 
importance of including national and local groups in transnational campaigns (1998:206).   
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statement, that is that groups who become ‘partners in dialogue’ with the Commission may 
find it hard to maintain good contacts with their grassroots members.  It was argued, 
particularly in the REACH case, that the resources sunk into engaging with the 
Commission in various dialogues did just this, pulling them too far away from their 
grassroots members, and sucking them into highly technical arguments hard to use when 
attempting to mobilise at the local and national levels.  Or, more pessimistically, we may 
also suggest that the Commission purposely appears to be open in order to stifle more 
public voices in semi-closed discussion forums, pulling them away from grassroots 
activities and thus ensuring that they seem to listen to all whilst really following their own 
agenda.  Either way, this would lead to the more radical conclusion that the Commission is 
the institution to avoid where significant change is sought by a campaign, implying that the 
national level and the Council(s) may prove a more fruitful path.190   
 
Coming back to the idea that the most important opportunities are still offered by the 
member states, the cases may also be said to begin to reveal a split between campaigns 
focussing on more technical issues at the EU level – i.e. the two environmental cases – and 
those focussing on more politically charged (in the sense of traditional ‘high’ politics 
affecting the distribution of goods) issues – i.e. the two social cases, in that they show some 
kind of pattern in types of actions for each of the categories.  In the ‘technical’ campaigns, 
convincing various actors is seen as a matter of science rather than politics – many 
interviewees were careful to underline the fact that the subject matter was beyond left and 
right.  This is certainly the case for the coexistence campaign, where the main target is the 
supposedly non-political Commission, but also for the REACH case where the main target 
is the European Parliament.  Here, interviewees stressed that the real challenge in 
convincing MEPs was not their political affiliation, but their committee affiliation.  While 
those sitting on the environment committee were seen as more or less on side no matter 
their ideological leanings, those from the internal market and industry committees were 
seen to be more sympathetic to arguments related to economic threats than human health or 
environmental ones.  Another example may be drawn from the coexistence campaign, 
where the red-green controlled Upper Austrian regional government joined forces with the 
socialist Tuscan authorities.  In addition, both campaigns feature the heavy use of scientific 
                                                 
190 This also raises points about how engaging with the Commission can move groups away from the work 
they would like to carry out towards the kind of knowledge production or project work the Commission 
requires.  There can be little choice for groups seeking funding between these two paths. 
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reports in campaigning efforts, rather than the more political tools of demonstrations and 
petitions.191  The two campaigns studied here may offer an additional explanation for the 
relative lack of protest seen at the European level by environmental groups (Rucht 2001), 
one that differs from the usual array of constraints also experienced by social and other 
types of groups.  Rucht lists these as, among others, the continuing importance of national 
channels for mobilisation (also acknowledged here), the appropriateness of lobbying in the 
EU arena as opposed to protest (discussed above), financial support from the Commission, 
the career ambitions of lobbyists, the difficulties of transnational coordination, lack of 
material resources, the opacity of the EU system to ‘ordinary’ people, the lack of a pan-
European public sphere, and the non-immediate threats posed in questions of European 
legislation (Rucht 2001: 135-9).  These are all valid obstacles to protest at the EU level but, 
as Rucht himself points out, are not restricted to the experiences of environmental groups.     
 
However, the technical nature of legislation is not restricted to environmental issues.  The 
real contrast lies in the fact that the social campaigns both sought to target more traditional 
political actors at both the European and national levels. The Lisbon agenda campaign 
concentrated its efforts on governments in the sense that its main target was the European 
Council.  Tellingly, the tools it used to achieve this were very linked to the national level, 
as already mentioned.192  The Bolkestein campaign, on the other hand, is a highly 
interesting (although not a common) example of political work at both European and 
national levels together.  Interviewees stressed that since the socialist group in the 
European Parliament could be more or less relied upon to support trade union positions, 
much lobbying work was directed to convincing the centre and centre-right groups of the 
Parliament.  At the same time, political parties as governments were targeted from the 
national level, and the European Council from the EU level, in various demonstrations.  
Thus, both of the most successful campaigns presented in this paper were careful to mirror 
the structure of the EU itself – a structure in which the member state, and by knock-on 
effect the political party – is still perhaps the most powerful entity. 
                                                 
191 It is interesting to note that the split between working on technical EU policy and working on  
campaigning is often reproduced in the staff structures of EU environmental groups - those working on policy 
do not campaign, those who campaign do not work on policy.  In light of the conclusions drawn here, this 
raises the problem of reconciling these two crucial aspects.  
192 In this sense, the social campaigns also seem to disprove the impression that “EU social policy is notable 
for its commitment to social dialogue, its promotion of social partnership and the involvement of civil society 
actors” (Daly 2006:464).  They seem to provide further proof of the ETUC’s new role as a more contentious 
EU actor as suggested by Bieler (2005:479) rather than the co-opted social partner (Martin and Ross 2001). 
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In a nutshell, it would appear that where the EU issue in hand is to do with ‘low’ politics, 
i.e. more technical issues, it is difficult for EU social movement organisations to exploit the 
mobilisation opportunities offered by the national arena.193  Or, it may be that the national 
level is more easily exploited in social campaigns because of previous social mobilizations 
at the national level on related issues, using similar types of actions. The strong trade union 
movement traditions in some western European countries spring immediately to mind here.  
The same mobilizing potential does not exist – or at least not to the same extent or manner, 
where more 'technical' campaigns are concerned (these being mostly the preserve of the 
more recent and qualitatively different ‘New Social Movements’).  The salience of the 
issue at stake, as discussed earlier, also comes into play here – referring once again to 
Rucht, this author notes that in comparing farmers’ and environmental campaigns on EU 
issues, the immediacy of the effects of the issue under debate was a central difference that 
could explain the higher levels of protest among farmers (Rucht 2001:139).  This is also 
reflected in the structure of EU decision-making itself, where the intergovernmental 
institutions have the most power over decisions with immediate effect in the member 
states.  Other high-profile campaigns that have known a high impact have also targeted the 
intergovernmental aspects of the EU, such as the integration of a gender equality clause in 
the Treaty of European Union, which also saw  “multilevel action coordination” (see 
Helfferich and Kolb 2001).  A broader conclusion than observing that the most important 
opportunities are still offered by the member state level could thus be that social movement 
campaigns at the EU level are shaped (more than any other factor) by the institution that is 
the most powerful or active on the subject concerned.  Sikkink (2005) posits a similar 
conclusion in her finding that domestic structures continue to shape transnational 
interaction, while Tarrow and della Porta (2005) also not that international opportunities 
can be expressed in domestic arenas.  This idea would also fit well with the observation 
made earlier about the importance of dynamic political opportunities as compared to 
political opportunity structure.  If a campaign is molded by the institution it must logically 
target in order to gain the outcome it seeks, then of course dynamic opportunities become 
paramount. 
 
                                                 
193 This may be related to Keck and Sikkink’s finding that deforestation campaigns that moved away from a 
definition of the issue in technical and scientific terms towards one focussing on social relations ultimately 
had a greater impact (1998:141-50, 161). 
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These comments concerning dialogue with the Commission as a threat and the split 
between technical and political campaigning are of course cautious, but they do raise 
questions that are certainly worth investigating.  Overall, although the conclusions 
presented here are difficult to generalise because they are based on such a limited number 
of cases, they do find confirmation in the existing literature on both EU and wider 
transnational campaigns, and provide at least some preliminary response to those who 
lament the lack of studies highlighting the causal mechanisms leading to movement 
impacts (e.g. Cornwall et al 2007, Caniglia 2001).  The conclusions drawn at the end of 
their edited volume on transnational movements by Smith and Bandy (2005), for example, 
recall many of the points made throughout this study.  Beginning from a concept similar to 
the EUSMO, the transnational movement network, the authors also point out the validity of 
IGOs for encouraging such organisations (ibid:233), as well as the advantages of proximity 
for regular communication between movement organisations (ibid:234).  More specifically, 
concerning the national level, Bandy and Smith also draw attention to the importance of 
pre-existing national movements and mass mobilisation, a point that was underlined in this 
study as central to the outcomes of the coexistence, Bolkestein, and Lisbon cases, and as 
one of the reasons behind the non-outcome of the REACH case.  Issues of cooptation at the 
EU level as a threat to mobilisation are also mentioned, as is the finding echoed here on the 
potential backlash against such co-opting efforts from grassroots groups (ibid:235).  
Finally, while many of the authors’ comments centre around the problems arising in 
coalitions involving groups from both the global north and the global south, the advantages 
of open, flexible, more permanent coalition structures that allow ample time for the 
discussion of controversial points and the slow but steady formation of common 
understandings and frames between groups who nevertheless retain their specific identities 
are expressly underlined (ibid:238, 244-5).     
 
Ruzza’s (2004) findings on EU level campaigning are also mirrored in some of the 
comments mentioned here.  Although this author aims to explain the long term fortunes of 
three distinct European level ‘movement advocacy coalitions’ (environmental, anti-racist, 
and regional), his descriptions of how these coalitions work in the EU arena, as well as of 
the peculiarities of the EU institutions resemble those included in this study.  Ruzza also 
analyses impacts by paying attention to framing and other decisions internal to movements 
as well as contexts understood as political opportunities (2004:139), and concludes that 
issue salience (especially in national contexts), the presence of elite allies (termed 
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institutional activists),  and “institutional set-ups” were paramount in the different 
outcomes achieved by the three movements he considers (ibid:140).  Ruzza also underlines 
the relevance of the member state level as part of the European level, stating that without 
public support at this level movement issues are unlikely to be picked up in the EU sphere, 
where movement organisations are used by institutions as conduits to acquiring greater 
legitimacy.  This leads to the observation that the EU can never be considered as a simple 
sphere where the relation between an institution and an impact is obvious – an interaction 
between national politics, EU elites, and EU policy communities is a necessary 
combination where change is seen (ibid:166).  The point that the EU, or indeed its 
institutions, must not be considered as simple units of analysis, is also one of the main 
conclusions drawn here.    
 
In lieu of a more traditional conclusion, it seems to me to be more appropriate to note that 
as I finish writing, fishermen from Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are protesting in 
Brussels, giving another indication that protest is possible in the bureaucratic monolith of 
the EU, even if lobbying is still the main tactic employed by most groups active at that 
level.  The possible role of EUSMOs in making the EU a less distant and 
incomprehensible, or even a more democratic, institution is another avenue of research that 
gains merit in light of the current study.  As Warleigh (2000:231) has noted, if such groups 
have no influence on policy, they are unlikely to have any role in such processes.  The fact 
that some of the cases included here show that a European issue can mobilise the national 
and local levels of membership of these organisations means that there may be some role 
for them in ensuring at least input legitimacy in the EU.  In another perspective, Eder and 
Trenz speak of the kinds of EUSMO coalitions studied here as agents that increase 
deliberation in the EU.  The kind of collective claims making observed in the cases 
included in this thesis, it is argued, constitute a strong public that not only provokes 
deliberation in EU institutions, but also contribute to forming new epistemic communities 
amongst citizens.  These ever stronger publics also cause EU institutions to reflect on their 
own democratic credentials, and invent new ways of including the public will – the 
Convention on the Future of Europe which was formed to draft the Constitutional Treaty is 
cited as the most striking outcome of this process to date (Eder and Trenz 2008:172).  In 
the same volume, Kohler-Koch also discusses EUSMOs’ potential contribution to 
participation and citizenship.  Despite reservations, especially about the real levels of 
individual engagement in European campaigns, she argues that where a group is dependent 
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on its members’ expertise, carries out campaign actions at both the EU and the national 
levels, and uses both conventional and unconventional actions, then proper member 
participation can be achieved (Kohler-Koch 2008:264).  The social cases detailed here both 
fulfil these requirements, adding another piece of empirical evidence to support the 
possible role of EUSMOs in EU democracy.  Indeed, the high turnouts at the protest 
marches described in the Bolkestein case even provide evidence of some level of individual 
engagement. If nothing else, the accounts of the relatively recent cases contained in this 
study increase our bank of knowledge on European campaigns.   
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Appendix I – Frame Grids 
 
 
European level T1  – Coexistence campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
Frame 
 
 
PR FoEE, GP, EEB 
3/3/03 
 
 
 
FoEE Biotech Mailout 
05/03 
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D Condemn Commission Communication – avoiding responsibility or breaking law by not legislating. 
Title; Para. 1; 
Para. 4 
Title; Para. 1; Para. 3 
Para. 7 7 
P EU level co-existence legislation demand Para. 2; Para. 3; Para. 4; Para 5 Para. 1;  Para. 7 6 
P Polluter Pays principle / establish liability for GM growers 
Para. 3; Para. 4 Para. 5; Para. 9 
Para. 10 5 
D Contamination risks / contamination inevitable / Contamination irreversible 
Para. 2; Para. 2; 
Para. 5 
Para. 1; Para. 2 
5 
D Increased costs (farmers / non-GM products) Para. 3; Para. 5; Para. 5 Para. 9 4 
D Environmental damage / threat to biodiversity Para. 5 Para. 2; Para. 7 3 
D Consumers / farmers rights to choose Para. 2 Para. 2; Para. 8 3 
D Seed Purity Para. 2 Para. 9 2 
M Member States have asked Commission for EU legislation Para. 1 Para. 4; 2 
M Majority consumers do not want GM Para. 5  1 
D Coexistence not only an economic issue (health and environment) 
Para. 1  
1 
D Labelling and traceability laws will become meaningless Para. 4  1 
P Keep moratorium until rules in place  Para. 11 1 
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European level T2– Coexistence campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
 
PR FoEE, GP, EEB 
23/07/03 
 
 
Declaration of the 
Network of GM-
free Regions 
4/11/03 
 
 
PR FoEE and 
AER 
14/9/04 
 
 
Conference conclusion 
manifesto AER, Genet; 
FoEE 
23/1/05 
 
 
Petition to the 
Commission GMO-
free Europe (FoEE) 
4/2/05194 
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
P Allow / create GM free zones / regional bans 
Para. 1; Para. 3; 
Para. 4; Para. 5 Para. 2; Para. 13 Para. 1; Para. 2; Para. 2 Para. 1; Para. 4 11 
D 
Contamination risks / 
contamination inevitable / 
Contamination irreversible 
Para. 1; Para. 2; 
Para. 3; Para. 4 Para. 9; Para. 10 Para. 6; Para. 7  Para. 2 9 
D 
Quality food products / 
organic / products of 
designated origin 
 Para. 5; Para. 6; Para. 7; Para. 9 Para. 6; Para. 9 Para. 7  7 
P EU level legislation demand  Para. 11 Para. 1; Para. 2 Para. 9 Para. 4 5 
P 
Polluter Pays principle / 
establish liability for GM 
growers 
Para. 2; Para. 4 Para. 12 Para. 2; Para. 8   5 
D Regional right to choose    Para. 2; Para. 7; Para. 8; Para. 9 Para. 4 5 
D Regional particularities  Para. 8; Para. 13  Para. 4; Para. 9  4 
D Seed Purity  Para. 13  Para. 3 Para. 5 3 
D Environmental damage / threat to biodiversity  Para. 5  Para.5 Para. 2 3 
D Consumers / farmers rights to choose Para. 3; Para. 5   Para. 2  3 
D Distortion of competition / internal market  Para. 11; Para. 13 Para. 1   3 
                                                 
194 Date the petition began to be circulated for signature, not date of submission to the European Commission. 
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D Criticise opacity of GM authorisation process   Para. 3; Para. 4; Para. 5   3 
D 
End of organic / non-GM 
food and farming if current 
approach taken 
Para. 3 Para. 9    2 
D 
Uncertainty of scientists / 
information on safety of 
GMOs 
   Para. 6 Para. 2 2 
P Keep moratorium until rules in place   Para. 2  Para. 5 2 
P Urge Member States to go against Commission advice Para. 1; Para. 3     2 
M 
GM-free movement 
widespread and widely 
supported 
  Para. 6  Para. 1 2 
M Majority consumers do not want GM Para. 5   Para. 7  2 
P Precautionary Principle   Para. 2 Para. 6  2 
P Subsidiarity principle  Para. 3; Para. 11    2 
D 
Condemn Commission 
Recommendation – 
avoiding responsibility or 
breaking law by not 
legislating. 
Title; Para. 1; 
     1 
D Increased costs (farmers / non-GM products)     Para. 2 1 
P Clearly defined safety measures   Para. 2   1 
D Co-existence nearly impossible    Para. 8  1 
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European level T3 – Coexistence campaign 
 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
 
PR EEB, FoEE, GP, 
EuroCoop, IFOAM EU 
21/3/05 
 
 
Conference statement of 
support 
AER FoEE 
17/5/05 
 
 
Conference PR Consumers 
International 
9/9/05 
 
Genet, AER, Foundation on 
Future Farming Conference 
report web page 15/1/06 
T
O
T
A
L
 
M 
GM-free movement 
widespread and widely 
supported 
Para. 2  Para. 6 Para. 1; Para. 1; Para. 3 5 
P Allow / create GM free zones / regional bans  Para. 3 Para. 2 Para. 2; Para. 4 4 
D 
Contamination risks / 
contamination inevitable / 
Contamination irreversible 
Para. 5  Para. 1; Para. 3  3 
M 
Scientific evidence / 
examples of GM 
contamination 
  Para. 3; Para. 4  Para. 4 3 
D Reject concept of co-existence as possible    
Para. 1; Para. 3 Para. 4 
3 
D 
Condemn Commission  
recommendation – avoiding 
responsibility or breaking 
law by not legislating. 
Para. 1; Para 4; Para 4    3 
D Regional right to choose  Para. 3  Para. 3 2 
D Consumers / farmers rights to choose  Para. 3 Para. 1  2 
P Keep moratorium until rules in place  Para. 1 Para. 2  2 
D Seed Purity Para. 7 Para. 3   2 
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P EU level legislation demand  Para. 1; Para. 2   2 
P 
Polluter Pays principle / 
establish liability for GM 
growers 
 Para. 3; Para. 3   2 
D 
Quality food products / 
organic / products of 
designated origin (must 
protect or more important) 
 Para. 3   1 
M Majority consumers do not want GM Para. 7    1 
D Environmental damage / threat to biodiversity    Para. 3 1 
D 
End of organic / non-GM 
food and farming if current 
approach taken 
   Para. 3 1 
P 
EU co-existence legislation 
including right to GM-free 
zones 
Para. 6195  
  
1 
D Increased costs (farmers / non-GM products)  Para. 3   1 
P Clearly defined safety measures  Para. 2   1 
P Precautionary Principle  Para. 3   1 
M 
(New) Commission should 
listen to public opinion and 
change (old) Commission 
approach 
Para. 1    1 
D Threats to organic farming jobs Para. 8    1 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 NB – Comment in a quote by EEB representative 
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National level T1 – Coexistence campaign  
 
 
                            Frame 
 
 
Document 
PR FoE France196, EEB, GP 
4/3/03 
 
PR FoE UK 
5/3/03 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D Condemn Commission Communication – avoiding responsibility or breaking law by not legislating. Title; para. 1; para. 3;  Title; Para. 1; 5 
P Polluter Pays principle / establish liability for GM growers Para. 2; para. 5; Para. 6; Para. 2; Para. 6 5 
D Majority consumers do not want GM Para. 6; para. 9 Para. 3; Para. 5 4 
P EU level co-existence legislation demand Para. 4; para. 4; Para. 6; para. 9  4 
D Increased costs (farmers / non-GM products) Para. 5; para. 9; Para. 5 3 
D Environmental damage / threat to biodiversity Para. 9 Para. 2; Para. 5; 3 
D Coexistence not only an economic issue (health and environment) Para. 3; Para. 2; 2 
D Contamination risks / contamination inevitable / Contamination irreversible Para. 1; Para. 4;  2 
D Consumers / farmers rights to choose Para. 2; Para. 4  2 
D End of organic / non-GM food and farming if current approach taken Para. 4; para. 5  2 
P Clearly defined safety measures Para. 2; para. 7;  2 
P Seed Purity Para. 4  1 
D Member States have asked Commission for EU legislation Para. 2;  1 
D Labelling and traceability laws will become meaningless Para. 8  1 
M GM-free movement widespread and widely supported  Para. 2 1 
D European Commission say contamination should be allowed.  Para. 3 1 
D Studies showing problems created by GM  Para. 2; 1 
                                                 
196 Reproduces (but changes wording and order slightly) of EU-level document. 
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D No impact assessment  Para. 4 1 
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National level T2 – Co-existence campaign 
 
 
 
                            
Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
 
PR FoE UK 
(FoE, GP, 
EEB197) 
23/7/03 
 
 
Petition FoE 
France, 
BioCoop 
06/03198 
 
PR FoE UK  
29/10/03 
Leaflet Comuni 
Antitransgenici 
Italy 2nd 
National 
Conference 
16/4/04 
PR FoE UK 
22/4/04 
Newsletter ‘Les 
avancees de la 
lutte contre les 
OGM Attac 
France 4/8/05 
PR FoE UK 
23/2/05 
TO
TA
L 
D 
Contamination risks 
/ contamination 
inevitable / 
Contamination 
irreversible 
Para. 8  
Para. 11; para. 
12; para. 13; 
para. 15; Para. 
11; para. 13; 
para. 15 
  Para. 5; Para. 7  Para. 3; Para. 4 12 
M 
GM-free movement 
widespread and 
widely supported / 
growing 
Para. 4; Para. 7  Para. 1; para. 3; Para. 5  
Para. 1; Para. 1; 
Para. 2; Para. 4 Para. 1; Para. 2  11 
P 
Polluter Pays 
principle / establish 
liability for GM 
growers or biotech 
Para. 9 
Para. 18; Para. 
21; para. 27; 
Para. 27 
    Para. 4 6 
D 
End of organic / 
non-GM food and 
farming if current 
approach taken 
Para. 6 Para. 1; para. 3; para. 15; para. 25      5 
P 
Allow / create GM 
free zones / regional 
bans 
Para. 8    Para. 1; Para. 5 Para. 4  4 
                                                 
197 FoE UK press release referring to press release by FoEE, EEB, and GP. 
198 The petition is accompanied by a 4 page document – hence the great number of frames.  The document is much longer than the others.  This is taken into account in the 
analysis. 
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P EU level legislation demand  
Para. 27; Para. 
27   Para. 1; Para. 5   4 
D 
Consumers / 
farmers rights to 
choose 
Para. 6; Para. 10      Para. 1; Para. 4 4 
D 
Studies showing 
problems created by 
GM 
 Para. 7; Para. 8; para. 8; para. 14      4 
M Majority consumers do not want GM Para. 10    Para. 7  Para. 3 3 
D 
Should not expose 
people or land to 
unknown risks / 
preserve health 
  Para. 5 Para. 2; Para. 3    3 
D 
Uncertainty of 
scientists / 
information on 
safety of GMOs 
 Para. 4; Para. 7; Para. 8      3 
D 
Increased costs 
(farmers / non-GM 
products) 
 Para. 3; Para. 15; para. 16;      3 
D 
Examples GM 
growers losing 
licence and not 
gaining 
compensation 
 Para. 19; para. 20; para. 24      3 
D 
Condemn 
Commission 
Recommendation – 
avoiding 
responsibility or 
breaking law by not 
legislating. 
Para. 1 Para. 22      2 
D 
Environmental 
damage / threat to 
biodiversity 
 Para. 3   Para. 6   2 
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D 
GM produced by 
logics of power and 
profit 
 Para. 6    Para. 8  2 
D 
Legitimate 
opposition of 
citizens and local 
authorities should 
not be / is being 
ignored 
     Para. 5 Para. 4 2 
D 
Need to promote 
agriculture that 
respects the 
environment, 
farmers, etc. 
   Para. 1  Para. 8  2 
P Keep moratorium until rules in place  
Para. 27; Para. 
27      2 
P 
Urge Member States 
to go against 
Commission advice 
Para. 2; Para. 6       2 
D 
European 
Commission say 
contamination 
should be allowed. 
Title; Para 2;       2 
P 
European 
Commission open 
door to regional 
bans 
Para. 3; Para. 7       2 
D (Economic value of) quality food    Para. 1; Para. 1    2 
M 
Commission under 
pressure to allow 
GM free zones 
    Para. 3   1 
M 
FoEE have launched 
gmofree-europe.org 
to highlight 
initiatives 
    Para. 4   1 
D Against GMOs    Para. 1    1 
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D Regional right to choose Para. 10       1 
D Cite other health scares (BSE etc.)    Para. 1    1 
D Seed Purity Para. 9       1 
D Protect biodiversity    Para. 1    1 
P 
Use European 
legislation to create 
GM-free zones 
  Para. 4     1 
P Precautionary Principle  Para. 4      1 
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D 
Organic Farmers 
will have no 
protection from 
contamination 
 Para. 3      1 
D 
Studies show GM 
crops do not give 
higher yields / 
reduce need for 
pesticides etc. 
 Para. 5      1 
D No longer any proof of benefits of GMOs      Para. 8  1 
D GMOs damage local economy     Para. 6   1 
D French govt. must stop field trials      Para. 5  1 
D 
French govt. must 
oppose GMOs in 
EU meetings 
     Para. 6  1 
D 
Call for proper 
implementation of 
the Cartagena 
Protocol 
     Para. 7  1 
M 
Attac supports all 
local initiatives 
against GMO open 
field trials 
     Para. 9  1 
D 
US trying to force 
GMOs on EU 
through WTO 
dispute 
      Para. 2 1 
D 
UK govt. will allow 
GMOs withough 
proper safeguards 
      Para. 4 1 
D Call for stricter rules       Para. 4 1 
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National level T3 – Coexistence campaign 
 
 
                                  
Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
French Coalition AlterCampagne199 
Open letter to MPs for GM 
referendum 18/6/05 
PR Which?; FoE UK; SA; GP 
UK; 5 Year Freeze; GeneWatch 
UK. 
21/3/05 
 
Legambiente (Italy) 
PR GMOs – Coexistence 
Impossible 
22/03/05 
ICPPC (Poland) – 
PR Polish Marshals want 
GMO free Poland 
9/9/05 
TO
TA
L
 
GM-free movement widespread 
and widely supported Para. 5 Para.  6; Para. 7 Para. 6 4 
Contamination risks / 
contamination inevitable / 
Contamination irreversible 
Para. 1 Para. 2  Para. 3; Para. 4 3 
Quality food products / organic / 
products of designated origin 
(must protect or more 
important) 
Para. 3  Para. 3; Para. 4 Para. 2 3 
Regional right to choose Para. 5  Para. 7 Para. 7 3 
Majority consumers do not want 
GM  Para. 6 Para. 1; Para. 5 3 
Coexistence recommendations 
legally flawed  Title; Para. 1; Para. 3   3 
EU level legislation demand  Para. 6 Title; Para. 1;  2 
Polluter Pays principle / 
establish liability for GM 
growers 
Para. 3; Para. 3    2 
Call for withdrawal of 
recommendations  Para. 1; Para. 6   2 
                                                 
199 AlterCampagne day of action against GMOs.  Letter from coalition made up of Agir pour l’environnement, Confederation Paysanne, Greenpeace, Federation Nationale de 
l’Agriculture Biologique, Attac, Friends of the Earth France. 
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Call for national referendum on 
GMOs Title; Para. 5    2 
Allow / create GM free zones / 
regional bans Para. 4    1 
Consumers / farmers rights to 
choose  Para. 7   1 
Environmental damage / threat 
to biodiversity    Para. 4 1 
End of organic / non-GM food 
and farming if current approach 
taken 
 Para. 8   1 
EU co-existence legislation 
including right to GM-free 
zones 
  Para. 3  1 
European Commission say 
contamination should be 
allowed. 
 Para. 9   1 
Majority Member state 
governments against GMOs   Para. 3  1 
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European Level T1 – REACH Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
Joint Letter to Commission  
EEB BEUC FoEE Greenpeace WWF 
25/10/02 
PR EEB FoEE Greenpeace WWF 
7/5/03 
PR EEB FoEE Greenpeace WWF 
BEUC EPHA WECF  
8/7/03 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D (Angry) Commission delaying reform 
Title; Para. 2 Title; Para. 1; Para. 2; Para. 4; Para. 5  7 
P Substitution and / or Phasing out of hazardous chemicals 
Para. 3 Para. 6 Para. 3; Para. 5 4 
P 
Public wants hazardous chemicals 
phased out / protection from 
hazardous chemicals 
 Para. 5; Para. 7 Title 3 
M Recall EP and Council support for White Paper 
Para. 4 Para. 3  2 
D 
Evidence of accumulation of 
chemicals in people and 
environment 
 Para. 1 Para. 4 2 
D Concerned by influence of business Title; Para. 2   2 
D Concerned radical reform will not take place 
Para. 1; Para 2   2 
D NGOs blame President for failing to take leadership 
 Para. 1; Para. 4  2 
D Commission failing to act on hazardous chemicals  
 Title; Para. 1  2 
M Submit most widely supported contribution to consultation 
  Para. 1; Para. 6 2 
P Insist on legislation applying to all chemicals 
Para. 3   1 
M Recall EU heads of state and govt. request for leg. By 2004 
Para. 4   1 
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M 
OSPAR convention commitment to 
cease emissions of hazardous 
substances by 2020 
Para. 4   1 
M 
Water Framework Directive 
requires phase out of hazardous 
substance within 20 years 
Para. 4   1 
M Further delays will compromise commitments 
Para. 5   1 
D 
Oppose internet consultation (but 
support public consultation in 
general) 
Para. 5   1 
D Oppose futher impact analysis Para. 6   1 
D REACH must not become subject to ‘paralysis by analysis’ 
Para. 6   1 
D Call for publication without further delay 
Para. 7   1 
D No compromise of original proposal 
Para. 7   1 
D Text fails to endorse key components of regulation 
 Para. 1  1 
D Human health and environment at stake 
 Para. 1  1 
D 
Delay caused by internet 
consultation will lead to delay of at 
least a year 
 Para. 2  1 
D Internet consultation a result of industry pressure 
 Para. 2  1 
D Commissioners have backed down on crucial components of reform 
 Para. 3  1 
D Proposed system will not encourage a sustainable industry 
 Para. 3  1 
D Hazardous chemicals found in common consumer products 
 Para. 6  1 
D 
Call on Commission to protect 
health and envi from hazardous 
chemicals 
  Para. 2 1 
D Demand Commission listen to the people 
  Para. 3 1 
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P 
Hazardous chemicals should only 
be used temporarily where use 
essential and no substitute available 
  Para. 3 1 
P Full right to know what chemicals are in products 
  Para. 3 1 
P Imported products must conform to EU safety standards 
  Para. 3 1 
D Recent scientific report endorses need for reform 
  Para. 5 1 
M Declaration in favour of REACH by US organisations 
  Para. 6 1 
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European Level T2 – REACH Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
PR EEB FoEE 
Greenpeace 
WECF EPHA 
29/10/03 
PR EEB EPHA 
EEN FoEE 
Greenpeace 
WECF WWF 
??/09/04 
PR EEB FoEE 
Greenpeace 
EEN WWF 
17/1/05 
PR EEB EEN 
FoEE 
Greenpeace 
WECF WWF 
??/03/05 
PR FoEE 
Greenpeace 
23/09.05 
PR EEB EEN 
EuroCoop 
FoEE 
Greenpeace 
WECF WWF 
17/11/05 
PR EEB 
EEN FoEE 
EuroCoop 
WECF 
Greenpeace 
WWF 
13/12/05 
PR EEB 
EEN 
EuroCoop 
FoEE 
Greenpeace 
WECF 
WWF 
27/6/06 
T
O
T
A
L
 
P 
Need substitution and / or 
Phasing out of hazardous 
chemicals 
Para. 3 Para. 5; Para. 7  Para. 2; Para. 3  Para. 2 Para. 5; Para. 5  
8 
P Industry information to be audited independently 
 Para. 5; Para. 9  Para. 2; Para. 5; Para. 
5 
    
5 
P 
Hazardous chemicals should 
only be used temporarily 
where use essential and no 
substitute available 
 Para. 5; Para. 7  Para. 2; Para. 3     
4 
P Sufficient information must be publicly available 
 Para. 5; Para. 11  Para. 2; Para. 4     
4 
P 
Imported products must 
conform to EU safety 
standards 
 Para. 5; Para. 10  Para. 2; Para. 6     
4 
D Statement against ‘adequate control’ 
Para. 3; Para. 5 Para. 7  Para. 3     
4 
D 
Proposal excludes many 
chemicals from proper 
safety assessment 
 Para. 8  Para. 4 Para. 6    
3 
D Proposal waters down White Paper 
Para. 6 Para. 4   Para. 6    
3 
D 
Proposal waters down White 
Paper in response to 
business demands / pressure 
Para. 2 Para. 4     Para. 5  
3 
P 
Import rules to protect 
consumers and prevent 
distortion of competition 
 Para. 5; Para. 10  Para. 6     
3 
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D 
Failure to provide 
information will make 
substitution impossible 
     Para. 3; Para. 5 Para. 4  
3 
P 
Strengthen registration 
procedures (close gap in 
safety information) 
 Para. 5; Para. 8  Para. 4     
3 
P Health and enivronment must be aims  of REACH 
 Title; Sub-title 1; 
Para. 1 
      
3 
D 
Regret exemption of many 
chemicals from need to 
provide information 
     Title; Para. 1; Para. 
4 
  
3 
D 
Commission compromise 
would slash safety data 
requirements for even more 
chemicals, duty to provide 
info etc. 
    Para. 2; Para. 3; 
Para. 4 
   
3 
D Criticise UNICE’s proposals for REACH 
  Title; Para. 1; Para. 2      
3 
D 
Council leave door open for 
many toxic chemicals even 
where safer alternatives 
exist 
      Para. 3 Para. 2 
2 
D 
Council vote to reduce 
safety data requirements  
and many dangerous 
chemicals will remain on the 
market 
      Para. 4 Para. 3 
2 
D 
REACH provides 
opportunity for industry to 
take responsibility for 
chemicals safety 
 Para. 9  Para. 5     
2 
D 
Speed up procedure for 
obtaining information / 
current procedure slow 
 Para. 11  Para. 7     
2 
D/P Proper information..or safer alternatives will be sidelined 
 Para. 7  Para. 3     
2 
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D/P 
Proper information..or 
consumers will continue to 
be exposed to unacceptable 
risks  
 Para. 7  Para. 3     
2 
D 
Proposal will allow 
continued accumulation of 
chemicals in people and 
goods 
Para. 3 Para. 6       
2 
D 
Proposal does not stop use 
of hazardous chemicals in 
goods 
Para. 7 Para. 6       
2 
D 
Statement against 
Commission paper for a 
compromise on REACH 
    Title; Para. 1    
2 
D Council ignore EP on substitution 
       Title; Para. 2 
2 
D First reading REACHwill not improve current system 
       Para. 1; Para. 2 
2 
D EP vote an important step towards substitiution 
     Title; Para. 1   
2 
D Disappointed with Council decision 
      Title; Para. 1  
2 
P Full right to know what chemicals are in products  
   Para. 2; Para. 7     
2 
D 
Commission puts producers’ 
interests before public 
health and environment 
Para. 1; Para. 4        
2 
P Citizens’ health must come first 
Para. 5; Para. 8        
2 
D Call on EP / MEPs to strengthen proposal 
Para. 8 Title       
2 
D (Angry) Commission delaying reform 
Para. 2        
1 
P 
Substitution needed to 
prevent build-up of 
chemicals in our bodies and 
environment 
     Para. 2   
1 
D Currently lack information on 90% substances 
     Para. 3   
1 
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D 
REACH following EP vote 
will not deliver health and 
environmental protection 
     Para. 5   
1 
D 
Council have unique 
opportunity not to be 
sacrificed for business 
interests 
     Para. 6   
1 
D 
Council rejection of EP 
decision will mean little 
change from current flawed 
system 
      Para. 2  
1 
D 
Urge EP to reaffirm 
substitution at second 
reading 
       Para. 3 
1 
P 
Only with substitution, duty 
of care and access to 
information will 
environment benefit 
       Para. 4 
1 
D 
Lack of safety data will 
mean more scares like baby 
milk scare 
      Para. 4  
1 
D Commission watering down own proposal 
    Para. 1    
1 
D Commission giving way to industry pressure 
    Para. 1    
1 
D 
Accuse Verheugen and 
Barroso of sabotage of 
REACH 
    Para. 2    
1 
D New Commission paper upturns principle of REACH 
    Para. 3    
1 
D Paper would mean risks remain unknown 
    Para. 3    
1 
D 
Paper would mean an 
overburdened chemicals 
agency 
    Para. 3    
1 
D 
Verheugen happier to 
defend polluters that health 
and environment 
    Para. 5    
1 
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D 
Verheugen / Commission 
holding democratic process 
in contempt 
    Para. 5    
1 
P Substitution will cut costs for treating diseases 
      Para. 5  
1 
P 
Substitution needed to 
protect health and 
environment 
      Para. 5  
1 
P System must be transparent    Para. 2     1 
P 
Improved procedure for 
access to information 
throughout the supply chain 
   Para. 7     
1 
P Presence of chemicals should be labelled 
   Para. 7     
1 
P 
NGOs’ 5 points crucial for 
protection of health and 
environment 
   Para. 1     
1 
D 
Many chemicals may not 
carry enough safety 
information 
Para. 3        
1 
D 
Proposal overturns existing 
EU principles in other 
legislation (workers’ 
protection and envi. 
Legislation) 
Para. 3        
1 
D 
Right to live and work in a 
healthy environment must 
not be compromised 
Para. 8        
1 
D Call on Council to strengthen proposal 
Para. 8        
1 
D 
Public believes chemicals 
matter for health and 
environment 
 Para. 2       
1 
D Research has linked chemicals to diseases 
 Para. 2       
1 
D Current legislation fails to regulate 
 Para. 2       
1 
D REACH is the right framework for regulation 
 Para. 3       
1 
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D 
Without strengthening 
proposal will not benefit 
environment and health 
 Para. 4       
1 
D 
UNICE proposal would 
reduce scope of legislation – 
allow use of hazardous 
chemicals 
  Para. 3      
1 
D 
UNICE proposal on risk-
based prioritisation no better 
than current system 
  Para. 4      
1 
D UNICE against mandatory data-sharing, bad for SMEs 
  Para. 5      
1 
D 
UNICE attitude to 
authorisation would lead to 
ongoing accumulation of 
chemicals in humans and 
environment 
  Para. 6      
1 
D 
First reading REACH will 
not protect people and the 
environment 
       Para. 1 
1 
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European Level T3 – REACH Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
Key priorities  
EEB EEN 
EuroCoop FoEE 
Greenpeace WECF 
WWF 
??/07/06 
PR EEB EuroCoop 
FoEE Greenpeace 
HEALi WECF 
WWF 
10/10/06 
PR WWF FoEE 
Greenpeace EEB 
14/11/06 
PR WWF EEB FoEE 
WECF EuroCoop 
HEAL Greenpeace 
1/12/06 
PR WWF EEB FoEE 
WECF EuroCoop 
HEAL Greenpeace 
13/12/06 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D 
Council text / Council EP 
deal allows contined use of 
dangerous chemicals even 
where safer alternatives 
exist 
  Para. 1; Para. 6; Para. 7 Para. 1; Para. 4  
5 
P 
Need substitution and / or 
Phasing out of hazardous 
chemicals 
Para. 2; Para. 8    Para. 5 
3 
P 
Chemical industry 
responsibility for safety / 
duty of care 
Para. 4; Para. 8 Para. 3    
3 
D Statement against ‘adequate control’ 
   Para. 2; Para. 2 Para. 5 
3 
D REACH risks failure due to Commission indecision 
  Title; Para. 2; Para. 5   
3 
D 
Deal confirms substitution 
for persistent and 
bioaccumlative chemicals 
   Para. 3 Para. 2 
2 
D Deal allows public to request information 
   Para. 3 Para. 2 
2 
D 
First reading / deal 
REACHwill not improve 
current system 
  Para. 7 Para. 5  
2 
D Call on decision-makiers to improve the text 
Para. 6 Para. 4    
2 
                                                 
i Health and Environment Alliance, previously the EPHA Environmental Network (EEN). 
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D EP vote leaves REACH alive but in critical condition 
    Title; Para. 1 
2 
D Denounce EP Council deal on REACH 
   Title; Para. 1  
2 
D Urge Commission to take an active role 
  Para. 4; Para. 8   
2 
D Finnish compromise ignores EP demands 
  Para. 1; Para. 6   
2 
D Verheugen supports substitution 
  Para. 3; Para. 8   
2 
P 
Provide information 
sufficient to identify 
dangerous chemicals and 
safer alternatives 
Para. 3; Para. 8     
2 
D 
REACH and chemicals 
agency need intensive care 
to ensure protection of the 
public 
    Para. 4; Para. 6 
2 
D Proposal waters down White Paper 
Para. 1; Para. 6     
2 
D 
Proposal waters down White 
Paper in response to 
business demands / pressure 
Para. 6 Para. 4    
2 
D 
EP committee vote an 
important step towards 
protecting health and 
environment 
 Title; Para. 1    
2 
P Full right to know what chemicals are in products  
Para. 5; Para. 8     
2 
D 
Leaders must choose to 
protect health and 
environment of waste the 
opportunity 
Para. 1     
1 
P 
Hazardous chemicals should 
only be used temporarily 
where use essential and no 
substitute available 
Para. 2     
1 
D Legislation a first modest step to regulation 
    Para. 2 
1 
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D Commission only institution to not debate substitution 
  Para. 3   
1 
D 
Growing discontent with 
Barroso’s passive approach 
within the Commission 
  Para. 3   
1 
D 
REACH risks failure after 
Finnish presidency’s 
compromise solutions 
  Para. 1   
1 
M Call on EP to strengthen proposal 
   Para. 1  
1 
D 
Deal on substitution 
(companies provide plan 
when alternative discovered) 
encourages companies to 
ignore safer alternatives 
   Para. 4  
1 
P 
REACH should close 
knowledge gaps and manage 
chemicals effectively 
   Para. 5  
1 
P 
Authorisation of hazardous 
chemicals should be limited 
to 5 years 
Para. 2     
1 
P 
Authorisations should take 
alternatives and substitution 
plans into account 
Para. 2     
1 
P Provide information on long-term effects 
Para. 3     
1 
P Provide good quality use and exposure information 
Para. 3     
1 
P Define risk management measures 
Para. 3     
1 
D Adequate control premised on a risky gamble  
    Para. 5 
1 
D 
Adequate control 
championed by chemicals 
industry 
   Para. 2  
1 
M Hazardous chemicals found in dust, blood etc. 
   Para. 2  
1 
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D 
Legislation means 
companies will have to 
provide information for 
large volume chemicals 
    Para. 2 
1 
 
D 
Loopholes leave REACH 
vulnerable to further 
manipulation by chemicals 
industry 
    Para. 6 
1 
D 
No guarantee that 3rd pary 
information on safer 
alternative will be 
considered 
    Para. 6 
1 
D 
Exemption of low volume 
chemicals (60% chemcials 
covered by REACH) 
    Para. 3 
1 
D 
Previous system allowed 
sale of almost all chemicals 
and only case-by-case 
restriction 
    Para. 2 
1 
D Loopholes allow continued use of dangerous chemicals 
    Para. 3 
1 
D Council ignore EP on substitution 
 Para. 2    
1 
D 
Bad REACH will fail to 
protect health and 
environment 
   Para. 5  
1 
D 
Bad REACH will decrease 
public trust in chemical 
industry and EU 
   Para. 5  
1 
D 
EP committee vote an 
important step towards 
substitiution 
 Para. 1    
1 
M Cross-party support for substitution 
 Para. 2    
1 
M Strong EP message to Council on substitution 
 Para. 2    
1 
D Call on EP / MEPs to strengthen proposal 
   Para. 4  
1 
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P 
Substitution needed to 
prevent build-up of 
chemicals in our bodies and 
environment 
 Para. 2    
1 
P 
Substitution needed to 
protect health and 
environment 
 Para. 4    
1 
P 
Improved procedure for 
access to information 
throughout the supply chain 
Para. 5     
1 
P Citizens’ right to ask about substances present in goods 
Para. 5     
1 
P 
Presence of chemicals of 
very high concern should be 
labelled 
Para. 5     
1 
P 
Extend list of non-
condidential information to 
cover all information 
relevant to health and 
environment 
Para. 5     
1 
P 
Industry should give 
transparent justifications 
when applying to keep 
information confidential 
Para. 5     
1 
P 
NGOs’ 4 points will deliver 
minimum level of protection 
for health and environment 
Para. 1     
1 
D 
Many chemicals will not 
carry enough safety 
information 
Para. 6     
1 
D 
Lack of safety information 
will mean registering 
without proper assessment 
Para. 6     
1 
D Little information negatively affects duty of care 
Para. 6     
1 
D 
Important decisions 
delegated to comitology 
excluding democratic 
oversight 
Para. 6     
1 
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D 
Chemicals agency 
bureaucracy increased 
without assessment of 
ability 
Para. 6     
1 
P 
Consistent authorisation in 
place for bioaccumulatve 
and persistent chemicals 
Para. 6     
1 
P 
Substitution essential to 
drive innovation of safer 
chemicals 
 Para. 2    
1 
M 
Happy EP committee voted 
for more information for 
consumers 
 Para. 3    
1 
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National Level All T – REACH Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
Letter from Dutch 
NGOs to Dutch 
MPs 
Greenpeace de 
Noordzee Stichting 
Rainwater WECF 
MNGM FNV 
Milieu Defensie 
Natuur en Milieu 
Waddenvereniging 
22/12/04 
Women and 
Chemicals Action 
Berlin 
AAK BUND 
BUNDjugend BPW 
DNR FUE NUT 
Greenpeace Grune 
Liga Berlin 
Hamburger 
Umewltinstitut 
IGUMEDi 
9/03/05 
PR REACH Under 
Attack  
FoEE Greenpeace 
Quercus 
(Portugal) 
1/7/05 
PR FoEE BUND 
Friends of the Earth 
Europe and Friends 
of the Earth Germany 
urged the 
Environment 
Committee to vote for 
a toxics free future 
4/10/05 
WECF Clean-up 
Greece 
Greek children 
demand a toxic-free 
future! 
24/10/05 
PR Greenpeace 
Germany, BUND, 
WECF 
REACH: just born, 
already weak 
13/12/06  
T
O
T
A
L
 
P/D 
Make  / health and 
environmental concerns 
should be at / the centre of 
REACH 
Para. 1  Para. 4 Para. 2; Para. 3   Para. 2 
5 
D Call for a toxic free future    Title; Para. 3 Title  3 
D Adopted REACH weak      Title; Para. 1 2 
D 
Adopted REACH will 
allow continued use of 
dangerous chemicals even 
where safer alternatives 
exist 
     Para. 1; Para. 2 
2 
 
100 gnomes carrying toxic 
symbols gathered by the 
European institutions 
   Sub-title; Para. 3   
2 
D 
Verheugen sabotage 
attempt to push polluter-
friendly plan 
  Title; Para. 4;     
2 
D Environment groups crticise Verheugen 
  Para. 1; Para. 4    
2 
                                                 
i Key: AAK = Arbeitsgemeinschaft Allergiekrandes Kind; BUND = Fund fur Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (Friends of the Earth Germany); BPW = Business 
Professional Women; DNR = Deutscer Naturschutzing; NUT = Frauen in Naturwissenschaft und Technik; IGUMED = Interdisziplinare Gesellschaft fur Umweltmedizin. 
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D 
Verheugen plans to water 
down an already weak 
REACH 
  Para. 1; Para. 8    
2 
D 
Adopted REACH weak 
because of German 
industry and government 
     Para. 3 
1 
D 
Public will learn of 
dangers of chemicals 
through disasters 
     Para. 3 
1 
D 
Industry has no incentive 
to develop safer 
alternatives with adopted 
REACH 
     Para. 3 
1 
D 
Adopted REACH offers 
scarce protection from 
chemicals 
     Sub-title;  
1 
D 
Risky chemicals allowed 
if adequately controlled 
under adopted REACH 
     Para. 4 
1 
D 
Scandalous that chemicals 
damaging foetuses 
allowed to be used under 
adopted REACH 
     Para. 4 
1 
D 
Positive that very 
persistent and 
bioaccuumlative 
substances will be 
replaced 
     Para. 5 
1 
D 
Positive that high level 
production chemicals will 
have information 
     Para. 5 
1 
D 
Positive that information 
will be available to 
consumers 
     Para. 5 
1 
M 
Groups will closely follow 
implementation of 
REACH 
     Para. 5 
1 
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D 
Blame German 
government for blocking 
substitution principle 
     Para. 1 
1 
D REACH was at least passed 
     Para. 2 
1 
D 
20,000 tests for 30,000 
chemicals covered 
weakened as a result of 
industry pressure 
     Para. 3 
1 
M 
Greek children demanded 
a ‘clean up the world’ 
decision 
    Para. 1  
1 
M Greek event attended by mayor of Athens 
    Para. 2  
1 
D 
 
Greek actions aimed at 
decisions scheduled for 
end of November by EP 
and Council 
    Para. 3  
1 
M 
Clean-up Greece 
published a brochure 
explaining the importance 
of REACH  
    Para. 4  
1 
D 
REACH heavily under 
attack from chemical 
industry associations 
    Para. 4  
1 
D 
Demant EP to resist 
pressure from industry and 
vote for a strong REACH 
   Para. 1   
1 
D 
Fear Envi committee will 
give in to influence of 
Chemicals industry 
   Para. 2   
1 
D Verheugen proposal an act of vandalism 
  Para. 8    
1 
D 
Barroso says he wishes to 
promote human health and 
environment through the 
Lisbon strategy 
  Para. 9    
1 
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D 
If attack on REACH 
succeeds will show 
Commission more 
concerned with the 
chemical industry than the 
quality of life of EU 
citizens 
  Para. 9    
1 
D 
Sabotage plan would 
provide data on only 6% 
of chemicals 
  Para. 1    
1 
D 96% chemical today have no or insufficient data 
  Para. 5    
1 
D 
Verheguen moved to force 
Dimas to accept major 
rollback of Commission 
proposal 
  Para. 2    
1 
D 
Proposal would require 
data on only 30% of 
chemicals 
  Para. 6    
1 
D 
Verheugen proposal 
would exclude 25,000 of 
the 30,000 
  Para. 7    
1 
D 
REACH doesn’t demand 
enough safety data on low 
volume chemicals and has 
too many exemptions 
  Para. 6    
1 
D 
Proposal will not come 
into force until 11 years 
after adoption 
  Para. 6    
1 
D 
Verheugen proposal 
would delay 
implementation by another 
2 years 
  Para. 7    
1 
D 
Verheugen acting while 
Parliament still discussing 
proposal 
  Para. 2    
1 
D UK Government wants a political agreement 
  Para. 3    
1 
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D 
Many toxic chemicals 
accumulate in the bodies 
of women, leading to 
diseases among women 
and their children 
 Para. 2     
1 
M Women made a huge chemical cross 
 Para. 3     
1 
M 
German Minister for 
Environment presented 
new WECF publication 
Women for a Toxic Free 
Future 
 Para. 4     
1 
M 
German Minister for 
Environment confirmed 
working in support of 
REACH 
 Para. 4     
1 
M 
German Minister for 
Environment would 
favour chemicals 
produced under 1 tonne 
per year included in 
REACH 
 Para. 4     
1 
D 
White Paper was 
sufficient to protect 
environment and health 
Para. 2      
1 
P 
Need substitution and / or 
Phasing out of hazardous 
chemicals 
Para. 3      
1 
D 
Proposal waters down 
White Paper in response to 
business demands / 
pressure 
Para. 2      
1 
D Proposal will not protect health and environment 
Para. 2      
1 
P Pre-registration of chemicals 
Para. 2      
1 
P Strong registration procedures 
Para. 3      
1 
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P Independent quality control 
Para. 3      
1 
P Equal safety requirements for imported products 
Para. 3      
1 
P Public access to safety information 
Para. 3      
1 
P 
One substance, one 
registration: i.e. 
information sharing 
Para. 3      
1 
P 
Civil society organisations 
on the management board 
of Chemicals Agency 
Para. 3      
1 
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European Level – Lisbon Campaign 
 
 
                            
Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
 
PR Social 
Platform 
9/2/05 
 
ETUC Call for 
Demonstration
16/2/05 
 
Social 
Platform 
Resolution 
for 
European 
Council 
21/2/05 
 
EAPN PR 
Day of 
Action 
3/3/05 
 
Social 
Platform, 
EEB, ETUC 
letter to 
Commission
9/3/05 
 
Social 
Platform 
PR 
Meeting 
with 
Barroso 
15/3/05 
 
ETUC PR 
Euro-
Demonstration
16/3/05 
 
 EAPN PR 
European 
Council 
16.3.05 
 
SOS 
Europe 
Petition in 
European 
Voice  
17/3/05 
 
Autism 
Europe 
Call for 
Action 
21/3/05 
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
P Balanced approach 
on all original pillars 
Para. 2 Para. 2; para. 3 Para. 2  Para. 1; Para. 
5; Para. 9; 
Para. 9; Para. 9 
Para. 2 Para. 3  Para. 2; Para. 
3 
Para. 3 14 
P Put social / envi back 
into Lisbon Strategy 
  Title; Para. 1; 
Para. 4;  
Para. 3 Para. 7; Para. 
9; Para. 9 
 Para. 1; Para. 4  Para. 4  10 
P Lisbon pillars 
mutually reinforcing 
Para. 3; 
Para. 8 
 Para. 3  Para. 5; Para. 6 Para. 2 Para. 3    7 
P Reaffirm EU 
commitment to 
social inclusion 
strategy / social 
cohesion / social 
agenda (or these are 
missing) 
Para. 2; 
Para. 3 
 Para. 2; Para. 4     Para. 1; Para. 3  Para. 3 7 
D Growth-first 
approach will fail to 
gain citizens’ 
confidence / affect 
referenda 
Title; Para. 
2 
   Para. 3 Para. 3  Para. 2   5 
P Social cohesion and 
fight against poverty 
must remain top 
priorities  
  Para.  5 Title; Para. 1; 
Para. 2 
Para. 9      5 
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D Growth-first 
hampers social 
agenda / social will 
be left behind 
Title; Para. 
2; Para. 4; 
Para. 7 
        Para. 1 5 
D Oppose spread of 
neo-liberalism / free-
trade agenda / de-
regulation 
 Para. 3; para. 4   Para. 8; Para. 
9; Para. 9 
     5 
D Commission 
approach says 
economic growth 
will automatically 
lead to social 
cohesion – not true 
Para. 8    Para. 7 Para. 4    Para. 3 4 
M Support ETUC 
demonstration 
 Para. 1  Para. 4   Para. 1    3 
P Fundamental Rights  Para. 11     Para. 2  Para. 3  3 
M Support SOS Europe     Para. 3     Para. 6 Para. 5 3 
D Need more (secure) 
jobs 
 Para. 6;    Para. 7  Para. 2    3 
D Commission shift of 
priorities / change 
from original Lisbon 
strategy / dropping 
various pillars 
Para. 3    Para. 1; Para. 
3; Para. 6 
     3 
M Oppose Bolkestein 
Directive 
 Para.  8     Para. 2; Para. 5    3 
D Social Policy / 
Environmental 
policy pushed aside 
for growth-first 
approach - against 
Para. 1     Para. 1     2 
M Social Europe 
(support, fight for, 
save) 
    Para. 7  Para. 5    2 
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P Need high level of 
social security 
 Para. 4   Para. 7      2 
D Approach abandons 
the poorest EU 
citizens 
Para. 4          1 
D Citizens losing 
confidence in 
decision-makers 
Para. 5          1 
P Reaffirm 
commitment to 
gender 
mainstreaming 
  Para. 6        1 
D Growth first other 
worries later 
outdated 
    Para. 4      1 
P More investment in 
research and training 
 Para. 5         1 
M Support social 
dialogue 
 Para. 11         1 
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National Level – Lisbon Campaign 
 
 
                            
Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
 
Belgium Social 
Forum Call to 
Demonstration 
02/05 
 
CGT (French 
Trade Union) 
Call for 
participation 
11/2/05 
 
Concord Member 
to Member 
Call for support 
03/05  
 
 
Syndicats 
(Belgian Trade 
Union 
Newsletter) 
11/3/05 
 
ACLI (Italy) 
Editorial 
15/3/05 
 
TUC (UK Trades 
Union Congress) 
PR 
19/3/05 
 
 
EAPN Ireland 
Newspaper article 
21/3/05 
T
O
T
A
L
 
M Oppose Bolkestein 
Directive 
Para. 3; Para. 3 Para. 1  Title; Para. 3; Para. 6; 
Para. 7 
Para. 2 Para. 1; Para. 2  10 
M Social Europe (support, 
fight for, save) 
Para. 3   Para. 3 Title; Para. 6 Para. 3 Para. 15 6 
D Need more (secure) 
jobs 
Para. 3; Para. 3 Para. 1  Title; Para. 3    5 
P Balanced approach on 
all original pillars 
  Para. 1; Para. 3; Para. 
4 
  Para. 2 Para. 10 5 
M Support ETUC 
demonstration 
Para. 4 Para. 1  Para. 4  Para. 3  4 
D Oppose spread of neo-
liberalism / free-trade 
agenda / de-regulation 
Para. 1; Para. 2   Para. 4 Para. 2;    4 
D Commission shift of 
priorities / change from 
original Lisbon strategy 
/ dropping various 
pillars 
    Para. 3; Para. 4  Para. 8 3 
D Social Policy / 
Environmental policy 
pushed aside for 
growth-first approach - 
against 
  Para. 1  Para. 2   2 
P Put social / envi back 
into Lisbon Strategy 
Para. 3  Para. 5     2 
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M Support SOS Europe    Para. 7  Para. 1   2 
P Fundamental Rights   Para. 4     1 
P More investment in 
research and training 
   Para. 3    1 
P Reaffirm EU 
commitment to social 
inclusion strategy / 
social cohesion / social 
agenda (or these are 
missing) 
      Para. 7 1 
D Growth first other 
worries later outdated 
      Para. 11 1 
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European Level T1 – Bolkestein Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
Joint Letter 
to Prodi 
ETUC; 
EPSU; UNI; 
ETUCE; 
ETF 
17/2/04200 
 
ETUC 
position paper
 
 
17-18/3/04 
 
UNI Initial 
Orientations 
 
 
 
17-18/5/04 
 
EPSU 
Congress 
Resolution 
 
 
15/6/04 
 
www.stopbolkestein.org 
Introductory text to the 
petition AND 
argumentation201 
 
CEEP 
Oninion 
 
 
 
1/2005 
 
CECODHAS 
Position on 
SGEIs 
 
 
2005 (not 
dated)202 
 
Social 
Platform 
Common 
Position203 
 
21/2/05 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D/P 
Commission must (or notes 
they do not currently) 
provide a more in-depth 
impact assessment. 
 Para. 8; Para. 11; 
Para. 17; Para. 
17; Para. 19 
Para. 63; Para. 65; 
Para. 82 
  Para. 3; Para. 3; 
Para. 5 
 Para. 2; Para. 
7 13 
D 
Proposal threatens collective 
agreements and national 
labour codes / workers’ 
rights.  These must stand. 
 Para. 19 Para. 9;  Para. 12;  
Para. 35; Para. 41; 
Para. 42;  Para. 
47; Para. 79 
Para. 6;  Para. 8 Para. 4;  Para. 27    12 
D 
Race to the bottom in terms 
of social standards as a 
result of directive / social 
dumping. 
 Para. 4 Para. 45; Para. 47;  
Para. 56; Para. 74; 
Para. 78 
Para. 6 Para. 24   Para. 5 9 
D/P 
Clarify relationship with 
Posting of Workers 
Directive; Exempt / Affects 
/ Weakens Posting of 
Workers 
 Para. 8; Para. 11 Para. 12; Para. 10; 
Para. 11; Para. 12 
Para. 5 Para. 26 Para. 6   9 
P 
SG(E)Is should be excluded 
from the scope of the 
directive / COP 
Para.5  Para. 15; Para. 16   Para. 4; Para. 8; 
Para. 9 
Para. 2; Para. 6  8 
                                                 
200 Relevant paragraph (5) only. 
201 These two documents, available through the website www.stopbolkestein.org, together provide the most comprehensive view of the signatories’ position.  The two documents are 
considered as one and paragraphs are numbered accordingly.  The text of the petition provided on the site is the ‘introductory text’ analysed here.  
202 This document is not dated, either on the CECODHAS website, or on the document itself.  Nevertheless, based on interview data, it can be placed in early 2005. 
203 Main title: “Keep Services social: urgent action needed on the services directive!”.  This title, and the style of the argumentation, may suggest that the document is aimed at 
members not yet active or aware of the draft services directive.  Although this document falls slightly after the first ‘phase’ identified in the campaign, it is retained here as the first 
position to come from the Social Platform, making it more comparable to the documents in the first, rather than the second, phase. 
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D/P 
COP risks abuses without 
accompanying 
harmonisation meaning 
negative economic and 
social consequences. 
 Para. 4 Para. 33; Para. 34;  
Para. 39; Para. 81 
 Para. 21 Para. 3;  Para. 5   8 
P 
Exempt healthcare (and / or 
social) services from the 
scope of the directive. 
 Para. 7 Para. 18; Para. 20;  
Para. 80 
  Para. 4; Para. 13  Para. 1;  Para. 
10 8 
P 
(No legislation until) 
framework proposal on SGI 
delivered / draft pre-empts 
SGEI debate 
 Para. 6 Para. 16 Para. 7 Para. 17  Para. 5;  Para. 6  6 
D Services directive will / could adversely affect SGI 
Para.5   Para. 2;  Para. 2  Para. 2;  Para. 4  Para. 4 6 
D 
Doubts about feasibility of 
monitoring service providers 
from the country of origin. 
 Para. 11 Para. 43; Para. 45; 
Para. 46 
Para. 4; Para. 5     6 
D Worried by / against the Country of Origin Principle. 
 Para. 4  Para. 5 Para. 23 Para. 2;  Para. 5   5 
P 
Labour and social standards 
should not be considered 
barriers to trade. 
Para.5  Para. 40; Para. 83 Para. 3; Para. 6     5 
D 
Support Lisbon strategy, 
Commission should not 
ignore sustainable growth, 
better jobs, cohesion 
  Para. 4;  Para. 7; 
Para. 77 
Para. 3    Para. 6 5 
D 
Object to all services being 
treated in the same way, 
SGIs or not / insist treated 
differently 
    Para. 15; Para. 16 Para. 4; Para. 10  Para. 1 5 
P 
Demand stronger social 
guarantees for workers (and 
consumers) / protection  
 Para. 1;  Para. 19 Para. 6   Para. 2   4 
D Demand quality SGI  Para. 19    Para. 9  Para. 1;  Para. 10 4 
P 
Member States should 
maintain the right to decide 
conditions for right of 
establishment / regulate 
service activities 
  Para. 25; Para. 84  Para. 19 Para. 10   4 
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P 
Temporary workers should 
be guaranteed same 
treatment as received by 
employees in country where 
they work / regulated 
separately / excluded 
 Para. 15 Para. 52; Para. 56;  
Para. 85 
     4 
D 
Demand proper consultation 
(with Trade Unions and 
Social Partners) 
 Para. 17;  Para. 
18  
   Para. 3;  Para. 7   4 
D Recalls importance of SGI for Social Model. 
 Para. 6  Para. 7    Para. 8 3 
D Opposed to including national healthcare systems. 
 Para. 6 Para. 18 Para. 4     3 
D Solidarity must take precedence over competition 
  Para. 1204 Para. 2 Para. 28    3 
D 
Calls on EU institutions and 
Member States to reject 
draft in its current form / 
group cannot support draft 
as it stands 
Para. 19   Para. 8 Para. 15    3 
D 
No trade or competition in 
SGI / directive will expose 
SGI to competition 
   Para. 8 Para. 2;  Para. 16    3 
D 
Supports measures aimed at 
reducing administrative 
costs and simplifying 
procedures. 
 Para. 3    Para. 1;  Para. 10   3 
D 
Difficult to predict all the / 
wide-ranging consequences 
of COP. 
 Para. 4    Para. 3; Para. 8   3 
D 
EU gives priority to market 
liberalisation, not social 
model. 
  Para. 1 Para. 1;  Para. 4     3 
                                                 
204 For EPSU, actual quote is “EPSU and ETUC are increasingly frustrated at the way that “competitiveness” is the yardstick against everything is measured and with the lack of 
progress on social Europe” (www.epsu.org/a/634). 
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P 
Public service obligations 
should not be considered 
barriers to trade / MS 
allowed to define 
Para. 5     Para. 4   2 
D 
Recognise growth potential 
in these sectors (esp. for 
new ms). 
 Para. 2  Para. 1     2 
D Notes negative effects of outsourcing. 
 Para. 2 Para. 37      2 
D Supports establishment of single points of contact. 
 Para. 3    Para. 1   2 
D 
Supports measures designed 
to protect workers, 
consumers, users, 
environment. 
 Para. 3    Para. 1   2 
D Supports provision of safer services of higher quality. 
 Para. 3    Para. 1   2 
D Directive contravenes the Treaty (various Articles). 
 Para. 5  Para. 4     2 
D Directive has repercussions for labour law. 
 Para. 8   Para. 25    2 
D/P 
Clarify relationship with / 
no compatibility with Rome 
Convention 
 Para. 8    Para. 3   2 
P 
Clarify relationship with 
national industrial relations / 
collective bargaining  
 Para. 8 Para. 82      2 
D Unacceptable to ignore the Social Dialogue. 
 Para. 18 Para. 66      2 
D 
Member states will be 
unable to check status of 
migrant workers / working 
conditions 
 Para. 12   Para. 26    2 
P 
Directive should contain 
guidelines for educating 
workers / provide for LLL 
 Para. 16 Para. 77      2 
D 
Economic development 
must come hand-in-hand 
with social development. 
  Para. 6     Para. 6 2 
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D 
Proposal encourages bogus 
self-employment / fake 
companies 
  Para. 36; Para. 37      2 
P 
No freedom to provide 
services in the private 
security sector without 
framework licensing 
principles 
  Para. 48; Para. 51      2 
P Must clarify relationship with GATS 
  Para. 72 Para. 7     2 
D 
Directive will 
commercialise all services in 
the Union 
    Para. 3; Para. 9    2 
D 
Merchandisation (sic) would 
deteriorate pension systems, 
welfare, healthcare in favour 
of private insurance. 
    Para. 4; Para. 20    2 
M 
Certain political parties and 
many groups have called to 
fight against the draft 
directive 
    Para. 5;  Para. 10    2 
D 
Very large majority of 
member states appear to 
favour rapid adoption 
    Para. 6;  Para. 11;     2 
P Exclude transport services      Para. 4;  Para. 11   2 
P Exclude postal services      Para. 4;  Para. 12   2 
P Exclude audiovisual services 
     Para. 4; Para. 14   2 
D 
Directive includes legal 
uncertainties on definitions 
of economic and non-
economic activities 
     Para. 7 Para. 1  2 
D 
Commission has at best 
sketchy knowledge of social 
services sector 
       Para. 2;  Para. 
3 2 
P Incorporate WP on SGI      Para. 7   1 
D Supports establishing transparent procedures. 
 Para. 3       1 
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P 
Demands priority to be 
given to the improvement of 
labour law. 
 Para. 8       1 
P 
Temporary agencies and 
posting of workers should 
be excluded. 
 Para. 10       1 
D 
Directive will limit MS 
control over product 
information 
 Para. 14       1 
D 
Proposal would lead to more 
deregulation and social 
insecurity 
 Para. 19       1 
D 
Establishing an internal 
market in services 
indispensable for 
completing Lisbon 
     Para. 1   1 
P 
Make it impossible to 
circumvent rules on 
establishment 
  Para. 31      1 
P Exempt gambling   Para. 60      1 
D 
Proposal will lead to strong 
negative reactions from 
people of Europe to 
integration process 
  Para. 74      1 
M 
No to a socially retrograde 
Europe, no to an 
educationally regressive 
Europe 
    Para. 1    1 
D 
Directive will deregulate 
education systems and end 
any kind of cultural 
exception 
    Para. 4    1 
M Group will approach institutions with demands. 
  Para. 76      1 
M Will build alliances to counter directive’s proposals 
   Para. 8     1 
M 
Only concerted effort by 
civilian (sic) society can 
prevent adoption 
    Para. 6    1 
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M Sign and forward Stop Bolkestein petition 
    Para. 7    1 
D 
Proposal needs to be 
coherent with proposals on 
temporary work, recognition 
of professional 
qualifications and diplomas 
     Para. 7   1 
D 
Public authorities and 
service providers are subject 
to public procurement 
obligations 
     Para. 9   1 
D 
Legal uncertainties between 
COP and obligation to 
define SGEIs through legal 
act of public power 
      Para. 3  1 
D 
Draft ignores schemes for 
prior authorisation, ECJ case 
law. 
      Para. 4  1 
P 
Directive must be modified 
to ensure social standards 
are not undermined 
       Para. 5 1 
D 
Directive undermines 
European social model at a 
time when charter of 
fundamental rights being 
included in Constitutional 
Treaty 
       Para. 7 1 
M 
Note that thousands of 
citizens have discussed and 
demonstrated against the 
directive 
       Para. 6 1 
M 
EP, MS, and Commission 
have a responsibility to 
respond to citizens’ 
concerns 
       Para. 9 1 
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European Level T2 – Bolkestein Campaign  
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
ETUC PR 
European Trade 
Unionists to 
demonstrate on 19 
March in support of 
employment and 
social rights 
19/3/05 
ETUC 
Call for the Euro-
Demonstration on 
19 March 2005 
 
 
EPSU 
Position 
The EU Directive on 
Services – a wholesale 
attack on basic 
services in Europe 
7/4/05 
www.stopbolkestein
.org 
News Headlines 
Bolkestein 
Returns… It’s Time 
for Action! 
30/9/05 
Social Platform 
Explanatory Paper 
The Services 
Directive, Services of 
General Interest 
(SGIs), and Social 
Services 
3/05 (relevant parts205)
T
O
T
A
L
 
D 
Race to the bottom in terms of 
social standards as a result of 
directive / social dumping. 
Para. 5 Para. 10 Para. 7; Para. 33; Para. 37; 
Para. 40 
 Para. 39 
7 
D 
Proposal threatens collective 
agreements and national labour 
codes / workers’ rights.  These 
must stand. 
Para. 5 Para. 12 Para. 7; Para. 24; Para. 33 Para. 3  
6 
D Worried by / against the Country of Origin Principle. 
 Para. 10 Para. 7; Para. 39  Para. 38 
4 
P SG(E)Is should be excluded from the scope of the directive / COP 
 Para. 14 Para. 38  Para. 1;  
3 
D Reject Bolkestein proposals for liberalisation 
Para. 5 Para. 9; Para. 10    
3 
D Oppose further deregulation (of labour markets) 
Para. 4 Para. 3; Para. 4    
3 
D/P More and better jobs, not longer working hours 
 Para. 2; Para. 7; Para. 9    
3 
M 
Trade unionists will demonstrate 
in support of employment and 
social rights (call for support) 
Title; Para. 1; Para. 7     
3 
M Demonstrate against Bolkestein Directive 
Para. 1 Para. 20    
2 
                                                 
205 Only the key points of the document relating to the Services Directive are coded, since the very detailed nature of the document would contribute little to the grid as a 
whole were all points to be coded – this would result in a very long list of unique frames, whereas coding the general thrust of each point allows a better comparison. 
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D 
Support completion of the 
internal market in services 
(potential job creation) 
Para. 5 Para. 10    
2 
P 
Europe needs greater investment 
in training, LLL, research and 
innovation 
Para. 4 Para. 6    
2 
P 
(No legislation until) framework 
proposal on SGI delivered / draft 
pre-empts SGEI debate 
  Para. 42  Para. 29 
2 
D Services directive will / could adversely affect SGI 
  Para. 34  Para. 28 
2 
D 
Object to all services being 
treated in the same way, SGIs or 
not / insist treated differently 
  Para. 20 Para. 2  
2 
P Europe needs flexible reform of the Stability Pact 
Para. 4 Para. 8    
2 
D/P 
Proposal deliberately vague in 
defining services / SG(E)Is – 
need clear definition 
  Para. 20; Para. 38   
2 
D 
Distinction between economic 
and non-economic services 
problematic 
    Para. 6; Para. 10 
2 
D 
Reject any reduction of the 
Lisbon goals in favour of 
business 
 Para. 4    
 
D Proposal advances cause of liberalisation 
  Para. 20   
1 
D Oppose erosion of social rights  Para. 2    1 
D Oppose spread of neo-liberalism  Para. 2    1 
P Demand a Social Europe  Para. 2    1 
D 
Protection of employment and 
social rigts must be EU policy 
priority 
Para. 3     
1 
D 
COP assumes a comparable 
environment (harmonisation) – 
this is not the case 
    Para. 39 
1 
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D/P 
Clarify relationship with Posting 
of Workers Directive; Exempt / 
Affects / Weakens Posting of 
Workers 
  Para. 36   
1 
P 
Since Posting of Workers not 
binding single market not 
possible 
  Para. 40   
1 
D 
Concerned about impact on 
quality servieces, esp. for 
accessibility and suitability for 
vulnerable groups 
    Para. 1 
1 
P 
Creation of an internal market for 
services must also achieve social 
objectives 
 Para. 13    
1 
P Need fundamental rights to strengthen social Europe 
 Para. 15    
1 
P 
Need trade union rights, 
information and consultation of 
workers, collective agreements, 
social dialogue 
 Para. 16    
1 
P 
Social Europe must include goal 
of full employment, equal opps. 
And non-discrimination 
 Para. 17    
1 
P Europe needs a pro-active social policy agenda 
 Para. 18    
1 
M Group will continue to fight for a Social Europe 
 Para. 19    
1 
P Exempt social services from the scope of the directive. 
    Para. 28 
1 
D Contradicts WP on SGIs by including SGIs in draft directive 
    Para. 26 
1 
D 
Draft endangers MS’ freedem to 
define publlic services and how 
to organise them 
    Para. 27 
1 
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D 
Including social services in the 
directive fails to implement the 
subsidiarity principle 
    Para. 30 
1 
D 
Companies will be able to set up 
letter box companies to avoid 
laws 
  Para. 35   
1 
D 
Doubts about feasibility of 
monitoring service providers 
from the country of origin. 
    Para. 40 
1 
D COP will negatively affect the quality of services 
    Para. 3 
1 
D Voluntary codes of conduct will not guarantee quality services 
    Para. 44 
1 
P 
Labour and social standards 
should not be considered barriers 
to trade. 
     
 
D 
Support Lisbon strategy, need 
balance between sustainable 
growth, better jobs, cohesion 
 Para. 4    
1 
D Any service of a certain size includes an economic dimension 
    Para. 7 
1 
D 
A social service can be 
considered economic depending 
on the context in which it’s 
provided 
    Para. 8 
1 
D 
Social service providers could 
also run economically productive 
activities 
    Para. 9 
1 
D SGIs a common value in the draft constitution 
    Para. 11 
1 
D 
SGIs part of states’ obligation to 
ensure fundamental right to lead 
a dignified life 
    Para. 11 
1 
D SGIs a central element of the European social model 
    Para. 11 
1 
D SGIs crucial to providing a base for the creation of wealth 
    Para. 11 
1 
D Member states’ rules on SGIs vary widely 
    Para. 12 
1 
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D Directive contradicts the WP on SGIs 
    Para. 25 
1 
D Directive would lead to deterioration of welfare 
   Para. 3  
1 
P 
Demand stronger social 
guarantees for workers (and 
consumers) / protection  
Para. 4     
1 
M Stop Bolkestein petition strong, thank for support 
   Para. 1  
1 
M 
Barroso gave impression that 
Bolkestein has been quietly 
dropped, but is making a 
comeback 
   Para. 4  
1 
M Outright rejection of directive off the agenda 
   Para. 5  
1 
M 
Signals sent by the European 
Parliament will be of paramount 
importance 
   Para. 7  
1 
M Urgent to put Bolkestein back on the agenda 
   Para. 8  
1 
M Pass Stop Bolkestein petition to as many people as possible 
   Para. 9  
1 
M Send Stop Bolkestein model e-mail to MEPs 
   Para. 10  
1 
D 
Requirements for freedom of 
establishment could negatively 
affect quality of SGI 
    Para. 32 
1 
P 
Member States should maintain 
the right to decide conditions for 
right of establishment / regulate 
service activities 
    Para. 33 
1 
D Draft directive will create legal uncertainty for service providers 
    Para. 37 
1 
D 
Demand proper consultation 
(with Trade Unions and Social 
Partners) 
Para. 6     
1 
D Europe must aim for full employment, trade union rights 
Para. 6     
1 
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D 
Directive would deteriorate 
pension systems, welfare, 
healthcare in favour of private 
insurance. 
   Para. 3  
1 
P Exclude energy sector   Para. 22   1 
D 
No assessment of impact on 
social services or on fundamental 
rights 
    Para. 31 
1 
D 
Directive will deregulate 
education systems and end any 
kind of cultural exception 
   Para. 3  
1 
P Professional qualifications must be comparable against EU 
  Para. 41   
1 
 
 332
National Level T1 – Bolkestein Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
FGTB & CSC (BE) 
Non a la directive Bolkestein!
PR  
7/5/04 
CGT (FR) 
Declaration on the draft 
services in the internal 
market directive206 
11/5/04 
CGIL (IT) 
Directing committee 
document on the Bolkestein 
directive 
15/12/04 
DGB (DE) 
Position on EU Services 
Directive 
06/06/04 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D 
Race to the bottom in terms 
of social standards as a 
result of directive / social 
dumping. 
Para. 3; Para. 4; Para. 6; Para. 11 Para. 9 Para. 13; Para. 18  
7 
D 
Proposal threatens collective 
agreements and national 
labour codes / workers’ 
rights.  These must stand. 
Para. 11 Para. 7 Para. 8; Para. 13; Para. 15 Para. 17 
6 
D/P 
Clarify relationship with 
Posting of Workers 
Directive / other EU 
legislation; Exempt / Affects 
/ Weakens Posting of 
Workers 
Para. 5  Para. 15 Para. 5; Para. 13; Para. 14 
5 
P 
(No legislation until) 
framework proposal on SGI 
delivered / draft pre-empts 
SGEI debate 
Para. 8 Para. 4  Para. 6; Para. 26 
4 
D 
Doubts about feasibility of 
monitoring service providers 
from the country of origin. 
Para. 5; Para. 6  Para. 15 Para. 30 
4 
                                                 
206 This statement is contained in a newsletter on the Services directive which also contains extracts from the Belgian document also analysed in this grid, proving some 
cross-national work here. 
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D/P 
COP risks abuses without 
accompanying 
harmonisation meaning 
negative economic and 
social consequences. 
Para. 7   Para. 4; Para. 34; Para. 36 
4 
D 
Object to all services being 
treated in the same way, 
SGIs or not / insist treated 
differently 
Para. 2  Para. 11 Para. 37 
3 
P 
Demand stronger / directive 
undermines social 
guarantees for workers (and 
consumers) / protection  
Para. 11 Para. 3  Para. 38 
3 
D 
Calls on EU institutions and 
Member States to reject 
draft in its current form / 
group cannot support draft 
as it stands 
Para. 11 Para. 1 Para. 8  
3 
D 
EU / directive gives priority 
to market liberalisation, not 
social model. 
Para. 3  Para. 8; Para. 16  
3 
D 
COP threatens social 
protection (and right to 
quality SGI) 
  Para. 13; Para. 13 Para. 15 
3 
D 
No definition of / need 
definition of public services 
or SGI  
  Para. 9 Para. 11; Para. 26 
3 
D 
Healthcare systems under 
threat – public authorities 
unable to guarantee. 
Para. 4; Para. 7; Para. 11    
3 
D 
Supports measures aimed at 
reducing administrative 
costs and simplifying 
procedures / freedom of 
establishment 
   Para. 2; Para. 9; Para. 28 
3 
D 
Commission has not carried 
out a / call for a proper 
impact assessment in terms 
of social protection etc. 
   Para. 10; Para. 15; Para. 18 
3 
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D Demand quality SGI Para. 11 Para. 4   2 
D 
Support Lisbon strategy, 
(Commission should not 
ignore / which includes) 
sustainable growth, better 
jobs, cohesion 
  Para. 2 Para. 2 
2 
D 
Will adversely affect social 
rights – lower wages, longer 
hours etc. 
Para. 3  Para. 8  
2 
D 
(Support ETUC campaign 
to) allow MS to guarantee  
rights of people before the 
market 
Para. 11 Para. 4   
2 
P 
Directive should contain 
guidelines for / threatens 
schemes for educating 
workers / provide for LLL 
Para. 4   Para. 35 
2 
D 
Proposal needs to be 
coherent with proposals on 
temporary work and 
recognition of professional 
qualifications and diplomas 
Para. 8   Para. 15 
2 
P 
Directive must be part of a 
package deal ensuring 
regulation of other areas 
   Para. 21; Para. 27 
2 
P Need harmonisation to achieve social goals of EU 
   Para. 3; Para. 32 
2 
D 
Need balance between / 
point out both single market 
and social and ecological 
aims of EU 
   Para. 7; Para. 8 
2 
D 
Health, education, culture, 
and audiovisual services will 
be subject to rule of market 
Para. 3; Para. 11    
2 
D Services directive will / could adversely affect SGI 
  Para. 4; Para. 13  
2 
D 
Proposal encourages bogus 
self-employment / fake 
companies / bad companies 
Para. 6; Para. 7    
2 
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D Will destructure the European labour market 
Para. 11    
1 
D 
Privatisation and 
liberalisation of public 
services with no possible 
return 
Para. 3    
1 
D Directive threatens democratic decisions by MS 
Para. 11 
 
   
1 
D 
Do not question the internal 
market in services, but how 
this will be achieved 
  Para. 19  
1 
P 
Need to look for points 
allowing harmonisation 
between national standards 
  Para. 9  
1 
D 
Commission deny positive 
common standards while 
intervening in social 
services 
  Para. 10  
1 
D Scope of directive vast and not clear in exemptions 
  Para. 11  
1 
P 
Exempt healthcare (and / or 
social) services from the 
scope of the directive / 
clarify position 
Para. 8    
1 
D 
Market and competition 
ideas are negative for EU of 
25. 
  Para. 4  
1 
D 
Directive undermines 
principle of equality for 
workers 
  Para. 15  
1 
D Worried by / against the Country of Origin Principle. 
  Para. 13  
1 
M 
Necessary to inform 
members about directive in 
order to mobilise 
  Para. 20  
1 
M 
Invite members to mobilise 
at European and national 
levels 
  Para. 20  
1 
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M Request ETUC to carry out a hard pressure campaign 
  Para. 20  
1 
M 
Make trade union position 
known by elected bodies 
both European and national 
  Para. 20  
1 
M Ask government to oppose the draft directive 
  Para. 20  
1 
M 
Need a strong ETUC able to 
push union views at the 
European level 
Para. 11    
1 
D 
Cannot accept an ultra-
liberal Europe that treats 
workers as commodities 
Para. 11    
1 
P Must clarify relationship with GATS 
   Para. 39 
1 
D 
Demand social cohesion and 
fundamental rights be taken 
into account 
 Para. 10   
1 
D 
Companies will be able to 
set up letter box companies 
to avoid laws 
   Para. 30 
1 
P 
Member states must retain 
power to deliver high 
quality SGI 
   Para. 26 
1 
D 
Directive will 
commercialise / deregulate / 
liberalise all services in the 
Union 
Para. 1    
1 
D 
Other legislative proposals 
risk being lost behind this 
directive 
Para. 8    
1 
D 
Attempt to reintroduce the 
rejected liberalisation of port 
services directive  
Para. 10    
1 
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D 
Directive undermines 
European social model at a 
time when charter of 
fundamental rights being 
included in Constitutional 
Treaty 
  Para. 3  
1 
M 
Note that thousands of 
citizens have discussed and 
demonstrated against the 
directive 
  Para. 17  
1 
M 
Protest wave from London 
social forum, students, some 
states and local authorities, 
employers, has slowed down 
path through EP 
  Para. 17  
1 
M Mobilisation against the directive must continue 
  Para. 18  
1 
D 
Support completion of the 
internal market in services 
(potential job creation) 
   Para. 2 
1 
D 
There are positive effects 
from the single European 
market 
   Para. 2 
1 
P 
Need to be sure that 
abolishing national laws 
doesn’t result in problems 
for health and safety 
   Para. 29 
1 
D 
Support clauses 
strengthening consumer 
rights 
   Para. 9 
1 
P Demand national rights on public employment 
   Para. 11 
1 
D 
Creation of single market 
cannot be based solely on 
market values 
   Para. 12 
1 
P 
Directive must guarantee 
minimum labour and living 
conditions 
   Para. 19 
1 
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P Demand regulation of posting of workers 
   Para. 23 
1 
P 
Demand regulation of living 
conditions for temporary 
workers 
   Para. 24 
1 
P 
Demand guarantee that 
present European rules on 
labour rights be further 
developed 
   Para. 25 
1 
P 
Free market in services must 
be accompanied by more not 
less social regulation  
   Para. 5 
1 
 
 339
National Level T2 – Bolkestein Campaign 
 
 
                            Document 
 
 
 
Frame 
 
FGTB (Belgium) Call for 
Demonstration 
19 March 2005 
??/02/2005 
 
CGIL (Italy) Call for 
Demonstration 19 March 
2005 
CGT (France) Press Release 
Bolkestein Directive halted: 
initial success of social 
mobilisation 
24/3/05 
DGB (Germany) Call for 
Demonstration 14 
February 2005 Strasbourg 
??/01/2005 
T
O
T
A
L
 
D/P More and better jobs (not longer working hours) 
Para. 2; Para. 3; Para. 7; Para. 9 Para. 2; Para. 3; Para. 7; Para. 9   
8 
M Demonstrate against Bolkestein Directive 
Para. 1; Para. 21 Para. 1; Para. 20  Para. 3; Para. 12 
6 
D 
Race to the bottom in terms 
of social standards as a 
result of directive / social 
dumping. Against social 
dumping. 
Para. 11 Para. 11 Para. 2 Para. 1; Para. 5 
5 
D Worried by / against the Country of Origin Principle. 
Para. 11 Para. 11 Para. 2 Para. 7 
4 
D 
(ETUC) Oppose further 
deregulation (of labour 
markets) 
Para. 3; Para. 5 Para. 3; Para. 5   
4 
P 
Creation of an internal 
market for services must 
also achieve social 
objectives 
Para. 13 Para. 13  Para. 2 
3 
D SGIs must not be subject to market rules 
Para. 14 Para. 14 Para. 2  
3 
D Reject Bolkestein proposals for liberalisation 
Para. 11 Para. 11   
2 
P More social cohesion Para. 2 Para. 2   2 
P Demand quality services Para. 9 Para. 9   2 
M No to the Bolkestein directive 
Para. 9 Para. 9   
2 
P Call for a Social Europe Para. 2 Para. 2   2 
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P 
(ETUC believes) Need 
intelligent modernisation 
with a high level of social 
security 
Para. 5 Para. 5   
2 
D 
(ETUC) Support completion 
of the internal market in 
services (potential job 
creation) 
Para. 10 Para. 10   
2 
P 
Europe needs greater 
investment in training, LLL, 
research and innovation. 
Para. 6 Para. 6   
2 
P 
(ETUC believes) Europe 
needs flexible reform of the 
Stability Pact 
Para. 8  Para. 8   
2 
P 
Stability and growth must be 
encouraged by efficient 
economic and employment 
policy 
Para. 8 Para. 8   
2 
D Oppose erosion of social rights 
Para. 2 Para. 2   
2 
D Oppose spread of neo-liberalism 
Para. 2 Para. 2   
2 
P Need fundamental rights to strengthen social Europe 
Para. 15 Para. 15   
2 
P 
Need trade union rights, 
information and consultation 
of workers, collective 
agreements, social dialogue 
Para. 16 Para. 16   
2 
P 
Social Europe must include 
goal of full employment, 
equal opps. And non-
discrimination 
Para. 17 Para. 17   
2 
P Europe needs a pro-active social policy agenda 
Para. 18 Para. 18   
2 
M Group will continue to fight for a Social Europe 
Para. 19 Para. 19   
2 
P Exempt social services from the scope of the directive. 
Para. 14 Para. 14   
2 
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D 
(ETUC) Support Lisbon 
strategy, need balance 
between  sustainable 
growth, better jobs, cohesion 
Para. 4 Para. 4   
2 
D 
(ETUC) Reject any 
reduction of the Lisbon 
goals in favour of business 
Para. 4 Para. 4   
2 
D Spring summit important for Lisbon Strategy 
Para. 2 Para. 2   
2 
D 
Internal market in services 
must not have negative 
consequences on labour law 
and social legislation 
Para. 12 Para. 12   
2 
M 
Council decision proof that 
stopping ultra-liberal 
policies is possible through 
trade union action (at both 
EU  and national level) 
  Para. 1 Para. 6 
2 
D 
Proposal threatens collective 
agreements and national 
labour codes / workers’ 
rights.  These must stand. 
   Para.  
1 
D 
Proposal will create unequal 
competition and 
uncontrollable national 
markets 
   Para. 5 
1 
P 
SG(E)Is should be excluded 
from the scope of the 
directive / COP 
   Para. 12 
1 
D Propoal will erode national labour legislation 
   Para. 5 
1 
P Exempt temporary workers from directive 
   Para. 11 
1 
D/P 
Proposal deliberately vague 
in defining services / 
SG(E)Is – need clear 
definition 
  Para. 2  
1 
D Proposal will liberalise SGEIs 
   Para. 5 
1 
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D Proposal will disenfranchise temporary workers 
   Para. 5 
1 
D Proposal against Social Europe 
   Para. 5 
1 
P Demand a directive on SGIs    Para. 2  1 
P 
Demand stronger social 
guarantees for workers (and 
consumers) / protection  
   Para. 8 
1 
D Bolkestein has not been withdrawn 
  Para. 2  
1 
M Must continue to mobilise on Bolkestein 
  Para. 2  
1 
M 
Pleased the European 
Council decided to 
reconsider Bolkestein 
  Para. 1  
1 
M 
Council decision a first 
success for the March 
demonstration in Brussels 
  Para. 1  
1 
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Appendix II – Documents used in frame analyses207 
 
Coexistence 
 
European level 
 
FoEE, Greenpeace, EEB.  2003.  Co-existence of GM and non-GM agriculture: the EU 
Commission dodges its responsibility.  Revised 3 March 2003, Retrieved 15 December 
2004.  www.eeb.org/press/2003/press_release_GM_nonGM_03_03.htm 
 
FoEE, 2003.  Biotech Mailout.  Co-existence between GMOs and non-GM agriculture: The 
Commission dodges its responsibility.  Revised May 2003, Retrieved 15 December 2004.  
www.foeeurope.org/GMOs/Index.htm 
 
FoEE, EEB, Greenpeace.  2003.  Green NGOs condemn Commission’s recommendation to 
allow genetic contamination in organic food.  Revised 23 July 2003, retrieved 18 June 
2004.  http://www.eeb.org/press/2003/press_release_green_ngo_GMO_24_07_03.htm 
 
European network of GMO free regions.  2003.  Declaration of the European network of 
GMO free regions.  Revised 4 November 2003, retreived 15 December 2004.  
http://www.gmofree-europe.org/PDFs/GM-free_regions_network_declaration.pdf 
 
AER, FoEE.  2004. Campaign of the Assembly of the European Regions and Friends of the 
Earth for GMO-free zones and regions.  Revised 14 September 2003, retrieved 16 
December 2004.  www.a-e-r.org 
  
AER, Genet, FoEE.  2005.  Berlin Manifesto for GMO-free Regions and Biodiversity in 
Europe: Our Land, our Future, our Europe.  Revised 23 January 2005.  Retrieved 1 March 
2005.  http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/conference-2005/berlin-manifesto.html  
 
GMO-free Europe.  2005.  GMO-free zones: Petition to the European Commission.  
Revised 4 February 2005.  Retrieved 1 March 2005. http://www.gmofree-europe.org/Petition.htm 
 
EEB, FoEE, Greenpeace, EuroCoop, IFOAM EU Group. 2005.  GMOs on the 
Commission’s table: still not edible for farmers, consumers and the environment.  Revised 
21 March 2005.  Retrieved 15 September 2005.  
http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/joint_21_March_GMOs.htm 
 
FoEE, AER. 2005.  Safeguarding Sustainable European Agriculture.  Revised 17 May 
2005.  Retrieved 15 September 2005.  http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/10_principles_EN.pdf 
 
Consumers International.  2005.  Appeal to the EC and world for caution over GMO 
contamination.  Revised 9 September 2005.  Retrieved 15 September 2005.  
http://www.consumersinternational.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=94114&int1stParentNodeID=89651
&int2ndParentNodeID=89689&int3rdParentNodeID=97047&int4thParentNodeID=90169&int5thParentNode
ID=89677&int6thParentNodeID=94236&int7thParentNodeID=94236&int8thParentNodeID=94236&strSubS
ite=1&strLHSMenu=89651 
 
                                                 
207 Documents are listed in the order in which they are found in each grid. 
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Genet, AER, Foundation on Future Farming.  2006.  European Conference on GMO-free 
Regions, Biodiversity and Rural Development.  Revised 15 January 2006, retrieved 15 
February 2006.  http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/conference-2006.html 
 
National level 
 
(France) Les Amis de la Terre. 2003.  Coexistence des filieres OGM et non-OGM: la 
Commission fuit ses responsabilites!  Revised 4 March 2003.  Retrieved 12 December 
2004.  www.amisdelaterre.org/imprimer/php3?id_article=483 
 
(UK) FoE UK.  2003.  Friends of the Earth Slams EU Plans for Growing GM Crops.  
Revised 5 March 2003.  Retrieved 16 December 2004.  
www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_release/friends _of_the_earth_slams.html 
 
(UK) FoE UK.  2003.  EU Commission calls GM Contamination of Organic Food to be 
Allowed.  Revised 23 July 2003. Retrieved 16 December 2004.  
www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/eu_commission_calls_gm_con.html 
 
(France) BioCoop, Les Amis de la Terre.  2003.  Sauvons la bio de la contamination OGM.  
Revised June 2003.  Retrieved 16 December 2004.  http://www.amisdelaterre.org/Petition-
Campagne-OGM.html 
 
(UK) FoE UK.  2003.  Bournemouth Goes GM-Free.  Revised 29 October 2003.  Retrieved 
16 December 2004.  http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/bournemouth_goes_gmfree.html 
 
(Italy) Comuni Antitransgenici.  2004.  OGM: Coesistenza e Sovranita Alimentare.  
Revised 16 April 2004.  Retrieved 16 December 2004.  http://www.comuniantitransgenici.org/ 
     
(UK) FoE UK. 2004.  Campaign Launched for New EU Rules on GM-Free Areas.  Revised 
22 April 2004.  Retrieved 16 December 2004.  
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/campaign_launched_for_new_22042004.html 
 
(France) Attac France.  2004.  Les avancees de la lutte contre les OGM.  Revised 4 August 
2004.  Retrieved 16 December 2004.  www.france.attac.org/spip.php?article3473 
 
(UK) FoE UK.  2005.  Scarecrows Lobby Parliament for a GM-Free Britain.  Revised 23 
February 2005.  Retrieved 1 October 2005.  
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/scarecrows_lobby_parliamen_22022005.html 
 
(France) Agir pour l’environnement, Confederation Paysanne, FNAB, Attac, Les Amis de 
la Terre.  2005.  Lettre ouverte a l’attention des parlementaires francais: Appel du 18 juin 
pour un referendum sur les OGM.  Revised 16 June 2005.  Retrieved 1 October 2005.  
http://www.amisdelaterre.org/Vers-un-Appel-du-18-juin-pour-une.html 
 
(UK) Soil Association, Greenpeace, FoE UK, GeneWatch, Which?, Five Year Freeze.  
2005.  European GM Crop Co-Existence Recommendations Legally Flawed.  Revised 21 
March 2005.  Retrieved 1 October 2005.  
http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/UKpressrelease21march.doc 
 
(Italy) Legambiente.  2005.  OGM, La Coesistenza Impossibile.  Revised 22 March 2003.  
Retrieved 1 October 2005.  http://www.legambiente.eu/ 
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(Poland) International Coalition to Protect the Polish Countryside.  Polish Marshals want 
GMO Free Poland.  Revised 9 September 2005.  Retrieved 1 October 2005.  
http://icppc.pl/pl/gmo/eng_index.php 
 
 
REACH 
 
European level 
 
EEB, BEUC, FoEE, Greenpeace, WWF.  2002.  New EU chemicals policy: Concerns over 
delay and influence by certain business sectors.  Revised 25 October 2002.  Retrieved 5 
January 2006.  http://www.foeeurope.org/press/Chemicals%20Letter%20to%20Prodi%20-%20final.pdf 
 
EEB, FoEE, Greenpeace, WWF.  2003.  Delay and indecision as Prodi Commission fails to 
protect us from hazardous chemicals.  Revised 7 May 2003.  Retrieved 5 January 2006.  
www.eeb.org/press/2003/press_release_chemicals_07_05_03.htm 
 
EEB, FoEE, Greenpeace, WWF, BEUC, EPHA, WECF.  2003.  European Citizens Say 
Protect Us From Hazardous Chemicals.  Revised 8 July 2003.  Retrieved 5 January 2006.  
eu. greenpeace.org/downloads/chem/PRonSubmissionforREACH.PDF 
 
EEB, EPHA FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF. 2003.  Slimmed down REACH needs healthy 
supplements.  Revised 29 October 2003.  Retrieved 5 January 2006.  
http://www.eeb.org/press/2003/press_release_REACH_slimm_down_29_10_03.htm 
 
EEB, EPHA, EEN, FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF.  2004.  NGOs call on MEPs to put health 
and environment concerns at the heart of European chemicals reform – REACH.  Revised 
September 2004.  Retrieved 5 January 2006.  http://www.chemicalreaction.org/ (through news 
link). 
 
EEB, FoEE, Greenpeace, EEN, WWF.  2005.  UNICE in bid to wreck REACH.  Revised 17 
January 2005.  Retrieved 5 January 2006. 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/17januaryjointprunice.pdf 
 
EEB, EEN, FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF, WWF.  2005 NGOs’ five key demands to improve 
REACH.  Revised March 2005.  Retrieved 5 January 2006. 
http://www.foeeurope.org/safer_chemicals/five_key_demands.pdf 
 
FoEE, Greenpeace.  2005.  Commission Sticks Boot into REACH.  Revised 23 September 
2005.  Retrieved 5 January 2006. http://www.chemicalreaction.org/ (through news link). 
 
EEB, EEN, EuroCoop, FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF, WWF.  2005.  Parliament votes to 
phase out hazardous chemicals but allows huge knowledge gaps on safety.  Revised 17 
November 2005.  Retrieved 5 January 2006.  
http://www.panda.org/news_facts/newsroom/index.cfm?uNewsID=50720 
 
EEB, EEN, FoEE, EuroCoop, WECF, Greenpeace, WWF.  2005.  Member States fail to 
address the chemical threat.  Revised 13 December 2005.  Retrieved 5 January 2006.  
http://www.eurocoop.org/publications/en/press/presspdf/presschemicalthreat05.pdf 
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EEB, EEN, EuroCoop, FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF, WWF.  2006.  EU Council ignores the 
European Parliament on substituting dangerous chemicals.  Revised 27 June 2006.  
Retrieved 25 June 2007. http://www.eeb.org/press/270606-Chemicals-NGOs-Press-Release.pdf 
 
EEB, EEN, EuroCoop, FoEE, Greenpeace, WECF, WWF.  2006.  REACH 2nd Reading: 
Key priorities of Environmental, Health, Consumer and Women’s NGOs.  Revised July 
2006.  Retrieved 25 June 2007.  http://assets.panda.org/downloads/reach_second_reading.pdf 
 
EEB, EuroCoop, FoEE, Greenpeace, HEAL, WECF, WWF.  2006.  REACH - European 
Parliament committee backs safer chemicals rules.  Revised 10 October 2006.  Retrieved 
25 June 2007.  http://www.eeb.org/press/PR-ENVI-vote-October2006.pdf 
 
WWF, FoEE, Greenpeace, EEB.  2006.  EU citizens risk falling victim to Commission’s 
indecision on REACH.  Revised 14 November 2006.  Retrieved 25 June 2007.  
http://www.eeb.org/press/joint_pr_REACH_141106.pdf 
 
WWF, EEB, FoEE, WECF, EuroCoop, HEAL, Greenpeace.  2006.  REACH, a deal too 
far.  Revised 1 December 2006.  Retrieved 25 June 2007.  http://www.eeb.org/press/20061201-
REACH-deal-NGOs.pdf 
 
WWF, EEB, FoEE, WECF, EuroCoop, HEAL, Greenpeace.  2006.  REACH: Alive but not 
kicking.  Revised 13 December 2006.  Retrieved 25 June 2007.  
http://www.eeb.org/press/20061312-Joint-NGO-press-release-REACH.pdf 
 
 
National level 
 
(Netherlands) Greenpeace, de Nordzee, Stichting Reinwater, WECF, Meldpunten Netwerk 
Gezondheid en Milieu, FNV, Milieu Defensie, Natuur en Milieu, Wadden Vereniging.  
2004.  Europees stoffenbeleid REACH.  Revised 22 December 2004.  Retrieved 2 October 
2006.   http://www.wecf.eu/cms/download/2004-2005/REACHbrief_Tweede_Kamer.PDF 
 
(Germany) WECF.  2005.  Women and Chemical Action on 8 March in Berlin.  Revised 9 
March 2005.  Retrieved 2 October 2006.  
www.wecf.de/cms/articles/2005/03/WomenChemicalsAction8MarchBerlin.php 
 
(Portugal) FoEE, Greenpeach, Quercus.  2005.  REACH under attack.  Revised 1 July 
2005.  Retrieved 2 October 2006.  http://www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/joint_01_July_reach.htm 
 
(Greece) WECF, Clean-Up Greece.  2005.  Greek Children demand a toxic free future!  
Revised 24 October 2005.  Retrieved 2 October 2006.  
www.wecf.de/cms/articles/2005/10/greece_toxfree.php 
 
(Germany) FoEE, BUND.  2005.  Friends of the Earth Europe and Friends of the Earth 
Germany urged the Envrionment Committee to vote for toxics free future.  Revised 4 
October 2005.  Retrieved 2 October 2006.  
www.foeeurope.org/press/2005/AK_04_Oct_REACH.htm 
 
(Germany) BUND, Greenpeace, WECF.  2006. REACH: Kaum geboren, schon geschwächt 
– BUND, Greenpeace und WECF kritisieren zu wenig Schutz vor Chemikalien.  Revised 13 
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http://www.wecf.eu/cms/download/2006/PM_REACH_EPvote_13Dec06.doc 
 
 
Lisbon Agenda 
 
European level 
 
Social Platform.  2005.  Growth-first approach hampers Social Agenda and will fail to 
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http://www.socialplatform.org/News.asp?news=11762 
 
ETUC.  2005.  Call for the Euro-demonstration on 19 March 2005.  Revised 16 March 
2005.  Retrieved 17 August 2005.  http://www.etuc.org/a/485 
 
Social Platform.  2005.  Social Platform Resolution for the European Council Meeting (22-
23 March 2005).  “Frome a strategy to a tragedy: Social NGOs call on political leaders to 
reject the Barroso approach to Lisbon and reaffirm the European model of society”.  
Revised 21 February 2005.  Retrieved 17 August 2006.  
http://www.socialplatform.org/module/FileLib/ENSpringSummit2005resolution.pdf 
 
EAPN.  2005.  21 March: A Day of Action to defend the 68 million people who live in 
poverty in the EU.  Revised 3 March 2005.  Retrieved 17 August 2005.  
http://www.eapn.org/code/en/news_detail.asp?pk_id_content=1121 
 
Social Platform, EEB, ETUC.  European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), The 
European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and the Platform of European Social NGOs 
(Social Platform) form a unique coalition to achieve a balanced sustainable development 
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March 2006. 
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18) Coordinator of the Stop Bolkestein web petition, Institut Emile Vanderwelde.  
Brussels, 16 March 2006. 
19) Advisor on the Services Directive, European Trade Union Confederation.  
Brussels, 16 March 2006. 
20) Policy and Information Officer, European Public Health Alliance Environment 
Network.  Brussels, 16 March 2006. 
21) Policy Officer for Chemicals and IPPC, European Environmental Bureau.  
Brussels, 20 March 2006. 
22) Policy Officer, Uni-Europa.  Brussels, 21 March 2006. 
23) Project Coordinator, Chemical Reaction.  Brussels, 22 March 2006. 
24) Policy Officer, Women in Europe for a Common Future.  Brussels, 23 March 
2006. 
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Appendix IV 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AER – Assembly of European Regions 
ATTAC – Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens 
BEUC – European Consumers’ Organisation 
BUND – Freunde der Erde (Friends of the Earth Germany) 
CECODHAS – The European Liaison Committee for Social Housing 
CGT – Confederation General du Travail 
CPE – Coordination Paysanne Europeenne 
DNR – Deutscher Naturschutzring 
EAPN – European Anti-Poverty Network 
EEB – European Environmental Bureau 
EEN – European Environmental Network (parent organisation of EPHA / HEAL) 
EPHA – European Environmental Network Public Health Alliance 
EPSU – European Public Services Union 
ETUC – European Trade Union Confederation 
EuroCoop – European Community of Consumer Cooperatives 
EWL – European Women’s Lobby 
FfFF – Foundation for Future Farming 
FoEE – Friends of the Earth Europe 
GENET – European NGO Network on Genetic Engineering 
Greenpeace – Greenpeace European Unit 
HBF – Heinrich Boll Foundation 
HEAL – Health and Environment Alliance (formerly EPHA) 
IFOAM – International Federation of Organic Farmers 
The Network – Network of European GM-Free Regions 
Social Platform – Platform of European Social Non-Governmental Organisations 
UniEuropa – European Division of Uni-Global, Union for Skills and Services 
WWF – Worldwide Fund for Nature 
WECF – Women in Europe for a Common Future 
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